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socialists in Europe

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Labour's Programme for 1973 included these key words about the European Community: "If these two tests are passed, a successful renegotiation and the expressed approval of the majority of the British people, then we shall be ready to play our full part in developing a new and wider Europe."

1977 will be an important year for the European Community and, in particular, Britain. Roy Jenkins is to take over as President of the Commission on 1 January 1977 and at the same time British ministers take the chairmanship of the Council for six months. Further ahead we have the prospect of direct elections to the Parliament in 1978.

The Labour Party has an unprecedented opportunity to make its mark on European policy making in a number of areas. It was a British socialist initiative which led to the successful implementation of the Lomé Convention, a significant advance in opening up the European Community to the developing countries outside the nine. In this first Fabian pamphlet on the Community, Geoff Harris discusses the relationship with other countries and the demands for membership by Spain, Greece and Portugal.

Britain has seen many benefits from membership although this is still a bone of contention for some people. Financial aid has been far in excess of our contribution and has been most noticeable in food subsidies and industrial development. We must now look at the future in both the economic and social terms of European unity. In the short term, we are likely to see a new and effective regional policy and this will have important consequences for Britain in the light of demands for decentralisation in England and devolution for Scotland and Wales. The political institutions of the Community—a distant and bureaucratic machine to many people—need revision, for direct elections will alter the power of the Parliament in decision making and accountability. Nor can long term planning be ignored if we are to make the Community work in a relevant manner. The complex economic questions which face the whole of the western world have still not found an answer, as monetary and economic union drifts further away. There is a dire need for a coherent social policy for the nine which goes beyond the elementary medical treatment seen so far. The Community has yet to decide on future action on the multinationals and an industrial strategy. These are just some of the issues for the coming years and we have an important part in the ultimate decisions.

European unity as much as anything is an attitude of mind and a will for cooperation. The Labour Party has joined a Community where socialists form the largest political grouping. Let us not turn our backs on our colleagues and Labour's chance to build a socialist Europe.
1. Introduction

The Labour Party has always resented strongly the idea that the European Community, especially with its present membership and nature, can be considered synonymous with Europe as a whole. It was with this in mind that Labour's 1973 Programme committed the Party to work for "a new and wider Europe" once the issue of British membership of the EEC had been settled. A year after that decision the significance of this approach to the Community can be seen more clearly. The Community has become a focus for the international ambitions of democratic forces in Portugal and Spain, as well as in Greece with which country membership negotiations have already begun. It has started to play a small part in dealing with the affairs of Europe as a whole through its contribution to the European Security Conference and the tentative opening of discussions with the state trading countries of eastern Europe.

Despite the concentration of some observers on direct elections to the European Parliament, on economic cooperation, on defence, as somehow the magic keys to a more rapid and constructive development of the Community, it could be that the issue of the size of the Community and its relationship with those European states which are not members, will be equally, if not more, significant in deciding its future character.

This short study will concentrate on the relatively immediate issues surrounding the possible further enlargement of the Community in the next decade. When these matters eventually become headline news it may well be that the issues of Greek wine, Portuguese shirts or Spanish automobiles will appear as vital matters, but anyone, particularly anyone on the left, who has witnessed or participated in Britain's or Norway's agonised decision making about Community membership knows that it is the issues of the future of democracy within the nations concerned, as well as their economic, social and political security, that are the central matters at stake. That is the case for the opponents of European integration, as much as for the eurofanatics and for the majority of people who, in fact, stand somewhere in between.

The real challenge for the Labour Party now that the issue of British membership is settled is to join the battle over the nature and content of this Community, not just to engage in a defensive struggle against its bureaucratic excrescences. The question of the relationship between the Community and democracy, in the broadest sense, still remains to be settled. The danger of a centralised undemocratic superstate is as great as is the possibility of a democratic socialist community. In short, there is all to play for, and the size of the Community is an issue bound up closely with these others.

A Community which cannot help countries struggling to build a stable foundation for parliamentary democracy and economic security would be a travesty, as well as an unlikely champion of democracy within its own borders. The purpose of the Community must be to strengthen democracy anywhere it has the power to do so, and the Community should admit as a full member any European state with a democratic regime and should exclude any European state without one, and should moreover actively participate in the "destabilisation" of undemocratic regimes anywhere in Europe.

This is the broadest possible statement of the argument. It hides numerous immense difficulties which are not only of a technical nature; for example, should a state with a democratic regime be able to join the Community even if it is unstable? What happens if democracy collapses in an EEC member state? Would a larger Community with a larger proportion of poor, perhaps unstable countries, be capable of any action, internal or external, to achieve a more acceptable distribution of wealth and power, or to influence events in Europe as a whole? Would the European Parliament, become too cumbersome to be an effective democratic platform?

Various things at least are clear. Firstly the issue of the possible enlargement of
the Community is one of its major current problems. Secondly this is a fundamentally political problem which must be treated as such. Thirdly in the broadest sense, the problem raises a question no less fundamental than the issue of democracy itself. Can the Community strengthen democracy in Europe or the world? (Most of the regimes in the world where people have any kind of say of running their affairs are, after all, in Western Europe.) Is Europe "a superpower in the making" and if it is, does it have the power, or even the desire to try and dominate or influence the international context of its operations, in the way that Russia, America, China and OPEC do? Does the socialist movement want that kind of Community? These are the problems that the Labour Party and the socialist movement throughout the Community and Europe must face.

the present situation

Jim Callaghan once referred to the "trauma of enlargement" which the Community experienced when it expanded to its present size. The weaknesses of the Community in the years after January 1973 and the state of crisis which occurred following the dramatic oil price increases were not all due to the fact that the Community had just expanded. It remains the case, however, that enlargement is bound to be disruptive for the operation and policies of the Community.

It is for this reason that many people fear the consequences of enlargement. They fear that the Community will become so diluted and enfeebled as to be incapable of any significant actions either to cope with its own social and economic problems or to play its part in international decision making.

