to handle. Other colonial powers have faced the same problem. France had her Algeria, and it took even de Gaulle a long time to wrest power from the colonists.

The nature of Rhodesia as a settler colony has led to differences in its constitutional evolution. The electorate, overwhelmingly white, were allowed in 1922 to decide by referendum whether they wanted to join South Africa or to become—for the first time—a British colony with an advanced degree of self-government. Till that time the territory had been protected by Britain but had been administered by a commercial company, the British South Africa Company. The referendum went in favour of a self-governing colony. Since then, Rhodesia has enjoyed its own elected parliament, its own cabinet, its own armed forces. The administration of all British colonies is left largely to men on the spot; in the Rhodesian case this was done without normal supervision from London.

It is important to realise, however, that this high degree of self-government did not detract from Britain’s sovereignty. The constitution of 1923 was granted by Britain. When it was altered in 1961 this had to be done by the British parliament, and parliament has at all times retained the right to change the constitution. Moreover the 1923 constitution gave British ministers the right to veto Rhodesian legislation which they considered to be contrary to the interests of the African population. It was only by British legislation that this detailed supervision was ended—and it could be restored at any time. The legal situation is clear: the British parliament is sovereign over Rhodesia. Even Ian Smith accepted this when he said in a BBC interview on 10 September 1964, “Although the British government say they have no intention of interfering in our internal affairs . . . nobody can deny that from a legal constitutional point of view they have a right to do so. . . .”

If Britain alone has a right to make Rhodesia independent, it is for Britain to decide on what terms she will do so. Before UDI reference was often made to a “convention” whereby Britain, while possessing the right to legislate for Rhodesia, did not do so. Such a convention had certainly been referred to by successive British ministers. It had, however, no legal effect in that no act of the British parliament could be declared invalid even if it broke the convention. Moreover, the convention needs to be accurately expressed. It was that the British parliament did not legislate for matters within the competence of the Rhodesian legislature. In other words, if Britain had given the Rhodesian legislature power to pass a certain kind of legislation she should not use her right to override the local legislature. The convention has its roots in the common sense point that there should not be conflicting legislation or two bodies responsible for one subject. But the convention never meant that Britain had lost the right to revoke Rhodesia’s constitution or to change those parts of it which the Rhodesian legislature itself could not change.

Whatever the content of the convention before UDI the illegal seizure of the colony has created a new situation in which the convention does not survive. There may be, there certainly are, practical limitations on Britain’s freedom to intervene in Rhodesia, but the convention is not such a limitation.

It is as well to recall in passing that the present crisis in Rhodesia, which began with the election of the Rhodesian Front government at the end of 1962,
was not initiated by the British government. The Conservatives were not at that time putting pressure on the Rhodesian government to liberalise, although they would have had plenty of justification for doing so, and there was no sign that a future Labour government would be prepared to impose changes. The crisis arose because the Rhodesian Front government demanded independence and refused to continue under the 1961 constitution. They forced Britain to discuss terms for independence and seized power illegally when they found the terms unacceptable. The crisis has been forced on Britain, not created by her.

the transfer of power

Our task in Rhodesia is to secure the orderly advance of the country towards a democratic constitution. How do we do it? In particular, at what point do we grant independence, before power has passed to the African majority or not until afterwards? So far as the substance of policy is concerned, as against the means of carrying it out, this is the only vital point.

Since UDI many people in Rhodesia and some in Britain have rejected the assumption that power should pass to the majority population at all. This is contrary to the assumptions behind the constitutional settlement of 1961; it is contrary to the basic principles applied in British colonial evolution; it is contrary to the spirit of Rhodesia’s existing constitution. But it is as well to look at the point again, for some argue that conditions have changed and that the Congo massacres and events in other African states call in question previous assumptions about the desirability of ultimate majority rule. The fact is that the continuation of dominance by a white population of 200,000 over an African population of 4 million is not only immoral, it is bound to lead to a bloody explosion. Rhodesia has a choice of passing peacefully to majority rule reasonably soon, or passing to it later after a revolution. It is brave and dramatic to stand against the inevitable, but it does not succeed. The way to avoid a catastrophe is to meet the legitimate aspirations of the Africans by providing them with a gradually increasing share in power. As The Times said on the 24 November 1965, “Rhodesians are being pressed to avoid a revolution, not to embark on one.”

Against the view that democracy has been discredited elsewhere in Africa, it must be said that a white dictatorship forced to employ police state methods to maintain itself is no more democratic than a black dictatorship. Democracy is not justified by the ability of each man to govern himself, but by the risks involved in allowing any group of men to govern their fellows. No better illustration of the risks could be provided than Rhodesia today.

A transfer of power from the 200,000 whites to the four million blacks in Rhodesia is inevitable. What is in doubt is whether this will entail a drastic decline in political standards and prosperity. We must do our best to ensure that the Rhodesia of the future possesses the maximum of political liberty. We shall do that cause no good if, despairing of success, we prop up a reactionary white supremacist regime, a course which will only encourage reactionary black racialism when the change comes.

We need to recognise that what is involved in the transfer of power from white to black is no superficial thing. What we mean when we say that the whites govern Rhodesia is that, even in so far as Africans participate in govern-
ment, enjoy educational facilities etc., they do so on sufferance by the whites. The number of seats in parliament dominated by African voters can be reduced at any time by the white members of parliament. The areas where Africans may live are prescribed by law made by whites. Europeans enjoy the best land and ten times as much annual income per head. Not only do whites govern Rhodesia: the whole of Rhodesian life is organised for their benefit. At present Europeans can behave as if Africans are unwelcome intruders in their own country.

If power passes to the majority all this will change. Segregation in land is bound to stop. There will be an African prime minister. Differences in incomes will diminish at least between those doing similar work. Salisbury's exclusive white hotels, restaurants, clubs, residential areas—all these will go. There will not be wholesale persecution any more than there is in Zambia. Europeans will not be expelled—Rhodesia's economy needs them too much for that. A majority can afford to tolerate a minority on a basis of individual capability: it is minorities who cannot afford to be egalitarian. Nevertheless, Europeans will inevitably and rightly feel that they are at the mercy of a vastly larger, foreign and basically hostile population. Their situation will be so utterly different from that which they enjoy today that it is quite unrealistic to expect them to acquiesce in the change.

It may be said that this view attaches too much importance to race and that people should not be concerned with the colour of a government, but with its quality. They should not but they are; and in the present feverish state of race relations in Africa and throughout the world it is fantasy to expect otherwise. For the foreseeable future race will count for a great deal in the formation of attitudes both of whites and blacks.

