SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY

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Hon. KENNETH YOUNGER, MP

Based on speeches at a Fabian Conference, Spring 1951

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2) To promote socialist co-operation through personal contacts and discussions between British socialists and socialists from other countries.

3) To prepare the ground for an international socialist policy in international affairs.

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SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY

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PREFACE

FOLLOWING its policy of stimulating thought within the Labour movement, the Fabian Society, through its International Bureau, organised a conference on Saturday, February 17, 1951, at the Beaver Hall in the City of London, to discuss Foreign Policy. At the request of many who were not able to be present it has been decided to publish the two main speeches made at the conference. R. H. S. Crossman, M.P., presented the views of a large number of Labour back-benchers in his forthright speech. Kenneth Younger, M.P., performed the difficult task of putting forward in cogent form the views of the Labour Government without lapsing into the colourless diction to which those responsible for foreign policy are frequently addicted.

In publishing these speeches as a basis for discussion, both within and without the Labour movement, the Fabian Society does not accept collective responsibility for the views of either M.P. It hopes that this pamphlet will be a useful contribution to further thought in this all-important field.

JOHN PARKER,
Chairman, Fabian Society.

April, 1951.
NOTE.—This pamphlet, like all publications of the Fabian Society, represents not the collective view of the Society but only the view of the individual who prepared it. The responsibility of the Society is limited to approving the publications which it issues as worthy of consideration within the Labour Movement.

April, 1951.
I. The illusion of 'independent policy'

This afternoon I am going to deal with the basic principles of policy and to try to do one particular thing which a Government front-bencher cannot do—that is, to discuss the difficulties of conscience which back-benchers feel, along with a great many rank-and-file Socialists.

Let me start from one point on which I think there will be unanimous agreement, that Government foreign policy is, in many respects, remote from the views of the "rank and file," and that among "politically conscious Socialists" there is considerable concern about it.

There are two possible reasons for this concern—that the Government has departed profoundly from the principles of the Party; or that the Party is very remote from reality. We have to consider both these possibilities in a Fabian conference of this sort, where we are studying the situation objectively.

I suggest that a great deal of the alarm and concern in the Party is due, not to the Government’s divergence from Socialist principles, but to the remoteness of the feelings of the rank and file from the realities which the Government has to face. This does not mean that the Government’s policy has been faultless. Far from it. Because it permitted its Socialism to be overruled by expert advice, the Government made a most terrible hash of Palestine. That was a clear case where principle was overruled by the false advocates of expediency. But it is only fair to remember that those of us who warned the Government about its attitude to the Zionists were a tiny minority inside the Movement: Never did Mr. Bevin undertake anything so popular as his Palestine policy—until it proved utterly unsuccessful.

An example of a problem where the conscience and convictions of the Party were partly right and the Government wrong is the treatment of our Zone in Germany, and indeed the whole handling of the German problem. Another, to which I shall come later, is the handling of our relations with the USA.

Having given these cases where, in my view, the convictions of the rank and file have proved right as against the policy of the Government, I must say that most of the concern which is felt about our Korean policy today is due, not to any departure of the Government from Socialist principle, but to the traditionalism of a Party whose convictions have not been brought up to date, and
which still refuses to face the realities that the Government is actually facing.

The evidence for this view is to be found in the response among "politically conscious Socialists" to an article published by Professor G. D. H. Cole in the New Statesman a fortnight ago. The publication of that article was useful. The response to it in the first week was, I think, 476 letters approving and 4 letters criticising. That was particularly interesting, because the quality of the four critical letters was immeasurably higher than the quality of the letters which approved. The approval was all emotional; the criticism was serious. It is a very grave situation when a statement such as Professor Cole published receives that kind of response, because what Cole did was to feed every illusion and provide a convenient escape from reality into the realms of neutralist self-righteousness.

This afternoon I want to discuss the realities from which Cole is escaping. The first of them is that the European balance of power has ceased to exist. Europe has ceased to be what it was for hundreds of years—the centre from which power radiated to the rest of the world. For hundreds of years we in Britain, and our neighbours in France and in Germany—this tiny fringe of the Eurasian continent which we call Europe—have been the centre from which not only power radiated, but ideas, techniques and civilisation itself. Naturally we have come to assume that the world must be formed in the image of European man, and we now feel that the world has gone wrong because we have ceased to be its centre.

Of course, we have ceased to be its centre. Power has passed from Europe to Washington and Moscow—two non-European powers. They are now the foci of world politics; and Europe, which used to be the subject of world politics, speaking only in the nominative, is now one of the many objects disputed between the Great Powers and spoken of mostly in the accusative. It is, of course, ignominious to submit to the declension from the nominative to the accusative; and I believe that a great deal of our self-righteous indignation against American capitalism is a suppressed resentment at no longer being the centre of the world, suppressed resentment at the knowledge, which we try to deny, that Britain cannot make a single decision on her own in the field of international affairs. How wonderful it must have been when one could pass a resolution in one's trade union branch and have the conviction that, if the great Government at Westminster adopted it, it could be enforced on the foreigner. How wonderful to know that, if that resolution became British policy, the shape of the world would change.

But it is no longer true today; and if we go on trying to behave as though it were, we get into the most appalling convulsions of
mind. Not only do we get a suppressed resentment against America—one non-European power to which a great deal of power has passed—but we also get another attitude, which I find very common in the Fabian Society and which I described recently in an article in the *Political Quarterly* as “equidistant neutrality.” We say to ourselves, “If we cannot be genuinely independent and a powerful motive factor on our own in world affairs, then let us wash our hands of both sides. Let us watch Russian Communism on the one side and American capitalism on the other side with disdainful distaste for the extremism of each. Let us countercounterbalance our disappointment that Russian Communism has developed into a dangerous form of militarism by a resentment against the capitalist U.S.A. By showing resentment eastwards and westwards, we can make ourselves feel that we are independent.” I suggest that this is an attitude of mind out of which a great deal of the criticism of Government policy derives—a desire to feel at least personally independent by saying, “An equidistant plague on both your houses.”

II. The illusion of neutralism

Of course there is a policy which can flow from that notion of equidistant neutrality. It is perfectly possible to advocate military neutrality. It is also possible to advocate neutrality in the Cold War. This, indeed, is a conception which is widely prevalent in France and in Western Germany, although it is rather embarrassing for Socialists to note that the more reactionary the circles, the more prevalent this idea of neutralism is.

