DUMBARTON OAKS
A Fabian Commentary

To which are appended a Manifesto issued by the Conference of Labour Parties of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the text of the Dumbarton Oaks . . . Proposals . . .

By a Committee of the Fabian Society
Tract Series No. 261
FABIAN PUBLICATIONS, LTD.
DUMBARTON OAKS
A Fabian Commentary

CONTENTS

THE COMMENTARY

APPENDIX I

MANIFESTO ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE OF LABOUR PARTIES OF THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

APPENDIX II

THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS ON WORLD ORGANISATION:
STATEMENT OF TENTATIVE PROPOSALS

NOTE
This pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, represents not the collective view of the Society but only the view of the individuals who prepared it. The responsibility of the Fabian Society is limited to approving the publications which it issues as embodying facts and opinions worthy of consideration of the Society to encourage among socialists a high standard of free and independent research.

This pamphlet has been prepared by a Committee of the Fabian Society after consultation with members of the International Authority Group of the Fabian International Bureau.

December 1944.

Published by FABIAN PUBLICATIONS LTD., 11, Dartmouth Street, S.W.1.
DUMBARTON OAKS
A Fabian Commentary
BY A COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIETY
TO WHICH IS APPENDED A MANIFESTO ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE OF LABOUR PARTIES OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE TEXT OF THE DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS.

The Conference at Dumbarton Oaks, attended by representatives of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China, was a preparatory meeting of experts, designed to prepare the way for definite measures for the establishment of a World Organisation of the United Nations both for the prevention of wars and for the promotion of world collaboration in the political, social and economic fields. As a gathering of experts it had no power to commit any of the countries represented: it could only prepare a tentative draft for consideration by the Governments of the United Nations with a view to a mandatory Conference to be held at a later stage. Accordingly, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals must be regarded as open to amendment, not only in detail but also in matters of principle; and the present Statement, together with the documents attached to it, is being issued in the hope both of informing public opinion, especially in Great Britain and in the British Commonwealth, about the proposals that have been made, and of influencing such opinion in favour of a plan which Socialists throughout the world can accept as affording reasonable security against war without endangering the prospects of Socialism. It has not been thought necessary to reprint the commentary on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals issued by the Foreign Office; but the proposals themselves are given in full, in order to make the commentary fully intelligible, and the very pertinent Manifesto adopted in September 1944 by the Conference of Labour Parties of the British Commonwealth of Nations is added in an appendix as giving the best and clearest statement so far issued of the general Socialist attitude to the problems of world security and collaboration.

Although the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are not binding on any Government, they have to be taken as representing broadly the official or governmental view at present held by the great Powers concerned in drawing them up. This view may be modified by discussion and by the influence of public opinion, including that of the Governments and peoples of the lesser States. It is accordingly of the first importance that the proposals shall be widely understood and carefully scrutinised by democrats throughout the world, in order to bring them as fully as is practicable into harmony with democratic aspirations, not only as means to the prevention of war but also as instruments for the promotion of better mutual understanding among the peoples and of closer common action in the social, economic and cultural as well as in the military and political fields.

In many respects the proposals for a new World Organisation follow closely the model of the League of Nations set up after the last war. There are, however, important differences, above all in the position explicitly given in the new plan to the five great Powers—Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, France and China—both in the handling of ‘security’ questions through the proposed Security Council and in the military sphere. The purposes laid down for the new World Organisation are practically the same as the defined purposes of the League of Nations. They include (1) the prevention of war by the taking of ‘effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace'; (2) peaceful settlement of disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace; and (3) international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems. They do not include, as the League Covenant did, explicit reference to 'the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war' or to 'the establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments', or again to 'respect for treaty obligations'. It may perhaps be held that these purposes are all implied, though they are not definitely stated; but, as we shall see, it is more than doubtful whether the first is even implied in the absence from the draft of any agreed means of dealing with matters on which there is not unanimity among the great Powers to be represented on the Security Council.** It is, however, laid down in Chapter II (3) of the draft that 'all members of the Organisation shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered'. The question that here arises is whether the subsequent clauses of the draft provide adequate means of giving this general declaration real and practical effect.

**MEMBERSHIP

The first question that arises on the draft as a whole is that of membership. It is laid down that membership is to be open to 'all peace-loving States'; but no attempt is made to define this phrase or to indicate which States, outside the present membership of the United Nations, are expected to become original members of the Organisation. It seems to be contemplated that the Organisation will be actually set up in the first instance at a 'full United Nations Conference' (preamble, clause 3), though it is to be presumed that a number of neutral States would be invited to become original members. When the Organisation has been set up, the admission of new members is to be in the hands of the Assembly, on which every member-State is to have a single vote; but the Assembly is to act in this matter only on the recommendation of the Security Council, consisting of five members drawn from the five great Powers, with six others elected by the smaller States. It will therefore be impossible for any new member to be admitted except on the initiative of the Security Council. It thus appears to be definitely contemplated that the enemy countries, whatever the nature of their post-war Governments, will not be original members of the Organisation. This raises a special question in relation to Italy, now associated with the United Nations in prosecuting the war; but it also involves the wider question whether it would not be preferable to start on an inclusive instead of an exclusive basis of membership, and to deal with potential aggressors rather as members bound by legal obligations to observe the terms of the Charter than as outlaws to be kept down exclusively by force. It is, no doubt, out of the question to offer to any post-war Government that may be set up in either Germany or Japan immediate membership on the footing of a great Power, entitled to a seat as of right on the proposed Security Council. But this does not preclude admission to membership and to representation in the Assembly. It will not be possible in practice to conduct the world's affairs after the war without recognising Governments of some sort in Germany and Japan, or to arrange for social and economic collaboration of the kinds contemplated in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals without bringing these countries into consultation. Surely it would be better, while for the time excluding the enemy countries from membership of the Security Council, the body made responsible primarily for keeping the peace, to bring these countries into the Organisation as soon as they are provided with Governments with which

* See below, section on "The Position of the Great Powers."
it is possible to deal, and thus to allow them to play their full part in the general deliberations of the Assembly and in the social and economic work of the World Organisation and of its subsidiary functional agencies. The idea of the World Organisation as a ‘club’ of ‘good’ States with all the ‘bad’ States outside the pale and excluded from all the rights and obligations of membership may be a natural idea to arise under war conditions, and especially under those of the present war, but is not one that will stand the practical test of working the Organisation in time of peace.

This conclusion is borne out by the experience of the League of Nations after the last war. It would have been infinitely better for the League if Germany had been made a member of it from the very beginning, and had thus been made subject to its obligations. It will be easier to deal with a potential disturber of the peace as a member of the World Organisation, with a right to appeal in appropriate cases to third-party judgment than as an outsider held down by sheer force. This, of course, implies that it will be practicable to find in the ex-enemy States Governments with which it will be possible to deal; and it is in no way negates the right of the United Nations after victory to take suitable steps for the temporary occupation of the defeated countries, for the punishment of war criminals, and for such reparations as can be made to the countries devastated by the aggressors without doing more harm than good. Germany and Japan cannot enter the new World Organisation on the terms that would have been open to them if their Governments had not been guilty of wanton aggression or be allowed to escape the due expiation of the crimes committed in their names. But this is not the same thing as to say that they will be better outside the World Organisation and exempt from all responsibility for acting on the new principles of international good-neighbourliness which the rest of the world is being called upon to accept. We are urging this point not in the interests of Germany or of Japan, or of any particular country, but in those of a world peace which can be made secure only on a basis which will bring all great countries under a common rule of law and within a world system of political, social and economic collaboration.

The case is the stronger because it is made clear in the Dumbarton Oaks draft that countries which are not members of the World Organisation, equally with those which are members, are to be entitled to bring any dispute before the Organisation and call upon it for aid (Chapter VIII (2)). Thus, non-members will enjoy, in this respect, the privileges of membership, without the obligations. Surely, the two should go together. Either members alone should be privileged to enjoy the Organisation’s aid (or why join it?), or the class of non-members should be reduced to the smallest possible dimensions, if not extinguished altogether. The latter is clearly preferable, in the interests of world cooperation, as well as of security.

THE POSITION OF THE GREAT POWERS

The conversations at Dumbarton Oaks have failed to deal with the most critical question of all. It is generally accepted that, whatever part the smaller States may be able to play in maintaining world peace, the prospect of durable success is bound to depend absolutely on eliminating the possibility of a resort to warlike action by the major Powers, either against one another or by any one of them levying war upon a smaller State. It is, therefore, clear that, if the World Organisation is to succeed in its primary objective, each great Power which belongs to it must be in some effective way pledged not to resort to war against a fellow-member, or indeed against any other State, except on behalf of the Organisation against a defaulter, or with its consent. This obligation must be made applicable in all cases and to all members of the World Organisation, whatever the nature of the quarrel may be. It must hold good not only
for disputes which are held to be ‘justiciable’ before the World Court of Justice, but also for ‘non-justiciable’ disputes which call for settlement by some other means. It is indeed highly desirable to extend the conception of ‘justiciable’ disputes as widely as is practicable; but there must be no class of ‘non-justiciable’ grounds in which any State remains authorised to resort to war on its own account. The principle of all-in arbitration—that is, of reference to third-party judgment of all questions which threaten to disturb the peace—must apply in full, whether the dispute be between two or more great Powers or between such Power or Powers and a smaller State or States. All-in arbitration, in the sense defined, and under procedures approved by the World Organisation, is the only foundation on which a satisfactory structure of international collaboration can be based.