But European integration should never be seen as a process which should go on for its own sake. It is precisely this approach which makes socialists extremely sceptical about the whole idea. It is an approach which dates from the mid 1950s, a period of increasing economic prosperity and constant tension between East and West. The current situation of cuts in working people's living standards and detente between the great powers requires new approaches to the role of the Community.

The Community has not developed as the "founding fathers" hoped. It is a far more pragmatic organisation and indeed far more prone to disintegration than many theorists had imagined. This being the case it would be wrong to reject candidates for membership because they would somehow sap the federalist virility of the Community.

It should be among the central purposes of the Community to strengthen parliamentary democracy in Europe as widely as is practicable. Certainly in those countries which are emerging from one form of fascism or another, the Community has a right and a responsibility to act in support of democracy. If membership of the Community for new states can help achieve this then it is a policy which democratic socialists should support.

Many people are not fully aware of the extent to which the Community has become a focus of the hopes of democratic forces in less fortunate countries around its borders. Their hopes, perhaps sometimes exaggerated, are a positive factor for the Community, not some kind of threat. The Community does not contribute an automatic barrier against fascism, of course, but the belief held in the countries concerned that it can help in the building of a democratic society should be taken very seriously.

Working with socialists from those countries the Labour Party can therefore now begin the practical task of building a new and wider Europe.

the problems of enlargement

The first phase of enlargement, even without the British and Norwegian referenda, was pretty rough on the original member states. There is a danger that
everything is held up while the issue of enlargement is being settled—although how far a point this is, in a Community so prone to not deciding anything unless it is forced to, is at least open to question.

There are certainly a number of difficulties associated with the idea of a wider Europe, that is, leaving aside the problems related to any particular candidate state: would enlargement sap the limited vitality of the Community? Would enlargement and the long period of negotiations preceding it paralyse the Community? Would a wider Community need to drastically reform its institutions in order to continue to operate? Would the economic problems of the new member states wreck the Common Agricultural Policy or demand a regional policy too massive to be a realistic possibility? Would membership of the Community strengthen parliamentary democracy in the countries concerned? What would the Community do in the event of a communist or fascist coup in one of its member states? Given that the present crop of candidates for membership are all in southern Europe, would enlargement mean a political shift in the Community towards the Mediterranean or the Balkans? What effect would enlargement have on the balance of power among the three major powers currently within it, namely, Britain, France and West Germany?

These are the questions which we must bear in mind as we look at Greece, Spain, Portugal and Turkey, the current possible future members, as well as at Scandinavia and eastern Europe which will also be profoundly affected by any enlargement of the EEC.

The Commission Report on the Greek application showed a willingness to postpone the issue. This follows the approach laid down in article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which said only that: “Any European state may apply to become a member of the Community”. The Community waited with impatience for Britain to take up the offer. There is, however, far less unanimity about how
2. the Greek case

There is little doubt that the tenth full member of the European Community will be Greece. Its major political leaders want to be in and do so with very great enthusiasm. The Commission, the Council and the Parliament are all publicly and unequivocally on record as strongly favouring this application. The Commission has prepared a negotiating mandate and the two parties began detailed bargaining in July 1976. The Council’s President says this process could see Greece as a member in 1980.

When the Council gave the instructions to the Commission on 10 February 1976, to get this process under way, the decision was very warmly welcomed by the Greek Prime Minister, Karamanlis: “This decision is of historic importance for our country for it means that Greece will become a member with equal rights of the group of developed European countries, a group which—when it has completed its unification—will become a power able to influence the advancement of humanity. Our membership will also contribute towards safeguarding our democratic regime and our standard of living. I should like to express my profound respect for the governments of the Community for the understanding with which they welcomed the Greek request.” The question as to what the benefits of membership for Greece would be is perhaps primarily a matter for that nation to decide, but Karamanlis’s statement reminds us of some of the central questions about the Community: will it really be a power able to influence the advancement of humanity? How could its existence safeguard democracy in one of its member states?

But the apparent eagerness of the Greek leadership (of the government party as well as the main opposition parties) is a remarkable fact. Parties favouring EEC membership won nearly three quarters of the votes in the 1975 elections. In order to understand the reasons for this enthusiasm we must recall some of the basic facts about the country.

Throughout most of its history Greece has been an object of international politics rather than a subject. As one writer has pointed out, despite a great sense of pride in themselves as a people, they did not possess an exclusive political identity in a state of their own for some 2,500 years of their history. Certainly in the twentieth century they have hardly been in a position to decide their own future free of outside interference. So a country used to having its affairs sorted out by self imposed masters in Washington or Whitehall will not be overly concerned at the threat from Brussels where at least they will have a place at the table and a share in decision making.

The European Community appears to offer the ideal framework in which Greece can operate. The NATO framework proved less than helpful during the Colonels’ dictatorship, the alternative of Balkan co-operation is of no real concrete value, and the possibilities of increased trade with COMECON or more co-operation with independent minded communist countries like Yugoslavia or Romania would remain available to Greece as an EEC member state as they are to other members like Britain and France who have been most eager to capitalise on them. During the 1975 election campaign, Karamanlis skillfully played on anti-American and anti-NATO feeling, showing just how much he had learnt during his exile in Paris, but like his Gaullist mentors he had no real desire to weaken Greece’s western orientation.

So, first and foremost, EEC membership offers to Greece an alternative to being pushed around by the Great Powers. Domestically it is the view of most Greek leaders that membership of the Community will open up the country to the democratic influence of the nine, tying its nascent parliamentary institutions to others more firmly founded and importing a much needed element of political stability.

The limited choice available to Greece in deciding, as it now has a rare chance to do, its place in the world is even clearer if we look at its economic situation. It is a country of nine million people. Its gross domestic product per
The need for foreign capital as well as continued access to a larger market makes EEC membership inevitable. No purely national economic policy could succeed and other international frameworks for economic co-operation do not really provide concrete alternatives.

It has also been pointed out that the Greek economic situation is not all bad.