Let us see what neutrality in the Cold War implies. First of all, it is obvious that, if we want a coherent neutral bloc of European states, we had better make it a Federal Union. It is a striking fact that Western Union, in the full federal sense, is only supported by those nations which do not believe they can fight, and so are spiritually defeated already. It is opposed by those nations in Western Europe which still believe in themselves and are ready to stand up to aggression. The more defeatist the nation, the more federal and the more neutralist it is! If Britain, therefore, wishes to join this neutral bloc, it would have to assimilate the defeatism of France and Western Germany into its system. We should have to join in saying that there is no future for us except a Byzantine future—to live on when history has passed us by, as the Byzantine Empire lived on for hundreds of years by a mixture of chicaneary and exploitation of power politics.

I don’t know how many of you have studied Switzerland. This is a country which has practised neutrality for a long time. In order to practise neutrality in an ideological conflict, you have to impose on yourselves a spiritual neutrality which stultifies any form
of progressive dynamism. Switzerland has sacrificed progress for the sake of neutrality. I am not saying whether it is a right or wrong thing to do. All I am saying is that no Socialist who believes in our democratic Socialism as a world ideal can opt for a Western European neutral bloc. For it must be a conservative bloc, it must be a capitalist bloc and, above all, it must be a spiritually defeated bloc. You can't be a Socialist and believe at the same time that history has passed beyond our democratic Socialism. So, if you want to help shape the future of the world, you have to give up the notion of neutrality.

I would add one other thing about the notion of Western European neutrality. It is impossible without a colossal army. Remember that Switzerland has paid for her neutrality by a very high armament and a much higher demand on her men than we are proposing in this country. The mere fortnight that we are asking is nothing compared with the ordinary routine demand on the Swiss male citizen for the defence of his country. The same thing applies to Sweden. So we should have to increase our armaments if we chose neutrality instead of the collective security of the Atlantic Pact. The only other possibilities would be either to accept Russian control or to accept an American guarantee of our disarmed neutrality. On the latter, and more probable, hypothesis, we should have no way of influencing American policy at all. You notice, therefore, that the neutrality policy involves giving up any effort to restrain, influence or mould the policies of the New World. Lastly, I must add that so far I have been speaking as though we were just an island. If we want to maintain the Commonwealth we cannot possibly adopt a defeatist Western European neutralism at the same time, for the simple reason that Canada, Australia and New Zealand would not agree. It would break the Commonwealth at once.

These are the arguments with which I would answer those who say that what is wrong with British policy is the Anglo-American partnership, and that what we want is a policy independent of the USA and the USSR. It would be conceivable for a reactionary Conservative government in this country to join with French Conservatives and German Conservatives in a policy of neutralism, but it would be totally impossible for a Left-wing government, believing in Socialism and democracy, to condone such national and spiritual defeatism.

III. The Socialist attitude to the USA and the USSR

It follows from what I have said that the Atlantic Pact is the recognition in terms of diplomacy of the shift in world power, just as the Eastern bloc is the recognition of this fact. The speeches we made about the Russians during the war, and the articles they
wrote about us, did not change the fact that there were two wars fought and not only one. The Russians fought one war for their own purposes, and we fought another for our own purposes. We slightly co-ordinated the two wars, but not very well. The world was divided in 1945, and it is still divided today.

Once we assume that division, reject neutralism and accept the Anglo-American partnership as inevitable, we can begin seriously to discuss how, as Socialists, we are to plan our British foreign policy. So far I have spoken as though the Anglo-American connection was merely a matter of power. Power has moved from Europe; Western Europe has gone in with America, Eastern Europe with Russia. But it is also a matter of economics. Even if we wanted to join the Eastern bloc, it could not provide us with foodstuffs and raw materials; it is far too backward an area for us to draw any strength from as a highly industrialised nation. But I won't stress the economic side, since the case is so overwhelmingly obvious.

There is also a case for the Anglo-American partnership in terms of Socialist principle. Here I must put something to you which I know will not get general assent. I believe that, as Socialists, we have to accept the fact that we have far more in common with the United States than we ever had, or could have had, with the USSR. If I am asked the fundamental difference between democratic Socialism and Communism, I think it is this: we democratic Socialists believe that policy should arise from the people, that our Labour Movement is a movement of free working men, linked together for the common cause, and that the politicians must carry out the will of the people they represent. That is what we mean by a free Labour movement and, when the leaders fail to serve the rank and file, we criticise them for it. The Communist, by definition, does not believe anything of the sort. He thinks his job is to use the Labour Movement in order to get power. At that point he can, and should, totally disregard what the rank and file says, and impose on them what he has learned from the gospel is good. That, I believe, is the definition of the difference between a free working-class movement and a Communist movement. Communists work in a free working-class movement for one purpose only—so that they can get power and then destroy the freedom and democracy of that movement for the sake of their revolution.

This then, is the cardinal fact which separates British Labour from the USSR and links it with the United States. Whatever we think of American capitalism, there is room in America for the growth of a Labour movement sharing our common view of democratic action. (A voice: It has not succeeded.) Our friend says that it has not succeeded. That, of course, is the Communist view of the USA. Yet, in the last twenty years of American history, since the New Deal and the Fair Deal, the Labour movement and
Labour ideas have made the most colossal advance in America, compared with what people expected even in the 1920's. Then they said that a Fair Deal could not be achieved without violent revolution—that the Left was bound to turn to violent revolution to achieve its ends. They were wrong, and the evidence is there in terms of the actual situation in America.

I should have thought that there was ample evidence that there is a chance in that country for the peaceful evolution of the planned, free society—not of the sort of Socialism we are going to make here but of a welfare capitalism, which may well disprove the Communist theory that capitalists cannot work with the trade unions to iron out the trade cycle. The fact is that Keynesian theories of full employment are not applicable to this country, but are applicable to the USA. Indeed, one of the revolutions of mind that we have to accept, as Socialists, is that the Marxist view that Capitalism is bound to destroy itself has been disproved over here by the Labour Government, and across the Atlantic by American history since 1932.

Over here, we have not yet built Socialism, but we have made welfare capitalism work while we were building the foundations of Socialism. Moreover, the whole history of Western Europe is a tremendous confirmation of the view that a free working-class movement, under Parliamentary democracy, can disprove every assertion of Karl Marx, Lenin and Stalin, and transform the social and economic system peaceably and by collaboration. It is only by the most fantastic under-estimate of the achievements of Western Europe during the last fifty years, and of the achievements of the American Labour Movement since the New Deal, that one can take the defeatist view of saying that nothing can be achieved without revolution and the imposition of a centralised, totalitarian, Communist regime. I go further, and add that the imposition in Eastern Europe, by force, of Communist regimes, so far from being progressive, has been a reactionary thing, which will have to be changed if those people are to achieve their genuine emancipation and development.

