Fabian International Bureau

DISARMAMENT—THE WAY AHEAD

HUGH THOMAS

Foreword by Kenneth Younger, MP

FABIAN TRACT 307

TWO SHILLINGS
HUGH THOMAS recently resigned from the Foreign Office where he had been working since 1954; he was a member of the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee in 1955 and 1956.

FABIAN TRACT 307

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March, 1957
FOREWORD

by The Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger, MP

A NOther round of disarmament talks is beginning. Despite ten years of disappointments, world opinion continues to hope for some new initiative which will break the deadlock which prevents international agreement.

There is ground for this renewal of hope in the fact that the strategic and political situation is always changing, and the problem facing each new meeting of the Sub-Committee is never quite the same as it was on the previous occasion. The speed of technical development in the field of armaments is, alone, sufficient to ensure this.

This constant process of change, however, gives the negotiations a baffling quality which confuses all but the most industrious student of proceedings. At one time our side is insisting on treating atomic and conventional weapons together, at another on keeping them apart. At one time the West blames the Soviet Union for linking disarmament with the settlement of outstanding political issues; on the next occasion the roles are reversed. These apparent perversities reflect real changes in the calculations made by the different powers regarding the current state of the arms race, but to the public at large they present a perplexing picture.

The writer of the present pamphlet has had unusual opportunities of assessing the real intentions of the Powers and the possibilities of agreement. His analysis helps the reader to understand what the rival proposals are and what have been the main stumbling blocks.

He also suggests a policy for the West. Some of his ideas are, of course, controversial, but they present a challenge to those who reject them to put forward something better. A moment when official thinking seems to be at something of a dead end is appropriate for the publication of this stimulant to fresh thought within the Labour Movement on one of the most important issues of our time.
DISARMAMENT—
THE WAY AHEAD

HUGH THOMAS

Introduction

THE Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission—Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are its five members—meets again in London on 18th March, 1957. The General Assembly recently gave the Sub-Committee the widest possible terms: to take into account all the proposals made during its eighty-six meetings since May, 1954.

Will the Powers, as usual, agree to differ? Or will something really happen?

Part One of this pamphlet examines what can be done. Part Two suggests what should be done.

Part One

THE PROSPECTS

1. NUCLEAR WEAPONS (all nuclear weapons — thermonuclear, atomic and ‘tactical’ atomic — are considered together).

Elimination

1. It is now certain that no control system can be devised to guarantee, within an acceptable margin of error, the destruction of all existing stocks of nuclear weapons. The acceptable margin would be practically non-existent, since a very few nuclear weapons would be enough to give world domination to any state which alone possessed them.

2. It has been argued that nuclear weapons kept in store for a number of years would have to be re-processed before use; and that, therefore, if production of nuclear weapons were effectively halted, and, say, ten years were to elapse, old stocks would be useless. But this decline in potency is, however, confined to those (as yet) few H-bombs made with lithium. Other H-bombs, and all atom bombs, keep perfectly in store for an unlimited period.
3. Even in 1946, at the time of the 'Baruch Plan', control of the elimination of nuclear weapons could only have been based on a check of the total quantity of nuclear material produced against the declared quantity, and checking the answer against declared stocks of weapons. It is doubtful whether this could have given a one hundred per cent. guarantee — and the Soviet Union (who did not possess atomic weapons till 1949) could have accepted nothing less.

4. The truth about the possibility of a guaranteed total elimination of nuclear stockpiles was kept a diplomatic and scientific secret until 1955. Possibly the Great Powers' spokesmen who, for so long, during the Cold War, advocated the 'total elimination of all nuclear weapons under effective international control', did not know the snags. Perhaps they felt that their respective publics would find the truth too much to bear. At all events, the Soviet Government was the first to be candid on this matter, in its proposal of 10th May, 1955. The public reaction was tepid; could it be that they had suspected all along?

5. The Western Powers have since been careful not to provide for the elimination of nuclear weapons in any of their proposals (though they do speak of prohibition of production). Western spokesmen, nevertheless, have talked of their hopes for a 'nuclear break-through', in terms which, though not optimistic, might arouse expectations. The Anglo-French Plan of 19th March, 1956, for instance, provides for 'an international scientific conference to examine the possibilities of eliminating nuclear weapons'. This provision can only serve to blunt the full realisation that there is, in fact, no hope whatever of progress in this department of the disarmament problem. The sooner this is finally admitted the better.

6. Immediately after their proposal of 10th May, 1955, and throughout the short summer of co-existence that followed it, the Soviet Union also avoided mention of 'elimination' of nuclear weapons, though they continued to speak of their 'prohibition' — a word vague enough to apply to any, or all, of the possible ways whereby, theoretically, nuclear weapons may be dealt with. Latterly, the Soviet Government has returned to its old appeal for a 'destruction of stockpiles'. This is essentially a cold-war appeal and a lift in the international atmosphere will probably be followed by less obviously impractical demands.

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1 Also known as the United Nations Majority Plan, since it was later supported by a majority of the General Assembly. This was the U.S. Plan for the international control of atomic energy, launched by Bernard Baruch in the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission on 13th June, 1946. Although greeted by the world as an 'extraordinarily generous offer' — the words are Lord Cherwell's in the House of Lords, 18th February, 1948 — the Baruch Plan was politically inept: (i) it postponed the measures for the destruction of stockpiles until the very end of a complicated control system, thus making it easy for the Soviet Union to argue that the U.S. were interested in control, not disarmament; (ii) offending states were to suffer 'immediate, swift and sure punishment'; in this instance, the veto in the Security Council would not apply. The Soviet Union could thus accuse the U.S.A. of seeking to get round the Charter — which was indeed their aim.
Production

7. The future manufacture of nuclear weapons could be banned by (i) a total ban on all future production of nuclear weapons, i.e. whether made from existing stocks of nuclear material or from future manufacture of such material, or (ii) a ban on future production of nuclear weapons made from future manufacture of nuclear material.

8. Since extensive stocks of nuclear material already exist which could be converted into weapon-grade material without difficulty, it is almost as difficult to control (i) as the full-scale elimination of stockpiles.

9. But an inspection system of all nuclear material in use, able to see all the working documents and statistics in nuclear installations actually in production and with the right to inspect at will any installation where secret weapon-making was suspected, could give a guarantee in respect of (ii) where the margin of error would be acceptable provided stockpiles were not to be eliminated.

10. The only countries at the present time which might be able to evade a total ban under 7 (i) are the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union — and possibly Canada and France. The two last named countries have announced that they do not intend to make nuclear weapons. Even if they keep to this, by the early 1960's a number of other countries will be eligible for membership of the world's nuclear power club. The most likely early candidates are the Euratom countries (including Germany), Sweden, Australia, Argentina and China. Other countries will be in the running by 1970. What price the 'deterrent' darling of the West in the '50's, when new countries follow Britain's example and build an H-bomb mainly for prestige reasons?

11. The Statute of the U.N. Atomic Energy Agency provides, in its Article XII, that no nuclear material that it supplies to member states shall be used for weapon-making. Negotiations on the implementation of this Article are understood to be going on between the twelve leading nuclear states who drafted the statute. Various techniques may be developed which treat either nuclear material or reactors supplied by the Agency so that weapons cannot be made. This would presumably mean that only low-yield nuclear material would be supplied to receiving states and 'fast breeding' (the uncontrolled fission or fusion processes which are the basis of nuclear weapons) would be impossible. Such safety devices would inevitably hamper states' development of nuclear energy and may eventually be resisted as attempts by the possessor Powers to establish nuclear trade empires.

12. Even if effective, these Atomic Energy Agency schemes do not embrace the whole problem. Native nuclear projects, which would eventually be able to rival the present possessor Powers regardless of the U.N. Agency, will shortly take their place on the world stage. Nuclear material may be supplied, as it already has been supplied, by one country to another outside the Atomic Energy Agency. Britain, for example, has agreed to send an annual supply of medium-grade nuclear material to Australia. Other bilateral arrangements no doubt exist between the Soviet Union and China or the
Satellites. It cannot be absolutely excluded that a possessor state may hand over finished bombs, by gift or sale, to their allies. This is politically unlikely — if the relations between two such close allies as the United Kingdom and the United States are any guide. Arrangements certainly exist whereby allies will come to each others' aid with nuclear weapons. This is the basis of N.A.T.O. strategy, and, no doubt, similar arrangements have been concluded between the Soviet Union and China. But it is doubtful whether a possessor state would ever hand over complete control of a high-yield nuclear weapon to any ally or dependency. Although, therefore, acquisition by 'fourth' countries of nuclear weapons in this way cannot be absolutely excluded, it is fairly safe to leave the contingency on one side at any event for the purposes of this pamphlet. Such acquisition would, of course, be impossible to control, although one might expect the gift of an H-bomb by Russia to, say, Egypt to be attended by publicity rather than stealth.