As a matter of cold fact, entrenched racial minorities simply do not voluntarily hand over power. Such a conclusion is no more than commonsense suggests, but we can base our conclusion not on abstractions but on experience. Is there any case in history when an entrenched racial minority has acquiesced in the transfer of power to a previously subjugated majority if it could avoid doing so? Did the Zanzibar Asians? No. Did the colons in Algeria? No. Did the Europeans in Kenya? No. (The latter were only less successful than the Rhodesians because they had no army with which to resist British pressure.) Are there any cases when a racial minority has clung on to power? Yes—in South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. And let us not forget that South Africa and Portugal are the two countries with which white Rhodesians express most sympathy.

Common sense and experience both indicate that racial minorities do not voluntarily surrender power. It is against this background that we need to look at the situation in Rhodesia today, and then decide whether Britain can safely make Rhodesia independent before majority rule has actually arrived.

There are only two important questions in the Rhodesia issue: as to objective, whether we grant independence before there is majority rule, whenever that may be; as to means, whether we are prepared in the last resort to use force. The first step to realism is to recognise that nothing is of any significance except these two vital points.
2. Rhodesia today

There are about 217,000 Europeans in Rhodesia—about the same as the population of Harrow. Only about 28,000 adults were born in the country. The rest of the adult population are immigrants. Small scale pre-war immigration was followed by a vast wave after the second world war, taking the European population up from 83,000 in 1946 to 136,000 in 1951. A second wave followed in the fifties. About one third of the European population is of South African origin. Around a quarter have been in the country less than ten years, and three quarters for less than 20 years. These figures need to be borne in mind when assessing the rights of Europeans against the four million Africans.

The law and the constitution

The franchise in Rhodesia’s illegal 1965 constitution is the same as that in the legal 1961 constitution. It was worked out by Duncan Sandys for Britain and Sir Edgar Whitehead, Rhodesia’s then Prime Minister. Whitehead accepted the objective of ultimate majority rule but he wanted to be rid of routine British supervision of Rhodesian legislation. The old franchise had stipulated an income of £240 for the vote. Most Africans were excluded by this requirement and there was no chance of an advance in average African incomes fast enough to give them a majority. The new franchise was intended to provide a prospect of an African majority at a date perhaps ten or twenty years ahead. The qualifications for the vote are set out below. It is impossible to estimate how long it would take for an African majority to emerge under this system—so much depends on the pace of educational and economic advance, and that in turn depends on the policies of a white dominated government who are very conscious of the effect of their policies on the electoral register. But even if a vast number of Africans were to be added to the rolls, it would still be possible for the government to reduce the number of members elected by the lower, mainly African roll, and so to put off an African majority into the unforeseeable future.

**THE RHODESIAN FRANCHISE:**

**THERE ARE TWO SEPARATE REGISTERS OF VOTERS. 50 MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY THE A REGISTER, 15 BY THE B REGISTER.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>who qualifies?</th>
<th>qualifications</th>
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<tr>
<td>A register</td>
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<tr>
<td>about 100,000</td>
<td>£330 a year and</td>
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<td>nearly all</td>
<td>4 years secondary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>education; or</td>
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<td></td>
<td>£528 a year and</td>
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<td>primary education; or £792 a year and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>no education</td>
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<tr>
<td>B register</td>
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<td>about 100,000</td>
<td>£132 a year and</td>
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<tr>
<td>nearly all</td>
<td>2 years secondary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>education†; or</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>£264* a year and</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no education</td>
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† primary only if over 30
* £198 if over 30

The above table, in the interests of simplicity, omits a few minor provisions. About 1½ million adult Africans do not qualify for either register and consequently have no vote. Cross-voting is allowed. B voters can vote in A register elections but the number of B votes for each candidate is scaled down to ensure that B votes do not exceed one quarter of A votes. A voters have the same right in elections on the B register.

So long as nearly all Europeans support a single party, as they do at the moment, this cross-voting feature has no practical effect.
The franchise as it stands, therefore, offers no evidence of a firm intention to secure, and certainly no guarantee of, an African majority soon. Even so, this franchise and the other provisions of the 1961 constitution were opposed by Smith and his party as too liberal.

The other main features of the 1961 constitution were the Declaration of Rights written into the constitution and the Constitutional Council charged with advising against new legislation which offended against the declaration of rights. But the Council was given no power to veto such laws as is the Supreme Court in the United States, and no power to exercise even advisory functions against legislation already on the statute book. Since Rhodesia already had a full range of discriminatory legislation before the Council was set up, its effectiveness is nominal. It is composed of a multiracial panel of judges and has itself condemned its lack of real power to affect discriminatory legislation. In its report on the Land Apportionment Act, the Council questioned “what value the declaration of rights has in protecting rights in the future so long as one of those rights—the right to freedom from discrimination in regard to ownership of land...is specifically denied by this Act.” This condemnation was entirely ineffective because the act in question had been passed before the 1961 constitution.

The declaration of rights reads well. Discrimination is prohibited, but not if it takes place under an existing act. Arrest and detention without trial are prohibited, but not during an emergency and not if provided for by an existing act. There is freedom of expression—but Rhodesia’s press is today censored in accordance with perfectly valid exceptions to the rule. No trust can, therefore, be placed in the guarantees in the 1961 constitution.

The loopholes carelessly or deviously left are too great.

The changes introduced by Smith in the illegal 1965 constitution are important for what they reveal about the inclinations of the regime when able to write its own law as it pleases. The 1965 constitution is largely copied from that of 1961. Whole sections are identical, in particular the declaration of rights. But the few changes are all important. The constitution was promulgated by the rebel ministers and it was not even presented to parliament for acceptance. For a period of six months after its promulgation, the government gave to the illegal governor power to alter any of its provisions by the stroke of a pen without reference to parliament. This provision was actually used to alter the section relating to the Crown, without reference to parliament.