The Organisation adumbrated at Dumbarton Oaks does not provide this indispensable framework, though there is in it nothing fundamentally inconsistent with this purpose. The crux of the matter is in the question of voting rights on the proposed Security Council, to which are to be entrusted the main powers of the Organisation for keeping the peace. It is said under VI (C) of the draft that ‘the question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration’—a euphemism which politely veils a failure of the representatives of the great Powers to agree. Under the draft scheme, the Security Council is to consist of one representative from each of the five great Powers, together with six representatives from the smaller States. The question at issue is whether the Security Council is to be authorised to reach decisions, on any or on all matters, by a majority, or by anything short of unanimity, if any one of the five great Powers votes in a contrary sense, or is not prepared to associate itself with the majority. It is understood that, at Dumbarton Oaks, the representatives of Great Britain and of the United States were prepared to allow the Security Council to reach a binding decision without the vote of one of the five great Powers, at any rate where that Power was itself a party to the dispute in question, but that the representative of the Soviet Union insisted that the Council should be authorised to act only with the unanimous endorsement of the five great Powers.

This issue is crucial. It is easy to understand that the Soviet Union should regard with misgiving the call to bind itself absolutely to accept the jurisdiction of the remaining States in any dispute in which it may be involved. It is the most painful part of the record of the League of Nations that the only State which it ever expelled from membership was—not Germany or Italy or Japan—but the Soviet Union, on the occasion of the Soviet-Finnish war. This ill-judged action—ill-judged above all in view of the League’s very different handling of other international disputes—has inevitably affected the Soviet Union’s attitude towards association with capitalist countries in any form of permanent international organisation for keeping the peace. In effect, the leaders of the Soviet Union are afraid of a turn of affairs which might lead to a combination against their country of the other great Powers, using the World Organisation as an instrument, not of international justice, but of political warfare against a rival social system.

It is clearly worth while to take any practicable step towards exercising this fear; for unless it is exercised no satisfactory World Organisation for keeping the peace can be hoped for. The acceptance of third-party judgment in all cases in which a threat arises to world peace may be rendered easier if an attempt is made, in the Charter itself, to define the conditions within which the Organisation and any arbitrators acting under its authority are to proceed. If States fear that the acceptance of all-in arbitration or third-party judgment may involve, under pretext of measures necessary for preserving the peace, interference with their internal systems of political, economic or social organisation, or with their methods of organising their relations with other countries.
in accordance with their internal systems, they may be reluctant to accept international obligations into which they would be ready to enter if this fear could be allayed. It is, no doubt, laid down in the draft made at Dumbarton Oaks that the procedure for the maintenance of peace is not to apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned (Ch. VIII (A) (7)); but this exclusion is not without ambiguity, nor does it cover the ground. Any matter which comes to be regulated by international agreement is, ipso facto, for the States which are signatories to such instruments, removed out of the sphere of matters ‘solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the States concerned’; and there are many matters, in the sphere for example of international trade, that might raise awkward questions between a Socialist State and a State working under a system of private enterprise. As an instance, one may cite the long-standing dispute between the Soviet Union and other countries in connection with timber exports—the allegation that export under public auspices involves unfair trading methods and ought to be met by retaliatory action excluding goods so exported. It would be clearly impracticable to ask the Soviet Union to accept a third-party judgment that it should abandon State organisation of exports, as this forms an integral part of its social and economic system.

The question is whether it is possible to find a formula which will exclude difficulties of this sort, without prejudicing the effectiveness of the World Organisation. It would help towards this if the Charter of the World Organisation were to lay down, in addition to the words already quoted, the positive rule that every member-State reserves its right to organise its political, social and economic system in such manner as may seem fitting to its own people, and therein with the negative rule that the Organisation shall take no action, either directly or through arbitrators acting on its behalf, to discriminate against any form of political, social or economic structure that does not plainly threaten to disturb the peace of nations. It is necessary to lay down the reservation embodied in the closing words in order to enable the World Organisation to take action, should need arise, against a political system which plainly does threaten, by intensive armament, to disturb the peace—as the Nazi system was actually doing in the years before 1939. Nor is there any means of avoiding the necessity of leaving it to the World Organisation itself to decide the scope of the limits imposed by the reservation; for otherwise there will be a gap which there is no alternative way of closing. The purpose of the reservation is not to allow any State, under cover of it, to pursue policies of war preparation or of national or imperial aggression, but rather to divert arbitrators or third-party adjudicators of any kind from travelling beyond what is essential for keeping the peace into the realm of decisions resting on their own, or their States’, views of what is desirable and undesirable in matters of national political, social or economic structure and policy.

Under the conditions here suggested, it may be practicable to get agreement to fill the gap left at VI (C) of the Dumbarton Oaks draft with something less stultifying than a rule requiring unanimity of the great Powers before any action can be taken by the Security Council. It should at least be practicable to go so far as to allow action to be taken in cases in which the sole dissident is a Power which is itself a party, directly or indirectly, to the dispute in question. It will not be enough to go to this point, unless it is made clear that the unanimity rule will not be invoked on the ground, stated or unstated, that a particular dispute falls within the exclusive regional jurisdiction of some one of the great Powers. For example, it should not be open to the United States to block action by the Security Council by invoking the Monroe Doctrine against interference on the American Continent, or to Great Britain on the ground that one of the parties to the dispute is a member of the British Common-
wealth of Nations. It would be best, on all accounts, to give the Security Organisation authority to act in any matter, in the last resort, against the vote or abstention of any one of the great Powers, provided that there was a sufficient majority favouring action of the representatives of the smaller Powers on the Council as well as of the great Powers. If this cannot be secured, the most may have to be made of an intermediate solution. Unless the Security Council is enabled to act in the absence of unanimity among the great Powers, it will be possible for any one great Power, even when it is itself involved in a dispute, to bring the entire Organisation to impotence at a moment of crisis.

There are two reasons why a great Power may be reluctant to forego the unanimity rule. One is based on the idea of national sovereignty, interpreted to mean that each State must reserve the final judgment in its own affairs in the hands of its own Parliament or governing authority. If this is insisted on, there is plainly no use in creating any World Organisation at all, except as a merely consultative instrument. It is the very foundation of the idea of a World Organisation for the prevention of war that it shall limit, though not abrogate, national sovereignty.

The second reason is that fear of intervention in a State’s national, political, economic, or social affairs to which reference has already been made. This is a legitimate fear, as matters stand; and every possible step needs to be taken to exercise it. If the method mentioned earlier is adopted, the great Powers should be able to agree to the operation of a voting procedure in the Security Council that will allow the Council to act even when unanimity cannot be secured.

On the other hand, it is plainly undesirable to empower the Council to act, by a bare majority, against the vote of one or more of the great Powers represented on it. It should not be authorised to act against the vote of any great Power except by the method of referring the dispute, in the first instance, to some form of arbitration or third-party judgment, the form of reference varying with the character of the dispute, but including, wherever it involves any justiciable issue, reference of the justiciable element to the International Court of Justice proposed at Dumbarton Oaks as an integral part of the new World Organisation. It would thus be possible to disentangle the justiciable from the non-justiciable elements and to narrow the points at issue constituting a threat to peace. The non-justiciable residue, where it existed, should also be referred, in the first instance, to impartial third-party judgment; and the Security Council should take no action in any case in which there arose a failure of unanimity among the great Powers, except in the light of the conclusions reached both by the Court and by any other tribunal or body of adjudicators to which the non-justiciable issues had been referred. The Security Council would thus never be in the position of acting on its own exclusive judgment in the absence of unanimity among the representatives of the great Powers, but would always be acting in the light of some third-party judgment. The only exception would be where a State either resorted to armed force or to the threat of armed force before the Security Council had considered and pronounced upon the conclusions reached by the body or bodies to which the dispute had been referred, or announced in advance its definite refusal to be bound either on a justiciable issue by a decision of the International Court of Justice, or on a non-justiciable issue by the decision of the Security Council in the light of a report made by a third-party body. Any resort to armed force, or any such refusal, or any rejection of the ultimate decision of the Security Council should be treated as authorising the Security Council to take action by a majority vote, or by such vote, short of unanimity, as may be laid down in the Charter of the World Organisation.