13. The problem is, therefore, to prevent, both within and without the Atomic Energy Agency, new countries, other than the present three possessor states, from acquiring in any way nuclear material outside international control, whether organised by the Agency or by some body set up to supervise the carrying-out of the Disarmament Treaty. However, it is inconceivable that states would accept the full rigours of a control organisation supervising their nuclear development unless the three possessor states were similarly treated; particularly since the control organisation could not, of course, guarantee complete security against nuclear war. Further, the control of the future production of nuclear weapons would nominally have to be comprehensive, i.e. including the proposal in 7 (i) as well as 7 (ii); the Great Powers would have to give a comprehensive undertaking, in company with the lesser Powers, not to produce henceforth any nuclear weapons. Although the Great Powers' undertaking could not be absolutely guaranteed (see paragraph 8 above), it is arguable that they have nothing to gain from breaking their word, since what Sir Winston Churchill called 'saturation point' has already been reached. Certainly, a few more weapons on either side could hardly make much difference to the balance of world power.

14. A settlement on these lines, with control as suggested in paragraph 9 combined with those plans already under way in connection with the U.N. Atomic Energy Agency, would go far to mitigate the worst dangers of the most formidable political and strategic problem of the century — the spread of nuclear weapons to further countries.

Use

15. A ban on the use of nuclear weapons without any qualification would be a moral ban, similar to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons (the United Kingdom accepted this protocol with the common-sense reservation that she would have to be free to use such weapons in retaliation). Such a ban could not, obviously, be controlled.

16. All the Great Powers have made proposals for the prohibition of
the use of nuclear weapons, though they have differed on the timing of the coming into effect of the prohibition.

17. Proposals have also been made for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons with qualifications:
   (i) a ban on use except in retaliation from the same kind of weapon.
   (ii) a ban on use except in defence against aggression.
   (iii) a ban on use unless some permission is given by e.g. the Security Council.

18. Of these, (i) is the same as an outright ban with an obvious reservation which would inevitably be made by any signatory state, even if only tacitly. A state might reasonably argue that, legal or not, the use of nuclear weapons against her would mean the lapse of the disarmament treaty, which would no doubt anyway include some general provision, perhaps in its preamble, that signatory states renounced the use of force.

19. (ii) first appeared in the Anglo-French plan on timing of 11th June, 1954. It has reappeared in later Western proposals, in particular in the latest Anglo-French plan of 19th March, 1956. It means precisely nothing. All states will remain free to decide what they consider to constitute aggression; e.g. Britain named the Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal aggression and Egypt so named the Anglo-French intervention of October-November 1956. A U.N. Special Committee has been desultorily considering the question of defining aggression ever since 1951 — without result. It would be preferable if — merely in the interests of clear-thinking — future Anglo-French proposals were to drop this meaningless provision.

20. (iii) has been put forward by the Soviet Union at different times since May, 1955. Its shortcomings are obvious too; if any state — i.e. for the present, either the United Kingdom, the United States or the Soviet Union — felt that its security was threatened to such an extent that it felt itself bound to take the suicidal, final step of nuclear attack, there can be little practical doubt that the country it was proposing to attack would be either another nuclear weapon power or a state supported by a nuclear weapon power. The veto would inevitably be used. In fact, of course, the intention of any state to use nuclear weapons would be itself a matter to be raised at the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter; it would be very hard to argue that Article 51 of the Charter (guaranteeing states' rights to self-defence until Security Council action) actually justified a nuclear reply to a conventional attack, however threatening. At all events in effect this qualification does no more than dress up the substantive ban.

21. The representatives of the Western Powers — Mr. Dulles in particular, at the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers in November, 1955 — have lavished scorn on what they term 'paper' prohibitions, though they have usually themselves included such prohibitions at some stage of their proposed disarmament programmes. However, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons is not absolutely without value, since the implementation of a disarmament programme, i.e. the start of cuts in
conventional weapons and the establishment of control, would create the kind of world where moral prohibitions would have more force than they do at present. The acceptance of such a ban by the possessor states might also, illogical though it may seem, help to persuade the non-possessor states to accept the kind of rigid control of their nuclear development programmes suggested in paragraph 13 above as essential.

Tests

22. It is possible to devise a system of control to act as an effective sounding board for all tests of high-yield nuclear weapons. Tests of low-yield, tactical weapons could probably take place without detection. It would also be possible to establish fairly precisely where such high-yield tests took place.

23. Tests might be totally prohibited or limited to a certain number each year. Such a regulation of tests would be valuable from the disarmament and medical point of view; the development of new types of nuclear weapons would certainly be held up, if not altogether halted, and, despite the generally optimistic reports of the British Medical Association and the U.S. Council for Medical Research, the continuing uncertainty as to what is the safe limit for radiation makes it highly desirable that tests should be at least limited without delay.

24. All possessor states have behaved in this matter with a single-minded selfishness that, once more, gives an extremely bad example to all other states. The first appeal for a ban on H-bomb tests came from Mr. Nehru in April, 1954, after the series of U.S. Marshall Island tests. The United States treated the appeal unceremoniously and the Indian appeal was not even discussed in the Disarmament Commission where it was lodged. For some time the Soviet Union lay low. They then carried out their own series of H-bomb tests in the Spring of 1956. The Soviet Union then included a ban on tests as one of the measures to be put into effect during the course of its disarmament programme proposed on 10th May, 1955. After a further series of tests, they launched a proposal for their immediate suspension. The United Kingdom and France provided for a limitation and then a prohibition of tests in their plan of 19th March, 1956. There was no likelihood whatever that this plan would be put into effect before the United Kingdom had its tests during 1957. Meanwhile, the United States Government, whose stockpile of different types of nuclear weapons is already indecently large, never speak of suspension of tests, but, in their working paper of 3rd April, 1956, mention limitation and monitoring.

Means of Delivery

25. It has been argued — particularly by United States spokesmen — that, if it is impossible to control nuclear weapons through nuclear material, an approach might be made by controlling their means of delivery. But this would surely entail control of every aircraft which is capable of carrying nuclear weapons; i.e. the internationalisation of the air. The development of long-range guided missiles with nuclear war-
heads makes such an approach even more unpromising. Individual nations may develop a defence system of sorts by means of ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles; but this could not be a means of international control.

II. BACTERIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

26. Most proposals, by both the Western Powers and the Communists, during the years 1946-55 referred to the need to prohibit ‘nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction’. This was taken to include bacteriological and chemical weapons. Recent proposals have not mentioned this category of weapon. It is possible that no real thought has been given to the question on either side of the Iron Curtain. It would however be desirable to continue to classify these with nuclear weapons since in general they are as susceptible of control as are nuclear weapons. The same observations apply, i.e. that the control of the future production of such weapons would not present overwhelming difficulties, but that past production could easily be concealed.

III. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Manpower

27. Given full inspection facilities it should be easy to check whether stipulated reductions of manpower have or have not been carried out. The only remotely relevant precedent — the allied control of German disarmament after World War I — worked perfectly although the Allied Powers chose to disregard the adverse findings of their control representatives.

28. Ever since 1952, the Western Powers have been proposing definite levels to which the Powers should reduce their overall manpower. The proposal was first that the United States, the Soviet Union and China should reduce to between one to one and a half million men; and that the United Kingdom and France should reduce to between 700 and 800 thousand men. Other states were to reduce to levels normally less than one per cent. of their populations. Later, this proposal was revised to give a level of between 650 thousand for the United Kingdom and France; and other states were to reduce to levels ‘considerably lower’ than these.

29. The Soviet Union, throughout the Cold War proper — 1948-1955 — insisted on the immediate reduction of the armed forces of the Great Powers by one-third. Since no one knew the existing level of Soviet armed forces, this meant that the Soviet Union were proposing, as the French representative, Monsieur Moch, put it, a reduction ‘from one unknown level to another’. On 10th May, 1955, however, the Soviet Union accepted the figures which had been proposed by the Western Powers. Soviet proposals have repeated these figures ever since. The Soviet Government have also proposed levels for all other states of not more than 150 to 200 thousand.