In the long run, any Western Socialist must know that the health of Europe can only be achieved if Russian Communism withdraws to its sociological frontiers, to those areas where Communism is not reactionary, because the economy is so backward and primitive and so undeveloped that these ruthless, dictatorial methods can conceivably bring improvement.

But anywhere west of the Russian frontier—in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, in Yugoslavia or in Hungary, Communism is positively reactionary and is consequently creating national movements against itself. It is not only Tito who feels that Yugoslavia is, from a sociological point of view, on a higher level than the Soviet Union and should not be dragged down to that level.
Gomulka has been purged in Poland. There are purges in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Eastern Germany. In every one of these countries they are purging those Communists who are West-orientated, who want to keep their European level and not be dragged down to the primitive level of Russia. As Aneurin Bevan has said, we must remember that, if Communism has had successes, they have not been where Marx prophesied but in the backward, primitive countries. Communism has abjectly failed ever to capture, except by the imposition of force, one single modern, industrialised nation. Not one modern, industrialised country, not one country with a democratic trade union movement, has been captured by a democratic vote. And the reason is that, where you have modern technological development and a modern artisan class and the beginnings of democracy and industrialisation, the workers know that the Communist technique of government is behind the level of their development. Yes, in China; yes, in Russia; but anywhere in Western Europe, Communism is dragging people backwards and not emancipating them at all.

It is very important that the British Socialist should define his attitude to the USSR and the USA with real precision. Only when we have defined our position clearly can we start thinking objectively about our own foreign policy, instead of thinking with our bowels and deluding ourselves that resentment against our own relative unimportance is a basis for a policy.

Seen from this point of view, the Atlantic Pact is the framework for the defence of that area of the world where our form of planned freedom is the only way of organising the community. It is not something dirty and distasteful for Socialists, but a necessity of survival.

IV. Socialism in the Cold War

Instead, therefore, of saying to ourselves that we must end the Cold War, we should, as Socialists, say that the Cold War, in one form or another, will be with us as long as there are in the same world free, democratic Labour Movements and Communist Parties and States, struggling for the future of mankind. It is a struggle of principle between the highly developed Labour Movements of the West and the conspiratorial movements which originated in the primitive squalor and backwardness of the East. It would be a major disaster for mankind if the movements of the primitive nations crushed those of the progressive nations and imposed on them methods which may or may not be justifiable in Russia and China, but make no sense whatever in terms of the welfare of the Frenchman and Italian and German and Englishman and Austrian and Scandinavian and American. Communism makes no sense for our area of the world. Yet it may be imposed on us, as it was
upon Czechoslovakia, by force. That is why we are fighting the Cold War; no peace treaty will eliminate that fight.

I hope that we shall get quite a lot of agreement with the Russians in our negotiations with them. I hope that we shall settle this narrow issue here and that narrow issue there. But we shall never settle the ideological issue between us, because this is an issue of principle, on which neither side can surrender. We can hope to fashion a world in which both systems co-exist, but we can never fashion a world in which they collaborate. I use the word "collaborate" in the connotation of the Western Socialist, which, of course, is quite different from the connotation of the Russian Communist. The Communist can never collaborate with me, as a Socialist, in my sense of collaboration—of mutual respect. Collaboration for him is a tactical alliance pending my arrest and dismissal to Siberia. So let us not insult Communists by suggesting that they can collaborate with us, except in their sense of the word. And, since it takes two to make our Western idea of collaboration work, we had better give up the illusion that in our lifetime, or that of our children, there is likely to be peace, in the sense that there was peace before 1914.

We can hope that a world war will be avoided, but we are going through a revolutionary epoch, in which the economic basis for world unity is being created far faster than its political and social institutions. That is why we shall never be able to go back to peace in the sense that we had it before 1914. So let's get rid of the idea that the choice is Peace or War. There are fifty shades between the white of peace and the black of war, and statemanship now consists in making the shades a little greyer, instead of letting them move towards total black.

Once we begin to understand that the extremes of peace and war are not the only alternatives, then we shall begin to understand the problem facing the Labour Government of this country. No Government can get us peace in the anachronistic sense of the word or as it belonged to a previous generation. What the Labour Government can get is the survival of our Western way of life, without total war, through a period of revolutionary convulsion. But it cannot be achieved by a single peace treaty or by "ending the Cold War."

If this is the true picture of the world we are living in, what is the role of British Socialism? I have already put two or three suggestions to you. First, we must accept the Cold War without being ashamed at having to accept it. We must get used to it, for it is there. It is not something we can shoot out of the way by resolutions: it is the fact that is going to confront us and our children, and we have to tackle it without being ashamed of tackling it. Secondly, we have to get used to the idea that, in this Cold War, armed strength is essential, and that there is nothing to be
ashamed of in building this armed strength, or in relying largely on the vastly greater strength of the USA.

But, having said that about pacifism, I add that we must take care not to fall into the other extreme. We must not be hypnotised by our own propaganda about the strength of the Red Army, but remember what Aneurin Bevan said in the House of Commons, that 28 million tons of steel are not going, cold-bloodedly and deliberately, to challenge 140 million tons of steel. Therefore, while we have to take precautions that Russia shall not be tempted into thinking that she can get all she wants with only a week’s war, we must not fall into the other extreme of believing that all that can save us is break-neck rearmament.

V. Restraining America

It is crazy to hold the view that the only danger today is Red Army aggression. It is a danger while Europe is nearly defenceless. But the problem of military defence is almost the easiest problem to-day, provided we do not destroy ourselves in the attempt to build our forces up too hastily. And, here the great danger is America. The Americans are crusaders, and they have no great belief in the Socialist analysis of world history. They tend to believe one must either totally disarm and have peace, or totally arm and have war. It is natural for them to think that. They are a long way off, and they have never felt modern war at home. Our job is to say to them: Look, gentlemen, the choice is not between being at peace or being at war. What we have to face is two generations of armed peace. And armed peace is one of the most difficult things to maintain. It demands tremendous self-discipline, and it cannot be sustained unless your armament is geared to a healthy, sound and stable economy. So if we are to defend ourselves against Communism as allies together, you had better not play into the hands of the Communists by trying to rearm so fast that you dislocate our whole economic system, and create the wildest inflation of prices, bottlenecks and shortages. If you rearm that way, you decrease our common strength, instead of increasing it.

