Citizenship, rights and socialism

THE ECONOMY  ECONOMIC  EQUALITY  CONSUMERISM  DEMOCRACY
PEOPLE AT WORK  THE ENVIRONMENT  BRITAIN IN THE WORLD

CITIZENSHIP

Raymond Plant
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Introduction

A great deal of important and useful work has now been done by the seven policy review groups charged with updating and modernising Labour's programme in a manner consistent with its underlying aims and values. However, their Stage 1 reports published as Social Justice and Efficiency lack a theme to tie these policies together and link them to the Statement of Democratic Socialist Aims and Values. This pamphlet will argue that democratic citizenship should be the key idea at the centre of this project and that it can provide a unifying framework within which policy can be elaborated and a link to Labour's historical principles be maintained.

A citizenship approach is not new for Labour. Indeed, the theme was taken up in the Party's earliest days, reflecting the impact of Social Liberalism. It is the argument of this pamphlet that this tradition is in urgent need of rethinking and updating much as the modern Conservative Party has rethought the tradition of classical liberalism.

Citizenship and class

The other main strand of opinion in the early years of the Labour Party, reflecting the Marxist tradition, emphasised a class-based strategy. The class-based approach sees the market as inherently capitalist and its relationships as exploitative and dehumanising. This clashed with the citizenship approach which assumes that there are common values between different groups and classes in society which are genuine (ie not the product of what Marxists would call false consciousness). These values can provide a basis for political action to secure the rights and resources of citizenship within a mixed economy with some degree of private ownership. The citizenship approach rejects Marx's argument that since class determines political interests there can be no common basis for citizenship while there is some private ownership of the means of production and associated class divisions.

The class approach sees a sense of solidarity and common purpose among members of the class as a necessary prerequisite for the fundamental transformation of society which alone will end exploitation and bring about socialism. The citizenship approach is much more at home with individualism: it sees citizenship as securing the framework of rights and resources within which individuals can pursue their own conception of the good in their own way; and the communal basis of society is reflected in agreement about the common resources and means of citizenship rather than in terms of common ends.

The difficulties with the class approach are manifold. First, the industrial working class is too small a base from which to gain power. Despite the Marxian prediction, capitalism has not destroyed farmers, merchants, craftsmen and artisans so that in elections socialists could attain an "immense majority". On the contrary, the industrial working class has contracted and a minority status combined with democratic politics will condemn a class-based strategy to purist impotence. There has to be a way of breaking out of the numerically narrow bounds of
class interest to reach out to other groups in society. A search for a common basis of citizenship would provide one central theme to attract people back to support the Party on a wider basis of interest. This is wholly unlikely to happen if the Party were to retreat into a larger of restricted class interest.

Secondly, the class-based conception of the good is usually seen in communitarian terms drawing from the forms of solidarity historically found in working-class life at work and in the neighbourhood. There is no doubt that some of these evocations of the socialist vision of the good are immensely beguiling and certainly as someone who grew up in a very working-class area in Grimsby after the war, I remain moved by them. However, nostalgia is not a good basis for political thinking and particularly for a radical party.

The numbers of people for whom such communitarian visions are good and mean something at the level of their everyday experience are declining, attenuating their moral force. With the decline in the numbers of people for whom these experiences and values are central, the socialist has to be realistic and recognize the individualism of the age. This is itself in large part the result of the decline in community, which in any case was frequently far from the idyll which it may have seemed. Invoking unspecific communitarian values is of very little practical use in trying to determine a way forward in policy terms. This is not to try to devalue the idea of community, only to be sceptical about its precision and to indicate the need to rethink its role in the future of socialism.

Third, socialist thought and practice in Britain in this century makes it abundantly clear that the citizenship approach has played a central role in Labour Party thinking, particularly in the work of Tawney and in practice, for example, in Haldane and Attlee. It has a broader resonance in the labour movement (in the WEA for example), and in approaches to thinking about the welfare state associated with Titmuss and Marshall. It has also been central to continental socialist parties in France, the Danish Social Democrats, the German SPD (and not as mythology would have it from the Bad Godesburg Conference in 1959, but from the Erfurt Congress of 1881), and in Sweden. It is obvious why this should be so. Given the failure of Marxist predictions about the shape of class in capitalist society, socialist parties sought an opening to other classes and this has to be on the basis of some common identity such as citizenship.

Hence, a citizenship approach to the Policy Review is not a betrayal of socialism. It is, on the contrary, an attempt to rethink a set of issues which have always had a central place in the life and thought of the Labour Party, and which most continental parties have resolved.

One problem which preoccupied continental parties in relation to a non-class approach was whether votes would be lost among workers if socialist parties turned towards a non-class strategy. This is not so real a danger in Britain. First the class basis of politics is itself in decline and secondly there is no plausible party to the left to which those disenchanted by a citizenship approach could turn.

Interest groups

An alternative approach to rebuilding Labour support is that of seeing the Labour Party as representing a coalition of interest groups. Indeed, this approach arises quite naturally out of the decline of the class approach. Either politics addresses itself to individuals defined as such, or to individuals defined in terms of groups, such as classes or by religious, ethnic, linguistic, sexual, etc, characteristics; or it tries to surpass all of these with a more communal appeal in terms of citizenship. The Conservative Party in the grip of classical liberal ideas is attempting to appeal in the economic sphere purely on an individual basis,
while in other areas using images of the nation as a way of transcending the individualism of their economic approach. Labour has to abandon a class approach but should it adopt an interest-group strategy?

There are various difficulties in seeing a political party as a coalition of interest groups. The first is that a coherent political programme must have some core ideas and policies which go beyond aggregating the often incompatible demands of sympathetic interest groups. If a party falls prey to interest groups, there are attendant political dangers of arbitrariness and incoherence, a feature of the Labour Party Manifesto in 1983. A secure basis for devising a policy strategy requires a basic underlying benchmark to evaluate the claims of interest groups. A coherent account of democratic citizenship could provide that basis for considering interest-group claims. The Conservatives have benefited by having a set of core ideas at the heart of their strategy in government which has given their programme a high degree of coherence.

Second, interest groups aim to secure some concession or resource which will be to the advantage of members of the group or the interests which the group represents, the costs of which will be borne by citizens generally. The benefits of interest-group membership are highly concentrated, the costs highly dispersed, but the cumulative effect of these costs may well be very high. Without some benchmark defining the general good (such as the common basis of citizenship), interest-group pressures will be very difficult to resist. Unless there are ordered priorities around agreed principles and values, a Labour government concerned with the distribution of resources in the interests of need and social justice will fall victim to the most powerful groups and interests. Instead of a distributive ideal, social justice will become a camouflage for powerful special pleading.