30. After the Soviet Union had accepted the Western figures the Western Powers argued that those figures had been proposed dependent
on the solution of 'outstanding political problems' (see below). The Anglo-French plan of March, 1956, does not name any figures for the three stages of reductions it stipulates. The United States, however, proposed for the first stage of disarmament — having refused to commit themselves to any further stages — reductions by the United States, China and the Soviet Union to 2.5 million men and by the United Kingdom and France to 750 thousand men. The United Kingdom gave general support to these figures and said that they 'were willing to negotiate on final figures'. Western cautiousness at the meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in the Spring of 1956 was perplexing, particularly since it was they who insisted, at that time, on the need for a 'comprehensive' plan and since, despite their talk of the inter-relation of the two matters, they were not willing to specify precisely the outstanding political problems which would require solution before the old figures could be finally agreed. However, in November last, the Soviet Government took a further step towards agreement by accepting the United States' figures for the end of the first stage. Provided the United States does not refuse to negotiate on disarmament beyond the first stage and provided a reasonable settlement is reached as to how the collateral political problems should be solved, agreement ought to be reached at the forthcoming meetings of the Sub-Committee on levels, at all events those to which the Great Powers should reduce. It is in fact rather hard to see why agreement was not reached in 1956.¹

As for levels for other states, the United States' figure of 500 thousand is absurdly high. The Soviet figure is certainly nearer the mark though no doubt it will be resisted by the West because of the figures which it is still argued German forces must attain. A one per cent. of the population level, or one of 300 thousand — whichever is the lower — would probably be as fair and safe a proposal as can be put forward for other states; but the West and the Soviet Union agree that the figure for other states must be decided in conjunction with the states in question.

Armaments

(Conventional weapons have been defined as all those which — except for the Nagasaki and Hiroshima A-Bombs — were used in World War II.)

31. Ways of controlling the reductions of conventional armaments, including those in production, store and use, could be devised.

32. The most favoured way of approaching this problem has been to stipulate that reductions in armaments should be proportional to reductions in manpower. Lists of categories of weapons would presumably be prepared and levels fixed for each. Difficulty would be experienced in, say, judging what reductions in tanks should be made by a state reducing from 400 to 300 thousand men since the existing equipment and the requirements of different states varies enormously. But the difficulties are not insuperable, though it is as well to remember that it was

¹ Approximate present levels for the Five are: U.S.S.R., 4 million men; U.S.A., 2.9 million men; China, 2.5 million men (with perhaps up to 10 million militia); United Kingdom, 800,000 men; France, 850,000 men.
this problem alone which took up the whole time of the 60-nation League of Nations Disarmament Conference of 1932-1933.

33. Guided missiles should be included in the conventional disarmament programme. However, nuclear warheads would have to be treated with all other nuclear weapons. The same rule of separation of parts would apply to atomic artillery.

**Budgets**

34. Like armaments, reductions of overall military expenditure have been linked in the proposals of both West and East with the reductions in manpower — 'an agreed reflection' is the latest U.S. jargon. Though not a rational link, it is the most obvious way of approaching the matter, and, provided it applies to all countries, is a reasonable one. The Soviet Government, incidentally, have not only called for a proportionate reduction of military expenditure in the classic style, but also for an immediate, and apparently, uncontrolled fifteen per cent. cut in present military expenditures.

35. Control would be comparatively easy. A duplicate false set of figures — such as would be required for effective cheating — would be very hard to produce, especially since the control authority would be able — under both Western and Soviet plans — to check on-the-spot any apparent discrepancy.

36. Budgetary control has been suggested as a possible means of controlling conventional armaments; and certainly, while it would not be effective without on-the-spot inspection, it would be a very useful check on other inspection methods.

37. Monsieur Edgar Faure, then Prime Minister of France, proposed, at the 'Summit' meeting at Geneva in 1955, that increasing proportions of military expenditure should be channelled to give aid to under-developed territories. This was to take place prior to the Disarmament Plan proper. Later, to please its allies, the French Government agreed to link this plan to the Disarmament Plan proper. The Faure plan now survives only as an occasional reference in a preamble of Western sponsored General Assembly resolutions; it means as little as the United Kingdom pledge to devote a certain amount of the funds made available after Disarmament to the still unborn Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).

**IV. CONTROL**

38. The Soviet advances of the last two years have now brought agreement on control within grasp. The respective position of the three groups in the Sub-Committee — the Soviet Union, the United States (who have pursued a separate policy since mid-1955) and the United Kingdom and France — appears, on the eve of the fourth series of meetings of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, to be as set out on pages 12 to 15. (Canada — the fifth member of the Sub-Committee — usually steers a
## CONTROL PROPOSALS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation of Control</th>
<th>Soviet</th>
<th>U.K. — France</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership</strong></td>
<td>The Soviet Union apparently envisages the control authority as something near to a U.N. Specialised Agency, with no ‘Assembly’ of its own and no executive committee of separate states. The authority itself would be able to handle all minor matters; major disputes would go to the Security Council.</td>
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<td>‘International’.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Access</strong></td>
<td>The Control Organ is to have unlimited access to all objects of control, i.e. military units, stores of equipment and ammunition, bases, armaments factories. The Soviet proposals of 27th March, 1956, only provided for conventional cuts. The Soviet Note of 17th November, 1956, proposed again, in a general way, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and included a general provision for control ‘vested with all the powers and functions necessary’.</td>
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<td>It is proposed that the control authority’s inspection staff should have access—as in the Soviet Plan—to all declared objects of control, i.e. at the first stage all armed forces, conventional armaments, chemical and bacteriological weapons (thus implicitly regarding this group of weapons as conventional) all military establishments, all merchant vessels above an agreed size and civil aircraft, and all military budgetary documents required to verify the above: at the second</td>
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<td></td>
<td>An international secretariat, with an international Director and local posts, but ‘at least at first inspection teams would be chiefly on loan from national armed or civil services.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>An international Disarmament Organisation is envisaged, with an executive committee of 5 permanent members + 10 non-permanent members, and a General Assembly of all participating states.</td>
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<td>A Preparatory Armaments Commission under, and hence, apparently composed of, the members of the Sub-Committee.</td>
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**Disarmament — The Way Ahead**

Alarmingly, the latest U.S. paper on the topic suggested that the U.S. were still thinking in terms of a bilateral exchange with the Soviet Union; control was to be by member states acting as executive agents.

The control system will include ‘control posts’ (see below), aerial survey, mobile inspection units and a communication system, but there is no specification in the latest U.S. plan for rights of access. It is possible the U.S. sticks to its old proposals—which the Western Powers proposed throughout the Cold War proper—for unrestricted access. Once, however, it is admitted that the Control Organ should have the right to investigate all possible breaches of the
Soviet

Access (continued)  
This phase must be expanded to detail objects of control in the nuclear field. The control authority is also to have free access to military budgetary documents.

Establishment  
The Soviet Government made the really important concession in March 1956 that the control organ should be established within two months following the entry into force of the agreement. It shall establish its local branches and position its inspectors in good time to ensure that they are able to begin carrying out their functions at the moment when states begin the execution of the measures provided for in the agreement. The latest Soviet control plan does, therefore, admit that control should be in position before disarmament actually begins.

Powers  
All now apparently agree that it would be impossible for the Control authority itself to be vested with any actual powers vis a-vis signatory states. It has been interesting to observe the movement, in Western papers, away from ‘punishment’ (1946) to ‘enforcement’ (1954) to ‘supervision’ (1955) and finally to ‘inspection’ (1956) which has been advocated throughout by the Soviet Union as the only power which can realistically be wielded by the control authority.

U.K.-France  
stage in addition, all military equipment, factories and naval shipyards, merchant vessels and civil aircraft of specified size under construction and nuclear weapon test explosions; at the third stage—in addition—all nuclear installations.

The Anglo-French Plan of 19th March, 1956, did not stipulate when the control organ is to be set up, but it is to be assumed that it would be immediately after the entry into force of the agreement; certainly this was the attitude of all previous Anglo-French proposals.