As the OECD reported in 1975, Greece’s over-riding need is for increased investment. The organisation pointed to many concrete examples of the country’s “strong potential for sound economic development”. Its report concluded that “if general financial stability is achieved and economic policy lays appropriate emphasis on the rationalisation of industrial and agricultural development, there are good chances that a reasonable balance of payments equilibrium could be attained on a more solid basis than in the past. The Government’s aim of much closer economic integration with the advanced economies of the EEC could be of great help in facilitating the country’s sound economic development”. In similar vein the joint EEC-Greece Parliamentary committee noted, for example, the tendency towards greater diversification of Greek exports which are currently made up of 32 per cent agricultural products and 68 per cent industrial and manufactured products, whereas in 1962 the figures were 80 per cent and 20 per cent respectively.

These are the arguments, very crudely summarised, that have led to the near unanimity on the issue of Greek membership both within the institutions of the nine and within Greece.

The Community’s record with regard to Greece contains a number of lessons which relate directly to the central issues with which we are concerned. It should not be forgotten that the Community’s interest in Greece did not begin in 1974 but it was in fact in 1961 that Greece signed an Association Agreement, known as the Athens Agreement, with the six, which came into force in November 1962 envisaging a 22 year transition period leading to full Greek membership in 1984. Greek exports and investments appear to have benefitted from this arrangement, although naturally observers differ on how they would interpret the precise economic effects of membership.

Given that 7 of the 14 years in which Greece has had this relationship with the Community have been spent under a military dictatorship, the country has had the opportunity to test the political value of European unity.

The facts are that following the 1967 coup and under pressure from the European Parliament, the Council and Commission of the European Community decided that the operation of the Athens Agreement would be limited to day-to-day management and a number of measures envisaged in the Agreement would be frozen. The extension of the Agreement after enlargement in January 1973 was blocked. As John Pezmazoglu wrote in 1972 “long term loans from the European Investment Bank, in part at subsidised rates of interest, have been discontinued, and so has agricultural harmonisation, which would have consolidated equal treatment for Greek agricultural exports. Moreover, joint action and consultations on essential matters—such as the enlargement of the Community—have not taken place, and Greece’s progress towards full membership has been stopped”. He calculated that the freezing of the Association Agreement had deprived the Greek economy of around $200 million over the previous four to five years. This had
an impact on all sections of Greek society, although like most economic sanctions it probably hurt working people the most.

Were it not for the fact that US policy amounted to support for the Colonels' dictatorship, the EEC's policy might have had more impact. It is certainly the case that the European movement has not fully comprehended the significance of American interference in the development of democracy in southern Europe.

Those who blandly refer to the Community as a mere subsidiary section of a Washington based imperialist conspiracy should recall that whilst there were, for example, ten EEC-Greece ministerial meetings between 1962 and 1967, there were none between 1967 and 1974. This was at a time of normal relations between the US and Greece.

The EEC therefore played an active role, in spite of US policy, in sealing the moral, political and economic isolation of the Colonels' regime.

The Community's record since that regime collapsed is also significant in relation to the issue of whether or not the Community can play a role in strengthening democracy in Europe as a whole. The enthusiasm of Greece's elected leaders is in itself a sign of the Community's role as a pole of attraction for democratic forces.

In July 1974 the Colonels' regime collapsed. Two days after this, the EEC Commission stated that "the progress of democracy cannot have any but beneficial effects on the development of our association". The Commission met Greek ministers in September and in November the Council asked the European Investment Bank to unfreeze nearly $60 million of loans which had been foreseen in the financial protocol of the 1962 Agreement. In December the first EEC-Greece ministerial meeting took place since April 1967. Negotiations were reopened on harmonisation of agricultural policies and new financial aid. Without continuing the chronology of events it is clear that the Community was giving its stamp of approval to the new parliamentary regime, and anyone who might now consider overthrowing it again would be able to calculate the financial and economic cost, let alone the political cost, that Greece would have to bear.

On the 25 June 1975, the Council asked the Commission for its opinion on Greece's formal application for membership which had been lodged a week or so earlier.

According to Sir Christopher Soames, the purpose of the Commission opinion published in January 1976 was to pour "some economic water into the heady political wine" which Greek and Community leaders had been toasting each other over in the previous 18 months.

Despite the impressive record of Greece in smoothly re-establishing democracy and the country's relatively promising economic situation, the Commission, while welcoming Greece's application and proposing its eventual acceptance, felt it could not ignore the major social and structural changes which would be needed if Greece itself was not to suffer as a result of membership. A pre-membership phase involving reforms inside Greece and help on the part of the Community was envisaged which was interpreted in Greece as a brush off. As Jim Callaghan said after the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which firmly rejected the "pre-membership phase" idea, the Greek reaction to it was of such strength that it became in itself a political fact of life which ministers just could not ignore, without perhaps risking the whole enterprise. The argument put forward by the Commission that "the Greek economy at its present stage contains a number of structural features (relative size of agricultural population, the structure of Greek agriculture and the relatively weak industrial base) which limit its ability to combine homogeneously with the economies of the present member states" still remains entirely valid and it remains to be seen how far the richer members of the Community will
be willing to pay to help bring the Greek economy up to date.

The costs of Greek membership for Greece and for the current EEC states are being closely studied. The Commission has calculated a cost of some 300 million units of account if Greece is to be integrated into the CAP and the Common Market.

Greece's membership would strengthen the case for a more effective regional policy and a larger regional fund. Greek industry does not seem to have suffered as a result of the Association Agreement which opened its markets to tougher competition from Community countries. Experts in Greece and the Community will differ as to the precise economic effects of Greek membership. What is clear now, however, is that all Governments involved have made a political decision of immense importance. A commitment has been irrevocably made whatever the final timetable for Greek admission and full integration will be. This is the encouraging aspect of this early phase of discussions. Both sides have been clearly emphasising political as against any other considerations. The main political consideration has been, if so far in only verbal terms, a commitment to welcome and fasten a democratic Greece inside the Community precisely because of its political difficulties and its strategic position. This approach should continue to outweigh not only the bureaucratic considerations but also those which relate to fears for the often spoken of but rarely seen desire for political integration in the Community. The rejection of the pre-membership phase plan is a rejection of the hesitant approach to enlargement as well as an implicit acceptance of the view that all members are of equal status, and it is, moreover, a rejection of the call for different categories of EEC member states. This is an encouraging development. The two schools of thought, the hesitant and the more idealistic, are summed up in the following quotations.