The Conservatives have found it easier to resist interest-group pressure because they have sought to lower expectations about what government can and should do. So the Government has tried to restrain its own intervention in the economy and has abandoned the pursuit of social justice. The Labour Party cannot adopt such a strategy; it is rightly committed to intervention in the economy and to social justice. Principles are required to deal with interest groups seeking subsidies and resources if they are not to drive up public expenditure and over-extend government’s role. There is a growing belief on the left that the future of socialism does not lie with big government. However, one of the major causes of the growth of government since the war has been its expansion under interest-group pressure. If the left is serious about limited government, it must place its approach to interest-group politics on a more principled basis.

It is the argument of this pamphlet that the idea of democratic citizenship is the only basis on which Labour can hope to reach a value consensus to determine the broad boundaries of government responsibility and within these to separate legitimate from illegitimate claims. Citizenship embodies a concept of the common good which appeals not to highly specific and sectional goals, but to a set of needs, rights, resources and opportunities which all individuals must have to pursue any goals at all in our sort of society. Such an underlying idea will also indicate the forms of collective and communal provision which are necessary to provide these and the respective roles of the market and the state.
1. Citizenship and social values

With the renaissance of classical liberal ideas since the mid-1970s, Conservative politicians have been arguing for a reduced role for the state in the collective provision of resources to secure effective freedom for individual citizens. In this chapter, I shall argue that the Labour Party has to rebut the idea of freedom with the Conservatives have so convincingly hijacked over the past decade in order to advance the socialist idea of citizenship.

In his Preface to Democratic Socialist Aims and Values, Neil Kinnock writes: "We want a state where the collective contribution of the community is used to advance individual freedom. Not just freedom in name, but freedom that can be exercised in practice" (Labour Party, 1988).

The role and limits of government, of collective provision, is seen in terms of the liberty of individual citizens, of using the state as an enabling power to secure a sense of real freedom. This idea contrasts sharply with the Conservatives' view of freedom as absence from intentional coercion by identifiable agents. The Conservative definition requires a limited role for government in terms of liberty, ideally a framework of law within which one individual is prevented from coercing another. There is a clear distinction to be drawn between freedom on the one hand and ability, power and resources on the other. Given this distinction Sir Keith Joseph drew the appropriate conclusion in his book on equality when he argued quite clearly that "poverty is not unfreedom" (Sir Keith Joseph and J Sumption, Equality, J Murray, 1977).

Freedom, power and the market

In the view of Conservatives there is a categorical distinction between being free to do something and being able to do it. (This is central to Hayek’s criticisms of socialist conceptions of freedom in The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, 1960.) In the first sense someone is free to do X if no one is deliberately preventing him from doing it. The fact that someone lacks the capacity to do it—perhaps because of a lack of resources—does not in itself limit the freedom to do X.

Clearly if freedom is understood in this sense, then government has a rather limited role in the protection of free and equal citizenship. Its role is to provide equal freedom under the law and collective resources such as police forces and courts to secure this. It is not a legitimate function of government to secure for individuals specific resources to enable them to do what they are free to do. No one is able to do all that they are free to do, and this indicates that there is a distinction to be drawn between freedom on the one hand and capacities, resources and opportunities on the other. If this were not so then I am unfree whenever I am unable to fulfill my desires. If government had the role of securing resources for liberty in this positive sense, then its task would be endless.

But there is a stronger reason why Conservatives wish to separate freedom and resources, identified by Hayek (one of the gurus of the neo-liberal right). If freedom and ability along with associated resources are seen as the same thing, then resources should be redistributed in the interests of more
equal liberty. The sharp distinction which they draw between freedom and resources effectively blocks this argument and makes it impossible to argue for a collective redistribution of resources in the interests of individual freedom.

Excluding government as far as possible from the allocation of resources is reinforced by the New Right’s belief that markets are the correct mechanism for allocation between individuals, because they cannot infringe freedom.

Markets are complex institutions within which millions of people buy and sell goods and services and no doubt do so deliberately and intentionally. These complex interactions produce a distribution of income and wealth and other resources, which is an unintended consequence of all this buying and selling. If the outcomes of free markets are unintended then markets cannot limit freedom because freedom under the neo-liberal definition can only be limited by intentional or deliberate coercion.

Hence, the New Right argues, there can again be no case for collective action to preserve the liberty of individuals in the face of markets.

Liberty and citizenship

There is no reason to dissent from the neo-liberal definition of freedom and what it enjoins in terms of government in itself. But it should still be rejected as a full characterisation of the nature of liberty.

It is true that freedom is limited by coercion whether it is by individuals or government and the Labour Party accepts this part of the definition of freedom and what follows from it, namely a concern with law and order and the protection of people from coercion, as well as a limitation on the arbitrary power of the executive. Labour should also accept that government itself is a coercive power and that this power therefore should only be used in a principled and justified way.

Indeed, the definition of liberty as the absence of coercion is vital for us because it is a necessary condition of the exercise of liberty in the broader sense which Neil Kinnoch, Roy Hattersley, Bryan Gould and others have argued for, namely that freedom has to do with being able to do things. But we need to establish the link between freedom and ability and to show that markets do infringe freedom in terms of their outcomes before we can go on to argue for a broader conception of citizenship which will involve collective provision for liberty in the sense of increasing abilities, opportunities and resources for emancipation.

The central argument against the neo-liberal’s distinction between freedom and ability is to ask what is freedom in the sense of the absence of coercion valuable for? The most obvious answer to this question would be that if I am free from deliberate interference then I am free to do what I want, to live a life shaped by my own values and purposes. Freedom is valuable because it is a necessary condition of autonomy. But if this is why freedom is valuable, it cannot be separated from ability, resources and opportunities. I can do what I want, lead a life shaped by my own values, only if I have the capacity to fulfil my desires. (For further discussion of this point, see K. Hoover and R. Plant, Conservative Capitalism in Britain and the USA: A Critical Appraisal, Routledge, forthcoming 1988.)

The neo-liberal will reject this account. If people who lack the resources to do what they desire to do are unfree, then equal liberty is an unattainable ideal. There are always going to be limits on people’s abilities and they will differ from one another.