But, in order to argue in this way with the Americans at all convincingly, we must ourselves believe in armed strength. If there is any suspicion that we do not believe in it at all, our argument does not carry conviction. So we must not think that it is un-Socialist to be strong, or that the Socialist thing to do is to “abolish power politics.” Socialism means getting power, civilizing it and using it for peaceful means. It is vital that the influence of Britain should be used, not to shirk power or to stand aside and be neutral, but to ensure that the Atlantic community is built on sound foundations.
Here we come to the problem of Germany. It is my criticism of the Government, or rather of the American Government, that they have made a hysterical under-estimate of the strength of the West. It is a nonsensical notion that, without German divisions, we are completely and hopelessly out-matched by the Red Army. What an insult it is to tell us that we must have the Germans because, without them, we have no chance of winning. That is hysteria. The soldier measures our strength by counting up the available divisions, but strength in a modern war is not measured solely in divisions. It is measured in morale, in the readiness to fight. It is no use speaking of the number of divisions if they melt away in a crisis, as the French divisions melted away in 1940. We must estimate, therefore, the effect on the morale of Western Europe, and on Englishmen, of the decision to rearm the Germans. “Europe is indefensible,” we are told by the Americans, “without a full complement of Germans”; which means, to put it in plainer language, that we Europeans are at the mercy of the Germans, who can impose any terms they like upon us for their assistance. How can any sane man come to that conclusion, unless he has mesmerised himself with the military strength of the Russians, and forgotten the immense potentialities of our free world? That is the real deterrent, and it is not effectively increased by German divisions. Indeed, it is decreased, because a sense of dependence on these divisions would disrupt our morale.

The job of the Labour Government is precisely to point out these things to the people in America, who sometimes get over-excited; to say quietly that we can do without these Germans for two or three years; that at least we ourselves should get strong first, because, if we do that, our need to use Germans will decrease and their price will go down. The less we need them, the more they will want to come in. Then we can make terms with them about their democracy. We can make no such terms this year. But in 1953, when we have got our strength back, then the Germans will be a secondary problem.

We must also persuade the Americans to understand the nature of the enemy. Some people say Communists do not rely on military means for expansion. This is a delusion. They believe that military force should be used for the achievement of an easy victory, which avoids any major war. That is why they went into South Korea. They thought they had an easy war there. But their main method of aggression is still based on their analysis of Western capitalism, and their conviction that it will get into economic difficulties, which they will be able to exploit. It would suit the Communist enemy, therefore, to cause us to enter upon breakneck rearmament.

So we will have to say to the Americans: Look, if you do not agree to Joint Commodity Boards, on which your allies have equal
standing in the allocation of sulphur and other materials, we cannot rearm. Armed strength in the West demands the international control and allocation of raw materials and of foodstuffs to ensure that the raw materials that we take out of the colonial countries are paid for in a fair return of consumer goods. That is all part of armed peace. If we ever let armed peace be defined by the Generals, we shall destroy the strength of the Western world in an attempt to pile up tanks, aeroplanes, bombs and guns. It is only by the international planning of all the resources of the free world outside Russia that we shall be able to maintain armed peace over a considerable period, and it is an ironical fact that, whereas Truman's Fourth Point could never have been implemented in peace time, there is one way of persuading the Americans to pour their wealth and dollars into the backward areas: to make them feel that they have to defend them against Communism. Thus good can come out of evil. So, in this long period ahead, our major Socialist aim will be to plan the resources of the world so that, when the necessity for rearmament recedes, as it will, and when the Russians see that there is something firm against them, we can switch this international economy from rearmament to the systematic building up of the backward areas by a Marshall Aid which Russia too can share if she wishes to do so. That is the long-term vision.

VI. Communism and the colonial peoples

So far I have been talking mostly in terms of Europe and Atlantic defence. It is absolutely vital to understand, however, that Communism, which we Europeans rightly view as reactionary imperialism, presents a totally different prospect in all the colonial areas. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the American State Department is that, although its diagnosis is correct in European terms, that diagnosis cannot be applied to China, or India, or Indonesia, because the situation there was totally different. There, you had a situation of such primitiveness and backwardness that there was little to defend against Communism. There were few liberties there, no free trade union movements: they were not industrialised countries. There were only millions of backward peoples, to whom Communism could make an overwhelming appeal.

We have to face the fact that in Korea the North Korean government had done a much better job for the ordinary man than the South Korean government had. That, indeed, is our major problem. We are deeply infected by the Liberal belief that, when you have emancipated a people, when you have taught them how to vote, then you must leave them alone. The Russians do not believe that. They say, “We must stay there, and see that Communists carry out the job properly.” What was wrong with South Korea was not American imperialism but American liberalism.
(Interruption.) That is a new idea to our friend. There is nothing more difficult than to get a Marxist to accept a new fact. I repeat that what was wrong with South Korea was not American imperialism but American liberalism, and I will define exactly what I mean. The American went to South Korea with no civilising mission or interest in the country except a strategical one. They came in; they staged some parliamentary elections; on the whole, they took the part of the rich against the poor; and then they cleared out! That is the history of what happened. But at no time was any attempt made to impose any system on Korea. (A voice: Except the rich on the poor.) I say no attempt was made, because the rich were on the backs of the poor already, and if you want to get the rich off the backs of the poor in a very primitive country, parliamentary democracy is a very bad way of doing it. The rich can always manage parliamentary democracy in a backward country. Anyone who has seen Iraq or Persia knows that a parliamentary democracy, imposed upon or granted to an undeveloped, backward country is the best way of maintaining the status quo and preventing any form of advance.

This is a terrible problem for us democratic Socialists. Here we are faced with the fact that when the Communist, with no inhibitions, imposes a ruthless dictatorship, this is thoroughly acceptable to the average peasant. He feels he has been liberated, because he hardly notices the dictatorship at the top, so long as he is given his land. But the highly civilised Western powers, who enter the colonial areas, try to bring with them the end-products of 500 years of parliamentary development. That way lies disaster. In the Middle East we have given democracy to every Arab state and, as a result, perpetuated feudalism and the most corrupt form of foreign capitalism. The one Middle Eastern country which has made a steady advance towards democracy in the last thirty years is Turkey, because she had a dictatorship, and under that dictatorship there developed an administrative class, law courts and the beginnings of a habeas corpus—under a dictatorship. (A voice: Then you agree with North Korea.) Look, I am not trying to agree or disagree, but to state a very difficult problem which faces us. Of course, I would “agree with North Korea” on one condition—namely, that North Korea was an independent state; that North Korean Communism was something indigenous to that country, which that country had developed. But it is not. It is merely the instrument of a great power. (A voice: It makes no difference.) Our friend says it makes no difference whether a system is indigenous to a country or whether it is imposed by a great power. Let me ask whether this country would prefer a system which we had made ourselves or one which the Germans, or the French, had imposed on us. (A voice: Or the Americans.) Absolutely right! The only difference being that the Russians, by
conviction, believe in imposing a system, and the Americans, by
every tradition, not only do not believe in it but are extremely
ineffective when they try to do it. (A voice: But they do do it.)