Firstly from the Commission: "The prospect of further enlargement at a time when the full consequences of the preceding one have not yet been absorbed raises questions about the possible effects on the working methods and the future development of the Community. The Commission considers that any further enlargement must be accompanied by a strengthening of the Community's institutions. In both the political and economic fields the Commission believes it essential for the Community to make significant progress in the internal development in the period leading up to enlargement." This seems a little like saying that decisions which the Community has found itself unable to take for 20 years must be taken before Greece joins and perhaps even that Greece cannot join until these decisions have been taken.

The following views expressed in a resolution of the EEC-Greece joint Parliamentary committee on 27 June 1975 would seem a somewhat more attractive and valuable approach. The Committee "expresses its profound conviction that Greek membership will strengthen the democratic structure of the European Community and make it better able to make a stand as a Community of peoples resolved to contribute through international co-operation and solidarity with economically weaker nations, to stability and peace in the world."

Tam Dalyell was right to attempt in the European Parliament in March 1976 to bring the discussion on to some of the practical difficulties that enlargement will bring, not least the question of language, but also the question of whether the 300 million units of account (which the Commission calculate the nine would have had to pay out in 1976 if Greece were now a member) would mean a reduction on other Community expenditure, which is still far too small where social and regional policies are concerned.

Dalyell was also on to a very good point when he suggested that some people's enthusiasm for Greek membership was explained by their lack of enthusiasm for political unification in Europe, by a desire for a loose free trade area or even an OECD type arrangement instead. These
are among the considerations to be taken into account, but the statement above from the EEC-Greece joint Parliamentary committee as well as the legal position in Article 237 would seem to raise more important long term considerations about the nature of the kind of Community that would turn Greece away. The negotiations for Greek membership will not be easy, but the objections or hesitations cannot override the basic decision that has to be made.

Signora Carettoni Romagnoli, an Italian Communist MP, raised what is the fundamental question for the left in Europe. Speaking in the European Parliament, also in March 1976, she said that "we cannot go against history. Today we are witnessing the development of a movement of the greatest importance in Southern Europe, a movement against the dictatorships: Greece has freed herself, Portugal has freed herself, we hope also that Spain will be free. The characteristic of this movement, which particularly interests us, is that it is a movement towards the centre, towards Europe not away from it. If we want a united Europe we must therefore follow this movement because, perhaps for the first time, we are beginning a process of coming together which is leading to the unity of the continent. The behaviour of the Community towards Greece will become a sort of model for European countries. The EEC must support those countries which choose our type of Parliamentary democracy." This statement precisely echoes Labour's commitment to "a new and wider Europe", and highlights the immensity of the opportunity which the left in Europe must grasp.

In referring to the left in Europe, it would be wrong to ignore the fact that the socialists inside Greece have been the least enthusiastic about the Community, preferring to seek non-alignment on the Yugoslavian model of closer links with the so called Third World. The Panhellenic Socialist Party is not, however, total in its opposition, referring more to the terms of entry than the principle. It should also be recalled that even with the communists, who are divided about the EEC, parties to the left of the Centre Union had only about a quarter of the votes in the 1975 elections, and even in more favourable circumstances than the post-dictatorship hysteria which Karamanlis capitalised on, it could not expect to do a lot better. The Centre Union contains a substantial social democratic faction so one should not underestimate the potential of the broader left. There is, however, no evidence that an anti-EEC campaign, especially in a referendum situation, with a straight yes or no vote would do anything to strengthen socialist forces in Greece and might well lead to their further diminution by the current leadership. Certainly the left in the rest of Europe would be disappointed by such a stand. That would be the case not only for socialists and communists in the nine, but also in Spain and Portugal.

This does not mean that the left in the rest of Europe will not be following very closely the development of Greek democracy. The Government will, for example, clearly have to adopt a far freer system of trade union legislation before it can achieve any membership. The riots on this matter in May 1976 are a sign that all is not perfect in the garden of Greek democracy. The European Trade Union Confederation has publicly expressed doubts as to the representative nature of the principal Greek union confederation. Given that unions now play a very major role in the Community's consultation and decision making process, the nine will be entitled to demand action from the Greek government to ensure full trade union freedom.

Before we examine the issues raised by the candidate for the eleventh member of the Community we should consider for a moment the tensions between Greece and Turkey. The latter also may wish to join but not for twenty years at least. Her productivity is much lower than that of Greece and Spain and her place in Europe open to debate on geographical grounds, leaving aside any other of the more obvious problems raised by her possible candidacy. The immediate issue is how the Greek-Turkish conflict over
Cyprus, over Aegean oil resources, and over coastal fortifications will affect Greece’s application.

This is, in fact, the most substantial objection to Greek membership at the present time. The Community would be in danger, perhaps, of importing a conflict about which its current members have different views, responsibilities and interests. There have been problems about Turkey’s arrangements with the Community which do not appear to have been overcome, but there is still no hard evidence that she would respond with any dramatic action if Greece does join. Nor is there any evidence that the favourable response to Greece’s application to join represents an endorsement of her Cyprus policy. The Community has not lived with the situation in which one of its members is at war with another country. The problem cannot be brushed aside. Community policy will have to be spelt out to both Greece and Turkey and every effort made to help re-establish normal relations between the two.

The Greek government is, however, quite right to resist West German pressure to fully rejoin NATO as a precondition of membership. Given the Irish and French independent defence policies there is no reason why new member states should be expected to follow such a dictate.

There are further reasons for going slowly, not only to enable the Greeks to prepare for membership and its effect on law, public administration, industry and agriculture, but also to enable democracy to take root again. It is clear from some Greek politicians’ statements that they have exaggerated hopes of the benefits of membership—they are right to seek their economic and political security within the Community but indecent haste in becoming a full member could have a backlash not only against the EEC but against democracy in Greece and lead to the instability which benefits the fascists.