There are two answers to this charge. The first is to recognise that only some forms of inability or incapacity can be changed by collective action—natural inabilities will always remain and they lie beyond the scope of political remedy. So it is perfectly true that we cannot finally equalise abilities, but that should
not rule out action towards achieving a fairer distribution of resources. Most Conservatives regard perfect competition as utopian but it does not stop them regarding a more and more competitive economy as a goal.

Secondly, it is clearly absurd to believe that to be free one has to have all the resources to fulfil one’s wants whatever they are, so that someone who wishes to live a life marked by a desire for expensive tastes will not be free unless he or she has the resources to pursue such tastes. Public provision is concerned to secure access to that range of resources which are necessary conditions of living an autonomous and purposive life—the necessary conditions of agency, not the necessary conditions of pursuing individual preferences. We are concerned with needs rather than wants. The satisfaction of the needs of agency are part of a feasible collective programme for active citizenship, because they are general within our society.

Without education, health care, income, self-respect and a framework of law within which one can live one’s own life in one’s own way, one cannot be an agent in the sense of having the resources to pursue goals which make freedom worthwhile in human life. But these resources must be provided in ways which do not threaten their overall purpose—the emancipation of individuals and communities.

If these are the basic goods of citizenship there are still questions as to how they are to be distributed and how they are to be resourced.

2. Needs, poverty and citizenship

The New Right claims that social justice is not possible through government action and that the distribution of resources is best left to the market. In this chapter, I want to examine these arguments and demonstrate that they do not hold water philosophically or practically.

It is a central argument of the New Right that needs cannot be identified in an objective and consensual way. If we are committed as a society to meeting the needs of citizens, then just because such needs are open-ended, the resources required to meet them can be bid up. Pressure will come not only from consumer interest groups, but also from producer interest group, ie those who have an economic interest in seeing a particular set of needs recognised and met in the public sector. The conclusion drawn from this is that the free market is a better mechanism for meeting subjective needs rather than collective or political provision which rests upon the mistaken view that there is an objective, or at least consensual, basis for needs.

Yet strangely, many thinkers on the right utilise a very definite concept of need in attacking the relative view of poverty. They argue that claims about the extent of poverty in Britain are exaggerated when the state provides enough to meet the basic needs for housing and subsistence. On this view the relative approach to poverty is defective because it links poverty to the expenditure of the rich rather than to
the needs of the poor.

For example, Sir Keith Joseph argued as follows in Stranded on the Middle Ground: "An absolute standard of means are defined by reference to the actual needs of the poor and not by reference to those who are not poor... A person who enjoys a standard of living equal to that of a medieval baron cannot be described as poor for the sole reason that he has chanced to be born into a society where the great majority can live like medieval kings. By any absolute standard there is very little poverty in Britain today" (Centre for Policy Studies, 1976).

This attempt to distinguish between absolute and relative poverty, or as the New Right would see it, between poverty and inequality, makes it impossible for the New Right to operate without a concept of need. It is this concept which defines the standard of absolute poverty against which other conceptions are to be criticised. They would, of course, argue that there is a consensual view about what an absolute standard of need is, that is to say what is required for subsistence. But this idea of an objective standard of subsistence is a will-o'-the-wisp notion which has bedevilled thinking about social policy. Even the most basic need for food may well mean resources not merely for purchasing food but also the resources to get to distant shops and the related infrastructure of public transport, etc.

The New Right cannot reject a needs-based approach to social justice on the grounds that needs are elusive when they depend upon it to differentiate their own view of poverty from a more socialist conception of relative poverty. The only real debate then is how needs are to be interpreted.

There is no apolitical way of deciding what needs are basic and any level at which the claims to needs are to be met will reflect social values and democratic processes. This is a moral question for political debate, not one which can be derived from a purely administrative approach. But the left should argue that citizenship requires the opportunity to participate in the normal or expected patterns of individual and family life and in the workplace, and define needs in the light of this.

This approach also allows us to reject the critic's view that needs-based policies will always be open-ended and can be pushed up by interest-group pressures in an unprincipled way. Since the New Right implicitly adopts a needs-based approach their conception of needs is equally vulnerable to bidding-up. Once government is in the business of meeting needs then interest groups are bound to arise. It requires some agreement about what is a reasonable range of resources for citizenship, this will make interest-group pressures more manageable. If we are able to reach a range of resources for citizenship to make interest-group pressures more moderate, there is no reason of principle why this cannot be achieved in relation to other sorts of needs.

Distribution

Even if there is a set of basic goods which is central to the exercise of citizenship in a free society how should they be allocated? The right argues that it is impossible to find a just way of distributing goods through political means for two main reasons.

The first is that any attempt to intentionally redistribute resources will produce injustice. The market on the other hand redistributes without injustice because its outcomes are unintended. That is why we do not regard the outcomes of earthquakes and famines as injustices; why we do not regard children suffering from genetic handicap or cancer as suffering from injustice. These are forms of bad luck or misfortune, not injustice, precisely because they are not the outcomes of intentional processes.

Secondly, even if intentional redistribution could be justified we have no way of agreeing about the criteria of distributive justice. There are many
possible criteria—need, merit, entitlement and so on. Given the moral divergence of modern society how are we to agree on the appropriate criteria of distribution?

Hence, in the view of the New Right the requirements of citizenship have nothing to do with distributive justice or the fair allocation of resources through political action. On the contrary, the needs of citizenship are best provided in the market rather than through state action. This is to be achieved through the trickle-down effect of the market whereby what the rich consume today will be available to the rest of society including the poor in the long run. This view has been explicitly endorsed by the present Government and lies behind the Budget of 1988. There is no need for organised collective action to meet the needs of citizenship because the market will do it for us.

One consequence of this argument is to justify inequality. Only by making the rich richer and thus producing the supply-side effects which such incentives are supposed to bring will the poor be made richer. Hence the solution to the problem of poverty is greater inequality.

A second consequence is to establish the criterion that the position is improving if the poor have more today than they had yesterday. It does not matter that they are consuming a lower percentage of the resources than the rich because such a view is locked into a mistaken relative view of poverty which in fact is a disguise for egalitarianism. The free market theorists' withers remain unwrung by studies which show that the rich are now consuming more resources than they were in 1979. What matters on this view is the absolute standard, not inequality.