U.S.A.  
Treaty—as the Soviet and Anglo-French proposals both tacitly admit, then unrestricted access becomes an inevitable right.

The U.S. wish their control organ to be set up ‘without delay’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breaches of the Treaty</th>
<th>Soviet</th>
<th>U.K.-France</th>
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<td>&quot;The international control organ shall make recommendations to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression with regard to violators.&quot;</td>
<td>The Anglo-French plan, at much greater length, reaches in effect the same decision; breaches or delays in the carrying out of the Treaty must ultimately be referred to the Security Council.</td>
<td>The latest U.S. plan only refers to this question in passing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disclosure of Information</td>
<td>Figures to be submitted to the control organ within one month of its establishment.</td>
<td>Initial declaration of levels and budgetary information immediately following the start of control.</td>
<td>Full disclosure of military information 'concurrently' with control.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aerial Survey</td>
<td>The proposal of 27th March, 1956, provided that 'at a specified stage in the execution of the general disarmament programme when confidence among States had been strengthened, the countries concerned shall consider the possibility of using aerial photography as one of the methods of control.' The Note of 17th November, that the Soviet Government were willing, in the interests of reaching agreement, to consider using aerial photography to a depth of 800 km. on either side of the line at present dividing Europe. (See below—political settlements).</td>
<td>The Anglo-French Plan introduces control by aerial survey at the start of the programme, and continues to advocate its use throughout.</td>
<td>The most recent U.S. Disarmament Plan is little more than an extension of the Eisenhower 'Open Skies' Plan for control by aerial survey with a few nugatory disarmament measures, thrown in for decency's sake. Looking back, it is hard to decide whether the Eisenhower Plan was put forward with naivety or cynicism. All previous Western plans for control had included the use of aerial surveys. Eisenhower used part of an old plan to hit the world's headlines at the 'Summit' meeting, largely, one suspects, because neither the U.S. nor any other Western Power were ready to declare themselves on the recent conciliatory and realistic Soviet proposal of 10th May, 1955. What began as a stalling move became an entire policy. The 'Open Skies' Plan comprised all U.S. Disarmament...</td>
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Aerial Survey (continued)

Policy 1955-56. After a bit, the U.S. included in the 'Open Skies Plan the Soviet idea for control posts, which (see below) had been worked out for quite a different purpose. The declared aim of the 'Open Skies' Plan was to guarantee against a 'great surprise attack'. In fact, it could give no security since it was not planned to cover states allied to the U.S.A. and Soviet Union, but only those states themselves. It will be understood why Bulganin, with great courtesy, explained, in his letter to Eisenhower of 18th September, 1955, that he thought the plan nonsense, unless it was linked to disarmament.

Control Posts

This idea was intended to give security against surprise attack with conventional arms at an early stage in the disarmament plan when the Soviet Government argued that it was politically impracticable to allow the control organ into every armament factory, in order to check precisely the quantities of weapons and stores. This was originally a Soviet proposal and included in the plan of 10th May, 1955. There should be control posts at certain key-points such as ports, rail- and road-junctions, airports, so as to give warning about any excessive concentration of troops. The U.S.A., U.K. and France have since taken over the idea of control posts, though their reasons for so doing are obscure, since the control they advocate for the first stage of the disarmament programme is comprehensive and considerable.
middle course between the United States on one hand and the United Kingdom and France on the other).

Control — General

39. The control organ should be a flexible and well-balanced international instrument capable of checking that the measures in the agreed disarmament plan are carried out with the minimum interference in the internal affairs of states. The International Disarmament Organisation proposed by the United Kingdom and France is a top-heavy structure laying itself wide open to political disputes. The place for such disputes is, of course, the Security Council. The control authority should therefore be an entirely executive affair, as suggested by the Soviet Union. It should be composed of international civil servants and, as the West suggest, national officers or officials on loan. The control organ should be established at the time of the signature of the Disarmament Treaty and should expand so as to be fully equipped to deal with each disarmament measure it comes up against in each separate stage. Certain objects and installations should be named for continuous control, but the control authority should have wide rights of further access so as to investigate suspected violations. States should, as has been generally agreed, make full military disclosures at the time of the entry into force of the Disarmament Treaty, so that the Control Organ would become, in fact, a repository of all the military secrets of the world. A report should be presented annually, but otherwise the Control Organ should keep its knowledge confidential. The control posts suggested to guarantee against surprise attack should be used to provide security against conventional attack at the start of the programme, while factories manufacturing conventional weapons remain immune. Aerial survey would clearly be a cheap and effective method of control and should expand generally outwards from a central area in Europe to cover all participating states. Breaches, if procedural, should be settled by the control authority, but all major breaches would have to be referred to the Security Council. There is no reason why an agreement on these lines should not be reached by the Powers in 1957.

V. ‘Experiments in Control’

40. The idea of trying out control experiments, before agreement on a disarmament plan, was seized upon by the West in mid 1955 more as a stalling move than a genuine attempt to solve the disarmament question. The West were flummoxed by the Soviet proposal of 10th May of that year which both revealed the truth about the possibilities of nuclear control (see paragraph 4 above) and made broad steps towards agreement in every aspect of the disarmament field. Disarmament seemed a practical possibility. The Western Powers were unprepared for this eventuality. Hence the ‘Open Skies’ Plan. Hence other United States’ plans for ‘experiments in control’ the meagre outcome, incidentally, of the eight ‘task forces’, headed by a formidable array of industrialists, scientists and ex-generals which, said Mr. Stassen, United States representative in
the Disarmament Sub-Committee, had been set to bend their mammoth energies towards the solution of the control problem. Hence also the ‘Eden Plan’ for an experimental control area on either side of the line dividing East and West in Europe — a plan which was silently dropped from the West’s armoury when the West German Government complained that it would result in the tacit recognition of the East German authorities. The implementation of these plans, the West have argued, would create the necessary confidence required before the start of disarmament proper, that is, the West would have more time to think. In effect, the death-blow was given to all plans of this sort by Jules Moch, veteran French representative in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, when he stipulated that there should be no control not covering disarmament measures and likewise no disarmament without control. Both the Anglo-French plan of 19th March, 1956, and the United States plan of the following April tacitly admit this, although the United States accompanied this document with two other proposals — one for a technical exchange mission, the other for a demonstration test area. The Soviet Union have had nothing to do with any of these ‘confidence-building’ schemes.

VI. TIMING

41. The Soviet Union has throughout wished to lay down fixed time-limits for each stage of disarmament; the West have provided — and never more clumsily than in the Anglo-French plan of 19th March, 1956 — for means of stopping the programme if things should go wrong. The Soviet Union fears that the West will use the least opportunity to stop the programme before disarmament proper, but after the establishment of control; the West fear that the Soviet Union will insist on the carrying out of the full programme, even although certain states have defaulted.

42. The dilemma is a false one. It would clearly be desirable to lay down a time-table, of say, three years for the whole programme. If there were delays of a minor nature, the control authority would be able to settle the matter in an amicable manner, without reference to higher authority; if the delay or evasion were serious, and the consequences of bad faith, then the matter would inevitably have to be taken — unless prior agreement were reached — to the Security Council. The squabbles on this question over the years are symptomatic of the unreal atmosphere in which disarmament negotiations have hitherto been conducted: they are really disputes about the conveniently vague question of ‘international confidence’ — which would have to exist if there were to be a disarmament agreement at all, and whose very existence would itself liquidate such problems as this.

VII. CO-ORDINATION

43. Both the Soviet Union and the West have long agreed that the two aspects of the disarmament problem — nuclear and conventional — should be combined together in one programme. Immediately after World War II, both sides made proposals which corresponded with their
strategic needs: the Soviet Union called for the immediate prohibition of nuclear weapons, the West called for sweeping conventional reductions with nuclear weapons dealt with only at the end. Neither attitude was reasonable; how could the West agree to the abolition of nuclear weapons — and it was then supposed that they could be completely abolished — at the start of a disarmament programme, thus leaving the Soviet Union with an enormous conventional preponderance? Similarly, how could the Soviet Union agree to massive cuts in conventional weapons if the West were to keep their nuclear weapons until the end of the process? The approach of nuclear parity, by Soviet development of first the atomic weapon in 1949 and then the thermonuclear weapon in 1953, and of conventional parity, by the development of NATO and Western rearmament, prepared, paradoxically, the way for international agreement on disarmament. The Soviet Union led the way by proposing that nuclear weapons should be dealt with fifty per cent. of the way through conventional reductions (30th September, 1954); the West responded with a seventy-five per cent. bid (19th April, 1955); the Soviet Union concurred (10th May, 1955).