So, in the case of Greece, the basic issue of principle is clear and settled. Greece wants to join. The nine want her in. The left in Europe will welcome this first step to a wider Europe.
The Spanish Government also wants to join, but its situation is totally different. Consequently whatever the pressures from big business or from the US to give the Juan Carlos dictatorship the stamp of approval it needs to help sell itself to the Spanish people, the response of the Community as a whole and the left in particular should be very different indeed to the response it has given to Greece's new regime.

The complexities and uncertainties of the current political situation in Spain are such as to prevent a simple summary. The EEC issue is one on which there is, however, a very wide range of agreement; from the regime's most ardent supporters to the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) there is acceptance of the need for integration into the Community, but the left inside and outside Spain agree that this is not on the cards until, as Jim Callaghan has put it, "Spain is well down the road to pluralist democracy."

Despite the fact that Spain's regime would agree with the view that the way the Community treats Greece will be a major precedent for other southern European countries, the situations of the two countries are very different. Firstly, Greece is well down the road to a parliamentary democracy, while Spain's self imposed rulers are still talking about stepping out on to that stoney road. Secondly, Spain's political system has been isolated from the rest of Europe for longer than Greece's has. Thirdly Spain is a major industrial power ranking tenth in the world in terms of industrial production. This is in spite of the fact that 28 per cent of the population is still working in agriculture. Fourthly, Spain would offer substantial agricultural competition to the French and Italian farmers in particular. Fifthly, Spain is not coming cap in hand to Brussels, for whilst the regime would like the stamp of political respectability that EEC membership would give it, it is clear that the country could survive outside and possibly even under the present regime. Industries were traditionally built up to satisfy the home market and Spain's population will be about 50 million by 1995. These points not only mean that the Community must act differently towards Spain's application for membership, than it has done towards Greece's, they also mean that the policy of cold shouldering the regime which helped weaken the Colonel's regime, cannot be automatically considered as the most effective policy available. The economic problems which Spanish membership would cause the Community mean that leaving aside the political factor, the six will not rush into any welcome for Spain's application, but as we shall see it would not be particularly wise for the Community and the left in Europe as a whole simply to brush it aside as a purely theoretical question.

On 17 February 1976, the Spanish Foreign Minister outlined his government's hopes. Spain does not want a mere free trade agreement with the EEC. She wants to join by 1980. This fits into a programme of supposed liberalisation which includes notably a plan for general elections in Spain in March 1977.

It is quite clear that the present group running Spain want to hold on to power and want a favourable response from the Community in order to help them stay in power, but there are also longer term considerations which should not be forgotten.

Spain first applied to join the EEC in 1962. From time to time between 1962 and 1967 discussions took place on the possibility of an association leading to membership on the lines of the 1961 Athens Agreement. In 1970 a preferential trade agreement between Spain and the EEC was signed. This was to last for six years. It involved the reduction of Spanish tariffs on a number of EEC exports, and the abolition of her import deposit scheme on them. The Community undertook to reduce by up to 50 per cent tariffs and duties on a range of Spanish industrial and agricultural products.

The agreement, and Spain's prior application to join the EEC, followed a major review of Spanish economic and foreign
policy beginning in 1959. Changes in the Spanish cabinet in 1957 brought in what the New York Times described as "managerial types". Franco wanted more efficient policy formation and administration, but was not, himself, planning any major political reorientation.

Since the 1953 agreement to establish US bases, Spain had been gradually re-emerging into international politics. This tendency was strengthened by the newly appointed technocrats who undertook detailed studies of the economy and constantly compared the position with that of the rest of Europe. They also perceived a need for foreign investment to provide sufficient capital for further economic development. Observing the situation in Europe at the end of the 1950's they felt Spain was being left out of the movement which had begun with the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957, and so a plan was adopted to restructure the Spanish economy so that she could join in the process of European integration. As Lopez Rodo, the then Foreign Minister, put it in 1965 "Until recently Spain had remained a little aloof from the rest of Europe, but now she has decided to recognise her European destiny. . . . The new Spanish economic development policy sets progressive integration into the world economy as one of its fundamental objectives".

This is still very much the policy of the Spanish government. The Community's response in the 1960s like that of the rest of the world a decade earlier was to maintain a distance from the Franco regime despite the usual US penchant to rehabilitate fascist military dictators. This boycott policy was not particularly successful in terms of the influence on political developments inside the country.

It has been cogently argued that the boycott by other countries in the 1950s did not actually result in increased dissatisfaction with the government of the Caudillo, but was in fact successfully interpreted by him as an attack on Spain not just the government. The relative economic success of the country in the period of the boycott did, up to the end of the decade at least, just add more to the pride of the regime. Spain did not therefore begin its slow move towards reincorporation in the world economy in any mood to make the political concessions which the boycott had been intended to extract. This remains a central difficulty in defining the Community's policy for the years ahead. For while there is a strong cultural, administrative and economic school of thought in Spain in favour of getting involved in European integration, there is not as yet a feeling that Spain cannot do without European help and recognition in the sense that there would appear to be in Greece. The current social and political situation, the industrial unrest, the organisational, if not electoral strength of the Communists may suggest that Franco's long reign has ended in failure but there are enough people in Spain who have not realised it, and would resent the suggestion that it is the case. Franco did not die a hated oppressor as anyone who saw the television coverage of events could see for themselves. The extreme right in Spain is not demoralised and discredited as it is in Greece and Portugal, nor is it poorly organised or financed. The policy that the Community adopts towards Spain must avoid putting Spain in a kind of ghetto where the venal forces of nationalism would merely give the right wingers another string to their bow.