The procedure for routine amendment of the constitution has been greatly weakened. The 1961 constitution laid down that its most important clauses, those affecting the franchise, for example, could only be altered by a referendum in which each of Rhodesia’s four races voted in favour of the change. If registered African voters were below a certain number they had to be supplemented by non-voters. We have already seen how this guarantee could be nullified by a reduction in the number of African dominated seats, a change that did not require a referendum. Nevertheless, in the new constitution the whole procedure is swept aside. Any change in the constitution can be made so long as parliament passes the amendment by a two-thirds majority and, at a later sitting which could be on the same day, passes a resolution of a similar majority requesting the illegal governor to assent to it. The Rhodesian Front has at present well over a two-thirds majority and
could therefore change the constitution in any way, abolishing votes for Africans, sacking the judges, abolishing the fundamental rights or introducing torture. Whether the Front is likely to do these things is not the point; the constitution would not stop them and the fact that, given the opportunity, they have not imposed any restrictions on themselves, is significant.

In the old constitution, the appointment of judges required the agreement of the Chief Justice. In the illegal constitution this power lies with the Prime Minister who need only consult the Chief Justice without being bound by his advice.

emergency regulations

Even long before udi, Rhodesia possessed draconian statutes with which to deal with its opponents. The death penalty was mandatory for such offences as petrol bomb throwing even if no damage had been caused; several people have been condemned to death under this provision and only saved by international pressure. A former Rhodesian Chief Justice, Sir Robert Tredgold, resigned in protest against the Law and Order Maintenance Act, which he described as outraging "almost every basic human right" and as "an unwarranted invasion" by the executive in the sphere of the courts. Members of the public could be obliged to live in certain areas, under "restriction." In the case of Africans, the place of restriction was usually a remote and desolate part of the bush, uninhabited and sometimes unhealthy. The only food and shelter were what the police provided and medical attention was minimal. Many of the restrictees were well educated urban Africans. Because the aluminium huts provided by the police were painfully uncomfortable in all weathers, they often constructed their own mud huts. It was as if the regime wanted to humiliate educated men by forcing them to live like tribal natives. Some of the restrictees were sent to live in these conditions for five years. They had broken no law. They had been seen by no court. They were only men who, in the opinion of a minister, for reasons he did not need to disclose, were considered a danger to the community; and there was no appeal from the minister's decision.

A fortnight before udi these powers were greatly extended. The government now has power to ban meetings of three or more people and the police are immune from proceedings if they cause injury or death in breaking up an illegal meeting. The police may prohibit the printing, distribution or even possession of any written matter. It is an offence to publish information about persons in restriction or detention or about their place of confinement. It is an offence to pass a remark to another person that might cause alarm and despondency. Every publication requires government approval and every line has to be passed by the government censor. Radio stations and printing works can be taken over and mail can be impounded. Anyone can be detained for 30 days without warrant or trial on suspicion that he may be a person whose arrest is in the public interest; and on release he can be rearrested. The traditional chiefs (who, the Smith regime likes to claim, are not controlled by government) can be sacked and substitutes appointed. Finally, it is an offence to wear, carry or simply possess a hat or walking stick if it is like that of a restricted person and has been reputed to be the badge of an unlawful organisation!

The powers of the administration are such that the courts can afford no pro-
tection. In January 1966 Mr. Malu-
leke, an African student, was charged
with arson and malicious damage to
property. The court found that there
was no case to answer and acquitted
him. As he left the court Maluleke
was arrested and served with a gov-
ernment order restricting him for five
years. Many more provisions and cases
of the same kind could be quoted. They
add up to a catalogue which amply
justifies the charge that Rhodesia to-
day is a police state. The view that,
leaving aside the illegality of UDI, the
Smith regime respects the rule of law
and British legal tradition does not bear
examination. No British people have
ever accepted the Hitlerian machinery
which is now directed against Rho-
desia's African population. When a
government resorts to such methods to
maintain itself in power it has aban-
doned all claim to sympathy.

education

If Rhodesia is made independent under
the kind of constitution it now pos-
sesses, great importance will attach to
the educational and economic oppor-
tunities open to Africans for the vote
goes only to those with money or edu-
cation. Europeans point to their large
expenditure on African education as
evidence of their generosity and their
intention to help Africans. In 1965-66
Rhodesia planned to spend £6.5 mil-
lion on African education, the largest
item in the budget. The figure has been
rising rapidly in recent years—it was
only £3.9 million in 1960—but it has
now been decided that expenditure
must be geared to rises in the national
income. Total expenditure on Euro-
pean education is slightly less than that
on African education. These facts
sound superficially impressive but one
must look behind them. There are ten
times as many Africans at school as
Europeans; so expenditure per child
is ten times higher for the European.
Secondary education for European
children is compulsory; for Africans
no education is compulsory. The facili-
ties for Europeans are nearly all pro-
vided by the state; most African
schools are provided by missions,
farms, and other private bodies. Only
11 per cent of Africans are in govern-
ment schools.

Most African children go to school for
some period of time, but only 8 per
cent reach secondary school and only
one in every thousand reaches the sixth
form. There is a big drop-out after
three years' primary education and a
massive drop-out at the end of prim-
ary school as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFRICAN PUPILS</th>
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<tr>
<td>ENROLLED IN 1964</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Substandard class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary Standard Four</td>
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<td>Primary Standard Six</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary Form One</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary Form Four</td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Sixth</td>
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Nor is this shallow pyramid to be
attributed to greater success in enroll-
ing young pupils than in past years.
The pattern has always been the same.
The 35 in the Upper Sixth in 1964 were
what was left of the 2,000 who were in
Form II in 1960 and of 29,000 in Pri-
mary Standard Three in 1955. For the
African the difficulty lies not in getting
to school and learning enough to earn
a living but in staying at school long
enough to begin to compete with the
European.

The Rhodesian government's annual
report on African education for 1964
said, "The amount of contribution
made by the parents and the voluntary
agencies is tremendous. There must be
very few systems where before the government grant for the teachers’ salaries is made available the applicants for the school have to erect the school building and the teachers’ houses, equip the school and buy the books and classroom requisites.” To meet the demand for education, communities were allowed to open new upper primary schools. The report states, “Not a single trained teacher was seen in charge of one of these classes, nor did any of them receive a satisfactory report.” As for farm schools, said to vary from very good to very bad, the report quotes the words of a government inspector: “On farms where the school has been opened merely to attract labour and where the farmer’s only concern with the school is that of paying the teacher, scholastic standards hardly exist. All sorts of ruffians, sexual maniacs and budding politicians are employed and can contaminate the children freely and for as long as they like provided they do not pester the farmer for pencils, books and other equipment. The farmer is quite happy to employ a dolt as long as by so doing school matters do not intrude upon farm matters and his pocket.” In 1964, the Smith government refused a British offer of a larger grant for a crash programme on African education. The programme which has been announced since UDI concentrates almost exclusively on primary education and will do little to bring Africans up to the standard where they can compete.

can agricultural workers averaged only £67 a year. These figures include all benefits in kind. If Africans do not pay high taxation it is because they do not receive a fair share of the wealth of the country. Nevertheless, as we have seen, African parents have to make a considerable contribution to the education of their children.