This procedure might not wholly close the gap; but it would narrow it to the utmost practicable extent. As for the form of third-party judgment to
be invoked, elasticity is needed. States, including the great Powers, should be encouraged by the Charter to enter into mutual treaties of all-in arbitration covering non-justiciable as well as justiciable disputes and to submit such treaties for approval of the Council (to be given by a majority vote); and arbitration procedure laid down in treaties so approved should be used whenever it is available. Such treaties should wherever possible be so drafted as to be open to adhesion by other States besides the original signatories. Only in the absence of such machinery should the Council itself (again by majority vote) appoint third-party adjudicators to deal with any dispute; and the method of appointing such adjudicators, either generally by setting up or prescribing a regular body of referees, or ad hoc, should be clearly laid down in the Charter. The attention of all adjudicators or referees appointed by the Council, or authorised to act under its auspices, including that of the International Court of Justice, should be drawn to the terms of the clause of the Organisation’s Charter which limits its right to interfere directly or indirectly with the political, economic, or social structure of any of its member States.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Under the Dumbarton Oaks plan, the principal organs of the new World Organisation are to be (1) a General Assembly (Ch. V); (2) a Security Council (Ch. VI); (3) an International Court of Justice (Ch. VII); and (4) a Secretariat (Ch. X), to which we may add, though this chapter of the draft does not, (5) an Economic and Social Council working under the General Assembly (Ch. IX). The plan proposed differs from the League plan mainly in giving much greater powers to the Security Council as against the Assembly than were formally given to the League Council and in giving a constitutional position to the Economic and Social Council as a definite organ of the Organisation. The Security Council, as we have seen, is to consist of five permanent members, one from each of the five great Powers, together with six members chosen to represent the remaining States under a system which will prevent continuous membership for more than two years. This provision, designed to give as many States as possible a turn, has its disadvantages; for it will prevent a big personality in international affairs from serving continuously for any long period if he happens not to come from any of the five great Powers. It may even involve the disappearance of the Council of a key figure in the midst of a crisis which his influence is being used to settle on amicable lines.

There is no provision for any regional grouping of the smaller States for the choice of representatives on the Council. No doubt, such grouping will tend to be arranged informally, even in the absence of formal arrangements; but might it not be better to make specific provision for it, where there exists a regional grouping of States which wish to act together and are prepared to bring their regional organisation into conformity with the requirements of the World Organisation and to act together under its auspices? This question will be discussed further at a later point in this Statement: attention is drawn to it here because such regional arrangements might make it possible for a regional group of States by common agreement to retain the same representative on the Council for a longer period than two years.

The main functions of the World Organisation in keeping the peace are to be entrusted to the Security Council, which in the most vital matters of war and peace will be the sole organ empowered to decide or act. All member-States bind themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter’ (Chapter VI (B) (4)). The Security Council will appoint the Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the five great Powers, or their representatives; and this Committee will be responsible under the Council for the strategic
direction of the armed forces placed at the Organisation's disposal by the member-States. All powers of decision and action in any case threatening or affecting security are vested in the Security Council; and under the terms of the draft the General Assembly 'should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council' (Chapter V (B) (1)). All member-States are to 'agree that in carrying out these duties . . . it [the Council] should act on their behalf' (Chapter VI (B) (1)); and the Security Council is to have 'the responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission [not to the General Assembly, but directly] to the members of the Organisation.' (Chapter VI (B) (5)).

As against these specific functions of the Security Council, the General Assembly is to have merely the right 'to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or members of the Organisation or by the Security Council, and to make recommendations with regard to any such principles or questions. Any such questions on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion (Chapter V (B) (1), italics ours). Thus, before the stage of action is reached the Assembly seems to be intended to fade out, and to give place to the Security Council as the executive body, with the further provision already mentioned that when a matter is in the Council's hands the Assembly shall not, save at the Council's request, make any further recommendation about it.

It would be unwise to lay too much stress on the evident intention of the Dumbarton Oaks draftsmen to concentrate power in the hands of the Security Council. It is necessary to recognise as a plain fact that military action against a threat of aggression must be essentially a matter for the great Powers, which alone, unless there were to be a large international armed force under the direct control of the Organisation, would be in a position to take the steps required to prevent war, or if it could not be prevented to wage it in such a way as not to give the aggressor all the advantage of the initiative. The Assembly, even within the restrictions imposed on it by the draft, would be in a position to exert very great influence if it were wisely and skilfully led. What is indispensable, though the draft is silent about it, is that the Assembly shall be enabled to focus world opinion on critical issues by public debate, and that it shall be free to discuss any issue, including issues which are being dealt with by the Security Council, with only such safeguards as may be necessary to avoid confusion of counsel when negotiations in the hands of the Council on any particular matter are at a critical stage. The proposal in the draft restricting the Assembly's power to make recommendations is much too sweeping: it is precisely by recommendation following upon public debate that the Assembly can best make its impact on world opinion and set about the building up of a consciousness of world citizenship among the peoples.

The Assembly is to be so constituted as to represent every member-State. The number of delegates from each State is not specified; but each State, whatever the size of its delegation, is to have only a single vote. This provision is doubtless held to follow logically upon the clause in the draft which lays down that 'the Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States'. (Chapter II (1)). 'Sovereign equality' is a curious phrase, which appears to go further even than 'national sovereignty' in asserting the absolute independence of each State. It is not easy to say what it is intended to mean. The proposed World Organisation assuredly
is not based in fact on this principle of equality, whatever the draftsmen may pretend. It is so designed as to place great authority in the hands of the Security Council, on which the five great Powers are given a very special position. No realistically built structure for keeping the peace, or indeed for promoting world collaboration in any sphere, could in fact be based on treating the United States or the Soviet Union as the equal of Venezuela or Siam. The World Organisation must recognise the inequality of States: it must limit the sphere of national sovereignty, or it is nothing. Such limitation is inherent in its very nature; and in such limitation the inequality of nation-States is inevitably implied. The great obstacle in the way of the Assembly becoming the nucleus for a real World Legislature on matters of common international concern is not the restriction on its powers laid down in the Dumbarton Oaks draft, but the unrealistic provision under which each State, irrespective of size or influence, is to exercise a single vote.

Let us consider what the principle of 'equality' really implies. It implies that no State should, by reason of its size or power, be placed in a favourable position for inflicting injustice on a smaller or weaker State, to the full extent to which it is possible to prevent this from happening. It is therefore clearly right that the small State should stand in exactly the same position as the great Power, when its case comes before the International Court of Justice or before any third-party form of judgment. This, however, is by no means the same thing as to maintain that, in all matters coming before the World Organisation (except those handled by the Security Council), every State, large or small, ought to have an equal voice. Such a principle is plainly inapplicable, for example, in the field of economic relations, which are placed explicitly under the direction of the Assembly. It would be absurd to say that in the arrangements of matters of monetary regulation or of foreign trade the greatest States should be given no more weight that the smallest—nor has this principle actually been applied in the operative part of the monetary proposals drawn up at Bretton Woods or in other recent formulations of post-war international policy and organisation. To insist on the 'equality' of voting rights for all States in the Assembly is in effect to reduce it to a mere debating society, without real powers of action or decision.

Yet the essential principle of 'equality before the law' could be so stated as not to involve these absurdities. It would be entirely practicable to work out a weighted scheme of representation for great and small States in the Assembly, without in any way deviating from the principle of full equality 'before international law and justice'. If this solution is rejected, it may be unavoidable, at the outset, in order to save the whole project from destruction, to accept the unrealistic constitution proposed for the Assembly on the basis of 'One State, One Vote', in the hope that practice will prove longer better theory. This, however, will be a great pity, even if, in most respects, the doctrine of 'sovereign equality' or 'national sovereignty' will have to be broken down in practice before it will be abandoned in theory. The hope of its abandonment must rest first on the practical invasion of it by the powers conferred on the Security Council, and secondly, and we may hope, in greater measure on the development of practical forms of world collaboration under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council, which is not by the terms of the draft tied down, any more than the Security Council is, to the stultifying principle of 'One State, One Vote'. True, the Economic and Social Council is, by the terms of the draft, made subordinate to the General Assembly, as the Security Council is not; but that need not prevent it in practice from developing wide powers in its own spheres of action, or from escaping in fact from the limitations imposed by the doctrine of 'sovereign equality' of all States in the Assembly itself.
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

This brings us to consider more directly the position assigned to the Economic and Social Council. Its defined purpose is to "facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Chapter IX (A) (1)). As we saw, the draft places this Council under the General Assembly, on which all States are to be equally represented, and assigns no such special position in relation to it to the great Powers as it proposes in the case of the Security Council. The draft does not, in fact, lay down any rules for the constitution of the Economic and Social Council. It leaves the whole matter open. It is, however, evident that close collaboration between the great Powers is no less necessary in economic and social than in military and diplomatic affairs, and that the possibility of effective common action in the latter field must depend very largely on success in preventing disputes and promoting collaboration in the former. It will be necessary in practice to give States different weights in relation to the Economic and Social Council, as has been actually done in the parallel case of the I.L.O. But the States which are given a special position on account of their economic and social importance need not, of course, be the same as those which are given permanent representation on the Security Council. Canada, India, Holland, Argentina and other countries have claims to special recognition on account of their economic importance; and it may well be possible to give ex-enemy States recognition on the Economic and Social Council even while they continue to be disqualified for seats on the Security Council.