Social justice

Even if markets are impersonal forces which are lacking intention, this does not mean that we should ignore their outcomes. Justice and injustice are not only a matter of how a particular state of affairs arose, but also of our response to it. An earthquake or a famine is not an injustice per se but there is the question of the justice or injustice in our response. If we can compensate the victims at no comparable cost to ourselves then to fail to do so when they bear no responsibility for their condition is where part of the potential injustice lies.

So it is with markets. If we can compensate those who are the victims of this supposed impersonal force at no comparable cost to ourselves as a society then to fail to do so would be an injustice.

However, this characterisation of markets is itself tendentious: the outcomes of markets may not be intended but they are foreseeable. The New Right argues for market solutions to problems because such solutions are likely to bring about what they take to be desirable results. So, for example, they are in favour of the abolition of rent controls because this will lead to an expansion in the supply of rented accommodation. Hence it is central to the whole rationale of the free market theorist that the outcomes of markets are foreseeable even if they do not embody an individual's intention.

If free markets are grafted on to a society with large-scale inequalities in resources then it is foreseeable that those who enter the market with least will leave it with least. We are usually, as individuals, held to be responsible for the foreseeable, even if unintended, consequences of our actions—as for example in manslaughter. It could be argued, by analogy, that if we support the introduction of markets and it is foreseeable that those who enter it with fewest resources will leave it with fewest, then we can be held responsible for such outcomes. Thus the question of justice and collective responsibility have purchase once again. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of this issue because the New Right regards social justice as the central value of
socialism and argues that it is a concept without moral purchase.

Consensus

If social justice has moral relevance, can it be grounded in consensus given the degree of moral pluralism in society? The first response is rather opportunistic but nevertheless is worth making. The New Right argues for moral diversity and subjectivism when it comes to social justice, while at the very same time, supporting policies which imply a moral consensus over things such as Victorian values, the role of the family, the national curriculum and so on. Moral diversity is invoked only to block social justice.

More important if we accept all the points made about moral subjectivism, we can still derive principles of distribution. A deep philosophical attempt has been made by John Rawls, namely a theory of presumptive equality which moves away from equality being justified because it benefits the worst off members of society. I have defended his views as being relevant to a socialist view of distribution elsewhere (see "Democratic Socialism and Equality" in D Lipsky and D Leonard, The Socialist Agenda: Crosland's Legacy, Cape, 1981).

However, such a view can be defended even on the New Right's own subjectivist premises. If we have no way of judging people's needs, merits, deserts and entitlements as the subjectivist position argues, then one response would be that a presumption in favour of equality can be argued since no one can be thought of as having a more just claim than anyone else. Moves away from greater equality would then be justified if inequalities in society worked to the benefit of the worst off. That is to say the basic goods of citizenship which we discussed earlier are to be distributed as equally as possible unless a more unequal distribution would produce more resources for the worst off. The theory would become one of legitimate inequalities. If our concern is with the worst off then it would be irrational to prefer a more equal distribution of resources if a more unequal one would produce more resources for all including the poor.

This is to agree to a central role for the market not as some amoral force but as part of a just society. The socialist approach to the market and its inequalities is that these are tolerable if the market mechanism is working better than any alternative to produce resources for all members of society, but particularly the worst off. As we shall see later, the market has to be constrained in the interest of the community as a whole. Because equality is a rather unspecific idea meaning anything from procedural equality of opportunity to equality of outcome, it might be best either to adopt an expression for legitimate inequalities such as Rawls' term "democratic equality" or to abandon the expression altogether and talk about fairness.

Trickle down

The final part of the New Right's critique of social justice is the trickle-down theory. We do not need distributive politics with all the interest group pressures which go along with it: rather the free market will produce the goods which people need even though it will produce inequalities.

Clearly there would be a lot to be said for the market mechanism if it did this in an impersonal way without political intervention and guidance. However, even on their own terms the free market is not working to increase what the right takes to be the absolute standard of the poor. Whatever the subtleties and controversies of measurement, being eligible for income support (supplementary benefit) and being homeless seem to be self-evident indicators of poverty. On both of these counts the free market has yet to work in the way suggested by its defenders. Since 1978 personal dispos-
able income in Britain has risen by 14 per cent in real terms, while supplementary benefit levels have fallen from 61 per cent of disposable income per capita in 1978 to 53 per cent in 1987. Using this criterion the incomes of the poor have not kept up, never mind increased with the development of the free market.

Secondly, the number of people being drawn into supplementary benefit and hence into the group which is not sustaining its share in total national income has increased dramatically from about three million in 1978 to about five million in 1987. Of course, this only indicates the recipients of benefits, not those who are dependent on them. It is estimated that in 1984 about 7,729,000 were dependent on supplementary benefit compared with about 5,750,000 in 1979.

Again homelessness, a clear enough symptom of poverty, has increased alarmingly. In 1970 the figure for homeless people was about 56,000 families; in 1985 the figure had grown to 100,000 and is likely to be far more now. Thus to rely on the market and a residual welfare state which seeks to provide only for an absolute standard of need will not provide adequate resources for democratic citizenship. Social justice is central to securing the basic goods of citizenship not just to some but to all citizens as a right.

3. Rights and citizenship

If the basic goods of citizenship should be available to all, they should be considered as matters of right and entitlement. This in turn raises questions as to how these rights are to be guaranteed and entitlements made available. Rights can proliferate endlessly with interest groups making claims of one sort or another as basic human rights. It is not in anyone's interests that the range of rights should be so utterly open-ended. It devalues rights and over-extends the role of government so that the powers which it needs to protect expanding rights actually become a major threat to liberty.

Citizenship involves negative rights such as rights to be free from coercion, interference, assault, freedom of expression and association—all in effect traditional civil and political rights. These are usually regarded as negative rights since the corresponding obligation on others is to refrain from assaulting, interfering and coercing. However, as we saw earlier, the goods of citizenship have to go beyond civil and political rights and embrace rights to resources, income, health care, education and welfare. These are usually called positive rights in the sense that they involve a claim on the resources of others through the tax system.

This latter view of rights and entitlement is firmly rejected by the New Right arguing that positive rights are rights to resources which are in themselves scarce and cannot therefore be considered to be objects of rights. Claims to civil and political rights, because they are rights to be free from interferences of various sorts, do not involve direct...
claims to resources in the way that positive rights do. Indeed, the New Right asserts that only civil and political rights are genuine rights of citizenship whereas economic and social rights are not.