The way in which an African can earn his living is dictated by the Land Apportionment Act. Under this act, 36 million of Rhodesia’s 96 million acres are reserved for the 5 per cent of Europeans in the population. This European land includes the best; it is true that it has been better looked after than African land but it was also better to start with and nearer to roads and railways. A Rhodesian parliamentary select committee reported in 1960 that between 1936 and 1959 about 113,000 Africans had been compulsorily moved from their farmlands in the European area. The committee commented that “millions of pounds of badly needed capital has been spent for ideological rather than productive purposes.” The Constitutional Council of Rhodesia although unable to take formal action against the Act, produced a unanimous report against it. They said it had been “responsible for not only intangible prejudice but actual material prejudice in the financial sense to all races.” It is often argued that the Act benefits Africans by keeping Europeans out of certain areas. Total absence of control would certainly allow Europeans to buy up African farms. But proper legislation should protect the under-privileged without giving massive advantage to a minority.

The Constitutional Council called the Act “the embodiment of racial discrimination.” Under it an African cannot live in town centres because these are European areas; he may work in
the town, but must live in an African "township" on the outskirts. The Council commented "it matters not that he is a successful businessman, a member of the professions, a civil servant, a member of Parliament, a Parliamentary Secretary or a member of the Constitutional Council. He may, it is true, live in one of the few multi-racial hotels, or at the University or other seat of learning, but he may not acquire, in the European area, a home for himself or his family . . . not being sufficiently advanced he must live as far as may be—sometimes as far as 14 miles or more—from his place of work in the European area. He must pay an undue proportion of his wages in transport costs." In a European area an African can only be an employee of a European, although in an African area a European is allowed to occupy land for mining. In Salisbury an African can be a law clerk in a European firm, but he cannot become a partner because that would mean he was carrying on his own business in a European area. Until the Rhodesian Front government came to power in 1962 successive Rhodesian governments were prepared to consider amendment and the eventual abolition of the Land Apportionment Act. The Front has always insisted on its retention as the keystone of the European position.

This description of some of the main aspects of life in Rhodesia today is given to show that there is no ground to believe that Rhodesia is moving, however slowly, towards equality for the African.

what do the whites want?
The majority of whites wanted independence under the 1961 constitution or something like it and they have supported Smith in his illegal declaration of independence. It is revealing to consider why they should be so anxious to be rid of British control. If the Europeans mean ultimately to permit an African government, surely they would want a British presence, if only for their protection. Some years ago Ian Smith was fond of quoting an American businessman who declined to invest in Rhodesia until it was independent because only then would he know "who was in charge." But if Rhodesia becomes independent with guaranteed progress to racial equality her present rulers will not remain in charge. Smith's remark only makes sense if you assume that after independence African advance is to be impeded. It requires criminal gullibility to imagine that the Europeans mean to allow power to pass into African hands.

Over the last ten years the European population and the governments they have elected have drifted consistently towards the right, away from the concept of non-racialism. When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed in 1953, bringing together the normal colonies of Zambia and Malawi with the settler colony of Rhodesia, it was welcomed by both Europeans and Africans in Rhodesia. To Europeans it seemed to provide a more viable unit and the prospect of majority rule seemed so remote as to be negligible. Africans were relieved to be placed for the first time in the same bracket as Africans in the northern territories; it gave them hope that they would now be regarded as the legitimate heirs of the country, rather than as a permanently subject race as in South Africa. Some Europeans wanted Federation to stop the African menace; some were prepared to look kindly on multi-racialism, often because they did not take it seriously. They did not mind telling the black man he was an equal, so long as the black man did not be-
lieve it. To a great extent therefore the common welcome extended to Federation concealed divergent views between the races on what it should lead to and when. The optimism lasted for three years, until the time came to settle the new state's franchise. The proposals of the Federal government, accepted by Britain, were such that the prospect of significant African influence in government was pushed into the unforeseeable future. Meanwhile, some improvement had been achieved in reducing segregation—enough to disturb some whites and whet the appetites of Africans. Garfield Todd, prime minister of Rhodesia since Federation, called for the extension of Rhodesia's own franchise to more Africans and further relaxation in discrimination. Africans still attacked his moderation but saw him as something of an ally. Todd lost the support of his white colleagues; some of his ministers resigned; his party summoned a caucus and replaced him as leader by Sir Edgar Whitehead. That was the end of racial harmony in Rhodesia. Till 1953 there had been peace, the peace of subjugation and resignation. From 1953 to 1958 there had been hope. From then on Africans looked more and more to their own leaders to fight for them. Many still co-operated with the moderate multi-racial party, but most transferred their loyalty to the militant leaders of purely African parties.

Rhodesian Front formed

The Federation was not finally broken up until 1963 but its future was in doubt for some years before. In the final stages the right wing European parties began to give it up for lost and concentrated on holding Rhodesia as a bastion of white rule. In March 1962 Wensky, Federal Prime Minister, called a general election to strengthen his hand in negotiations with Britain. Four right wing parties, Federal and Rhodesian, then amalgamated to form the Rhodesian Front. The Front announced that it would ignore the Federal election and concentrate on the Rhodesian election later that year.

Whitehead, with his moderate United Federal Party, had kept his dominance in Rhodesia till this time. He had gained a two-to-one majority in a referendum on the new and slightly liberal 1961 constitution. In the months before the election, however, Whitehead had promised to abolish discrimination in land within a year and he had told the United Nations that he foresaw an African government in about fifteen years' time. These statements confirmed the growing feeling among Europeans that they must either make a stand against African advance or lose control of the country within a few years. Emotional strength was added to the "hard line" by the fear and fury aroused by the treatment of Europeans in the Congo. The result was a victory for the Front which took 35 seats against Whitehead's 29. Of the 50 European-dominated seats Whitehead retained only 15.

drift to apartheid

The Front's political ideology has been clear from the beginning. Its first leader, Winston Field, called for a defence pact between Rhodesia, South Africa and the Portuguese territories. Its first policy statement of 1962, Principles and Policies, said: "It must be recognised that the African and European peoples have different philosophies and ways of life, and a policy is now advanced in which neither group is forced to live under a system nor in a manner alien to the group concept." The authority of the tradi-
tional chiefs was to be enhanced. In education “any sort of enforced integration” was “repugnant” and the Front had great success with an advertisement showing European and African children going to school together: the caption was “Rhodesia is not ready for this.”