An endeavour should therefore be made to include in the Statute of the Organisation a body of principles agreed on by the great Powers, as well as by other States, as governing their mutual relations in the economic and social field. The basis of any such agreement must, of course, be the freedom of each State to adopt such political, economic and social systems as it thinks fit, subject only to their not being such as to threaten world peace.

The form and terms of the Dumbarton Oaks draft make it evident that those who drew it up were thinking mainly about the prevention of war by direct "sanctions" and military preparation and action, and only to a much smaller extent about the means of promoting social and economic cooperation. Accordingly, the draft badly needs supplementing and clarifying in this latter field. Above all, it is important, not merely to set up an Economic and Social Council, but to give it, and the World Organisation as a whole, a Charter, or clauses in the general Charter of the Organisation, laying down the principles on which its action is to be based. Here too there arises the need, stressed in a previous part of this Statement, to allay the fears of those who suspect that the Organisation may be used to push the claims of some particular system of economic relationships as against rival systems. The Soviet Union may well feel that an attempt may be made to establish, through the Council, a system of world economic relations inconsistent, or barely reconcilable, with its own methods of public trading and control of foreign trade, or to constitute the Organisation a protector of private property rights against the will of a people to modify property relations within its own territory. For this reason, it would be highly desirable to include in the Charter a provision, relating to the Economic and Social Council and to the Assembly in its economic and social activities, parallel to the provision already suggested for the direction of the Organisation's work in the field of arbitration and third-party judgment on international disputes. Some such formula as the following would probably meet the case:

(a) No member-State shall discriminate against another member-State in its commercial dealings on the ground that it disapproves of the
methods used by such State in organising its economic affairs (e.g.,
private enterprise or State trading, taxes or subsidies, methods of
monetary regulation or import or export licensing, or the like);

(b) No member-State shall claim any right to protect property of its own
nationals within the territory or jurisdiction of another member-State
against any laws which such State may enact for the regulation of pro-
erty rights.

The Charter could also be drafted to include, for example, provisions
against discrimination by any member-State in any of its dependent or colonial
possessions against the commerce of other member-States, or against such
abuses as forced labour or denial of the elementary rights of combination or the
concession of exclusive spheres of influence, except in cases approved by the
Economic and Social Council, or at all events without giving the Council an
opportunity of debating such matters and expressing an opinion upon them.
It is no less necessary in the economic and social than in the political field both
to accept limitations on 'national sovereignty' and to define as clearly as
possible the scope and character of the limitations in question.

The laying down of a body of principles of common action in the economic
and social sphere, with provision for modifying and adapting them in the
light of experience, would give the Economic and Social Council the flying
start which it will need in order to make progress with its constructive tasks
of unifying the world by functional measures of collaboration. Without such
a basis, it is difficult to imagine that the proposed Economic and Social Council
can either achieve much result or afford the right foundation for effective
common action in the diplomatic and military fields.

We have seen that, under the draft scheme, the Economic and Social
Council is made subject to the General Assembly, 'under the authority' of
which its work is to be done (Chapter IX (A) (I)). The draft, however, goes
on to assign all the essential economic and social functions of the World
Organisation to the Economic and Social Council (Chapter IX (C)), and leaves
very vague the practical part which the Assembly is intended to play in this
field. The Assembly, as a rarely-meeting body, will not be able effectively to
govern the activities of the frequently-meeting Economic and Social Council,
in whose hands the main powers will tend in practice to become vested. It is
therefore of importance that the authority nominally given to the Assembly
shall not, in this field also, be reduced to a mere formality, and that the
Assembly shall be accorded effective powers not only to sanction the doings of
the Economic and Social Council, but also to issue orders to it and to pre-
scribe the general lines of policy it is to pursue. Whether this will be found
to be compatible with a constitution for the Assembly based on equal voting
rights (though not necessarily on equal representation) of all member-States
remains to be seen; but the point need not be developed here, as it has been
dealt with in a previous section of this Statement.

THE MEMBER-STATES AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS

We may now return to the consideration in somewhat greater detail of
the procedures which it is proposed to follow in dealing with international
disputes which threaten to disturb the peace. As we have seen, the main
powers in such matters are to be vested in the Security Council. Let us now
approach the question from the standpoint of the obligations resting upon the
member-States and of the methods by which they are pledged to allow any
disputes which arise to be settled without recourse to war. By the terms of the
draft, all member-States bind themselves, in general terms, to 'settle their
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security are not endangered' (Chapter II (3)), and to 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organisation' (Chapter II (4)). In accordance with these general principles, the member-States bind themselves, whenever a dispute threatens to endanger world peace, 'to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice' (Chapter VIII (A) (3)). The Security Council does not come in, except to call upon the parties to act in one of these ways, until such methods have been tried, and have failed, or have not been tried despite the Council's appeal. States are thus left entirely free to choose their own methods of adjusting their disputes without invoking the Council; but in default of settlement by these methods, they are bound to refer the dispute to the Council (Chapter VIII (A) (4)). The Council then decides whether the dispute does, or does not, endanger world peace: if it thinks not, it does nothing. If it thinks yes, it takes action* by 'recommending appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment' (Chapter VIII (A) (5)). It is laid down that 'justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the International Court of Justice', which can also be applied to by the Council for advice in other disputes (Chapter VIII (A) (6)).

Member-States are thus under an obligation to refer disputes to the Security Council only after they have failed to settle them by other means; and the Security Council can take action only when a dispute has been referred to it or when, in the absence of such references, it deems world peace to be endangered through a failure of the parties to arrive at a settlement. The Council, when it does take action, is left free to act as it thinks fit, in the first place presumably by declaring what it holds the right basis of settlement to be. The phrase used in the draft is that the Security Council is to 'determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security' (Chapter VIII (B) (2)). The measures which the Council is finally entitled to take are laid down in two consecutive clauses. Under the first of these the Council is empowered 'to determine what economic or other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its decisions, and to call upon members of the Organisation to apply such measures' (Chapter VIII (B) (3)). Under the second, the Council is empowered, if it considers these measures not enough to achieve the end in view, 'to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security' (Chapter VIII (B) (4)).

For this final resort, all member-States are to undertake to place at the disposal of the Security Council armed forces, facilities and other assistance needed for maintaining peace (Chapter VIII (B) (5)). But this undertaking is to be operative only in accordance with special agreements made by the member-States 'among themselves', approved by the Security Council, and subject 'to ratification by the Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional processes' (Chapter VIII (B) (5)). In other words, there is in the draft no absolute obligation upon any State to place armed forces at the disposal of the Council—presumably because it is feared that States will not agree to such an obligation save under specially negotiated conditions. It is, however, laid down that 'there should be held immediately available by the members of the Organisation national Air Force contingents for combined international enforcement action', the strength and degree of readiness of these contingents being determined by the Security Council (Chapter VIII (B) (6)).

* Unless its power to act is blocked by the 'unanimity rule,' on which see earlier.
This seems at first sight to go beyond the general obligation just described; but in fact it does not, for it is stated that the operation of this clause is to be ‘within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements’ mentioned earlier. There is, then, no complete assurance within the terms of the draft that the proposed combined Air Force, made up of national contingents, will be actually forthcoming, though it is clearly intended that it should be so.

These somewhat confusing provisions illustrate the difficulties in the way of creating an armed security system on the foundation of a State system resting on the acceptance of ‘national sovereignty’. The use of armed forces is regarded so much as an essential attribute of the ‘sovereign State’ that the draftsmen have concluded that a State can be bound to the use of such forces in the service of the World Organisation only by means of treaties or agreements and not by the terms of the Organisation’s Charter alone. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals make, here as elsewhere, only the most tentative and indirect approach to any step which can be regarded as derogating from the absolute ‘sovereignty’ of each constituent State. The same tentativeness is shown in the care with which the draft avoids prescribing any particular method of settling disputes, and leaves each State free, to the fullest possible extent, to choose its own methods. The vague phraseology used in defining the Security Council’s power to prescribe actual methods of settlement is obviously due to the desire to go as small a way as possible towards invading national ‘sovereignty’.

