00:00:00.000 - 00:00:16.600

Hello and welcome to Warpod, the official podcast of the Remote Warfare Programme. In our monthly Westminster Roundup podcast, we give you a quick roundup analysis of the two top stories from Westminster, chosen by Liam, that's him, and Megan, that's her. So Liam, what is your story of the month?

00:00:17.220 - 00:00:35.100

Well, hi Megan, I am actually recording this podcast from a cupboard. That's very exciting. The situation we find ourselves in, I suppose it's the least problematic, many other people suffering in more challenging ways. I'm just recording a podcast from a cupboard.

00:00:35.660 - 00:01:00.280

But anyway, yeah, yeah, exactly. Well, look, we're still doing the Westminster Roundup podcast though, and it has been an interesting month, but I think lots of things have been happening with regards to politics through the lens of the current pandemic. And I think one of the things that we've talked a lot about on this podcast over the last couple of months

00:01:00.280 - 00:01:15.280

is the Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review, which is this. You remembered the whole name, which is very impressive. It's only because I've got it in front of me on a laptop. I can read it and I can make sure I get it right. Although there's a few,

00:01:17.420 - 00:01:40.980

some people asking whether development is going to be included as part of this review. And some places I've seen that development has been included in the full title and other places I've not seen it. And I think the list of stakeholders does not include DFID, which is an interesting development.

00:01:41.140 - 00:02:08.820

Anyway, I wanted to talk about the fact that we had a timeline. It was meant to be completed, the review, by the spending review, which was anticipated for July 2020. But obviously with everything going on, there's speculation that the review will be delayed, not least because the spending review is actually most likely going to be delayed

00:02:10.220 - 00:02:31.260

beyond July, which has a knock-on effect on the review. Because it did seem like there was a plan to kind of link what was coming out of the review with this spending review, given that obviously money is a very important part of getting this right. Although, of course, as we've argued in the past, it's not everything.

00:02:31.700 - 00:02:52.860

We need to understand what exactly our strategic priorities are before we ask the question about, well, how much is that going to cost and what are we going to spend things on? So we've definitely seen that there may be a delay, which is an interesting point, because something that we've been arguing and others have similarly argued is that,

00:02:53.260 - 00:03:15.840

given the positive side of things, that the government was going to commit to, at least rhetorically, they were saying they were going to commit to wide-ranging civil society engagement and consultation. This was a response to a parliamentary question that came out, I think it was last month, or maybe even in February.

00:03:16.760 - 00:03:43.780

The answer was in March from Lord Ahmed, the FCO DFID minister, saying that there was going to be this broad-ranging consultation, which is really positive. But I know we were discussing this before recording the podcast, and there is a challenge in achieving that wide consultation and getting that integrated into the review in such a short space of time. I think you had

00:03:44.340 - 00:03:59.280

some of the roundtables that we've been holding at ORG, for example. There's a good example of the Canadian case, wasn't there? In the 2015 review, yeah, I think they had quite a big focus on having that external engagement as well. But they found that because they were doing it at the same time as writing the internal

00:03:59.280 - 00:04:15.860

review, there was this mismatch where you didn't actually have a chance to include the external feedback. So like you say, we've been arguing for a while that there should be more focus on really having a good timeline for ensuring that you not only have engagement with civil society and external experts, but also that it's meaningful and actually has a chance to have an impact,

00:04:15.900 - 00:04:37.020

definitely. Yeah, and I think we should take the lesson from Canada on that point to see how that, and I think how serious the government is with this external consultation, because if it takes seriously this point about the timelines and the impact that that can have on being able to embed

00:04:37.020 - 00:04:57.880

and integrate, incorporate some of this stuff from external experts into the review, then surely they should think about maybe extending the timeline of the review. But of course, if it's delayed anyway, perhaps there will be a bit more time, notwithstanding the fact that I think there is a significant amount of evidence suggesting that lots of people

00:04:57.880 - 00:05:14.840

have sort of been, their roles have been slightly changed. Absolutely, and I guess you can see that even in our interaction with people in the government, like trying to talk to people within FCO or MoDI, they're all very busy focusing on COVID, and so having that engagement is quite difficult. So I think it is quite, it'd be quite meaningful

00:05:14.840 - 00:05:32.040

to have a longer timeline to be able to actually do some work on this, definitely. I think it's notable as well that the Canadian review was actually meant to have 24 months and was cut down to 12, and even then they had a very hard time having enough engagement with civil society, and so trying to do this in six months, which is the initial timeline we had,