44. The West, uncertain of its role in a world of co-existence, and befuddled by the admission of the truth about the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons, apparently toyed with the idea of dropping nuclear disarmament and concentrating on conventional disarmament for the time being—an attitude voiced by Macmillan at the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers. Nothing daunted, the Soviet Government, when the Sub-Committee met in the Spring of 1956, proposed a plan for conventional disarmament, to find that the United Kingdom had joined with France to present a new, modified and creaky comprehensive plan that pleased no one. Hence the debates in the Sub-Committee in 1956, when the United Kingdom and French delegations attacked the Soviet Union for not providing for nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union, in its Note of 17th November, has shown that it is willing to do this, and there is today a further chance that agreement may be reached on the field that the disarmament treaty should cover.

VIII. DISARMAMENT AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS

45. The Western Powers have long urged that the implementation of a disarmament programme must be dependent on the development of international confidence, i.e. a settlement of outstanding political problems. The Soviet Government gave up, in 1955, their long-urged demands for an immediate unspecified ban on nuclear weapons and linked their disarmament plans to (i) a proposal for the withdrawal of forces of the Four Powers from Germany, with limited contingents left behind pending an agreement for their complete withdrawal; (ii) the liquidation of ‘foreign bases on the territory of other states’; (iii) the settlement of the Far East question according to the principles of sovereignty and international integrity — an obvious dig at the Nationalist Chinese in Formosa.
46. The West have sometimes suggested that they thought disarmament impossible unless Germany were re-unified. But they have never made crystal clear how precisely they supposed the two problems are linked. Adenauer has actually gone as far as to say that disarmament would help to bring about German re-unification. It is thus difficult to see what exactly the West has hitherto thought should be done to connect the two problems. On foreign bases, a United Kingdom memorandum (21st May, 1954) has stipulated that ‘military facilities of all kinds’ should be covered by the Disarmament Treaty, but did not go into detail.

47. The ‘re-assessment’ carried out by the West in the summer of 1955, following the 10th May proposal, was presumably intended to enable the respective Governments to put forward practical plans. One might have supposed, therefore, that they would have taken the obvious step of specifying the political settlements they required, if any, before disarmament. But this did not happen. Although Germany, European Security and Disarmament were discussed with the Soviet Union at the ‘Summit’ meeting and the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, the West, though agreeing to link the first two subjects, failed to fit in the third. A package-deal of all three could, given courage and imagination, have brought results. Unhappily this opportunity was not seized. The West stalled on disarmament, repeated cold war jargon on Germany, and were probably relieved when, in September, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal allowed them to slip back into their pre-co-existence attitudes. All the same, a more forthright Western acceptance of the challenge presented by the 10th May proposal might have altered, for instance, the whole course of history in Eastern Europe; the Hungarian tragedy — clearly a panic decision forced by the Soviet generals and the Stalinists headed by Molotov — need not have taken place.

48. The latest Anglo-French plan — of 19th March, 1956 — touches on confidence, but fails to specify the problems concerned and at what stage they should be dealt with. It stipulates that the executive committee must agree that ‘the necessary conditions of confidence exist for embarking upon the second (or third) stage of disarmament’. But we are not told what solution of what problem would be needed before confidence could be expected.

49. The Western Powers, of course, had Germany in mind. Western statesmen certainly appeared — when they last revealed their views on the subject — genuinely to desire the re-unification of Germany. It is all the more odd that they did not see (i) how unacceptable their insistence on a re-unified Germany’s right to join NATO would inevitably be to Soviet Russia, and (ii) how unnecessarily rigid their proposals actually were. A summary of the proposals put forward by the two sides on the subject of Germany during the past two years is given in Appendix A. It will be observed that they include measures which we might, had we not been told to the contrary, have supposed linked Disarmament to Germany. Sir Anthony Eden, indeed, actually used the same words to describe two of his proposals at the ‘Summit’ meeting; which Macmillan
at the meeting of Foreign Ministers, attacked Mr. Molotov for confusing.\footnote{1}

Broadly, the West stuck grimly to insisting that a United Germany must be able to belong to NATO if it wished to, and sought, by means of a series of proposals designed to give security to the Soviet Union, to bring the Soviet Government to accept this. The Soviet Government moved from the idea of a neutralised Germany to a blunt statement that the time was not ripe for German re-unification, \textit{since the achievements of the East German regime had to be preserved}. Both sides were, in fact, fighting battles which were already concluded; the twelve German divisions were not really essential ‘to defend the West’ in the nuclear warfare to which NATO was already committed in the event of war in Europe; and Germany is no longer a real threat to the Soviet Union, whose industrial output is now so far ahead that Germany can never catch up. The Soviet possession of nuclear weapons, also, should have prevented her government from psychopathic fears of revived German militarism.

50. The Soviet Government have offered several interesting concessions to make their attitude more acceptable; in particular, the two proposals of 27th March and 17th November, 1956, for (i) a zone of limitation of armaments in Europe and (ii) for applying the ‘Open Skies’ plan to a 800 kilometre stretch in Europe, deserve a great deal more attention than they have received. (They are fully described in Appendix A). The first — with the exception of the proposal for the prohibition of nuclear weapons within the zone — is much the same as Sir Anthony Eden’s first plan at the ‘Summit’, though that was ‘proposed in the context of European security’; the second, put forward during the middle of the Hungarian and Suez crises, suggests that the Soviet Government were still genuinely looking for some means of withdrawing from Hungary without losing face. Both proposals were treated unceremoniously in the West.

\footnote{1 On 18th July, Sir Anthony Eden proposed ‘a discussion’ — in the context of European security — about the total of forces and armaments on each side in Germany and the countries neighbouring Germany, supervised by a system of reciprocal control. This “was intended”, Sir Anthony Eden stated, “to make a practical experiment in the operative control of armaments. This, if locally successful, in Europe, might, as it were, extend outwards from the centre to the periphery”. On 21st July, Eden introduced his disarmament proposal (see paragraph 40 above). Of this, Eden remarked: ‘I suggest that we should consider whether we cannot set up a simple joint inspection system of the forces confronting each other in Europe. It should not be impossible to decide that, over a specified area, to be agreed between us extending perhaps by a fixed depth on either side of the line which now divides Eastern and Western Europe, there should be supervision by inspecting teams . . . . This proposal is not, of course, connected with our discussion for the unity of Germany . . . this suggestion could, however, be a practical experiment in the co-operative operation of armaments, an experiment which, if it were locally successful, might extend outwards from the centre to the periphery’. The same words about two different proposals! And yet the two topics — German re-unification and European security on the one hand and Disarmament on the other — were supposed, in Western orthodox thinking, to be entirely separate.}
IX. PROCEDURE

51. The U.N. Disarmament Sub-Committee has hitherto conducted itself more like an unruly legislature than a committee. The representatives of the different Powers have made speeches, read speeches rather, and have hardly attempted to settle down to a business-like discussion. They have strayed from one topic to another. It is suggested that the Sub-Committee should take a lesson from the House of Commons, which, at the Committee stage of discussion of bills, really turns itself into a committee. There is absolutely no reason why the Disarmament Sub-Committee should not similarly settle down to discuss proposals word by word, clause by clause and chapter by chapter. That is the only way that the Sub-Committee will get through its business. The Sub-Committee is served by a highly competent secretariat supplied by the U.N. Let it be competently used.

Part Two

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

1. Part One showed how the ends of the disarmament tangle are lying loose. Part Two shows how they must be tied up.

2. Part One suggests that the kind of disarmament programme which should now be sought should comprise the following:

(i) a controlled prohibition of the future production of all nuclear weapons. There will be a margin of error in respect of the observance of this prohibition by states already possessing stocks of weapon-grade nuclear material, but these states are those already possessing nuclear weapons. Other states must be persuaded to accept, in the general interest, not only this margin of error but also international control over their future nuclear energy programmes. This is the price they must pay to avoid a global nuclear arms race, resulting in final catastrophe;

(ii) controlled prohibition of nuclear weapons test explosions;

(iii) an unqualified ban on the use of nuclear weapons by possessor states;

(iv) similar treatment of other weapons of mass destruction, i.e. bacteriological and chemical weapons;

(v) conventional reductions — manpower and weapons — down to levels already proposed and agreed;

(vi) expanding control;

(vii) proposals on German re-unification and European Security to be tied to the staged disarmament plan so as to increase, at each step, the security of both West and East.