Spain is historically, economically and politically part of Europe in the sense that Turkey is not. The Civil War which brought Franco to power was a European political event in which the whole of the left felt, and was, actively involved. At the Labour Party Conference, debates about British policy were as impassioned and divided as any of the debates on nuclear disarmament or British membership of the Community in more recent years. The Party was clearly conscious of the magnitude of the events occurring. Michael Foot summed up the historical continuity of the issues at stake when in February 1976 he addressed a Trades Union conference on solidarity with Spanish workers from the same platform from which Aneurin Bevan had, nearly
30 years earlier, reported on his visit to Spain on behalf of the Party. Michael Foot said of the Spanish War "If we had done our international duty in those days, the whole of this 40 year horror might have been prevented. We have a wonderful second opportunity. Let us be sure we don't make the same mistake a second time. One of the ways the Government will have to assist will be to ensure that there shall be no concession to phoney democracy in Spain. It has to be a real democracy before the governments of the rest of the world should say that Spain can be brought into the Community of nations." This is the view which the whole of the European left is putting forward. It is not only in this historical sense however that Spain is an integral part of Europe. Strategically, Spain is in a very important position with its long Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts. Also economically it is clear that Spain's economy is very much dependent on the rest of western Europe. Of total Spanish imports in 1974 those from the Community made up over 35 per cent; of total Spanish exports the Community takes over 47 per cent. 48 per cent of this going in industrial goods.

It is clear that Europe as a whole is deeply involved in Spain's tragic past as well as in the hopes for her future, but the way the Community should discharge its major responsibility in this matter is far more problematic. Spain is a country with a great potential contribution to make to the European economy, and enlargement to include a democratic Spain should be supported as it appears to be in line with the principles of the Treaty of Rome and the interests of the Spanish people.

In September 1975 the Community's reaction to the execution of the Basque revolutionaries provided a trial run on how to deal with Spain in the present period.

On the first of October 1975 the Commission in Brussels called for the suspension of trade talks between the EEC and Spain following the executions. This policy was endorsed by the Council of Ministers meeting in Luxemburg a few days later. This action was considered as the minimum possible response to events. It was in line with a resolution which the European Parliament had just passed. This resolution, proposed by the Socialist group, invited the Commission and Council "to freeze existing relations until such time as freedom and democracy are established in Spain". Those who think the European Parliament is an irrelevant institution should not only consider the actions by the Community which followed the passage of the resolution, but also the efforts which Gaullists and Conservatives applied against those actions.

The negotiations which were due to have started were not concerned with Spanish membership of the EEC, but were for a trade agreement with Spain in the framework of the Community's Mediterranean policy. The Commission was only authorised to reopen contacts with Madrid on 20 January 1976.

It must be stated that there is little evidence that the Community action had a great deal of influence on the regime however appropriate and morally justified it was, and this was not only because the action was short lived or because it was too quickly followed by Franco's death.

Despite the EEC action Spain did not hesitate to ask for full membership of the Community and there is a strong feeling that the international protests were reported to the Spanish people as an unwarranted interference in their internal affairs, which was played upon to build up pro Franco hysteria. The protests however, served as a warning to the hardliners that they would have to give up their cherished power if they really wanted to get into Europe. The Community will, therefore, have to act with care if it is to avoid strengthening this kind of sentiment. Isolation would not help the left in Spain and might lead to a Portuguese type situation of disorder, with the constant threat of the re-emergence of fascism. The Community must try and find a way of encouraging pro-
EEC feeling in Spain without appearing to trample on Spanish national pride or unwittingly appearing to endorse the present regime.

As stated earlier the Spanish opposition favours joining the Community, but has recommended to the nine not to open any negotiations leading to political or institutional rapprochement with Spain until certain minimum conditions are met. The Community should not go further than this while the Spanish regime does no more than pander to the democratic desires of the people by making verbal commitments to some kind of undefined “aperture” at an unspecified date. As Felip Gonzales, Secretary General of the Spanish Workers’ Party (PSOE) has put it “isolation of Spain from the world would result from the continuation of Francoism by his successors”.

When in 1972 President Pompidou appeared to have made encouraging noises towards Madrid, Willy Brandt who was then the Chancellor of West Germany, spoke out plainly against Spanish membership. “Participation in the European Parliament requires a measure of democracy greater than that which exists in Spain, such as elected MPS and free trade unions”. The SPD and the German unions have extended considerable assistance to their counterparts in Spain, as has the Labour Party and TUC in this country. In June 1975 the leader of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, Ludwig Fellermaier, insisted that rapprochement between the Community and Spain would depend on the development of genuine democracy in that country.

His statement followed a meeting between the Socialist Group and the PSOE in Brussels. The meeting looked at the political situation in Spain on the basis of four indicators: degree of freedom of the press, freedom of action of parties and trade unions, and the real possibilities of organising free elections. In January 1976 Gonzales stated that the government of Spain had shown clearly that it “cannot permit the development of democratic liberties”. More specifically that despite a rapidly changing social and political situation in the country, it would not prove possible for the government to continue its policy of “little steps”, and would still rely on the regime’s totalitarian institutions.

This is an important observation and should affect Community thinking about whether to totally isolate Spain or whether to encourage the doubtful policy of little steps. Historically, dictatorial regimes collapse more often than they fade away. The Community’s dilemma is not unlike the one which faces the whole of the west in its relations with Russia. In this case the economic tools which the Community can use to influence Madrid are numerous, but as we have seen their efficiency should not be overestimated.

The Community has already found itself under US pressure to give greater recognition to the importance of Spain in western defence. Washington and Madrid seemed to favour the integration of Spain into NATO. Fortunately, the May 1975 NATO summit communique ignored Spain while several European countries used the occasion as an opportunity for making rude noises about the Spanish regime. The US did try to distance itself from Franco’s regime, claiming that it was solely concerned with defence considerations, but it is difficult to see why such a policy should have obliged Gerald Ford to make a special visit to Spain after the summit and to drive through the city with General Franco. More actions could only give new prestige to a failing regime. One of Jimmy Carter’s top advisers put it this way: “We’ve been too intimate with some very bad regimes. You get a temporary balance of power, but in the end you lose and get the enmity of the people. Nowadays idealism is realism”. This line should be explicit and effectively supported by European socialists, far more so than it has been in the past. Especially it should be a major tenet of Labour’s European policy.