I don’t know a single case where the Americans have imposed
their system on another country. (Voice: Western Germany.) If
our friend thinks that Herr Krupp learned his capitalism from the
Americans, he is very simple. Really, the simplicity of our friends
who think the Europeans were not capitalists before the American
Army arrived, and did not know how to run capitalism until
Coca-cola was introduced! It is fantastic to suggest that the
Americans have introduced this highly indigenous German mono-
poly capitalism, which caused two world wars out of its own
intrinsic strength before Eisenhower came along!

Of course, where there is an indigenous Communism, as in
Yugoslavia, Russia and China, we had much better come to terms
with it. But what we have to do is to make it perfectly clear that
the export of Communism, and its imposition on other countries,
is something that we cannot tolerate.

Why is Nehru not a Communist? Because of the British
Labour Government’s policy towards India. We have proved that
the social revolution in the colonial areas—and this is where I dis-
agree with Professor Cole—need not always be Communist. It has
only been indigenously Communist in one area—China. In
Indonesia and Burma it has been anti-Communist, and the Com-
munists are trying to destroy it by force. Let us forget the dreary,
defeatist illusion that every genuine revolution among the colonial
peoples must be Communist, and that every Russian-controlled
seizure of power must be genuinely revolutionary. The uprising of
the colonial peoples has its own intrinsic propulsion. If we are to
win the Cold War and prevent a hot one, our job is to ensure that
this uprising can achieve its national and social ends within the
framework of the Western world.
KENNETH YOUNGER

For the last few months, I have been very much tied down to the day-to-day work of international relations. I will, therefore, try to bring this conference rather nearer to some of the particular problems with which our minds are agitated at the present time than Mr. Crossman did. I will try to be as frank as I can about it but I hope you will appreciate that there are some limitations upon my expression of my own personal point of view.

The Nature of the Post-war Problem

I would like to take up at the beginning one of the general statements which Mr. Crossman made and repeated several times in the course of his speech. In giving you his appraisal of the conditions which we have to meet in the world today he suggested that what we had to expect was probably neither total war nor total peace but something which we nowadays call the cold war; that a measure of long-drawn-out conflict must be expected to go on over a very prolonged period.

I agree with that. I think there is good reason to believe that we may, if we handle things right, avoid a total war. But I cannot honestly say that I can foresee, after my experience of international work in the last two or three years, an early achievement of a really stable peace in the sense that there would be no conflict going on at all. It would be over-optimistic to imagine that any dramatic turn of events is likely to achieve that in the near future.

If that is the situation, then the defence of our way of life and the things we believe in, of our standard of living and, indeed, of our military security, can never be based wholly on military defences; nor on the other hand can it be based wholly on the things which all of us, as Socialists, hoped would be almost our sole preoccupation after the war, namely social reconstruction and the tackling of the deep-lying and long-term causes of war.

I am afraid that, in this situation, we cannot devote ourselves 100 per cent. to that. We must, therefore, accustom ourselves to a long and sustained effort where we have to have defence forces and to maintain production for the equipment of those forces, with all the unwelcome diversion of resources and manpower from purely peaceful purposes which that involves. I know it is not a very comforting picture—I do not think that Crossman drew a very comforting picture. But, at any rate, it is not a disastrous one. It offers hope and the opportunity for constructive thinking.

It is not very surprising that we should be in this situation
when one thinks of the legacy of the war. I will mention two aspects of this.

When one thinks of the great speed at which social and political developments are taking place in many parts of the world; when one thinks that new developments always caused very great social tensions in the past in the western countries; and that they are now coming at an even greater speed in countries which have lain dormant for centuries and are ill-prepared for them; then it is hardly surprising that there should be friction and the possibility of conflict in many parts of the world and that we should not be able to find ready and entirely painless solutions.

The second aspect is even more obvious. That is the breakdown of the old power relations between the major countries. Since the war, Germany and Japan, both of them major powers before the war, have been, as it were, "out of circulation." We have all realised that that could only be a temporary situation. But we have tended to dismiss both of them, particularly Japan, from our minds as problems which, no doubt, would prove very difficult in the future but which we could, for the time being, put on one side.

We have tended to think that we could determine the future destinies of those countries as we would like, not fully realising that before very many years had passed they would have their own views which it would be impossible to leave out of account.

Meanwhile China, recognised at San Francisco as one of the Big Five, has been for practical purposes in revolutionary turmoil, and wholly engaged in establishing her new regime in her own country. Many other countries in Asia, though enjoying far more peaceful conditions than China, are nevertheless in a state of ferment having, as in the case of the Indian sub-continent, just achieved their independence and being faced with tremendous internal problems.

European countries, including France, have been convalescing from a period in which they have suffered very great internal disruption as well as undergoing four or five years of enemy occupation. Even we, ourselves, have been conscious of the fact that, although we were victorious and came out of the war with our institutions still intact, nevertheless we, too, in a sense were convalescent. Finally, there is the big, over-riding new development to which Crossman referred, namely that power has become concentrated in the two great continental blocs of the Soviet Union and North America.

So, really, I think we ought not to be surprised or unduly despondent to find that, in order to get the world on to a peaceful footing, we have to face a long period of conflict and of difficulty.

Now, what in these circumstances is the task of democratic Socialists and of a democratic Socialist government?
The first thing I think we ought to be clear about is that we recognise the social revolutions which are going on in many parts of the world and that what we seek to do, insofar as we have influence, is to guide them and not to obstruct them.

The second thing is that, sympathetic as we may be to developments of that kind, we cannot acquiesce in the imposition of social revolution upon peoples by means of violence applied from outside their boundaries. It is the conflict between these two ideas which makes the mental and moral dilemma of democratic Socialists.

The United Nations as an Instrument for Peace

Now, many of us Socialists, as well as members of other parties in 1945, placed a great deal of faith in the United Nations. Some people were more, and some less, realistic about it, but we all thought that it was certainly something which had to be tried. We all expected our Government to put its best efforts into making the United Nations a success and that is what the Government has tried to do. Whatever we may think of the achievements or the failures of the United Nations organisation, there is no doubt that the machinery of peaceful change and peaceful evolution does exist in the Charter if you can persuade the members to use it.

I have always been very well aware of the point which has been somewhat roughly emphasised by M. Stalin in his statement to Pravda, published today, namely, the danger of an organisation of this kind becoming simply a piece of mechanism for the defence of the status quo—something to crystallise the power situation in favour of those who start by being powerful and wealthy. That is an accusation which was often levelled at the League of Nations and Stalin levels it in blunter and cruder terms now at the United Nations.