Although apartheid was not overtly recommended, the Front’s Policy Statement openly advocated separate development of the two main races. One of the Front’s principles reads “The Party will ensure the permanent establishment of the European in Southern Rhodesia.” Amendments to the 1961 constitution were to be sought because “inherent in the new constitution there is the intention to ensure the dominance by the African of the European before the former has acquired adequate knowledge and experience of democratic government.”

There is plenty of evidence therefore, of the Front’s initial lack of interest in racial co-operation and its attachment to the anglicised form of apartheid it called community development. More serious however is the trend since 1962 for attitudes to harden in the direction of apartheid. When the Front held its congress in August 1965 a confidential paper set out the resolutions submitted by local parties. These resolutions were not adopted by the congress but they give an indication of the views of the grass roots of the party which is the power behind Smith.

The dependence of any Rhodesian government upon these people must be remembered when assessing its freedom to give or to honour promises about African advance.

Some of the resolutions are laughable, like that which referred to UNESCO and the World Bank as “virtually commu-
Chapter IX of the Constitution. In effect the major part of the African population will be permanently accommodated in the Tribal Trust Land."

In February 1966 the illegal legislature in Salisbury was presented with the report of a "Select Committee on Political Boycott." The recommendation of the committee goes completely contrary to the multi-racial ideal. Housing policy, the committee states, should "be directed towards encouraging the natural grouping of house owners and tenants according to tribal affiliations." The government later announced its acceptance of this principle. The report suggests that Africans should be given school books "in which African customary respect for elders and traditional behaviour patterns upholding social order are shown to emerge as moral examples." As for the rule of law, "regard for the rights of the individual must not be allowed to outweigh the suffering that the vast majority must endure if there is delay in taking appropriate action." And if one wonders what that could mean—"in cases of a criminal nature stemming from public violence and intimidation the Rules of Court Procedure be revised to permit the concealment of the identity of complainants and witnesses, and that consideration be given to the admission of hearsay evidence in cases of this nature." Against this background there was nothing surprising in the announcement of the Minister for Law and Order on 8 July that Rhodesia will soon have a Suppression of Communism Act as South Africa does.

Characteristic of the up-to-the-minute attitude of the Rhodesian Front is this statement by a Front Member of Parliament in the legislature on 23 June this year: "I believe that the policy of partnership as enunciated by the Whitehead Government and as attempted, in a different sphere, by the Welensky Government, having been rejected decisively on at least two occasions by the electorate, need no longer be considered. Now we are said to live, it is true we do live, in a multi-racial society. One must ask oneself whether this is to be encouraged or whether it is to be deplored. I believe that the experiment having failed, a completely new solution in terms of our political life must be considered. If the African people as a whole wish to develop their ability and they wish to advance in their own sphere, they must do it in their own territorial bases."

The Front's leaders are straightforward enough not to attempt to camouflage overmuch their intentions. Those spectators who argue that the difference between them and the British government is only one of timing simply do not know Rhodesia today. If you ask the average white in Salisbury his opinion on African advance he does not tell you that he will be content to share power when Africans are as well educated as he is. More likely you will be told that Britain gave up India and the rest of the empire to communist thugs because she had no guts and that if Rhodesia is to pass into the hands of Africans, educated or not, it will be over the dead bodies of the white population. (The Rhodesian definition of communism is a little wild. "The State Department," said an MP recently in the legislature, "like the British Government, are riddled, they are rotten with communism.")

Do the views of Smith's die-hard supporters matter? First, there is no evidence that Smith does not share their opinions. Second, even if he did not and attempted to carry the country against them he would go the way of Todd, Whitehead and Winston Field. Smith is only Prime Minister
because the extremists put him there and he is popular because he satisfies the European voters. It is true that he is a more skilful politician than any of his predecessors, but the European population is in no mood for trifling. To imagine that he could use his popularity to get the country to accept a policy completely opposed to the basis of that popularity is fantasy. He could get away with a settlement holding out a real prospect of African advance only if his followers were brought to believe that he did not mean to honour it. And if afterwards he were tempted to honour it, he would undoubtedly find himself replaced by one of the many others waiting in the wings, Lardner-Burke, Dupont, Gaunt or Harper—Harper of whom even Mr. Patrick Wall said in 1961, in the House of Commons, that he would not be happy about the future of Africans if there was a possibility of the success of what was then the Dominion Party under Mr. Harper.

African politics

It has been said that Africans are not yet able to govern Rhodesia and it is certainly true that there are not enough with experience in administration and government to take over without a lowering of standards at the present time. To deny them experience, however, is not the way to put this right. In any case, it must be noted that Rhodesia has a larger number of African graduates than most African states. Many have studied at their own expense at British universities or at the Inns of Court. Others have studied while in prison or restriction. Rhodesia is as well off as, say, Tanzania in this respect. But Rhodesia is a more complex and industrialised community than Tanzania and requires a larger number of trained administrators. There is still a great way to go before Africans can play a role in the government of their country proportionate to their numbers; enough now to say that it is false to suggest that there is not a large number of capable Africans ready to take advantage of any real move towards equality.

African political leaders are divided. On the one hand there is the African opposition in Parliament made up of men who have been prepared to fight elections under the present constitution and even to continue to sit in Parliament after UDI. The main group comprises the United Peoples Party led by Mr. Chad Chipunza, the official leader of the opposition. This group calls for liberalisation but without making trouble over it. On the other hand are the nationalists demanding universal suffrage immediately and in jail for their active opposition to the regime. The nationalists are divided between the followers of Mr. Joshua Nkomo (the People's Caretaker Council, formerly the Zimbabwe African People's Union) and those of the Reverend Ndanabingi Sithole (the Zimbabwe African National Union). Differences of tactics are occasionally discernible between the two parties but basically they are divided by personalities and jealousy. ZANU has more support among the intellectuals; ZAPU is credited with the mass following.