The strategic importance of the revolutionary situation in southern Europe is
undeniable, NATO’s southern flank has rapidly become extremely unreliable. Greece has pulled out of NATO, Portugal’s situation within it is far from stable and Turkey’s relations with Washington are very bad indeed. The Community must recognise this situation and develop its relations with the countries concerned for its own good as well as for the security of western Europe as a whole, but the EEC must not follow the US in its eager forgiveness of dictators and if it wishes to avoid a Chilean situation the Community must recognise its responsibilities and discourage American involvement of the kind that appears to provide legitimacy to the Madrid regime.

The Spanish communists like those of Italy accept the Community as a positive development for the people of Europe. They work with everyone from socialists to monarchists within the “Democratic Co-ordination” which includes in its programme for a new Spain integration into the Community. In fact Spanish communism, if public opinion polls are anything to go by, is weaker than its French or Italian counterparts. One unfortunate aspect of the whole situation is the remarkable fragmentation of the left in Spain making it difficult for socialists and trade unionists from other countries, to limit their contacts to one party or union. The considered view of the left throughout Europe appears to be that negotiations on Spain’s application to join the EEC should be opened only when this application is put forward by a properly elected Government.

This could only conceivably occur after the elections scheduled for spring 1977. There is therefore no need at the present time for the Community to do more than regularise its trading relations with Spain, where a number of technical problems are outstanding, and make it clear to Madrid, and through political contacts in Spain, that the Community is not open to membership for fascist, or neo-fascist, regimes and that its attitude to Spain’s application is not a result of anti-Spanish feeling but a protest against the current regime. The record of events in the relations between the Community and Spain contains a number of lessons about the ability of the Community to use its economic weight to influence the evolution of democracy on its borders. Certainly it is the case that the Community has acted in a way that demonstrates a consciousness of its potential influence and its responsibilities, and its willingness to take a political stand independent of US policy. Certainly the socialists in the Community have acted in an outspoken way to strengthen the hand of the more ambitious members of the Council and the Commission and to ensure that not only economic considerations are applied to agreements with the Spanish government and the issue of its future membership. Furthermore the left inside Spain, and particularly the PCE through its membership of the Socialist International, have shown a recognition of the need to concert their efforts with those of their comrades within the institutions of the Community.

All these are encouraging signs of a wider Europe in the making, but the limited nature of the Community’s achievements must be recognised. The Spanish regime is still in power and has shown no hesitation to act decisively and aggressively in defence of its power. There has been no progress beyond the verbal commitment to democracy. All this would suggest that outside pressure alone cannot have a dramatic influence on the internal evolution of Spain.

There will be those forces within the Community which will encourage an early positive response to Spain’s application. The US appears only too keen to provide an external stamp of approval for a regime which so clearly lacks legitimacy at home. Certain newspapers in this country appear somewhat prone to give the benefit of doubt to particular political figures. The Times, for example, at one time believed that Arias (then Prime Minister), Areizaga (then Foreign Minister) and Iribarne (then Interior Minister) hoped to turn Spain into a democracy in the next two years although what evidence they had for this, apart from the words of the individuals concerned, remains unknown. It is clear that the King is trying
to carry the extreme right along with him on the road to democracy—a difficult but important task, but the creation of democracy cannot be achieved by individuals who are really no more than mildly reformed aparatchiks hardly willing to risk their own power.

The Community can of course welcome their verbal commitments, but it should also express the anger at the actions of the regime. It is a regime which to date has operated a policy combining repression and deceit—repression at home, deceit abroad. The Community must not be taken in by this sleight of hand. In such a rapidly changing and unpredictable situation Spain's application should not be rejected, but should merely lie on the table until a new Spain, with a legitimate stable and elected government, in place of the current self appointed and repressive one can take it up, and present it again. At that stage it will be welcome by the left in Europe, which should then work hard to ensure a speedy outcome to entry negotiations.
4. Turkey and Portugal

Earlier we referred to the possible Turkish follow up to Greece’s application for EEC membership. This may now seem to be hardly a current issue, but more a possibility for 20 years hence. The basic point about Turkey is that it is not normally considered part of Europe. It is in an important strategic position and it is fortunate that its government does not have a pro-Soviet orientation. In historical terms it is fair to say that in the twentieth century the rest of Europe has not felt or shown itself to be particularly involved in Turkey’s evolution in the way it has in Spain and to a lesser extent Greece. These are perhaps the major reasons for the great scepticism which would meet any Turkish claim for full membership of the Community within the next 20 years, leaving aside economic aspects.

The Turkish government appears to be in the process of a profound review of its foreign policy and its attitude to the Community in particular. All this makes the question of her accession a fairly theoretical issue.

Portugal

To many people’s surprise the new Portuguese government has decided to move their country further up the queue of applicants for membership.

This would appear to be a natural development of Soares’ political strategy. He aims at the firm establishment of parliamentary democracy in his country. He has for many years maintained contacts, at the highest level, with the socialist movement in the rest of Europe. The Communist Party and the former dictatorial regime tried to lead the country in a different direction.

At the same time the European left has felt particularly involved in events in Portugal. The French Socialist Party has fostered links between all the socialists of southern European countries. The ovation given to Mario Soares at a recent Labour Party Conference expressed the same feeling of solidarity and understanding if not, quite naturally, uncritical support.

Many people assumed that Portugal would, for economic reasons, be slow in its movement towards full integration into the Community. Certainly the current economic situation is critical. The government has been forced to introduce austerity measures, including drastic import controls.

It should be noted, however, that alone of the four countries under consideration, Portugal is in EFTA.

In January 1976 Melo Antunes, who was then Portugal’s Foreign Minister, said that the speed with which the Community could come to the aid of Portugal would be a test of its “operational capacity”. His statement followed soon after a decision by the EEC Council of Ministers to authorise the Commission to open negotiations with Portugal on the basis of the “future developments” clause of the 1972 EEC-Portugal Free Trade Agreement; “thereby promoting”, as the Council stated “a strengthening of links between the Community and Portugal and giving tangible form to European solidarity with democratic developments in Portugal”.

The negotiations were completed in mid-September (the same month in which Portugal became the nineteenth member of the Council of Europe); the rapidity with which the Community worked out an agreement with Portugal suggests that once again it was acting in full consciousness of the political significance of its position, most notably with regard to the development of democracy.