I do not think that in its rather short and stormy life the United Nations organisation has deserved that criticism. Its achievements have, so far, been on a minor rather than a major plane, but some have been of a very progressive nature. The United Nations played a very big part in the birth of the new State of Indonesia, in helping to transform what had been a colonial territory into an independent State with a minimum of bloodshed, and the minimum of dislocation of relationships between East and West. This was a genuine success for the progressive idea, for the conception that the old colonial relationship can be broken, not in the way Communists have always maintained, but by reasonableness; not exclusively by the pressure of military action but by mobilisation of the moral forces of the world who believe in peaceful change.

One can quote a number of instances of that kind which show that the machinery of the United Nations, so far from merely being
what Stalin has tried to make out in his recent speech, is an instrument for conducting international relationships for purposes which appeal to Socialists.

What the United Nations is opposed to is not change in itself, not even drastic change. It is, however, opposed to change by the arbitrary use of force and it is its resistance to changes of that kind which have earned it Stalin’s criticism today. Almost the first thing it had to do at the first Assembly and the first meeting of the Security Council in London in 1946 was to try to get Soviet troops in Iran away from where they ought no longer to have been.

The United Nations also took a stand against a dictated settlement of the Berlin problem by economic and physical force.

Finally, there has been Korea, about which I will talk a little later on.

In trying to make this international machinery work we have, quite frankly, had absolutely no help from the Soviet Union. She has had, in the United Nations, an astonishing record of obstruction. I am not thinking merely of the number of individual disputes in which she has taken a line different from the majority of the nations. She has even obstructed the building up of the machinery of collective security which had been contemplated at San Francisco. She has made it quite impossible for us to progress even on the purely technical and military level towards agreements which would have put certain armed forces at the disposal of the United Nations. Moreover, in every organ of the United Nations which has attempted to deal with atomic energy or conventional armaments, the proceedings have always broken down because the Soviet Union was unable to agree with anybody else at all, not only with America but with the smaller nations too. It is too facile to say, as the Soviet representatives always say, that the reason is simply that all the nations, except herself and other Communist states, vote at the dictation of the United States.

It simply is not true.

It certainly is not true, as we have recently seen, of countries like India, nor of a number of countries one could mention in the East, the Middle East and in Western Europe who are certainly not open to that charge.

The Problem of Soviet and Satellite Armaments

Now we are told by Stalin that the United Nations is nothing but the United States’ tool for aggression. I am not going to discuss any further the merits of that accusation. It might be more interesting to speculate why Stalin should choose to deliver this very bitter attack, not only upon ourselves and upon the United States, but also upon the United Nations as a body at this particular time.
Ostensibly, I suppose, the statement was made in order to deny our Prime Minister's statement about the armament of the Soviet Union. It may be that it was felt that that came a little too near the knuckle and must be speedily and dramatically denied. There has been some question in this hall as to whether there has been some exaggeration about Soviet rearmament. I do not think that there has been. Obviously I cannot discuss the question which was asked from the hall, 'What is your evidence? Does it merely come from the Daily Express?' It certainly comes from something more authoritative than that. It comes, in part, from published statements and published figures and reasonable deductions from them. I am not going any further into that. I can only say that we are reasonably satisfied, on the best information we have, that the figures given on more than one occasion by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of Defence are substantially correct. At any rate, I think I can say that whatever demobilisation may have occurred, and we know that much demobilisation occurred in the Soviet Union from the peak figure of twelve or thirteen millions at the end of the war, the residue left in the armed forces has never corresponded, even approximately, to what is necessary to meet any possible threat to Soviet security. In addition to the armaments of the Soviet Union, there have been, particularly in recent months, great increases in the armaments of the south-eastern satellite states who were formerly allies of the Nazis and were, of course, subject to peace treaty limitations. We have good reason to believe that these increases are above the treaty limits and that they have been increasing very rapidly in recent months, yet the Soviet Government, who ought to be one of the custodians of the integrity of the peace treaties, has seen to it that none of us can readily find out the facts. It certainly is the fact that our Yugoslav friends are extremely worried about the level of the armaments of some of her neighbours and they, probably, have as good means of knowing the truth about these armaments as anybody.

**Germany and the Defence of the West**

It is in this context of the knowledge that the Soviet is maintaining these armaments, combined with her failure to cooperate with us in the matter of the enforcement of the peace treaties, that one must view the problem of Western defence.

And in that problem, whether one likes to do it or not, one must include the question of the future security of Western Germany. Until a few months ago, if one had been addressing any Labour or Socialist, or indeed any intelligent audience, I think one would have found general support for the proposition that Western Germany, democratised as far as may be, must be gradually brought back into the comity of nations. None of us could envisage that
she was continuously going to be kept under occupation. Therefore, we must regard it as part of our duty to see that Western Germany is brought into the comity of nations, enjoying a reasonable sense of security.

One of the questions we are facing today is whether that can be done without contemplating any contribution to their own security being made by the Germans themselves. Crossman referred to his conception of a neutralised Germany. I am not going, in detail, into that possibility, I would just like to say that it is not only the present government of Western Germany which views the prospect of neutralisation with considerable dismay. It is also the Socialists. Indeed, I have reason to believe that there are no substantial groups in Western Germany today who can view with any degree of confidence the complete neutralisation of Germany, by which I mean a Germany neither occupied by foreign occupation troops nor with the means of defending herself. You will appreciate, therefore, that there is a real problem to be dealt with here.

The Prime Minister in the foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons last Monday dealt at some length with this German problem. He pointed out some of the conditions which must be fulfilled in any case before there can effectively be any German contribution to the defence of Western Europe and of herself. He put first the willingness of the German people to do so and those who know Germany know that there is not, at the moment, a general willingness to make any contribution to defence.

Perhaps the main condition, also mentioned by the Prime Minister, is that the Western allies must be stronger; the Germans must have confidence that, if they are to take part, they are not merely to be a sacrifice, a sort of thin advance guard of the Western Powers but that they really are being integrated into a system where they will help and be helped effectively. There are many in Germany equally anxious to be sure that, if there are to be German forces rapidly built up, these German forces, again in the words of the Prime Minister, will be not the masters but the servants of German democracy. These pre-conditions are obviously difficult. All I ask is that people who view the whole question, as so many of us do, with the greatest distaste, should not allow that distaste to make them think that the problem does not exist. It is a real problem.

If this problem of Western European defence is real, then German defence is an inescapable part of it. The Government does not question the need to approach it with caution and only asks that it should be recognised and honestly faced. No one likes our own defence programme, let alone a programme which may include our former enemies within it; but that is no reason for
saying that we must not face the problem. Our feelings will not change the facts of the international situation.