Resources

Of course social and economic rights are asserted against a background of scarce resources, but the contrast between civil and political rights on the one hand and welfare rights on the other is not as clear-cut as is suggested.

Civil and political rights which imply the corresponding duty to abstain from coercive action may appear to be costless. In reality this is not the case since people do not always abstain from such actions: they do assault, coerce and interfere and they have to be prevented from doing so. To protect such rights, there is a need for police forces, a legal system, and a system of justice to protect such rights. These institutions involve resources.

Likewise, negative rights such as the right to privacy and the right to security imply that other people should abstain from interference. But the institutions which are necessary to ensure that such obligations are satisfied involve costs. For example, what is necessary to secure the right to privacy changes with advances in technology. Before the advent of the computer, the Data Protection Act was not necessary and the costs of enforcement were not incurred. Similarly, in the case of a right to security, various forms of expenditure are necessary such as street lighting and so forth. The degree and amount of street lighting and other security inducing measures will run up against resource constraints as much as welfare rights.

The critic's arguments can be put in other ways. One is for the Right to argue that in the case of civil and political rights the corresponding obligation is categorical: it is to abstain from action and therefore we know when the right has been fully protected. Welfare rights are based upon needs which are in principle open-ended so we can never know when the rights have been fully protected and respected.

The point can be put starkly in relation to different interpretations of something as fundamental as the right to life. To the neo-liberal such a right will be understood in negative terms as the right not to be killed or murdered and the corresponding duty is to abstain from these actions. On the left, the right will be understood partly as that but also as the right to the means to life—to the resources necessary to maintain life. In the latter case it is harder to agree about what will meet the claims falling under the right. But the examples of privacy and security indicate that the difference between the two sorts of rights are not as straightforward as this. The degree to which we collectively provide resources to protect privacy or security is as much a matter of judgement and political negotiation to be undertaken against a background of limited resources as for welfare rights.

The second approach by critics of welfare rights is to argue that because they are open-ended they will become subject to interest-group pressures and political bargaining in a way that the more categorical civil and political rights will not. These rights are thought of as, in a sense, beyond politics and political negotiation; whereas welfare rights are always going to be subject to political pressures. However, this optimistic approach is false for the reasons which we have already discussed. The resources given over to maintaining security and property rights are going to be as much a matter of interest-group pressure as welfare rights.

It follows from all of this that we cannot draw a sharp distinction between 'real' rights such as traditional civil and political rights on the one hand and illusory welfare rights on the other. Equally if civil and political rights are
genuine, then there can be no case in terms of resource constraints for arguing that welfare rights are not genuine. In the real world all sorts of rights run up against resource constraints and are subject to political negotiation and pressure.

The right will also argue that since welfare rights imply resources, they must infringe property rights, an illegitimate interference with the property holder’s right to use his property as he or she pleases. However, all forms of rights including property rights infringe freedom. Taking property rights as given in our society in which there are virtually no unowned resources restricts the freedom of non-property owners to exercise their liberty. Hence, the real question is not about the infringement of liberty. The question is rather whether, for example, the right to the means to life has priority over the unfeathered right to property. For the socialist the answer will be clear. However, we should not succumb to the liberal suggestion that this is an undifferentiated infringement of liberty.

Enforcement

I now want to look at the question of enforcement, particularly in relation to welfare rights where the problem is thought to be more troublesome. This is not to say that the ways in which civil and political rights are to be protected are unimportant, far from it given the growth of arbitrary actions by government. However, in this field, the issues such as whether there should be a Bill of Rights are well understood and have been quite extensively discussed. The issue of enforcement in the welfare field, however, is more intractable.

The critic will argue that social and economic rights are not genuine because they are not justiciable, ie cannot be enforced in law. The example of the recent litigation over young children requiring heart operations in Birmingham would support this view. There the judges argued that they could not interfere with clinical judgment in relation to waiting lists.

However, there are alternatives to this model of enforcement. The first would come closest to the justiciable one and argue that although a judge may not be able to enforce a particular right to a specific form of treatment, he does have a role in determining whether a patient’s interests have been fully taken into account and that his or her plight is not the result of negligence or inadverence. So there could be a place for judicial review in this narrower sense. This is not as novel as it looks and applies to a civil right such as equal protection before the law. While a judge cannot dictate the policing policy in a particular city there have been cases where individuals have taken their grievances about policing to court and the question of whether those individuals’ interests have been properly taken into account is one to which a judge can address himself. This is not different from the welfare case: the deployment of scarce resources requires professional judgment, but the professional has an obligation to make sure that all interests are properly weighed.

More generally, welfare rights could be protected by empowering the specific individuals in several different ways. It is possible to define certain rights in terms of cash entitlements which could be protected by law. This could be done through a minimum income policy or through giving a legal guarantee to income support. Indeed, many social security benefits could be treated in this way. Certainly in terms of the liberty of citizens, avoiding stigma and securing a sense of independence, there is a lot to be said for cash rather than in kind or service-based benefits.

In other fields, perhaps particularly health and in terms of care for the elderly it might be possible to define entitlement in terms of a cash surrogate like a voucher. Such vouchers might empower a patient who needs medical attention to have the operation done in the shortest time outside the local
hospital system. If we are to be serious about rights and empowerment in the welfare field we must be prepared to consider such alternatives. As the Policy Review document says "Rights without enforcement are a mockery".

However, enforcement can take on forms other than the judicial, and one way is to put more power by way of strict entitlements into the hands of consumers. A strong commitment to rights in the welfare field is not compatible, for example, with major regional disparities in treatment times. This sort of disparity may not be cured just by the commitment of more resources, important though that is: we have to give consumers more voice to constrain the system reflecting more the choices of professionals and bureaucrats rather than those with the rights which the institutions are to serve.

It will be argued that if choice is entrenched in the welfare field to this degree, those with the least capacity to make informed choices will get the worst service. A more collective, bureaucratic mechanism allocates medical care fairly rather than empowering individuals which will produce poor results for some. This raises an interesting conflict between libertarian and communitarian forms of socialism. The libertarian wanting to disperse power more to individuals, communitarians worried about the overall consequences of individual choice. However, unless this is thought through urgently the Labour Party is likely to be left behind radical ideas on the right about a patient’s charter for example in the health service. (But see Robin Cook’s Fabian pamphlet, *Life begins at 40: in defence of the NHS*. August 1988.) More resources for welfare without empowerment of consumers within it will not meet the mood of the times.