On 2 August, Soares stated that an application for EEC membership would be one of his new government’s first tasks. He apparently anticipated that the process of accession would take three years. That would of course depend on when an application were presented. On 27 September the Foreign Minister (Ferreira) stated that his government was concerned that Europe should not be built without Portuguese participation.
although he was clearly not eager to indicate the precise moment when a formal application would be made.

The agreement signed on 20 September 1976 involved a 200 million units of account loan, a series of trade concessions, a programme of industrial, technical and technological co-operation, and a commitment by the nine to end any discrimination against Portuguese workers with regard to social services and social security.

Despite rapid progress on this agreement it cannot be assumed that Lisbon will receive such clear encouragement to present an early application as was given to Greece. In the near future Soares will be touring the capitals of the nine and will then presumably decide on the advisability of an early application.

It is probable that with the Portuguese projected application the nine have begun to realise the significance of their attitude to Greece. All the technical difficulties and the questions of weakening the Community will now begin to become apparent.

Portugal would do well to concentrate on establishing the principle of full membership as her right, without pressing for negotiations for accession to begin right away.

There is no reason why such an approach should be turned down by the Community, and no political justification for doing so.
5. Conclusion

The first general problem raised by the foregoing concerns, most simply, the likely future boundaries of the Community. It has been argued that Greece, Portugal and Spain are likely future members with Turkey conceivably following on 15 to 20 years behind. It has also been argued that the Community has the potential and the right to act to help countries on its borders. I have not referred to the countries of Scandinavia or eastern Europe, not because it might be considered irrelevant but merely because it is clear that the Community's influence within these regions is so limited because they both have developed systems of established order and stability without joining the Community or calling upon it for solidarity. This has clearly not been the case in the countries we have looked at. Moreover, the real possibility of the enlargement of the Community has followed upon a dramatic turn of events within the countries concerned, of general significance for southern Europe as well as the Community, and perhaps the west, as a whole. Scandinavia and eastern Europe do not as yet contain governments wanting to join the EEC, but given the speed with which situations can change, and given the possibility that a larger Community might have the same kind of political magnetism there, that it has had in southern Europe, it is not a possibility that should be totally ruled out—most obviously in the case of Yugoslavia.

What I have tried to establish is that the concept of a new and wider Europe put forward in Labour's Programme can amount to a lot more than a fine-sounding phrase. A wider Community would be a different Community and it is this question of the nature of a larger EEC which is the second major problem. Enlarging the Community will force the nine as well as each member state concerned to define its attitude to constitutional democracy, its role in the Mediterranean and the economic price the richer member states are prepared to pay for the economic development of other members. Clearly (as on most Community decisions) certain of the bigger member states will have a predominant say. West Germany as the current Community paymaster could use its position to insist that Greece should not be in the EEC if it is not in NATO. Italy's perilous economic position might make her fight hard to keep out competitors for Community aid as well as competitors for her agricultural and industrial products.

At the same time the Commission will have its say on each application as it did on that of Greece, and will strongly press all the institutional and administrative difficulties. It will certainly argue that majority voting in the Council of Ministers would be more practical than ever in a larger Community if the whole organisation is not to grind to a halt. A wider Europe would clearly enhance the political resources of the Community, though a decision making process too slow to be efficient might mean the frittering away of that great potential. A wider Community could be a weaker Community in the purely institutional sense, but it cannot be argued that new members should never be allowed merely because they might weaken the Community. The Community of six and of nine has shown itself too capable of lacking solidarity or even disintegration through self-interest and lack of purpose.

A community of thirteen would be no more or less prone to disintegration than a Community of nine and indeed it could be argued that the need which Spain and Greece have for European solidarity as well as the fact that their entry will force the existing members to make the decisions they have all too often postponed, will make a wider Europe a stronger Europe and perhaps one with a far greater sense of purpose and attraction, for its neighbours as well as for its own citizens. Certainly the enlargement of Europe should not lead to the institutionalisation of a two tier Community.

The political leaders of the Community have made a clear political decision in the case of Greece and stand ready to do so when Spain has been removed from the fascist grip. They probably have not fully thought through the significance of the enterprise they have embarked upon.
and many of them may well lose their nerve as the immense difficulties involved become clearer. Certainly the virtual impossibility of taking in the new states at one “gulp” makes the process more difficult than the previous round of enlargement.

The Labour Party has given a commitment to a “new and wider Europe”. A Europe capable of real solidarity with its neighbours rather than just the exploitation of them as a source of cheap and temporary labour. Jim Callaghan has frequently spoken of the new dimension of influence given to Britain through its EEC membership. It is a dimension which the Labour Party should be conscious of, ready to use, and particularly ready to expand upon in co-operation with the left throughout Europe—not just in Paris, Bonn and Rome, but in Lisbon, Athens and maybe in the future even further afield.

The problems involved in acting upon the commitment to a wider Europe cannot be minimised or brushed aside. Economic issues will become predominant as the political commitment to accept enlargement is reaffirmed and strengthened by the conscious support of democratic forces at Community (in the European Parliament) and at national level, as well as within the countries concerned.

The Community has proved all too capable of adopting wildly ambitious goals, only to drop them in difficult circumstances or because of a failure to foresee practical difficulties.

The building of a wider Europe is an exceedingly ambitious commitment fraught with practical difficulties. We have seen that the Community should be slow to expand where fascist regimes remain in power, but quick to respond as people get rid of such regimes. The Community has made the political commitment and the socialist movement has played an active part in pushing negotiations and building up political consciousness of the significance of unity with the rest of Europe: this has particu-
The Young Fabian Group exists to give socialists not over 30 years of age an opportunity to carry out research, discussion and propaganda. It aims to help its members publish the results of their research, and so make a more effective contribution to the work of the Labour movement. It therefore welcomes all those who have a thoughtful and radical approach to political matters.

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Enquiries about membership should be sent to the Secretary, Young Fabian Group, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, SW1H 9BN; telephone 01-930 3077.

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