3. A five-stage plan for disarmament, German re-unification and European and world security is set out below. It may appear over-
ambitious. In particular, the sections dealing with the Middle and Far East are not fully developed. But it is surely desirable to have a draft, however inadequate, to work upon. The principle of the draft plan is that security and disarmament must advance together from the solution of the central problem of Germany.

FIVE STAGE PLAN FOR DISARMAMENT, GERMAN RE-UNIFICATION AND WORLD SECURITY

Stage I — Simultaneously:

(i) The United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union start to withdraw 50 per cent. of their troops at present stationed in Germany.

Any conceivable weakness suffered by the West as a result of this should be offset by the Soviet withdrawal. There is no intention here of neutralising Germany; but both the West and the Soviet Union must be prepared to make some concession to secure German re-unification. A Four Power withdrawal is all that is suggested; West Germany will not be required to withdraw from NATO, nor East Germany from the Warsaw Pact: see Stage IV (i). The Soviet Union must not insist that Germany leave NATO and the Western Powers must not insist that a re-united Germany must be able to belong exclusively to NATO. The modus vivendi suggested in Stage IV (i) is practicable and all faces are saved. Of course, it is possible that the withdrawal of troops from Germany in this fashion will actually be welcomed by powers such as the United Kingdom (see also Stage II (i)).

(ii) Freeze at existing levels all conventional armaments, overall manpower and military budgets.

This would not be controlled; but it is difficult to see how states’ security would suffer from a ban on the increase in the present level of armaments — which is anyway being reduced. This proposition is a gesture, an agreement at least to maintain peace at its present precarious consistency.

(iii) Limitation on nuclear weapon test explosions.

i.e., to a certain number each year. It would be preferable to reach an agreement on a complete ban, even at this early stage. But there is apparently no likelihood of securing Western agreement to this.

(iv) A U.N. expeditionary force shall take up position along the East-West demarcation line in Europe.

So far as is known, this proposal is made here for the first time. It has the great advantage of associating the U.N. with the disarmament plan from the start. The aim of the proposal is to ensure that no frontier incidents wreck the disarmament plan at its start — and the likelihood of these is considerable, taking into account that the atmosphere in East Germany at the time of a Soviet withdrawal would probably be inflammatory.

The U.N. Force would have to be composed, like that at present in the Middle East, of representatives of smaller countries. There is a limit to the amount of troops such smaller countries are able to contribute
to a U.N. force, but this has not yet been reached. It is possible that the force at present in the Middle East, or elements of it, could eventually be transferred to Europe. Certainly the European force should be formed in the same way as the Middle Eastern.

The demarcation line, though nominally the East-West line in Europe, would in fact be probably limited by the line of demarcation in Germany, since the Austro-Eastern and Yugoslav-West European frontiers do not constitute dividing lines between the Western and Communist blocs; the Greco-Bulgarian and Russo-Norwegian frontiers might, however, be additionally given token U.N. forces.

An earlier draft of this pamphlet proposed a U.N. force along the entire Western-Communist demarcation line — from Turkey, Persia, Pakistan to Korea and Indo-China, with U.N. naval units in the China seas; but it is felt that this is, for the time being, at least, an extravagant idea. But is is a proposal which would certainly repay further consideration — perhaps as a development of the Soviet plan for control posts at strategic points suggested in the Soviet proposal of 10th May, 1955 (see above, Part One, end of paragraph 38).

(v) An international control organ shall be set up with facilities adequate to guarantee (i) and (iii) and to gain information about (ii). It is recommended that the control headquarters should — at any rate at present — be in Berlin — the effective meeting place of West and East. The control organ should be staffed by an international secretariat, though it is recognised that, at least at first, the work of the control organ will have to be done by nationals of the different states. These will none the less be bound by the rules governing the conduct of international civil servants (Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter).

(vi) Aerial survey shall take place — on a reciprocal basis — of territory 800 km. either side of the demarcation line dividing East and West Europe.

The Soviet Government agreed, in its Note of 17th November last, to make this limited concession to the 'Open Skies' plan. At first, the operation would have to be carried out by nationals, in nationally-owned aeroplanes, of the two sides; but they should be bound by the same international obligations as those in the control organ.

(vii) Representatives of the Federal German Republic and the East German Government shall confer together, under the chairmanship of the Commander of the U.N. expeditionary force, on the organisation of free elections.

This proposal is likely to be hotly contested by the West. The Federal German Government has resolutely refused to meet the East German Government at the Conference table; and the other Western Powers have fully supported this attitude: yet officials of the two countries have been meeting unofficially, on administrative affairs, for a long time. The meeting now proposed would also be essentially administrative, yet would enable the East German authorities to say that they had helped to make the arrangements for free elections. It is, however, arguable that the proposal should come in Stage II, not Stage I.
On the completion of Stage I.

Stage II — Simultaneously:

(i) *The United States, Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom start to withdraw the second 50 per cent. of their troops in Germany.* See comment on Stage I (i). Other developments in Stage I and concurrent developments in Stage II should make this further step acceptable. The Federal German Republic and East Germany will continue as essential elements in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

(ii) *Representatives of the United States, Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom shall meet together — perhaps at Geneva — to produce a guarantee of the German-Polish and German-Czech frontiers. There may be some minor adjustments, in Germany’s favour, but, in the main, the frontier shall be concluded before the last troops of the Four Powers leave German territory.*

There is no use pretending that this will be easily accepted by Germany; but any other solution would bring further suffering to the peoples of Eastern Europe. The guarantee is an essential part of German reunification and is the price Germany must pay for it.

(iii) *Nuclear weapons shall be prohibited in Germany.*

This proposal has been included in several recent Soviet plans. If the West were to withdraw from West Germany, nuclear weapons would automatically be banned from the Federal German Republic, who undertook not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons by the Paris Agreement. This proposal thus merely extends the Paris Agreement to East Germany.

(iv) *The United States, Soviet Union, and China reduce their total armed forces to 2.5 million men and the United Kingdom and France to 750 thousand men. Conventional armaments and overall military budgets shall be correspondingly reduced.*

There should be no difficulty about these figures since they had been agreed by the Sub-Committee as appropriate for the first stage of disarmament by the end of last year. The allocation of figures to China means that, by this time at least, the Chinese People’s Government will have to be filling the Chinese seat in the U.N. The figures are naturally subject to negotiation, since, for example, the United Kingdom expects to have reduced as low as 700 thousand by April, 1958.

(v) *Control posts shall be established at large ports, road and railway functions and in aerodromes throughout the territories of the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers, in order to warn against any dangerous concentration of troops.*

All Powers in the Sub-Committee have now accepted this proposal, though it is here restricted to the territories of the two grand alliances for the first time. As suggested above, this proposal might be used so that the U.N. force might take up positions all along the edge of the Iron Curtain. Control and the reductions under (iv) will not (see (vii) below) be fully effective at this stage; the control posts should make up for any apparent loss of security.
(vi) The aerial surveys provided for in Stage I (vi) shall be extended to 1200 km, on either side of the line of demarcation between East and West in Europe.

See Stage III (vii) below.

(vii) The control organ shall establish central branches in the capitals of the five powers named in (iv). They shall have the right to inspect all governmental documents relating to military budgets.

The control organ’s powers will thus not be, at this stage, highly developed. Its functions will be to check, in a general way, that the reductions under (iv) are being carried out. It may be argued that these reductions are being inadequately controlled; but the control posts established under (i) should be adequate guarantee against surprise attack by conventional weapons; and states’ facilities to guard against nuclear attack — if there are any — are not touched. The implications of evasion, at this stage, are thus not grave enough for the control, as envisaged here, to be inadequate.

(viii) Establishment of a demilitarised zone fifty miles deep, guaranteed by the U.N. expeditionary force on either side of the line dividing East and West in Europe.

This plan derives ultimately from one of Sir Anthony Eden’s, at the ‘Summit’ Conference. It was later taken up by the Soviet Government in their proposal of 27th March, 1956. This will be a further safeguard against attack and will be a very salutary experiment in international confidence. It should be considered whether similar demilitarised zones should not be established in the two other major theatres of international tension — the Middle and Far East. Plans for these are not included in the present draft plan; but they should be part of a final world settlement.