Providing a basis of entitlement and empowerment in the welfare field means challenging many of the professional producer interest groups in the public sector. Clearly the empowerment of the citizen as consumer will involve a limitation of the power and scope of professional groups such as social workers, doctors, teachers and social security officials. Claims to professional expertise as against the limited knowledge of the consumer have to be challenged if we are to have a real society of active citizens, instead of a society managed by experts. Of course there is expertise in these areas, but it should not be allowed to be a cloak for the assertion of professional power over the lives of citizens in a democratic society.

If rights are to provide a basis for individuals to lead a secure and autonomous life then institutions must themselves enhance this autonomy. Too often the institutions of the welfare state and the growth of professionalism within them has actually led to a reduction in the capacity of individuals for choice and judgment. I doubt whether there is a real way forward in the welfare field without empowering individuals through cash, rights, entitlements and cash surrogates such as vouchers. This is particularly important when the state is effectively the monopoly provider of services in health and welfare for the vast majority of citizens. If they are denied exit either through lack of resources or because the private sector has been removed, then the democratic voice must be increased drastically if we are to be responsive to the idea that citizenship, individual freedom and personal responsibility go together.

Empowerment could also involve the public funding of voluntary agencies in the welfare field. Such initiatives have been crowded out to a degree by the growth of professionalism in welfare. Obviously there is professional expertise here, but it should not be used to downgrade other forms of provision in some areas where expertise is not so salient and in ways which extend the control of the professional over the nature of the service.
4. Citizenship and obligations

To what extent should the rights of citizenship depend upon the performance of obligations? In this chapter I want to consider the argument that welfare rights should depend on performing corresponding obligations of a workfare or learnfare sort.

This approach, deployed particularly on the American right (for example by Lawrence Mead in his book Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship) raises the question of whether citizenship rights are conditional or absolute. It is also of political importance because the radical right in Britain has taken it up as a response to the dependency argument in welfare which it would be very foolish to dismiss. To have a fully developed concept of citizenship we have to produce some response to this challenge.

The socialist case for the idea of conditional entitlements for the fit and able-bodied would be as follows. Suppose the Government is committed to securing as far as possible and practicable full employment, decent levels of unemployment benefit, regional policies to spread investment and job opportunities more broadly, and well-resourced and relevant training. It could then be argued that entitlement to benefit by an unemployed person, if not their dependents, should depend upon their willingness to undertake training, or satisfying a stringent available-for-work criterion. There are several possible justifying arguments for this policy.

First, in our society it is widely believed that a right or an entitlement arises either because it has been paid for or out of contract. Rights depend on reciprocity of some sort. If we are in favour of matching rights to resources then given this background of values we shall only be able to make our case convincing if some of the entitlements are linked to fulfilling obligations.

It is difficult to deny the widespread nature of this attitude. On this view the community has no duty to provide the resources for citizenship to those who are capable but refuse to accept the basis of the common obligations of citizenship. It might be argued that such a proposal would increase public support for the government expenditure necessary to provide good training and better unemployment benefits. Certainly, in socialist Sweden those who refuse work or training lose benefits for themselves (though not for their dependents).

It can also be argued that training is in the interest of the unemployed. Detachment from the disciplines of the labour market seems to be one of the major obstacles among the long-term unemployed to getting a job. Training of a decent sort and associated adequate levels of benefit may well be a way out of privation, marginalisation and being demoralised. This is essentially the case for obligation in the context of the dependency argument. Welfare beneficiaries become dependent on welfare; there are no ladders out of being trapped within welfare. One way of creating such a ladder, it is argued, is through making welfare dependent on discharging community obligations to inculcate attitudes which will be important in the labour market.

But there is a much more central socialist argument namely that within the socialist tradition work has been regarded as essential to human dignity and development. Productive labour also provides the resources for the distributive side of socialism. It is therefore arguable that benefits created by taxation on the community (including the lower paid) should be available, in
the case of the able-bodied, only to those who are actually prepared to enter the labour market either by undertaking training or through the operation of a stringent availability-for-work criterion. There is little in the British socialist tradition which sees citizenship wholly in terms of passive entitlement: there has usually been an equal stress on the performance of duties and obligations.

Clearly this issue raises a deep issue again between the libertarian and the communitarian strands of socialism. The ideas above lean much more to the communitarian side of socialism seeing the community as having a right to insist on obligations as a condition of some benefits of membership and certainly this idea fits many models of community. The libertarian, however, will see these ideas as intolerably coercive.

Liberty

The libertarian critic will draw upon two arguments. The first is that civil and political rights are not conditional. The right to equality before the law for example is not dependent on discharging an obligation so why should welfare rights be any different?

One answer to this would be to claim that there is in fact a sharp distinction between the two sorts of rights, a point discussed earlier but rejected. So this cannot be the basis of the conditionality of welfare rights. A more cogent response would be to claim that civil and political rights in fact secure the independence and self-confidence of individuals whereas the dependency theorists argue that when welfare is seen as an entitlement without condition, then this creates dependency. This is an empirical claim which needs investigating in the British context. If it turned out to be the case then certainly some forms of welfare (which would not include health, education, services for the elderly and the non-able-bodied) could be linked to obligations if they were thought likely to overcome dependency.

The libertarian critic will still argue that, rather than conditional entitlements, it would be better to stimulate self-help among poor communities and families, by the use of community development and social work. The dependency theorist, however, will argue that just because such schemes are voluntary they will not in fact reach those who are most marginalised and dependent and who need skills the most. Again this is an empirical argument about which socialists need to make a judgment.

A more theoretical response from the libertarian would be to claim that a policy of conditional entitlement is coercive in the sense that it is an intentional attempt to get someone to do what they would not otherwise do by changing the costs and benefits attached to their particular desires.

This may well be so but the tax system is coercive and bears heavily on the lower paid. They have no choice but to pay the tax needed to finance benefits. Should therefore those benefits be available as a matter of unconditional right to beneficiaries? Further, what matters is not whether the proposal is coercive but whether it embodies legitimate coercion. Most actions by government are coercive as the tax example shows. What matters is whether the coercion is being exercised towards legitimate ends. At this point all the arguments discussed above come back into play.

This issue is difficult to resolve in a socialist context but given the salience of dependency theories in Britain and the USA it will not go away. It has to be resolved in the context of a socialist theory of citizenship which recognises the centrality of production and supply as well as distribution. Obviously any introduction of conditional entitlements in Britain at the moment would be deeply unjust because the economic prerequisites mentioned earlier: full employment, regional policy, defensible levels of training are not in place.
5. Citizenship and the market

There is growing recognition on the left of the role of the market. In this chapter, I want to look at its strengths and weaknesses and to see how it can be used to enhance the idea of citizenship.