A last group of Africans is the traditional chiefs and headmen, over 600 of them. The Smith regime says these men are the proper representatives of the African people. They are paid by the government and can be dismissed by the government, and steps have been taken recently to give them greater powers of administration in the tribal areas. Educated urban Africans laugh at their illiteracy and one of the Smith government's few tactical errors was to put them on show by sending them on
foreign visits. In order to bolster the authority of the chiefs, the government, in 1964, sent loudspeaker vans round the tribal areas broadcasting a statement the text of which was later revealed in Hansard: "The Government wishes that all people should have a clear understanding of its policy. The Government is strong and its policy will be carried out. Nobody will be allowed to stand in the way. Anyone who tries to interfere will be severely dealt with... Increased powers are being given to the chiefs. They have been provided with specially trained messengers who know how to deal with troublemakers. Guns are being made available to the chiefs and headmen. They have the power to arrest persons who try to undermine their authority. Government proposes to give the chiefs authority to punish and to banish wrongdoers... Now that you know what policy is, you also must rally to your chief. Those who argue will be brushed aside."

African attitudes

A lot of argument takes place about the attitude of the mass of the African people towards the Smith regime. The regime itself claims that most Africans want only to live in peace and security and that they welcome tough action against agitators who carry out political intimidation. There is no doubt that the two nationalist parties have indulged in violence, particularly in 1963 when they were fighting each other to obtain mass support. There was probably relief in the African townships of Salisbury when troops were sent in to stop this intimidation. But to go on from this to claim that Africans are content to go on living under white government is not justified. White rule brings its own violence. To these Africans who accept it without question and are prepared to make do with the inferior place it grants them, life under Smith, though not prosperous, can be peaceful. But any African who tries to change things or even to advocate change will soon find that the regime exercises its own forms of intimidation.

However non-political an African may be there is within him a chord that can be played upon: he is open to the appeal that in his own country he should enjoy economic and political equality. The claim that Rhodesia is the most peaceful country in Africa is false because the inevitable appeal of this argument creates an explosive force which can at any time be ignited, and which will prevent the maintenance of white rule without an ever-increasing degree of police suppression.

Many white Rhodesians think of the nationalist politicians and their campaign as malicious and unnecessary, the consequence of a temporary political fever. Mr. Smith is reported to have said recently "this moment of madness in Africa and the world will pass." These Rhodesians have not yet learnt that the dynamics of human affairs create certain inevitabilities which can be swept over but which cannot in the long run be evaded. If African government were to bring less peace and less prosperity, Africans would still say yes to it. In the manner in which Britain could bring it about the transition to African government should in fact bring greater security and prosperity.
3. guarantees

So far I hope I have shown that on general grounds it is folly to expect a racial minority to surrender power voluntarily; second, that conditions in Rhodesia today, far from suggesting that Rhodesia will prove an exception to the rule, suggest that there is even less chance than usual of such a voluntary hand over there. We need now to consider whether arrangements can be made which would compel a gradual hand-over once Britain had granted independence. The devising of such arrangements, or "guarantees," has been the subject of all the discussions that have taken place with the Rhodesian government both before and since UDI.

In most constitutions granted by Britain to her former colonies provisions are included to make it difficult or impossible to change the basic features. It can be made obligatory to obtain a two-thirds rather than a simple majority to alter the franchise. In federal constitutions the consent of provincial authorities is sometimes required to certain measures. On some issues a referendum of voters may be required. Occasionally, no allowance at all is made for amending certain clauses.

Whatever the means, these "entrenched" clauses constitute some kind of guarantee against breach. But it is vital to recognise that they do not prevent breach: they only make it necessary for a government to break the law if it wants to change these provisions without having the assent required by the constitution. The only thing that prevents a breach is the readiness of the public to resist the government physically in the event of its breaking the law in this way. A guarantee of this kind is worth more than a mere undertaking or promise of good behaviour, but its reliability depends on the reluctance of the government in question to break the law and the readiness and ability of the public to resist if it does.

Those who draft constitutions are often reluctant to make a guarantee too restrictive. Britain herself enjoys no written guarantees and there is a bias in the British tradition against arrangements which leave no room for flexibility. There is some similarity in the functions of the Constitutional Council established by the 1961 constitution and the Supreme Court of the United States. But while the Supreme Court's decision is final and binding on the legislature, the Rhodesian Council's decisions are only advisory and can be over-ridden by a two-thirds majority in parliament or by a simple majority after six months' delay. The Council's supervision can be entirely by-passed without a two thirds majority and without delay if the government of the day certifies that urgent action is required. A provision of this kind is no guarantee at all, for it is not even necessary to break the law in order to get round it.

Even if a really rigid guarantee is intended there is still the danger of leaving loopholes by accident, for it is difficult to anticipate and close every loophole in legal drafting. It has been suggested that the ability of the Rhodesian parliament to reduce the number of B roll seats is the result of an unintentional error in drafting the 1961 constitution. In 1965 the British government, legislating to prohibit evictions from houses, accidentally left a loophole. If British government lawyers can accidentally fail to bind their own courts, we can be sure they can fail to bind courts in another country, operating under a different legal base (Roman Dutch law applies in Rhodesia), which may be glad at some future date of an opportunity to be free of restraints. These factors must cause us to hesitate.
before putting our trust in written guarantees.

But even if loopholes could not be found, there would still be the danger of plain straightforward breach. If a guarantee were worked out to provide for the automatic increase of African voters and to prevent the negation of this right by the reduction of African seats, it could be argued that such a provision would afford Britain her "honourable discharge" and allow her to grant independence with a clear conscience. It would be tragic and pathetic if Britain were to place faith in the readiness of the Rhodesian regime to stick to the law. Even before UDI Smith and his colleagues made clear that to them adherence to the law came secondary. When Smith was seeking support for UDI in June 1964, he said that he thought people would support his government whether independence came legally or illegally... "It depends on whether we bungle or run the country well. Civilised independence is what really matters." And, of course, UDI itself proves conclusively that the regime is prepared to break the law if necessary to maintain the present situation. This applies not only to the illegal government but to the mass of the white population who have supported it. Now that the Smith regime has written its own constitution and its own laws it may well abide by them. As we have seen, they are so loose as to make breach unnecessary. There is no evidence that they would stick to provisions not of their liking, and plenty of evidence to the contrary.