REGIONAL ORGANISATION

A second, and a much better reason, for leaving open alternative methods of adjudicating upon disputes which threaten the peace is the desire to leave room, in suitable cases, for regional methods of adjustment. The draft deals with this question of regional organisation only in the barest outline, laying down that ‘nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organisation’ (Chapter VIII (C) (1)). It states that ‘the Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the States concerned or by reference from the Security Council’ (Chapter VIII (C) (1)); and it goes on to say that ‘the Security Council should, where appropriate, utilise such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council’ (Chapter VIII (C) (2)). In other words, it is proposed to make use of regional agencies or agreements for purposes of conciliation or adjudication, but the draft proposes to reserve enforcement entirely for the Security Council, which may, however, use regional agencies as instruments for the execution of its own enforcement policy.

This is reasonable. If ‘sanctions’, or in the last resort military measures, are to be applied for keeping the peace, there must be one world authority, and not several, entitled to apply them. It is, however, desirable to give much more consideration than appears to have been given at Dumbarton Oaks to the question of regional organisation and to its relation to the World Organisation as a whole. If there is not to be conflict of jurisdictions, regional organisations must be definitely linked up with the World Organisation, and must agree to act within its principles and be accredited to act as its agents. It should be considered whether the representation of the smaller States on the Security Council should not be put formally on a regional footing, at any rate where a
particular group of States is regionally organised and desires collective representation, and whether these representatives should not be chosen in such cases by the regional organisation (the great Powers represented on it, of course, not voting). It is even more important to secure close links between the World Organisation and the regions on the economic and social side, in order to foster close, neighbourly collaboration between States on a regional basis, even where this cuts across the territorial structure of Empires. Membership of a regional body should not, of course, be exclusive: a State having concerns in more than one region could be a member of more than one regional organisa-

Regional agencies have the further importance that their existence, in organic connection with the World Organisation, would make it possible to give special recognition to considerable States which cannot, in the Organisa-

As a whole, be accorded the same status as the five great Powers. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals admit at once to the status of great Powers four States—the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and China. They add that France should be admitted to this status in due course, but make no provision for admitting any other country. It is evident beyond the need for argument that France must be admitted, not merely in due course, but from the outset. It is also necessary to consider the position of Italy, and of the British Dominions, including India: nor as we have seen can the position of Germany and Japan be left out of account for the future, though there can be no question of admitting either to a seat on the Security Council at present. Italy already has a larger population than France, but is not likely for some time to come to rank effectively among the great Powers. The position of Italy could be recognised by giving that country a special position in the regional organisation of Europe rather than by according any special rights in the World Organisation.

India and the British Dominions, especially Canada, raise more difficult problems. The other great Powers cannot be expected to agree to the British Empire having a greater weight in the Security Council than they claim for themselves. If, however, India were to become a unified ‘sovereign’ State, the Indian claim to rank equally with China could in the long run hardly be gainsaid. Here again an immediate solution could be sought in giving India a special position in any regional organisation set up to deal with the problems of the Far East.

As for Canada and the other Dominions, their claims in the World Organisation as a whole must be settled between them and Great Britain, on lines acceptable to other countries; but their status in the British Common-

wealth should not prevent them from being eligible for special status in any regional arrangements affecting them, as well as in the composition of the Economic and Social Council.

These problems suggest that before a satisfactory structure for the World Organisation as a whole can be worked out, it will be necessary to consider more carefully what forms regional organisation is likely to take in different parts of the world, and to reach agreement concerning the attitude towards it of the great Powers on which the success of the whole Organisation is bound largely to depend. It is, for example, necessary to seek clarification of the attitude of the Soviet Union towards any proposed regional arrangements in Europe, covering either the whole continent—in which case the Soviet Union as well as Great Britain would obviously have to participate—or only a part. There have been, from time to time, suggestions of regional organisations covering Western Europe, the Danubian area, the Balkans, and Central Europe, as well as projects for lesser regions, such as Scandinavia. The variety of these projects, and the evident danger of international misunderstandings if they were separately pursued, makes clear the desirability of bringing all such
arrangements definitely under the auspices of the World Organisation and into full conformity with its principles. It also suggests that, given this coordination, it may be highly desirable to encourage the creation of overlapping regional bodies for differing purposes, so that a State might be a member of more than one regional agency, not only in different parts of the world, but also within the same continent. There is, for instance, no inconsistency between a regional arrangement for Scandinavia, covering a group of problems, and a wider regional arrangement covering a larger part of Europe, or even Europe as a whole. Such regions within regions, or regions overlapping for different functions, are perhaps more likely to arise in the economic and social than in the strictly political sphere; but this does not make it the less important to begin thinking out in advance the problems that are likely to arise in coordinating their activities with those of the World Organisation as a whole.

CONCLUSIONS

There are many other points arising out of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals which it would be fruitful to discuss—for instance, the tasks to be assigned to the proposed Commissions of Experts on economic and social matters to be set up by the Economic and Social Council (Chapter IX (D) (1)); the relations to be established between the Economic and Social Council and the 'various specialised economic, social and other organisations' with 'responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes', barely referred to in Chapter IX (A) (2); the position which the International Labour Organisation (which is not referred to at all) is intended to occupy in the new international set-up; the powers and functions of the International Court of Justice (Chapter VII); and the composition and working of the Secretariat (Chapter X). It has, however, seemed best to keep the present Statement to a small number of key points, rather than attempt to travel over the entire field. We have limited our comment in this way, not because we underestimate the importance of these other questions, but because it seems desirable for the moment to seek to focus public attention on those issues over which the deepest misunderstandings are likely to arise, or on which the attempt to evade decisions on difficult points may result in reducing the entire Organisation to ineffectiveness when a really serious crisis has to be faced.

In the last resort, of course, the problem is not, and cannot be, one of machinery. The final question, on which all else depends, is whether the great Powers, and especially Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, are prepared and able, despite their different social structures, traditions, and outlooks on world affairs, to work together for the preservation of peace and the promotion of friendly collaboration among the peoples. In plain English, can Socialist (or Communist) and capitalist States work together, without coming up against causes of difference, due to their divergent outlooks and institutions, that will at some time cause one or more of them to value the predominance of its outlook in world affairs as more to it than peace, and as likely to be furthered by courting, or at least risking, an appeal to force? There is plainly no assured prospect of avoiding such a clash unless the great Powers are agreed in believing that, in general, it is possible for different economic and social systems to live side by side without needing to quarrel in any degree that excludes amicable adjustment, and that, again in general, the best way of pushing their ideas is by persuasion and example rather than by force. There is good reason to believe that these views are today pretty generally held by responsible opinion in all the countries chiefly concerned, and that accordingly the necessary basis for world organisation does exist.

That, however, is not by itself enough. Countries will not agree to differ unless the state of the world is such that other countries whose peoples come to
wish to adopt institutions more in harmony with their own can reasonably expect to be able to alter their institutions in accordance with their wills. In other words, a World Organisation cannot succeed in securing the loyalty of countries living under, and believing in, different social systems if it is so organised as to become a mechanism either for the pushing of uniformity of any brand or for the maintenance of the status quo. As we have seen, one way of preventing both these things is to make it explicit that the World Organisation must not in any way interfere with the right of any people to organise its political, economic and social system in its own chosen way, provided only that its way does not threaten violence to others. This, again, is not by itself enough, even if it fully safeguards the right of any country to change its form of government, by reform or by revolution, without external intervention from the World Organisation or from any of its member-States. It is not enough because the differences of political, economic and social systems necessarily affect the relations between States, as well as the internal affairs of particular countries. It is therefore necessary in addition to work out ways and means whereby friendly peaceful intercourse—trade, transport, travel, crime prevention, measures of social hygiene, and many others—can be pursued between countries living under different social systems based on widely divergent conceptions of justice and value. The working out of such mutual accommodations is bound to be a matter of time, and must be accomplished largely by way of functional agencies and arrangements which will have to be both separately devised and fitted into the structure and general operation of the new World Organisation it is proposed to create. What is essential is that the need for this process of mutual accommodation, not in one field alone but in many, shall be recognised from the outset, both by Governments and by public opinion in all the countries concerned. Words can indeed give no full assurance of this recognition; but they can be used to point the way. That is why it is desirable to write into the Charter of the World Organisation such safeguarding principles as have been suggested earlier in this statement. Even if they do not bind, they may reassure: even if they afford no final guarantee, they may yet be of real help in guiding the Organisation and its subsidiary and related agencies into the right paths.

In sum, then, we hold that the Dumbarton Oaks scheme, unsatisfactory as it is in certain respects, does afford foundations on which it is well worth the while of Socialists to attempt to build a more comprehensive structure. The task for Socialists, in relation to it, should be one of seeking amendment, and not destruction; and above all else it should be that of enlightenment—of getting the plan understood, of promoting a clearer realisation of the pitfalls and difficulties in the way of something better as well as of the possibilities latent in what is now proposed. This is the spirit in which the problem is approached in the Manifesto of the Conference of Labour Parties of the British Commonwealth of Nations, which is appended to this Statement; and this, we hope and believe, is the spirit in which Socialists of every shade of opinion will approach it in every part of the world.
APPENDIX I.