The idea of democratic citizenship is a profoundly anti-capitalist one: it embodies the idea that individuals have a status and a worth to be backed by rights, resources and opportunities which is not determined by their status in the market and their economic value. The underwriting of these rights of citizenship requires collective action and politically guaranteed provision outside the market.

Nevertheless, the economic market is a very useful and indeed central instrument for securing socialist aims. The draft statement of Labour’s Democratic Socialist Aims and Values and the first Policy Review report Social Justice and Efficiency stress the role of the market in distributing many sorts of goods. At the same time, it has to be kept within control and its outcomes have to be subjected to modification. A recognition that the market is central is not necessarily to succumb to capitalist values.

Markets and distribution

Currently the market enables a vast range of goods and services to be produced and distributed in the economy. Some have argued against the Policy Review because it embraces market forces. If the market is essentially capitalist, then intellectual honesty requires that we should be told how goods and services will be produced in a socialist Britain: presumably via some form of either centralised or democratic planning. If, however, critics believe that there should still be a role for a market, then what is the nature of their quarrel with its endorsement in the Review?

The arguments against a centralised economy are overwhelmingly strong in practice and theory. Such economies have not worked in the USSR, in China or in eastern Europe. They have endangered civil liberties and because of the centralised and political nature of the planning they have fallen victim to elite interest-group pressures. Planners and bureaucrats are not always selfless pursuers of the public interest. They have interests of their own which make them responsive to political pressures.

Individual choice and pluralism are essential to citizenship and both are threatened by centralised planning.

In theoretical terms, the work of Menger, Mises and Hayek still stand as a formidable challenge to the economic assumptions of central planning. Their case rests upon the nature of ordinary economic knowledge and the ways in which this cannot be drawn together by central planners. In the economy, knowledge is dispersed among millions of economic agents who use it all the time in their economic transactions out of which prices and distributions emerge. Usually, this knowledge is tacit in the sense that all the knowledge and assumptions which go into making decisions are not explicit: it is a case of “knowing how” rather than “knowing that”. This knowledge, dispersed and inexplicit, cannot be drawn together by a planning agency to replicate the ways in which prices are set and demands for commodities occur. The market, however, is able to use this dispersed knowledge just because it is such a highly decentralised institution.

This is the strongest argument against
centralised planning and it is an argument of principle not of complexity. The problems which Hayek identifies cannot be solved by more complex computers because the knowledge in question is normally of a non-propositional sort. Only the hubris of centralising politicians who are over-convinced of the capacity of human reason could maintain a strong belief in centralised planning.

If centralised planning is impossible and indeed is a threat to the values of citizenship, are there other decentralised mechanisms for replacing market mechanisms and in particular democratic procedures operating on a decentralised basis? There are some encouraging examples of local planning mechanisms, such as the late GLC and Sheffield, but these do not in any way displace the market. They operate in an economy which is overwhelmingly market based and signals about price and demand are available from the market sector. The planning that was done was in association with the market, not seeking to replace it. These planning functions were much more ways of trying to intervene in and socialise the market in the sense of making the market responsive to social considerations than an attempt to replace it by a different system of production and distribution.

It is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise. Localised democratic planning can only avoid one part of Hayek’s critique: it can cope with the dispersal of knowledge but it cannot cope with its tacit nature. Democratic planning requires propositions and argument which are hard to distil from the knowledge how which is characteristic of the economy. This of course is not to say that both central government and democratic values have no place in economic life. On the contrary, we have to consider the defects of the market as well as its strengths and how these can be countered in a democratic society.

Reference has already been made to the undesirable outcomes of markets and I argued then that without the redistribution of resources both as a condition of liberty and in terms of social justice, the market would be incompatible with the values of democratic citizenship. However, there are other important defects:

- the free market leads to concentration of wealth and power;
- the market prefers long-term to short-term returns;
- despite embodying individual choices, markets may lead to outcomes which might not have been chosen had they been foreseen;
- the external effects of markets on the environment;
- the ways in which markets undercut any appeal to the public good on which their own operation may well depend.

In the rest of this chapter I will briefly look at these factors.

Concentrations of wealth

On the strict liberal view, what matters about markets is not their outcomes but the fact that in a free market we find the embodiment of free and uncoerced exchange. Justice consists not in outcomes but in non-coercion and in a market we find uncoerced exchanges. From this it follows that all the accumulations of wealth which arise out of individual uncoerced exchanges are morally legitimate and just. (This view is defended by Sir Keith Joseph in Equality cited above. It is provided with its deepest philosophical rationale by R Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell, 1973.)

However, even if we grant that wealth is accumulated in a non-coercive way in a free and democratic society the incremental outcomes of free exchange are important. Firstly, accumulations of wealth usually imply power. In a democratic society, we should be concerned with the dispersion rather than the concentration of power. Even when the outcomes of markets are the consequences of free exchange, they may
be incompatible with the values of a democratic society.

Central to this approach, therefore, should be an attempt to disperse capital and power more widely. Apart from general progressive and redistributive taxation which was discussed in the context of social justice earlier, there are various ways in which this could be done, particularly individual or group dispersal. Individual dispersal could for example, involve giving workers shares in companies after a particular length of service. Labour would, therefore, create some property rights in their enterprise instead of being based entirely on capital input (a wholly anti-capitalist idea). It could be done by means of a negative capital tax as once proposed by Professor Atkinson. Capital could also be dispersed by encouraging other forms of ownership, particularly workers’ co-operatives and providing for favourable forms of credit on the part of government.

Secondly, people in markets usually take a short-run view of returns. This can lead to underinvestment, a lack of infrastructure, and a lack of commitment to high-quality, long-term training. These things are not themselves antagonistic to markets—indeed on the contrary they will make markets work better. But they will not necessarily be provided by markets. It is, therefore, a central and ineradicable role for government to use collective resources to provide these sorts of goods.

The third feature of markets which makes them an instrument of policy rather than a panacea is that they may well embody individual choices. But the incremental effects of such choices may well be unforeseen and may produce consequences which would not have been chosen. So for example, because individuals choose to shop at a hypermarket outside the neighbourhood, local shops which the very same people found convenient may close. In this way, amenities may well be destroyed by what Fred Hirsch in The Social Limits To Growth called the tyranny of small decisions. The dispersed decision pro-
cedures of the market are not suitable for every choice that we make. This requires a plurality of institutions which can act as checks on one another.