00:05:32.500 - 00:05:51.000

has been, it's been very tight, and everybody's been saying that it's far too short. Especially for a review that's supposed to be the most comprehensive review since the Cold War, it'd be great to have more time. And it's interesting as well, because look, if you look at the Modernising Defence Programme,

00:05:51.020 - 00:06:12.960

the National Security Capabilities Review, which sort of took place between 2017 and well, I think it was the end of 2018, when you had the publication of the Modernising Defence Programme, the defence element of that review, that took a significant amount of time, and that was just meant to be a sort of so-called mini strategic reviewer of threats. So, and I mean, the one

00:06:12.960 - 00:06:32.560

argument that the government and other experts have said as well, a lot of this thinking has already been done because of these reviews and because of the time taken, so that we can then take that analysis and then inject that into the current review. But I think still, given that there is so much more of a focus that we've already been discussing on that external

00:06:32.560 - 00:06:56.040

engagement, that they still probably will have to do a lot of groundwork in making sure that that is truly incorporated into the review. And the last thing I want to say is that obviously all the committees now, despite Parliament not being in session at the moment, have launched their inquiries into the integrated review. So it's quite busy, and I think there's

00:06:56.040 - 00:07:13.300

going to be a lot of interest. We've seen a lot of articles from different MPs, Tom Tugendhat, Elissa Kearns, who's a new MP and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee now, and Emily Thornberry as well. I think Emily Thornberry and Tom Tugendhat both doing, I'm not sure if it's a joint article, but a piece. No, two separate ones, yeah. Two separate ones, but being launched

00:07:13.300 - 00:07:35.640

on Politics Home about why this is such an important review. But anyway, yeah, that's kind of my story. I think, wait and see, I think we keep saying wait and see about this integrated review, but it very much does feel like that every time we speak. Absolutely, definitely. So anyway, Megan, what is your story? So my story is that we've seen an increased engagement

00:07:35.640 - 00:07:56.600

around the 250 troops who are going to be deployed to the UN MINUSMA operation in Mali this year, which is something we've been asking for for a long time. So we've seen that the UK has kind of committed to deploying these 250 troops, but there's been very little engagement within Parliament to ask what are they supposed to be doing and what are the success terms for that

00:07:56.600 - 00:08:19.560

operation. But now we are starting to see quite a lot more engagement from MPs, and we've seen a lot of questions being asked. The answers are very varied, so some of them have been a little bit more detailed. Very vague. Very, very vague. Actually, I was just saying before, it's quite frustrating reading the replies from the Minister for Armed Forces, James Heapy, who has usually a

00:08:19.560 - 00:08:39.670

one-line reply saying, oh, we are going along with the UN goals, which isn't very clarifying. But it has been really good to have more engagement because we've been seeing for a long time that both within the UK, but also across Europe and France, for example, that there's been very little engagement with these deployments. And it pays back to this wider point we've been

00:08:39.670 - 00:08:58.810

emphasizing for a long time, where remote warfare and partner operations are seen as a very low risk form of engagement. And so there's no challenge when it actually happens. And it's been something we've been exploring for a while, also comparing it to the Danish approach, where MPs often challenge a lot more and ask the government more questions. And so the government is forced to

00:08:58.810 - 00:09:21.650

justify why they are engaging. And it's been quite an interesting contrast to see that kind of different level of engagement. Yeah, no, absolutely. And I mean, I think what's quite interesting about this as well is that, and this reflects some of the conversations that we've had with troops, is they're not quite clear on what the mission objective is. And when I say that, I mean,

00:09:21.910 - 00:09:47.330

are they there truly to support the UN mission through this long range reconnaissance unit that they're forming? Or is it actually a slightly different purpose, which is to bolster their support to the French? And of course, you've got the politics of the fact that the US has been talking a lot about pulling back from many of its deployments across the continent, and whether

00:09:47.330 - 00:10:12.790

actually the French need great support. And of course, with everything going on with the UK trying to, very much linked to the previous story, with the UK trying to sort of firm up its future mission, global mission, whether this is also part of the UK trying to be seen as still a lead security partner with its European allies, and particularly with the French. I mean,

00:10:12.870 - 00:10:38.710

we've obviously seen a lot of developments and joint exercises with the French over the last sort of six years, five years. But I think it's sort of been increased given the current situation with the negotiations out with the UK and the European Union. But yeah, I mean, I think the fact that, and I'm trying to understand also how it, because you're right, when you say there's

00:10:38.710 - 00:10:58.210

been lots of parliamentary questions, but it seemed like there was media interest at a particular point earlier on in this year. And then suddenly, MPs have sort of realised that this is going on, have then sort of decided, well, hang on a minute, I think we need to ask more questions about it. I think you're right, definitely. And I think it's interesting to see as well that there are some MPs