FROM A PEOPLE’S WAR TO A PEOPLE’S PEACE

(Manifesto issued by the Conference of Labour Parties of the British Commonwealth of Nations held in London, September 12 to 27, 1944.)

The representatives of the Labour Parties of the British Commonwealth of Nations, assembled in London, rejoice in the unfolding of the great panorama of liberation now being enacted upon the Continent of Europe and in the Pacific after so many years of human toil and suffering, and unspeakable destruction and slaughter.

We send a message of sincere sympathy to the bereaved, both relatives and friends. We also send our fraternal greetings to each and every one of our brothers in arms and their dependants, wherever they may be, and assure them that the fruits of our victory will be peace, justice and happiness if our will prevails.

We likewise send our greetings to the auxiliary arms of the services, men and women, and to the workers in field, factory, office and workshop who have laid the foundations of victory by a job well done.

LABOUR’S GREATEST OPPORTUNITY

Everywhere throughout the democratic world there is evidence of the determination of the common people to march beyond military victory to economic abundance and international order. That determination grows as victory in the war draws nearer. The peoples of France, Italy, Belgium, and other countries, liberated from Nazi oppression by the heroic efforts of the Allied armies and their own resistance movements, have already begun their struggle to destroy the forces of privilege and reaction in their own lands and to rebuild their national life on new foundations of economic as well as political democracy.

In every country of the British Commonwealth the Labour Movements are making great progress. The important achievements of the Labour Governments of New Zealand and Australia, the tremendous contribution to victory made by the Labour Ministers in Great Britain, supported throughout by the strength of the Labour Parties, the Trade Unions, and the Cooperative Movements, have awakened the admiration of our peoples and have aroused confidence in the capacity of Labour to govern.

At no time in the history of the Labour Movements has the opportunity for advance been so great. If this opportunity is not seized now, it may not recur in our time. It remains for the Labour Movements of the British Commonwealth of Nations to take advantage of it and to march in the forefront of the world movement towards Socialism.

HOW TO BUILD THE NEW WORLD

The new democratic world order will not come by hopes alone. It must be built through unremitting struggle and international Labour and Socialist unity. The forces responsible for the rise of Hitlerism must be destroyed for all time. The economic conditions which sow the seeds of Fascism, wherever they may be found, must be finally eliminated. Only an international order built for collective security and economic expansions, can be the final guarantee against future wars.
Peace without prosperity for the great mass of wage and salary workers would be both a sham and a danger. As freedom from want cannot be permanently achieved without freedom from fear, so also freedom from fear is unattainable without freedom from want. Neither can be removed without effective collaboration among nations.

We must plan for peace as we have planned to win the war, with foresight and determination and without regard to vested interests or crusted prejudices. Full employment and the raising of standards of living is the first condition of an increase in production and purchasing power. To increase production and maintain purchasing power is the way to full employment. Full employment and a full standard of life require full trade.

The principal wartime financial controls should be maintained until more permanent and satisfactory arrangements can be made. The Banks and other financial institutions should be made the servants of the community. Funds available for investment should be brought under national and international control and direction, all with the view of ensuring full employment, higher production, and raising the standards of living everywhere. There should also be international arrangements for as much stability as possible in foreign exchange rates, subject to the need for full employment in the countries concerned. Wartime arrangements for bulk purchase, through state agencies, of foodstuffs and raw materials, should continue. They improve the methods and reduce the cost of distribution in international trade. Every extension of Socialism makes it easier to plan employment as a whole.

Victory, when it comes, will have been attained by the more or less rigorous application, according to country and circumstances, of those Socialist principles and practices which are the basis of our policy and activities. Any other policy would have lost us the war.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To these ends and in this spirit, the Conference of Labour Parties of the British Commonwealth of Nations recommends the following more specific policies to its constituent parties:

JAPAN, TOO, MUST BE DEFEATED

The decisive defeat of Japan must be pursued with the same vigour and persistence as the attack against Germany. The Pacific campaign is an integral part of the same war of aggression of which Hitler has been the chief symbol in Europe.

TREATMENT OF ENEMY COUNTRIES

On the defeat of Germany and Japan, all necessary steps must be taken, military, political, and economic, to put it beyond their power and that of their satellites, to revive their attempt at the domination of other peoples by aggressive means. The responsible authors of war crimes should be visited with swift justice. In the making of peace, there should not only be, so far as possible, restitution to their victims, but the social and political institutions which permitted the emergence of Nazism and Fascism must be destroyed. As these are destroyed, every effort must be made to rebuild the Labour, Trade Union, and Cooperative Movements in the defeated countries.

THE NEW WORLD ORGANISATION

This war might have been avoided if the nations which are now united in war had been prepared and united to prevent war. None is strong enough to
stand alone. It is therefore of good augury that the principal United Nations are committed by the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 to the planning and establishment of a general international organisation based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership by all peace-loving States, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

All peace-loving nations, both great and small, should have full, democratic voice in the new world organisation. Because the active participation by each of the Four Great Powers is indispensable to the maintenance of peace, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China should have permanent seats on the Council of the world organisation, but other nations should also be represented on such a Council and all member nations should have representation on the Assembly. All States which form constituent parts of any world authority should themselves renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and settle all their disputes by peaceful means.

The new world organisation must have the will and the power to prevent aggression. To this end there should be as rapid a development as possible in the direction of an international police force, the international control of all armaments, and the automatic imposition of economic and, where necessary, military sanctions against any country declared guilty of aggression, or preparing for aggression.

The principle of majority rule shall obtain in the proceedings of both bodies save where, in exceptional cases, provision is made for an alternative procedure. The world organisation shall build a Permanent Court of International Law, create a strong and efficient international Civil Service, and be provided with an ample budget. The Conference assumes that, in the creation of the new body, full account will be taken of the important experience gained during the life of the League of Nations and the international bodies associated with it, such as the I L O. It assumes, further, that all functional bodies serving the purpose of international government shall be fully integrated with the new world organisation and that their objectives shall at no time be in conflict with those of the world organisation. Finally, it assumes that the Assembly and Council will work by the vitally important method of public debate.

The Conference recognises the need for regional organisations, which shall perform the functions appropriate to the interests of nations whose relationship is specially close by reason of geographical situation or other causes. But, while accepting this need, the Conference emphasises its strong belief that the obligations of each nation state to the world organisation are primary in importance and that the regional organisations must therefore be integrated with the general world organisation. In particular the States concerned should agree not to use force except as authorised by the competent organs of the World Authority.

INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT

The Conference places on record its profound admiration for the contribution made by India to victory over the aggressors in this war. It affirms its belief in the right of India to full self-government and it looks to the British Government and the leaders of Indian communities to cooperate for its achievement with the least possible delay. Further, it expresses the hope that a free India will decide to remain a partner in the British Commonwealth of Nations.

DEPENDENT PEOPLES

The inhabitants of dependent territories in the British Empire must be recognised to have paramount interests in the areas where they dwell, and
their exploitation for the economic advantage of business men, whether resident in those territories, or absentee investors, must cease. The Conference is convinced that the knowledge is now available not only to develop rapidly the standard of life among the native races but also to quicken the pace of their advance to self-government. This is not merely the concern of Great Britain alone but is a factor of profound importance in the general relations of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND ITS LABOUR PARTIES

The World War of 1914–18 produced the concept of Dominion status which received its formal recognition in the Statute of Westminster. The present war has advanced still further the standing and the nationhood of the British Dominions. It is important that these developments should be marked by a parallel advance in full consultation between the Dominions and Great Britain, so that the Commonwealth may make its most effective contribution to the development of a world organisation and the maintenance of world peace. In particular it is important that the Labour Parties of the Commonwealth should seek to reach a united policy on all matters of common concern, above all in foreign policy and the issues of security to which it gives rise.

TOWARD A SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

The Conference looks forward to the revival, as rapidly as possible after victory, of a Socialist International in which it recommends that both the British Labour Party and the Dominion Labour Parties shall seek to play their full part. It welcomes the creation of a preparatory committee for this purpose.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMONWEALTH LABOUR PARTIES

This Conference is particularly conscious of the grave responsibility resting on the Labour and Socialist Parties of the Commonwealth at this time. The position of Great Britain and the Dominions among the nations of the world has been enhanced by their unbroken steadfastness throughout the war, and not least during the dark months between the fall of France and the attack on the Soviet Union, when their peoples stood alone against a victorious and brutal enemy.