The only thing I can see in the near future which might, perhaps, change the facts of the situation would be if we were to see, as I hope we may, a disposition on the part of the Soviet Government at the Four Power Conference, to see these facts change. That is what we propose to put to the test.

We want to discover, if we can, whether the Soviet Government is really worried about peace and security in Europe or whether this is only a tactical move from which she hopes to get some concession which will enable her to become the sole master of Germany.

We must not forget that Germany is a very great prize at the centre of Europe with a very large, technically competent and virile population. If we were to agree to something which turned out to be a bogus settlement which did not really reduce the tension at all, or permit us to get rid of any of our own burden of defence, and as a result we merely found that the Iron Curtain had shifted to the Rhine, I do not think that many Socialists or anyone else would think that we had done right.

The Aggression in Korea

May I now say something about the problems of the Far East and particularly about the Korean question, which precipitated and made acute a number of problems which we would have had to face anyway in that area.

I cannot help thinking that there are many people in this country who, with regard to Korea, are now enjoying being wise after the event. When very difficult and very rapid decisions had to be taken in the last days of June—whether to treat the attack of the North on the South as aggression; whether to subscribe to the resolution in the United Nations calling upon members to meet it; and whether to send first naval forces, then aeroplanes and then ground forces—I do not remember that I then received from my own constituency any very considerable volume of protest. I believe that the Labour movement felt that the right thing was being done. Our minds harked back to Manchuria and Abyssinia before the war, about which we were all so vocal.

There are only a very few people entitled now to say “We always thought it was the wrong thing to do.” I think a lot of people who agreed at the time are now trying to wriggle out of certain consequences which follow quite inevitably on the decision with which they then agreed.

The whole Korean story seems to me about as typical an example as you could find of Soviet non-cooperation in the international world.
It is not always remembered that the Cairo declaration, so constantly quoted in connection with Formosa, also covered Korea and other former possessions of Japan. At that time, and for a long time subsequently, the 38th parallel, which is a household word now, was never considered. People did not think in terms of a frontier on the 38th parallel; they thought of Korea as one whole country that was to be free and independent. The parallel only came into existence politically because the Soviet and American armies, at the time of the Japanese collapse, met there and agreed to stop there. It is a line which has neither political, economic, ethnical or strategic significance. It is a line on the map where the armies stopped. For about two years after the war attempts were made to try to get some agreed solution between the Americans and the Russians for a united and independent Korea.

I won't go into the details of why they broke down. It is one of the numerous cases where, when you examine it impartially, you must reach the conclusion that it was the Russians and not the Americans who caused the unnecessary obstruction. When it became clear that agreement was unlikely at that level, it was transferred to the forum of the United Nations. But the Soviet Government would not admit that the United Nations had anything to do with it and they have simply obstructed for three consecutive years. As long ago as 1947 the United Nations produced a resolution which would have offered a happy and peaceful settlement for Korea which might have enabled us to get a democratic solution, but these debates were boycotted by the Russians, and when the United Nations commission went to Korea, they refused them any access north of the parallel. I do not think that any Western State can be blamed for that; certainly not the Americans. There was no trace of any American imperialism in their action, nor in their subsequent action in withdrawing their troops altogether.

The direct challenge to United Nations' authority which seemed to so many to be a clear issue in June has since become complicated by being connected with other Far Eastern issues relating to the place which the Chinese Communist Government should take in the world.

Nevertheless the simple issue of North Korean aggression remains and our aim has, therefore, been to resist it, in accordance with our Charter obligations, and, at the same time, to limit the conflict to Korea. In respect of the wider matters which have bedevilled the problem, we are trying to find a way of getting all the interested powers around the table, including Communist China and the Soviet Union, to discuss them. We have been very much hampered in this by the fact that there has been no general agreement in the United Nations about the recognition of the Peking Government as the true government of China. Because of this it may be very difficult to obtain the admission of China to a con-
ference on these matters, as a full member of U.N. at the start. Therefore, what we have been trying to do is to hold a conference at which the Peking Government would be accepted as an equal in the hope that, if we could get some kind of agreement, and China should show a disposition to meet us half-way, the second and important step of her becoming a full member of the United Nations would follow more easily. That is the essence of the proposal put forward only a week or so ago by Mr. Lester Pearson on behalf of Canada, which we broadly supported and which we hope to see taken up.

May I go back to the time, before the Chinese intervention, when first the North Korean attack had been stemmed and the United Nations' forces were moving up Korea? We put forward, at the opening of the General Assembly in New York, a resolution, which was eventually passed on 7th October, for the setting up, after hostilities, of a free, unified and independent Korea. The object of putting that forward at that time was, firstly, that we wanted to get the authority of the whole body of the United Nations behind the decision which had been taken so rapidly in June to meet this aggression; and, secondly—and this is often forgotten—that we wanted to assure Korea's neighbours, and particularly the Peking Government, that the United Nations' forces were in Korea for the purpose stated in the United Nations' resolution and for no other purpose at all. That was one of the main reasons why we thought it was vital that that resolution should be put forward at the very beginning of the conference. At the same time we were trying, vainly, to obtain the help of the Soviet Government, and also on one occasion of the Peking Government, which was the only government, as far as we could discover, which had any contact with the Northern Korean authorities, to use their good offices to bring the fighting to an end and to enable the dispute to be settled by negotiations. That was before the 38th parallel was crossed by United Nations' troops but we met with a complete stonewall there. We were told bluntly it was nothing to do with the Peking Government and that they could not even tell us where the North Korean Government was.

That resolution is often taken to be the one giving authority to the United Nations' forces to cross the parallel. It is natural that it should be so and I think it had something of that effect, but, in fact, that authority was given in June by the Security Council resolution which repeated the aims of the United Nations which had been declared in resolutions over the past three years to have a united Korea and called upon United Nations' troops to take whatever action might be necessary in order to achieve that end.

Korea had been treated as a whole ever since the Cairo Declaration and I think it is fair, particularly to the United Nations' command, to say that neither we nor, so far as I know, the vast
majority of the nations at that time raised any substantial objection to the crossing of the 38th parallel, thought we had certain misgivings about it. That was done with the full consent of 45 or more out of the 60 members of the United Nations. Later we began to have grave doubts about whether it was right to go very much further and we did not think it wise to go right up to the Manchurian frontier. That, as the Foreign Secretary has explained, was the advice which we gave and which was turned down.