On the completion of Stage II,

Stage III — Simultaneously:

(i) Free German elections under U.N. supervision. A new all-German Government would then be formed, to draft a constitution. The constitution will be adopted and new elections will be immediately held: as a result, the first Government proper of a re-united Germany shall be formed.

(ii) The Four Powers — in effect only the United States and the Soviet Union — shall withdraw 50 per cent. of their troops remaining in other countries of Europe.

The way is thus paved for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Europe. The West would, of course, have no need to maintain the full NATO machinery as the strategic need for it — Soviet troops in East Europe — was removed. But NATO itself would remain.

(iii) Prohibition of nuclear weapon test explosions.

(iv) All States, other than those named in Stage II (iv), shall start to reduce their armed forces either to 300 thousand men or to a level of one per cent. of their total population — whichever is the
lower. This process shall be complete by the end of Stage IV. Armaments and military budgets shall be proportionately reduced.

These figures represent a compromise between the 150 and 200 thousand suggested by the Soviet Union and the figure of 500 thousand suggested — with United Kingdom support — by the United States. The one per cent. of population figure derives from a paper presented by the three Western Powers in 1952.

(v) The United States, Soviet Union and China shall reduce their total armed forces to 1.75 million men; and the United Kingdom and France shall reduce to 700 thousand men. Armaments and military budgets shall be correspondingly reduced.

The final figures (see Stage IV) for those Powers will be 1 million to 1.5 million for the first three and 500 thousand for the two latter.

(vi) The control organ shall be expanded to guarantee (ii), (iv) and (v).

It shall have entirely free access at all times to all objects of control, i.e., all war-making or war-storing plants and installations and shall be able to carry out surprise visits to any place or installation where breaches of the disarmament treaty are suspected.

Such wide powers are essential if really significant reductions are going to be accepted by the Great Powers. Local rules — such as the warning given of routine inspections — should be worked out. Surprise visits should be carried out rarely and only with the agreement of the director-general of the control organ in the country, or the group of countries concerned. The delay involved in such a procedure would not be serious since breaches of the conventional aspect of the problem would not present risks to peace demanding immediate action.

(vii) The aerial surveys provided for in Stage I (vi) and Stage II (vi) shall be extended to the whole of the territories of state members of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, and, in addition, to all countries in alliance with any of those states; this would include, therefore, China, Formosa, North and South Korea, the Indo-China successor states, the Bagdad Pact and SEATO powers not members of NATO.

Aerial survey is certainly the most convenient and the cheapest way of controlling disarmament in large tracts of territory. The Soviet Government’s concession on 17th November, 1956, following that on 27th March, 1956, suggests that this is a matter upon which agreement can be negotiated.

On completion of Stage III,

Stage IV — Simultaneously:

(i) The re-united Germany signifies adherence to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Probably the only way of saving faces on all sides.

(ii) The Four Powers withdraw their remaining troops in foreign territory; but arrangements may be made whereby the United States will be permitted to retain troops in the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union will be permitted to retain troops in the republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
The qualification may not be required. But if the United States keeps troops in the United Kingdom, then the Soviet Union must have a quid pro quo. To find this in the Baltic States is perhaps far-fetched; the Soviet Government may perhaps put in another claim. This should be heard with sympathy in the West.

(iii) Total prohibition of the use and production of nuclear weapons. See below for control (v).

(iv) The overall armed forces of the United States, Soviet Union and China shall be reduced to 1 million to 1.5 million and of the United Kingdom and France to 500 thousand.

The figure for the three Powers is the old and agreed one. 500 thousand is a new figure for the United Kingdom and France, but it ought to fit the defence plans of the powers concerned.

(v) The control organ shall be expanded to deal effectively with (ii), (iii) and (iv).

(vi) Aerial survey, as a method of control, shall be generally extended throughout the world.

Here the Soviet Government would probably gain more than they would lose.

Stage V

(i) Three Security Pacts, to be later endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly, shall be signed, recognising existing frontiers, and agreeing to settle disputes by peaceful means, between

(a) the States which are members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact;

(b) a specified list of countries of the Middle East, including the members of the Bagdad Pact, states in alliance with Egypt or Israel and, again, the United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union and France;

(c) a specified list of countries of the Far East, including the Chinese People’s Government, the Chinese Nationalist Government of Formosa, the Indo-Chinese successor states, North and South Korea, and the members of SEATO.

(ii) The control organ shall remain permanently in existence and shall co-operate throughout with the U.N. Atomic Energy Agency. The U.N. expeditionary forces shall remain in permanent existence, with changing personnel.

(iii) The General Assembly shall consider what further reductions can be made in the armed forces of member states towards those levels required for the maintenance of internal security.

Such a provision was included at the end of the Anglo-French plan on timing of 11th June, 1954.
CONCLUSION

THIS PAMPHLET is written in the conviction that disarmament or, rather, internationally controlled reduction of armaments, is both desirable and practicable. It is desirable, firstly, because of the obvious beneficial effect on national economies of reductions in defence expenditures; secondly, because of the great lightening in the international atmosphere which would follow a controlled disarmament plan linked with a general settlement of outstanding political problems. The alternative to disarmament is a global nuclear arms race with no holds barred; the alternative to a settlement of, say, the German problem is a world permanently on the brink of world war.

Disarmament is also practicable: not merely unilateral disarmament, or reductions, as being planned in the Ministry of Defence, which is merely an internal adjustment; but internationally controlled disarmament. Admittedly, the implementation of a plan such as suggested in Part Two would demand sacrifices of sovereignty by nation states; it could be argued that the setting up of an effective control system would imply intolerable interference in states’ freedom to settle their own affairs. But the whole problem of human affairs in the twentieth century is one of control: human control of the present wave of the industrial revolution. Disarmament must be an experiment in international control, control, that is, for the common benefit, of competing national attitudes. It is unduly pessimistic to suppose that the Soviet Union will inevitably refuse to share in such a project: the Soviet political system is itself a form of economic control of a rapidly industrialising society; we in the West believe it a perversion of what was originally a Western attitude and is not, therefore, quite irreconcilable. And the Soviet Union has as much to lose from a global nuclear arms race as ourselves. It will no doubt be said that the present state of international relations would forbid the start of a comprehensive disarmament programme. But ‘international confidence’ is not demanded at the start. Confidence is created as the programme goes along. Confidence will come.

The Disarmament Sub-Committee might have reached agreement in the spring of 1956. Now it is reassembling. The occasion is more favourable than ever. A draft which seeks to take into account the fears and demands of all has been set out in Part Two. If the Four Powers’ experts on Germany, German re-unification and European Security are not present in the Music Room at Lancaster House, let them be sent for. Now is the time for decision. It is the golden moment of opportunity. It may never come again.
APPENDIX A

PROPOSALS ON GERMANY

THE WEST

Proposals at Geneva III (Foreign Ministers meeting — October-November 1955)

(a) Re-unification
   (i) Free all-German elections, resulting in
   (ii) Formation of National Assembly, which would draft
   (iii) A Constitution, which, being adopted,
   (iv) An all-German Government would be formed, which would
   (v) Conclude a Peace Treaty.

(b) Security (re Germany)
   (i) Military forces in a zone comprising areas of comparable size, depth
       and importance on both sides of the line dividing the re-unified
       Germany and East Europe should be 'limited and balanced'.
   (ii) The Soviet Union would have the right to operate a radar system in
       the West part of the zone and the Western Powers in the East.
   (iii) Armed aggression by any NATO member v a non-NATO member and
       vice-versa would oblige all parties to take 'appropriate action to meet
       that common danger'.
   (iv) These measures would come into effect progressively at stages to be
       agreed: the signature would be concurrent with the signature of the
       agreement on the plan for re-unification. The final stage would only
       come into effect when a re-unified Germany decided to enter NATO.

(It will be seen that the Security proposals, though nominally concurrent with
those on re-unification, would really only come into effect at the conclusion of
the re-unification plan; for (i) of the Security proposal pre-supposes a united
Germany; and it is difficult to see how Germany could be re-united in any legal
sense until at least (iii) of the re-unification plan, and, probably, not until (iv).