Through unity in ideas and in action, the Labour Movements of the Commonwealth can not only strengthen the bonds of cooperation between their own peoples, but can and must give new strength and encouragement to the popular forces everywhere. Ours is a major responsibility to ensure that governments pursue an international policy which will encourage the emergence and victory everywhere of democratic and Socialist forces; which will deny aid and comfort to discredited monarchies, spokesmen of unrepresentative governments, and other past ruling classes; and which will lay solid foundations for lasting peace through collective security against aggression and through positive measures for economic and social development in all lands. We also have a responsibility to ensure that the unity which has been achieved during the war between the British Commonwealth, the United States, China, and the Soviet Union is carried unbroken and strengthened into the peace.

This Conference accepts the challenge which the present world crisis has placed before the parties represented in its discussions. No single factor could be of greater value to the future of the world than Labour and Socialist Governments, in each of the nations of the Commonwealth, working unitedly together, in cooperation with similar forces in other countries, toward international peace and social justice.
APPENDIX II

DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS ON WORLD ORGANISATION

21st August—7th October, 1944

(Introductory paragraphs omitted)

Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation

There should be established an international organisation under the title of The United Nations, the Charter of which should contain provisions necessary to give effect to the proposals which follow.

CHAPTER I.—PURPOSES

The purposes of the Organisation should be:

(1) To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace;

(2) To develop friendly relations among nations and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

(3) To achieve international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems; and

(4) To afford a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

CHAPTER II.—PRINCIPLES

In pursuit of the purposes mentioned in Chapter I the Organisation and its members should act in accordance with the following principles:

(1) The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States.

(2) All members of the Organisation undertake, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership in the Organisation, to fulfil the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter.

(3) All members of the Organisation shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.

(4) All members of the Organisation shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organisation.

(5) All members of the Organisation shall give every assistance to the Organisation in any action undertaken by it in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

(6) All members of the Organisation shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken by the Organisation.

The Organisation should ensure that States not members of the Organisation act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER III.—MEMBERSHIP

Membership of the Organisation should be open to all peace-loving States.
APPENDIX II

CHAPTER IV.—PRINCIPAL ORGANS

(1) The Organisation should have as its principal organs:
   (a) A General Assembly;
   (b) A Security Council;
   (c) An International Court of Justice; and
   (d) A Secretariat.

(2) The Organisation should have such subsidiary agencies as may be found necessary.

CHAPTER V.—THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

(A) Composition

All members of the Organisation should be members of the General Assembly and should have a number of representatives to be specified in the Charter.

(B) Functions and Powers

(1) The General Assembly should have the right to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member or members of the Organisation or by the Security Council; and to make recommendations with regard to any such principles or questions. Any such questions on which action is necessary should be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. The General Assembly should not on its own initiative make recommendations on any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which is being dealt with by the Security Council.

(2) The General Assembly should be empowered to admit new members to the Organisation upon recommendation of the Security Council.

(3) The General Assembly should, upon recommendation of the Security Council, be empowered to suspend from the exercise of any rights or privileges of membership any member of the Organisation against which preventive or enforcement action shall have been taken by the Security Council. The exercise of the rights and privileges thus suspended may be restored by decision of the Security Council. The General Assembly should be empowered upon recommendation of the Security Council to expel from the Organisation any member of the Organisation which persistently violates the principles contained in the Charter.

(4) The General Assembly should elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the Economic and Social Council provided for in Chapter IX. It should be empowered to elect upon recommendation of the Security Council, the Secretary-General of the Organisation. It should perform such functions in relation to the election of the Judges of the International Court of Justice as may be conferred upon it by the Statute of the Court.

(5) The General Assembly should apportion the expenses among the members of the Organisation and should be empowered to approve the budgets of the Organisation.

(6) The General Assembly should initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in political, economic and social fields and of adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare.

(7) The General Assembly should make recommendations for the coordination of the policies of international economic, social and other specialised agencies brought into relation with the Organisation in accordance with agreements between such agencies and the Organisation.

(8) The General Assembly should receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council and reports from other bodies of the Organisation.
APPENDIX II

(C) Voting

(1) Each member of the Organisation should have one vote in the General Assembly.

(2) Important decisions of the General Assembly, including recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security; the election of members of the Security Council; election of members of the Economic and Social Council; admission of members, suspension of the exercise of the rights and privileges of members, and expulsion of members; and budgetary questions, should be made by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting. On other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, the decisions of the General Assembly should be made by a simple majority vote.

(D) Procedure

(1) The General Assembly should meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require.

(2) The General Assembly should adopt its own rules of procedure and elect its president for each session.

(3) The General Assembly should be empowered to set up such bodies and agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER VI.—THE SECURITY COUNCIL

(A) Composition

The Security Council should consist of one representative of each of eleven members of the Organisation. Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China, and in due course France, should have permanent seats. The General Assembly should elect six States to fill the non-permanent seats. These six States should be elected for a term of two years, three retiring each year. They should not be immediately eligible for re-election. In the first election of the non-permanent members three should be chosen by the General Assembly for one-year terms and three for two-year terms.

(B) Principal functions and powers

(1) In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the Organisation, members of the Organisation should by the Charter confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and should agree that in carrying out these duties under this responsibility it should act on their behalf.

(2) In discharging these duties the Security Council should act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organisation.

(3) The specific powers conferred on the Security Council in order to carry out these duties are laid down in Chapter VIII.

(4) All members of the Organisation should obligate themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council and to carry them out in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

(5) In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments, the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Chapter VIII, Section (B), paragraph 9, should have the responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission to the members of the Organisation.

(C) Voting

[Note.—The question of voting procedure in the Security Council is still under consideration.]
APPENDIX II

(D) Procedure

(1) The Security Council should be so organised as to be able to function continuously and each State member of the Security Council should be permanently represented at the headquarters of the Organisation. It may hold meetings at such other places as in its judgment may best facilitate its work. There should be periodic meetings at which each State member of the Security Council could, if it so desired, be represented by a member of the Government or some other representative.

(2) The Security Council should be empowered to set up such bodies or agencies as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions, including regional sub-committees of the Military Staff Committee.

(3) The Security Council should adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

(4) Any member of the Organisation should participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the Security Council considers that the interests of that member of the Organisation are specially affected.

(5) Any member of the Organisation not having a seat on the Security Council and any State not a member of the Organisation if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council should be invited to participate in the discussion relating to the dispute.

CHAPTER VII.—AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

(1) There should be an International Court of Justice which should constitute the principal judicial organ of the Organisation.

(2) The Court should be constituted and should function in accordance with a Statute which should be annexed to and be a part of the Charter of the Organisation.

(3) The Statute of the Court of International Justice should be either (a) the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, continued in force with such modifications as may be desirable, or (b) a new Statute in the preparation of which the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice should be used as a basis.

(4) All members of the Organisation should, ipso facto, be parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

(5) Conditions under which States not members of the Organisation may become parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice should be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER VIII.—ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, INCLUDING PREVENTION AND SUPPRESSION OF AGGRESSION

(A) Pacific settlement of disputes

(1) The Security Council should be empowered to investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

(2) Any State, whether member of the Organisation or not, may bring any such dispute or situation to the attention of the General Assembly or of the Security Council.

(3) The parties to any dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security should obligate themselves, first of all, to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or other peaceful means of their own choice. The Security Council should call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

(4) If, nevertheless, parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above fail to settle it by the means indicated in that paragraph, they should obligate
themselves to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council should in each case decide whether or not the continuance of the particular dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and, accordingly, whether the Security Council should deal with the dispute, and, if so, whether it should take action under paragraph 5.

(5) The Security Council should be empowered at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in paragraph 3 above to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

(6) Justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the International Court of Justice. The Security Council should be empowered to refer to the Court for advice on legal questions connected with other disputes.

(7) The provisions of paragraphs 1-6 of Section (A) should not apply to situations or disputes arising out of matters which by international law are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned.

(B) Determination of threats to the peace or acts of aggression, and action with respect thereto.

(1) Should the Security Council deem that a failure to settle a dispute in accordance with the procedures indicated in paragraph 3 of Section A, or in accordance with its recommendations made under paragraph (5) of Section (A), constitutes a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, it should take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organisation.

(2) In general the Security Council should determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and should make recommendations or decide upon the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.

(3) The Security Council should be empowered to determine what diplomatic, economic or other measures not involving the use of armed force should be employed to give effect to its decisions, and to call upon members of the Organisation to apply such measures. Such measures may include complete or partial interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations.

(4) Should the Security Council consider such measures to be inadequate, it should be empowered to take such action by air, naval or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of members of the Organisation.

(5) In order that all members of the Organisation should contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, they should undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements concluded among themselves, armed forces, facilities and assistance necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such agreement or agreements should govern the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. The special agreement or agreements should be negotiated as soon as possible, and should in each case be subject to approval by the Security Council and to ratification by the Signatory States in accordance with their constitutional processes.

(6) In order to enable urgent military measures to be taken by the Organisation, there should be held immediately available by the members of the Organisation national Air Force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action should be determined by the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in paragraph (5) above.