**Chinese Intervention and the Condemnatory Resolution**

Then came the Chinese intervention, first on a relatively small scale, by volunteers, and, late in November, on a large scale with organised armies. It was at that time that the Chinese delegation, from which we hoped a good deal, under the leadership of General Wu, came to New York, not to discuss the Chinese intervention, but, on invitation, to discuss the accusation being made against America, in respect of Formosa. When he came, his instructions were so rigid that he would not even discuss the Chinese intervention in Korea which by that time had become the most important of all the problems of the Far East. I saw him myself, as did our Permanent Representative, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, and India’s representative, Sir Benegal Rau, but we were unable to get any change out of him at all. The Asian countries themselves issued an appeal to the North Korean authorities, and to the Chinese, that they should not advance south of the parallel but should accept certain cease-fire provisions. But there was no response. Then they tabled what was called the cease-fire resolution on Indian initiative and a resolution was passed setting up a small group to try to organise the cease fire. The group was declared by the Chinese to be illegal and they said they could not deal with it at all.

Now it is perhaps not surprising that during all these events when the United Nations forces were in retreat and heavy casualties were being suffered that there should have been a considerable wave of emotion in the United States. I was there then. As I was not here I do not know how people felt about our troops. But the American troops in Korea were more numerous than ours and the thing came home to more American homes than to British homes and we can hardly be surprised that there was a wave of anti-Chinese emotion. When they viewed what was happening in Korea alongside the total lack of response which even the Indian delegation was receiving from the Chinese delegation, that feeling was accentuated and American opinion got into a ferment of mind which could have been dangerous, and which made it difficult for the process of negotiation to make any progress.

I think it is worth asking oneself why the Chinese turned down
these proposals so definitely. We are told at the present time that it is impossible to imagine that the Chinese could consider cease fire negotiations now because the recent resolution stated that they had engaged in aggression. At the time of which I am speaking, however, nobody had labelled the Chinese as aggressors so it was not that which made them refuse to negotiate on the first occasion.

Then what was it? We are still in the realm of speculation, but I suggest that the main reason was that the military situation in Korea was, from their point of view, very favourable. They had their eye, not so much on what was being said in New York as upon what they were able to do in Korea, and, because of the military situation, they were not prepared to meet us at all. We should remind ourselves of this when we are assessing what is likely to be the effect of the resolution which has now been passed. This is the one which accuses the Chinese of engaging in aggression by helping the North Koreans and, in its original form, called for the institution of sanctions. That was the resolution which we, the British Government, opposed and I think we had the support, certainly the solid support of the Labour movement of this country in doing so.

What is not always so clearly realised is that we were very nearly alone in doing so, apart from the Soviet Union and her group of satellites. The Indians and the Burmese opposed, but the other members of the Commonwealth either said they would support or at any rate promised not to oppose. The same was true of our friends in Western Europe. We were almost alone, with India, to stand out against that resolution because we thought that the original resolution, by proceeding straight away to sanctions, would result in action which would not help the negotiation of a settlement. It was, we can claim, almost entirely in deference to our views that the resolution was eventually amended. In the end we achieved our purpose that there should be no resort to other measures, i.e., sanctions, until the good offices committee had had a clear run to get a negotiated settlement.

I believe that that was a very big change. Some people say that, because we have called the people's government aggressors, the door is closed. I do not believe that that is true. I do not believe that this will greatly influence the Chinese Communists. If they were willing to hold the door open on other grounds, that clause, I am sure, would not make them shut it.

As there has been some criticism of our acceptance of the amended resolution, I should like to explain what was the choice we had to make. We knew that the original unamended resolution had strong support. We knew that, if it was voted upon, it would be passed. There was no question of it being held up or defeated. We also knew that it was only in order to get our support that an amended resolution was put forward at all. If we had not
been prepared to accept the resolution with the amendment, it is almost certain that what would have been voted upon would have been the unamended resolution, which would have closed the door to negotiation. That was the alternative we had to face and we took the choice of which you know; that, although we did not much like the resolution even as amended, we had better back it because it would still leave the door open.

There was of course another alternative. We could have voted against the resolution and let the door be closed, but would that have been a responsible course to take? It might have enabled us to say self-righteously that we were doing the right thing, but it would not have helped to solve the problems of the Far East. That is the realistic way in which you have to view the course we adopted.

**Anglo-American Relations**

It is in connection with these events in the United Nations that we have been accused of subservience to the United States.

I agree very much with what Crossman said about the United States and about our alliance with them. I am not going to repeat the things which he said so well. I just want to say that, however many aspects of U.S. policy there may be that alarm us, we in this country share very many of the same ideals, and we share a belief in the same sort of way-of-life.

I also want to emphasise that North America is essential to us and to the free world, not only for defence, but for our plans for raising living standards all over the world. You have only to consider the Colombo Plan of which, I believe, most people in our movement are proud. This plan is intended, over a period, to raise the standards in South East Asia. We know that that cannot possibly be done on an adequate scale unless we get some cooperation from the United States of America. We shall waste the greatest constructive force in the Western and democratic world if we try to get along in these matters, as in defence, without N. America. We have learned to work more closely with them than with any other country in the world. We have close blood relationships and other ties with them. To pretend that these things do not matter is to take a very superficial view. Moreover, it is not just a matter of the United States. The members of the Commonwealth, Australia, Canada and N. Zealand, all believe that this alliance with the U.S. is an essential part of their, and our, world policy and the same is true also of our French friends across the Channel.

We may have differences on particular matters. We have a different perspective, looking from the opposite side of the Atlantic, upon the risks of war and we have different standards of living.
Where we differ, I believe and the Government believes, that we must speak bluntly and firmly.

The Prime Minister spoke bluntly and firmly on the Far Eastern problem when he went to Washington and we, in a similar way, in the delegation in New York, spoke equally bluntly from day to day. Incidentally, we were bitterly criticised by many elements in the U.S. for the line we were taking. If you told an American that the British Prime Minister had been taking a subservient line he would have been very surprised indeed.

Crossman used a very good phrase in talking about Anglo-American relations. He said that “Anglo-American friction should be creative.” What does that mean? It means that when we talk bluntly with the Americans and insist upon taking our own line, and not theirs, we must see that these disputes among friends lead to something better and not to something worse. That is what we have to keep in mind. It is not creative simply to sulk in international relations if you do not get your own way. That is not the creative way though it may give some temporary satisfaction; nor does it constitute loyal membership of the United Nations. In these matters of China and Korea there were many of our friends who were inclined to share the views of the U.S. and not ours. I think we did pretty well to get so much of our view accepted. If we are to play our part in international affairs it is no use thinking we can be separatists.

There is an underlying resentment felt in this country that we cannot get exactly what we want. But power has shifted. I believe that the sort of relationship we are building up with the Commonwealth and Western Europe, and together with them our relationship with America, is not only vital to us for defence purposes but for all the long-term plans of the western world. It also corresponds to the real position of Britain in the world and it offers the most hopeful way of moulding the world situation and world events to the needs of our people.
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