One needs only to use a little imagination to see how things might work out. If independence were granted under a constitution which theoretically ensured advance to an African majority at some time in the future, there would be no blatant abrogation by Smith on the day after independence. Whether he could survive the signing of an agreement on these lines would depend on whether his supporters thought he meant it or not. But whether he or someone else were in power, the result would be the same. Africans, incensed by what they would call Britain's sell-out, would intensify their resistance. This would be aggravated by the cocksure attitude of whites who, feeling that they had won the fight by getting Britain to call off sanctions, would call for closer links with South Africa. White extremists would be encouraged. African states would send arms to help the resistance. Acts of terrorism would mount. Finally, there would happen some particularly appalling incident, a mother and children burned alive in their car perhaps, and the government of the day, protesting its best intentions and its deep disappointment with the way things had gone, would announce that this kind of thing was not anticipated when the guarantees had been drafted, that in the new circumstances African advance must be halted until a higher degree of civilisation was demonstrated and probably that the only solution was on South Africa's lines of complete racial segregation. The guarantees would lie in the dust. Britain would condemn both sides but protest her inability to intervene. And, at the time, there would even be grounds for sympathy with the Rhodesian government. No one would be really to blame. Britain's duty is to prevent the enaction of this tragedy.

a treaty of guarantee

It has been suggested that guarantees in the independence constitution could be fortified by a treaty between Rhodesia and Britain, giving Britain the right to intervene with troops if the con-
stitution were broken. We have already had experience of such a device in Cyprus. The Cyprus constitution was more firmly entrenched than any other and to make assurance doubly sure a treaty was concluded between Britain, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus giving all three outside powers the right to send troops to restore the status quo in the event of a breach of the constitution. If the three powers could not agree on joint action each was to be free to act unilaterally. You could not devise a more cast iron guarantee: but what happened? The constitution was broken and none of the guaranteeing powers intervened. It was simply not practical politics to do so. It is true that international opinion on Cyprus was divided and rather favourable to the Greeks, who did not want intervention. Nevertheless the precedent is not encouraging.

For the last three years it has been open to us to send troops to enforce our will. We have not done so either when Rhodesia accepted her position as a British colony, or in the face of the illegal seizure of the colony. If we decline to send troops at a time when we are unquestionably the sovereign power, is it reasonable to expect that we shall do so if Rhodesia is once recognised as an independent state in which our rights are only those accorded by a treaty? Rhodesia would not be the first sovereign state to question the validity of an unequal treaty forced upon a country as a condition of independence. If we do not, for one reason or another, send troops to Rhodesia now, do not let us delude ourselves that it will be any easier if Rhodesia's independence were legalised.

Another proposed guarantee, advanced by Sir Alec Douglas Home, is that the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council might be given the final right of decision on the validity of changes in the constitution. So far as questions of law are concerned, the Judicial Committee is a body of unquestioned standing and integrity, and it is kept as the final court of appeal by a number of fully independent Commonwealth countries. But the value of this arrangement depends on the readiness of Britain to take military action to enforce any decisions the Privy Council might make. The difficulty of the Rhodesian problem is not to find a body to decide what is legal, but to find means of enforcement. It comes back to bayonets in the end. It is folly to imagine that the mere prestige of a body like the Judicial Committee would ensure the acceptance of its rulings in Rhodesia. This was the reasoning of Duncan Sandys in relation to the purely advisory nature of the Constitutional Council, and his judgement has proved false.

the Hardwick Holderness plan

In the last few months a proposal has been canvassed by Mr. Hardwick Holderness, a white Rhodesian lawyer of liberal views. If operated according to the spirit, both the legal 1961 Constitution and the illegal 1965 Constitution should result in a rising proportion of Africans in the legislature, but the practice of drawing the government only from the majority party means that Africans would have no participation in government until they secured a majority in the legislature, whereupon Africans would themselves form the government and Europeans, as the minority, would have no place in it. This means that Africans would gain no experience in administration, which is exactly what they need if Europeans are to be brought to trust them in government. A further disadvantage of the present arrangements is that African
majority is such a long way off that the African group in the legislature enjoys no influence on government policy since a minority party only exercises influence in proportion to its chances of becoming the majority. Mr Holderness concludes that Rhodesia must break away from the Westminster system of party government. He suggests that there should be a legislature in which Africans and Europeans each supply 50 per cent of the members, and in which a majority of each race is required for the passage of laws. Similarly, the cabinet would be made up of both races. In the event of deadlock the powers of government would be exercised by a president, about whose precise powers and selection Mr Holderness advances no firm views.

The disadvantage of the 1961 Constitution to which Mr Holderness points is a real one, but one may question the effectiveness of his solution. In a government balanced equally between the two races deadlock would not be an occasional occurrence, but a permanent state. The pressures on both sides would be too great to avoid it. In practice, therefore, power would be exercised by the president who would be obliged to favour one side or the other. Even if he tried to compromise by conceding half the demands of African ministers he would not have escaped the dilemma, for he would then be torn between Europeans who wanted him to stop there and Africans who wanted him to go further. A constitution along these lines would not justify Britain in granting independence unless the balance of power lay with the Africans who must ultimately inherit it. But we must accept that if the balance of power did lie with the Africans, there would be no guarantee that they would not break the constitution to achieve untrammelled African dominance. It is unrealistic to imagine that there is any stable point of balance between these positions. As a way of letting Britain give up her legal sovereignty the Holderness plan fails. Something like it could, however, be the means by which Britain could exercise her supervision most effectively during a transitional period before independence is granted under majority rule.

The clear conclusion is that no arrangements can be devised which can be relied on to bring about ultimate racial equality if once British control has been abolished and sanctions stopped. It follows from this that Britain's duty is to secure and maintain control until power has irrevocably passed to the majority.

The process of bringing about majority rule may be a long one if it is to be done without ruining the economy. The delay will, however, be acceptable once the end-result is assured. There are basically two ways in which Britain can provide for Rhodesia's administration during a transitional period. We can impose direct colonial rule; or, having brought down the illegal government, we can attempt the role of referee, encouraging people to come forward and run the country without direct British participation. At the moment there are neither leaders nor followers to form a moderate party, but the establishment of British control might create a new situation which could lead whites to make the best of a bad job, as they would no doubt put it. The attempt could well fail and we should then be obliged to undertake direct rule. That would be dangerous, for it would make it possible for both black and white extremists to concentrate on irresponsible sabotage of British rule; to avoid this, it would be worth making strenuous efforts to restrain our role to that of referee and arbitrator if at all possible.
4. the six principles

In the course of Britain's discussions with the Smith regime, both before and after UDI, six principles have been laid down as essential requirements for a legal granting of independence:

1. the principle and intention of unimpeded advance to majority rule to be maintained and safeguarded;

2. guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution;

3. some immediate improvement in the political status of Africans;

4. progress toward ending racial discrimination;

5. the British government to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole;

6. arrangements to prevent oppression of majority by minority or minority by majority.