(7) The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security should be taken by all the members of the Organisation in cooperation or by some of them as the Security
Council may determine. This undertaking should be carried out by the members of the Organisation by their own action and through action of the appropriate specialised Organisations and agencies of which they are members.

(8) Plans for the application of armed force should be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in paragraph (9) below.

(9) There should be established a Military Staff Committee, the functions of which should be to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, to the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, to the regulation of armaments and to possible disarmament. It should be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. The Committee should be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the Organisation not permanently represented on the Committee should be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires that such a State should participate in its work. Questions of command of forces should be worked out subsequently.

(10) The members of the Organisation should join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

(11) Any State, whether a member of the Organisation or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of measures which have been decided upon by the Security Council should have the right to consult the Security Council in regard to a solution of these problems.

(C) Regional Arrangements

(1) Nothing in the Charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organisation. The Security Council should encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the States concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

(2) The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilise such arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority but no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council.

(3) The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX.—ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

(A) Purpose and Relationships

(1) With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the Organisation should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the discharge of this function should be vested in the General Assembly and under the authority of the General Assembly in an Economic and Social Council.

(2) The various specialised economic, social and other organisations and agencies would have responsibilities in their respective fields as defined in their statutes. Each such organisation or agency should be brought into relationship with the Organisation on terms to be determined by agreement between the Economic and
APPENDIX II

Social Council, and the appropriate authorities of the specialised organisation or agency, subject to approval by the General Assembly.

(B) Composition and Voting

The Economic and Social Council should consist of representatives of 18 members of the Organisation. The States to be represented for this purpose should be elected by the General Assembly for terms of three years. Each such State should have one representative, who should have one vote. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council should be taken by simple majority vote of those present and voting.

(C) Functions and powers of the Economic and Social Council

(1) The Economic and Social Council should be empowered:

(a) To carry out, within the scope of its functions, recommendations of the General Assembly;

(b) To make recommendations on its own initiative with respect to international, economic, social and other humanitarian matters;

(c) To receive and consider reports from the economic, social and other organisations or agencies brought into relationship with the Organisation, and to coordinate their activities through consultations with, and recommendations to, such organisations or agencies;

(d) To examine the administrative budgets of such specialised organisations or agencies with a view to making recommendations to the organisations or agencies concerned;

(e) To enable the Secretary-General to provide information to the Security Council;

(f) To assist the Security Council upon its request; and

(g) To perform such other functions within the general scope of its competence as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

(D) Organisation and Procedure

(1) The Economic and Social Council should set up an Economic Commission, a Social Commission, and such other Commissions as may be required. These Commissions should consist of experts. There should be a permanent staff which should constitute a part of the Secretariat of the Organisation.

(2) The Economic and Social Council should make suitable arrangements for representatives of the specialised organisations or agencies to participate without vote in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it.

(3) The Economic and Social Council should adopt its own rules of procedure and the method of selecting its president.

CHAPTER X.—THE SECRETARIAT

(1) There should be a secretariat comprising a Secretary-General and such staff as may be required. The Secretary-General should be the chief administrative officer of the Organisation. He should be elected by the General Assembly on recommendation of the Security Council, for such term and under such conditions as are specified in the Charter.

(2) The Secretary-General should act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, and of the Economic and Social Council, and should make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organisation.

(3) The Secretary-General should have the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten international peace and security.
Appendix II

Chapter XI.—Amendments

Amendments should come into force for all members of the Organisation when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by the members of the Organisation having permanent membership on the Security Council and of a majority of the other members of the Organisation.

Chapter XII.—Transitional Arrangements

(1) Pending the coming into force of the special agreement or agreements referred to in Chapter VIII, section (B), paragraph (5), and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, the 30th October, 1943, the States parties to that declaration should consult with one another and as occasion arises with other members of the Organisation with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organisation as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

(2) No provision of the Charter should preclude action taken or authorised in relation to enemy States as a result of the present war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

Note

In addition to the question of voting procedure in the Security Council, referred to in Chapter VI, several other questions are still under consideration.
THE FABIAN SOCIETY

is working through the following departments for

SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION

HOME RESEARCH
Social Problems: Education: Local Government:
Economic Reconstruction: Reading Lists and Advice

INDUSTRIAL GROUPS
For members actively engaged in industry and administration:
Panels working on the socialisation of selected industries

WOMEN’S GROUP
Women’s work, wages, status and conditions

SOCIALIST PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE
Working on new forms of socialist education and propaganda:
Panels of Speakers available

COLONIAL BUREAU
Status and opportunities of Colonial Peoples: British
Imperial Policy: Empire bi-monthly journal

INTERNATIONAL BUREAU
A forum for British and foreign socialists studying international reconstruction. Publishes monthly journal France
and Britain

LOCAL FABIAN SOCIETIES
The Vanguard for socialist education and propaganda in the
provinces. Join locally as well as nationally. Write for
the name and address of your local secretary

For particulars of membership and application form
write to the General Secretary, Fabian Society,
11, Dartmouth Street, London, S.W.1
# SELECT LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

Full list on request.

## FABIAN SPECIALS
1. Take Over the War Industries "Populus" ... 3d
2. Let's Talk it Over An Argument about Socialism, for the unconverted. Raymond Postgate ... 4d
6. A Guide to the Health Plan ... 6d

## LETTER SERIES
4. A Letter to a Shop Steward 'Guild Socialist' ... 2d
5. A Letter to a Woman Munitions Worker A. Susan Lawrence ... 2d
6. A Letter to a Doctor Brian Thompson, M.D. ... 2d
8. A Letter to a Teacher ... 2d

## BIOGRAPHICAL SERIES
13. Richard Carlile G. D. H. Cole ... 1/-
14. John Burns G. D. H. Cole ... 1/-

## FABIAN RESEARCH PAMPHLETS
28. Rent Rebatas (Revised and Enlarged Edition 1939) Geoffrey Wilson ... 1/-
45. Planned Investment C. P. Mayhew ... 6d
63. Regional Government 'Regionalist' ... 6d
65. The Wool Industry in Peace and War Dryden Brook ... 6d
67. The Soviet Home Front N. Barou ... 6d
74. Full Employment Barbara Wootton ... 1/-
75. International Action and the Colonies ... 1/-
76. A New Charter for Education Grace Leybourne ... 1/-
77. Export Policy and Full Employment (revised edition) E. F. Schumacher ... 1/-
78. Kenya: White Man's Country? Colonial Bureau ... 1/-
81. Facts for Socialists, 15th Edition ... 6d
82. The International Labour Organisation A Descriptive Survey ... 6d
83. Government and Industry. A Framework for the Future ... 6d
85. The International Post War Settlement Leonard Woolf ... 6d
86. Newfoundland: The Forgotten Island. Lord Ammon ... 2-
87. World Co-operation, 1844-1944 N. Barou ... 2-

## FABIAN TRACTS
250. Food in Wartime Charles Smith ... 2d
251. Nutrition in War Sir John Orr ... 3d
255. Nursery Education Dr. Stross ... 3d
257. Raw Material Controls G. D. N. Worwick ... 6d
258. The Fabian Society G. D. H. Cole ... 6d
259. Your Coal and You H. Norman Smith ... 4d
260. Small Savings: The Case for a People's Saving Bank ... 6d

## LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERIES
189. Urban District Councils: C. M. Lloyd ... 2d
191. Borough Councils C. R. Attlee ... 2d

## BOOKS
- Britain's Food Supplies in Peace and War by Charles Smith. (Routledge) 10/6
- Socialization Studies: Electrical Supply Industry by G. H. (Gollancz) 7/6
- Fabian Essays (1931 Edition) 2/-
- Victory or Yoked Interest: Fabian Lectures, 1941 (Routledge) 5/-
- Education for Democracy by Margaret Cole (Allen & Unwin) 2/-
- Retail Trade Associations by Hermann Levy (Routledge) 15/-
- Downing Street and the Colonies (Allen & Unwin) 2/-
- War over West Ham E. Doreen Idle (Allen & Unwin) 6/-
- American Labour Ernest Davies (Allen & Unwin) 2/-
- Social Security Ed. Dr. W. A. Robson (Allen & Unwin) 15/-
- Plan for Britain: Fabian Lectures, 1942 (Routledge) 6/-
- Our Soviet Ally Ed. Margaret Cole (Allen & Unwin) 7/6
- Fabian Socialism G. D. H. Cole (Allen & Unwin) 7/6
- When Hostilities Cease Papers on Relief and Reconstruction (Gollancz) 4/6
- Can Planning be Democratic? Fabian Lectures, 1943 (Routledge) 6/-
- Fabian Colonial Essays (Forthcoming) 8/-
- Co-operation in the Colonies (Forthcoming) 7/6 & 10/6

Printed by The Horwood Press Ltd., General Printing Works, Aylesbury, Bucks.