So for example in the case discussed, there would be a need for democratic, participative planning procedures to counterbalance the likely outcomes of dispersed market choices. This is not to say that political or collective procedures are infallible or can foresee things in a way in which people in markets do not. It is only to recognise the fallibility of all institutions including markets and the need for a democratic and collective counterpoint to markets if our own longer-term choices and judgments are to be accorded any weight.

Fourth, markets produce external effects such as pollution of the environment which call for government responsibility and collective action. Some on the New Right argue that such externalities can best be dealt with by strengthening individuals’ property rights and then allowing these externalities to be fought in civil courts as a matter of compensation. However, the most obvious answer except to the most blinkered defender of the free market and minimal government is for the state to enforce standards in this field and to prosecute those who fail to abide by them.

Moral underpinning

Finally, markets operate on the basis of the rational calculation of self-interest. This is of course a fundamental human emotion and motive and it would be difficult to imagine life without it. However, it needs to operate in only a limited framework because the more the market mentality comes to dominate our lives, its associated motives become more and more dominant. Then other values which cannot be captured in terms of self-interest and the calculation of advantage will be undermined.
However, such values are not peripheral in human life but play a central role in the complex web of relationships and motives which make up what we are. But more importantly in the present context, motives other than self-interest may be important for markets as well. Markets cannot exist in a moral vacuum: generally they presuppose certain values such as honesty, fair dealing, promise keeping and some orientation towards the common good and civic virtues. The more sophisticated early defenders of the market such as Adam Smith realised this.

The growth of a new type of trader in the City who seems to be emancipated from more traditional values embodied in “my word is my bond” had led to crooked dealing and scandal which in turn has necessitated elaborate and costly regulatory mechanisms. The market here worked more efficiently and without regulation when there was a more widely accepted basis of morality and fair dealing. Now it seems that self-interest has displaced such values with all the consequences which we have seen over the past year or so.

If self-interest is the only motivation which counts how do you convince a businessman not to seek monopoly, or subsidy or price fixing? All of these have deleterious consequences for the market even though they be in the individual’s own interests. There needs to be some orientation to an idea of the common good or the good of the community to argue against such behaviour. There is no point in saying “what would it be like if everyone did that?” since the individual knows that everyone is not doing that. This argument is powerless if the only motivating force is that of self-interest.

So the market itself needs a framework of civic responsibility within which to operate just as interest groups and unions do. Unless such a civic vision is articulated and defended, not just as a matter of altruism but as something which is in all our interests, then the political community will fall victim to strong special interests whether in politics or in markets. In its claims about the centrality of citizenship and the sense of belonging, the Labour Party is in a better position to defend the range of values which are essential to human life—including self-interest—in a way that the Conservative Party used to do before the accountants took over.

So markets have a central role to play within a socialist society. But they must operate within a set of community values where outcomes will not be regarded as impersonal visitations but adjusted within a framework of social justice. As such the market can play a central role in promoting the efficient production of resources without which the ideal of democratic citizenship involving resources, liberties, rights and opportunities will be impossible.

Citizenship and community

The necessity for communal provision for which I have argued presupposes a commitment by the community to all of its members. After nine years of under-mining the case for collective provision this commitment cannot just be assumed, it has to be rebuilt. Polling and survey evidence suggests that there are still communal and mildly egalitarian values within the population and the possibility of rebuilding is there. However, it will have to be a thoughtful rebuilding which learns from the mistakes of the past—one which does not mindlessly over-extend public policy and the capacity of government; which does not seek only centralised and bureaucratic solutions; which will constrain the power of producer-interest groups and the professions; which will allow a variety of ways of meeting needs; which is aware of the power of interest groups.

The final condition is the most important, namely that the whole notion of collective and public provision has to be defended partly on moral grounds and partly on grounds of efficiency. Because of the acute political dilemmas of the
1970s, there has been some loss of confidence in politics and the use of political power for allocative purposes. The market has benefitted from this. Confidence in politics against the market will not be enhanced until some of the lessons of big and centralised government have been learned and a robust attitude to interest groups is taken.

The aims I have suggested are of an enabling kind. In the context of community it is not the function of public policy to try to create a specific form of community for the whole of society whatever conservatives of the left and the right might think. There are profound totalitarian dangers in that. Our natures are too diverse to fit into a single pattern of life. We should, however, seek to enable people to form and sustain, where they already exist, their own forms of community which meet their needs. To do this we do need some general community spirit to sustain collective provision, but this only needs to be modest. The idea of community is beguiling but as a general idea and as a guide to policy almost wholly indefinite. People create and sustain their own forms of community, not to have them imposed upon them. Given the resources, a society of citizens, rather than individuals or subjects would be able to form their own communities, as indeed they did in the early years of the socialist movement.
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Citizenship, rights and socialism

In this pamphlet, Raymond Plant argues for a society based on democratic citizenship: that Labour should promote policies which enable every citizen to lead a full and autonomous life shaped by their own values and purposes. This requires a framework of education, health care, income and law that underpins such citizenship. It also provides a rationale for the transfer of resources outside the workings of the market to achieve the ends of citizenship.

Raymond Plant argues that such an approach is superior to both a class-based strategy and one based on appealing to interest groups. A class approach is rejected because the industrial working class is too small a base from which to gain power and increasing individualism has reduced the influence of community values. An interest-group strategy cannot hope to reconcile the differing aims of interest groups without some overarching conception by which to judge competing claims.

More important, a philosophy based on citizenship can convincingly rebut the ideas of the New Right which have sought to exclude government from the provision of resources in the name of freedom. Plant shows that even on the New Right's terms, there is a necessary link between freedom and ability to exercise that freedom. And he demonstrates that while the market produces acceptable outcomes in very many cases, social justice requires intervention to ameliorate foreseeable injustices.

The pamphlet goes on to reject conventional critiques of a rights-based approach to welfare, and to explore means by which rights can be realised. The left should consider all means of empowering citizens to achieve their rights, Plant argues, including the law, cash benefits and cash surrogates such as vouchers. And he suggests that if rights are to be seen as just and fair, they should be matched by responsibilities of citizenship—including the responsibility to contribute to the common good through work.

Fabian Society

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