00:10:58.210 - 00:11:14.110

who are challenging that influence piece, where they're saying, you know, it's possible to build influence while building capacity, which is what we need to do. But it needs to be clear on the ground what people are trying to work towards. Like we've seen that people we interview in these places, into the Hill, for example, don't know what they're supposed to be working towards,

00:11:14.370 - 00:11:30.970

which makes it very difficult to report on what you're doing and your progress. And so having that clarity about whether you're building influence or building capacity, or doing both, but then to what extent, is really important to have on the ground as well. And I mean, there was a really good example of this. Our colleague Abigail Watson was speaking at an event recently about the

00:11:30.970 - 00:11:52.450

integrated review and was talking about the fact that conversations that she'd been having with troops deploying to the mission sort of suggested that, again, that's my point earlier, that they weren't quite sure about what it really was that they were doing in terms of influencing. Was it about the French? Was it about the UN? And there was sort of this, the rupture of laughter

00:11:52.450 - 00:12:12.290

from members of the audience who happened to be in the British Army and were going to be deploying on the mission. And they were asking exactly the same questions. Well, you know, we are so unclear about what we're meant to be doing. And some people might argue, well, they don't need to know what they're doing because it's, you know, they're an instrument of political power. Therefore

00:12:12.290 - 00:12:33.770

they just do what they're told. But I think actually that doesn't reflect some of the research that we've done, that actually these people, these soldiers who are in a way are now being asked to be deployed as a foreign policy instrument in terms of building that influence in that capacity. It's important that they do understand what they are there to do,

00:12:33.990 - 00:12:52.250

because to be effective, they surely need to know what they should be prioritising. Absolutely. I think even when our two colleagues went to Mali and Kenya to do research there, they found people quite senior in the military who were unaware of whether they were supposed to be building influence and building capacity, which is quite problematic to not have that

00:12:52.250 - 00:13:12.650

clarity when you're on the ground. And I think also the fact that the foreign office, for example, in its so-called Africa strategy, which is about a list of 10 bullet points, one of the points there is that, you know, it's there to address the underlying causes of conflict. Well, OK, that's the political message from the foreign office. But what's the MAD doing

00:13:12.650 - 00:13:34.850

in terms of its influence building? Is its mission being set up in a way that is fulfilling that objective of addressing those underlying causes of conflict? Because we know that in many of these areas that the state capacity there is quite weak and that if you're not doing this capacity building in a responsible way, that of course you potentially are exacerbating conflict

00:13:34.850 - 00:13:52.910

rather than addressing. And of course, let's be honest, this mission with the UN is a very limited mission. And there probably will be elements of that if it is there to, as the government is sort of trying to reassure everybody that it's there to support the UN mission, that it's going to be helping the UN mission in terms of addressing protection of civilians issues and

00:13:52.910 - 00:14:13.710

fulfilling that mandate of the UN mission, then that is a positive sign. But also you've got to be honest about, well, how does that, and it speaks to our research, how does that then fit in with the broader efforts being done in somewhere like Mali? Because with 250 troops, I mean, you're going to be able to have a very limited sort of tactical outcome. So how are

00:14:13.710 - 00:14:36.370

you really addressing protection of civilians issues? Because if, yeah, it's a broader issue than just them being deployed when you need the whole international effort to marry up to be able to address protection of civilians issues, for example. I think it goes beyond the POC issue, even though that is very, very important. But even how are you going to be functional in any kind of

00:14:36.370 - 00:14:54.030

aspect of your deployment if you don't fit into what's on the ground already? And we have seen statements from the FCO, for example, from Harriet Baldwin, I believe it was, who said that it's more important than ever because there's so many actors on the ground that the UK stands out. Whereas we're saying it's also very, very important that they fit in and that the UK

00:14:54.030 - 00:15:17.370

brings valuable additions to what already exists on the ground instead of trying to just stand out as this exceptional force who can't do much with 250 troops. Yeah, exactly. Well, I think that's probably it for this month. I think there's some really interesting things going on and some developments despite most of the media attention being on COVID-19. I think that's always a challenge

00:15:17.370 - 00:15:38.170

with this sort of thing as well, that we are still preparing to deploy in somewhere like Mali. So we need to make sure that there is sufficient accountability transparency over what it is exactly the UK is hoping to achieve with that deployment. Absolutely, I couldn't agree more. Well, anyway, from my cupboard and not quite from my bedroom, yeah, this has been

00:15:38.170 - 00:15:40.950

the Westminster Roundup podcast. Thank you very much. Thank you so much.