Proposals at Geneva II (the 'Summit' Meeting — July 1955)

(a) Re-unification
   As (a) at Geneva III. This plan in all its essentials was first put forward
   at the Berlin Conference of 1954.

(b) Security
   (i) After the re-unification of Germany, a European Security Pact between
       Anthony Eden.
   (ii) 'A system of reciprocal control' of total forces and armaments in
       Germany and in the countries neighbouring Germany; out of this grew
       plan (b) proposed at Geneva III by Sir Anthony Eden.
   (iii) A demilitarised zone should be set up between East and West—
       proposed by Sir Anthony Eden.

(c) Disarmament
   Joint inspection of forces confronting East and West. This was supposed to
   have no relation to any of the German or European Security plans of
   the West, but, if it were implemented in Germany—as it was clearly
   intended to be when first proposed—then the two German governments
   would inevitably be involved.
Other Proposals

(a) Sir Anthony Eden, at a speech at the English Speaking Union just before the 'Summit' meeting, launched a plan for the control system at present in force in W.E.U. to be 'extended eastwards'. Of this plan, nothing more has been heard.

(b) In November, 1954, Monsieur Mendes-France was apparently thinking in terms of a plan whereby the control system envisaged for the then as yet unformed W.E.U. should be repeated in the Warsaw Pact countries; and that, thereafter, the two control systems should be merged.

W.E.U. Control

The Paris Agreements provide for an inspection system of the armaments of the W.E.U. countries. This system has now at long last been set up, under the Italian Admiral Ferrari. It can hardly be said to be either a Disarmament or a European Security Plan; but it does provide a possible lesson and example for future control plans, if it works according to its statute.

THE SOVIET UNION

November 17th, 1956

(i) Aerial photography of 800 km. on each side of demarcation line at present dividing East and West.

(ii) Controlled reduction, during 1957, of one-third of the armed forces of the U.K., U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

(iii) Liquidation within two years of foreign military bases on the territory of other states.


(v) Non-aggression pact between members of NATO and members of Warsaw Treaty.

March 27th, 1956

(i) Zone of limitation and inspection of armaments 'including the territory of both parts of Germany and states adjacent to them', with ceilings to be agreed (in conjunction with the states concerned) for U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and French troops within the zone; atomic and hydrogen bombs would be prohibited within the zone and there would be joint inspection.

(ii) Prior to (i), atomic weapons would be banned on German territory.

October-November 1955 German Re-unification (Meeting of Foreign Ministers)

Mr. Molotov suggested that there could be no immediate plan for German re-unification, but that an all-German council should be formed of representatives of West and East Germany to consider contacts.

The Soviet delegation, both at Geneva II and Geneva III, proposed a Security Pact along the lines of (v) of the proposal of 17th November, 1956 (above).

May 10th, 1955

(i) Staged elimination of foreign bases over two years — as in (iii) of 17th November plan.

(ii) Immediate withdrawal of U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and French troops in Germany, except limited contingents temporarily left pending an agreement for their complete withdrawal.
APPENDIX B

DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS 1945-1957

I. THE PRELIMINARIES

1. June, 1945. Art. II(i) of the U.N. Charter provided that the ‘General Assembly may consider’ ways and means of permitting disarmament and ‘may make recommendations’ to Member States or to the Security Council. Art. 26 stipulated that the Security Council ‘shall be responsible for formulating . . . plans . . . for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments’.


II. THE U.N. ATOMIC ENERGY AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS COMMISSIONS

Atomic Energy Commission

5. June 13th, 1947. Western plan for complete international ownership of use and possession of all fissile material (Baruch Plan); an international authority would own all fissile material from mine to end-product. The two weaknesses of the Plan are described in the footnote to paragraph 3 of the text above.


7. October, 1948. Atomic Energy Commission, in its third report, declares that an impasse has been reached and recommends suspension of its work.


Conventional Armaments Commission

9. Western view: international confidence is a prerequisite of disarmament, i.e., disclosure of existing military strength and establishment of an effective system of verification required before start of disarmament.

10. Soviet view: an all-round reduction of existing armed forces by one-third to take place immediately. Control to be established ‘simultaneously’.

11. No agreement reached, even on plan of work.

III. THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION


14. 28th May, 1952. Tripartite (U.K., U.S.A. and French) proposals in Commission for reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces; U.S.A. U.S.S.R. and China to reduce to between 1 and 1½ million men; U.K. and France to between 700,000 and 800,000 men; the armed forces of all other States normally to be less than 1 per cent. of population.
15. 12th August, 1952. Supplementary Tripartite Proposals, proposing principles for the co-ordination of nuclear and conventional disarmament in one balanced programme.

IV. THE SUB-COMMITTEE OF THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

17. 28th November, 1953. General Assembly approves resolution suggesting that the Disarmament Commission set up a sub-committee of 'Powers principally involved, which should seek in private an acceptable solution' (Soviet bloc abstains).

A May-June, 1954. First meeting of Sub-Committee.
19. 21st May, 1954. U.K. memorandum proposes (i) that the Disarmament Convention should cover: 'All types of weapons, all types of armed forces, and military facilities of all kinds'; (ii) the weapons to be covered should be divided into two groups: (a) weapons to be prohibited, and (b) weapons to be limited and reduced.

20. 11th June, 1954. Anglo-French Plan on timing, with the following main provisions: (a) States should regard themselves as prohibited from the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction except in defence against aggression. (b) After the positioning of a control organ (to be effected within a specified time), and as soon as the control organ reports it can effectively enforce them, the following measures should be successively carried out: (i) A freeze of overall man-power and expenditure at 31st December, 1953 levels. (ii) One-half of the reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces (figures to be agreed). (iii) Prohibition of manufacture of all nuclear and other prohibited weapons. (iv) Second half of the agreed reductions. (v) Total prohibition and elimination of all nuclear and other prohibited weapons, and the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.

B Second Meeting of Sub-Committee, February-May and August-October, 1955
21. 8th March, 1955. Revised version of Anglo-French Plan of 11th June, 1954, now supported, in addition, by Canada and the U.S.A.
22. 29th March, 1955. Anglo-French memorandum on reductions of armed forces proposes that:—
(a) U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and China should reduce to between 1 and 1½ million men.
(b) U.K. and France should reduce to 650,000 men.
(c) Forces permitted to all other States should be 'considerably lower' than the above levels.
23. 19th April, 1955. Anglo-French proposal advancing the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons from the end to three-quarters of the way through the conventional reductions.
24. 10th May, 1955. Soviet proposals: main points:—
(a) Acceptance of Western view that development of confidence is a prerequisite of disarmament and of acceptance by states of rigid control.
(b) Acceptance of Western proposals on timing of nuclear prohibitions and figures for reductions of armed forces.
(c) Statement that 'there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organising the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons'.

C The 'Summit' Meeting, July, 1955

25. During the course of the discussion on Disarmament at this meeting the following proposals were made:—
(a) Eisenhower ('Open Skies') Plan for exchange of blue prints of military establishments and verification by aerial survey.
(b) The Faure Plan for proportional reduction of military expenditures and devotion of portions of sums saved to the improvement of living standards in under-developed countries.
(c) Eden Plan for joint inspection of forces confronting each other in Europe.
(d) Bulganin Proposal, repeating Soviet proposals of 10th May, 1955, but proposing also:
(i) A level of armed forces of 150-200,000 men for all States other than the Great Powers.
(ii) Great Powers should pledge themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

26. Resumed session of the Disarmament Sub-Committee in New York, in August-October, made no progress. This was mainly due to the U.S. decision to place all its past proposals 'in the deep freeze' and to press only the Eisenhower Plan for 'Open Skies'. Deadlock continued at the Geneva meeting of Foreign Ministers in November, 1955.

D Third Meeting of Sub-Committee, March-May, 1956

27. 19th March, 1956. Revised Anglo-French Plan, including a preliminary stage to be put into effect immediately, 'before confidence established', providing only for conventional weapons.
29. 3rd April, 1956. U.S. plan for the 'first phase of a comprehensive disarmament plan.'

E Later Developments

31. 17th November, 1956. Soviet proposal recapitulates past Soviet proposals and proposes, in addition, that the Eisenhower 'Open Skies' plan should be put into effect in a test area on each side of the line at present dividing NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers. Acceptance also of U.S. figures for 'first phase' reductions.
32. 18th March, 1957. Fourth Meeting of Sub-Committee begins.
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