I have suggested that no arrangements can be devised reliably to prevent abuse in the future. This leaves the fifth principle as the final defence, and it was on this point that the talks of 1965 came to the crisis resulting in UDI. It is dangerous to translate any of these principles, particularly the fifth, into more precise terms. However the natural meaning of the fifth principle is clearly that Britain will concede legal independence to Rhodesia only if Africans want it and approve of the basic features of the independence constitution.

Mr Smith and his supporters often claim that the majority of Africans support the present regime and want to see an end of British "interference." Indeed, Smith has based his claims on such support. The joint communiqué issued after his talks with the Conservative government in September 1964 said, "The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia accepted that independence must be based on general consent and stated that he was convinced that the majority of the population supported his request for independence on the basis of the present constitution and franchise. . . . The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia recognised that the British government were entitled to be satisfied about this. . . ." When Smith proceeded to test African opinion by means only of an indaba or gathering of traditional chiefs and headmen, he was informed by both the outgoing Conservative government and the incoming Labour government that the opinion of these persons could not be accepted as evidence of the views of the African population generally. Nevertheless, this is the only form of evidence he has presented. At a later stage in the negotiations before UDI, a Royal Commission was proposed to ascertain the wishes of the Rhodesian people as a whole, which was to consist of Sir Hugh Beadle, Chief Justice of Rhodesia, a Rhodesian government representative and a British government representative: two Rhodesians against one British. Smith rejected this proposal when the British government would not say that Parliament would unquestionably accept whatever it might recommend.

The Rhodesian regime has always declined to test African opinion by the holding of a referendum even though the 1961 constitution provided for the holding of such a referendum to decide important constitutional changes. It is argued that intimidation would have caused Africans to vote contrary to their real wishes. Against this it must be stated that the police and military facilities of the regime have always provided adequate assurance against
intimidation. Moreover, this particular referendum could have been observed or supervised by British personnel to lend double assurance. Had a referendum been held and had it been favourable to Smith, the Rhodesian government's case would have been immeasurably strengthened and Britain would almost certainly have granted independence on their terms. The fact that a referendum was not held, indicates the regime's conviction that the result would have been unfavourable.

When the regime objects to the "stirring up" of Africans that would take place in a referendum campaign they are objecting to the normal and legitimate, though no doubt emotional, exposition of the case for political reform.

So long as the fifth principle is rigidly adhered to, there is no danger of Britain agreeing to an unreliable independence constitution. There is, however, a danger that our resolution will fade and that the massive capacity of the British for self deception will lead us to interpret the principle in a loose manner. Any tendency in that direction will have to be firmly resisted.
5. the means

Having now suggested what Britain should want to do, it is at this point and at this point only that we should consider how to do it. The Rhodesian problem, like most problems, presents issues of principle and of practicality. Its solution is only rendered more difficult if the two factors are muddled up. Although Britain does not at the moment exercise control in Rhodesia, the illegal regime is not being allowed to exercise untrammelled independence because of the severe economic sanctions applied against her by Britain and other countries.

In some ways Rhodesia is particularly susceptible to economic sanctions. Unlike South Africa she is not nearly self-sufficient, but depends on exports to buy the imports she cannot produce herself. Sales of tobacco and sugar, the two principal exports, have been severely cut by the boycott. Certain other factors operate in Rhodesia's favour. She is a small country in terms of industrial activity, so her requirements are tiny and she can be kept going by only a small leak in the boycott. Her own production of coal is abundant. Above all, Rhodesia has South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique for neighbours, countries which are both prepared to help her break the blockade. The rest of the world is not boycotting these two countries and is not likely to. If it tried, the leaks would be even greater than in the case of Rhodesia because many countries which are prepared to help Britain bring one of her colonies to heel, would not be prepared to act in the same way against independent states. Consequently, South Africa and Portugal can see Rhodesia through by the diversion of only a small proportion of their imports.

Rhodians mainly notice the effect of sanctions in petrol rationing and higher prices. Enough oil appears to be getting in to keep stocks up, and the decision to allow the sale of unrationed petrol at a premium price suggests no desperate shortage. A great deal of publicity attached to the stoppage of supplies from the two tankers, Joanna V and the Manuella, but the publicity only detracted from the routine shipments through Lourenco Marques and South African ports. For the purpose of oil supplies, Rhodesia has become simply a remote part of South Africa. Oil and petrol can pass up the southernmost of Mozambique's two railway lines to Rhodesia; it can go up the South African line to Beit Bridge on the Rhodesia border and thence by road tanker. There has even been some smuggling of supplies up the other line which passes through the British protectorate of Bechuanaland.

Nevertheless, the boycott is having an effect. Unemployment has risen, some of it mopped up by the extension of military service from four and a half to nine months. Perhaps the most critical feature is the tobacco sales, for on the income of these so much of the rest of Rhodesia's economy depends. With the traditional British market closed, new markets are hard to find. Devious routes by sale and resale have to be employed. Middlemen require their cut and when they run the risk of having undisposable goods on their hands, their cut is high. This reduces the return to the producer, and if his expected return falls too low he will not plant as much for next year and he will lose his income. The effect of sanctions is more in undermining confidence in the future than in the current standard of living. Nevertheless, even in the field of tobacco, the regime has been able at least to promise farmers a reduced but tolerable income next year. If we pin our faith in the inability of the regime to live up to that promise in 1967 we must assume that South Africa will not
be prepared to pay a little last price to break the back of sanctions.

who surrenders first?

In assessing how sanctions will affect political policy, it must be remembered that the whites see no alternative to their present course. They know that to give in to Britain's terms means ultimate African government. Even if sanctions are destroying their prosperity they do not see surrender as likely to save it. Therefore they have nothing to lose by hanging on as long as possible.

The immediate damage can be mitigated by using up the country's financial reserves, that part of them which is not in British hands. The rebel regime can use the reserves to buy up its own tobacco. If by this means they succeed in holding out long enough to make Britain lose heart and call off the boycott, they know that they can easily build up the reserves again. If, on the other hand, they lose, and Britain finally gains control of the country, they know that its affairs will pass into other hands, and it will not be their own money they have squandered. Britain will be left to clear up the mess and pay the bills. Both the mood of white Rhodesians and the circumstances of the case incline them to hang on to the last.

Mr Selwyn Lloyd advocated a "middle course" and said he thought the case for such a course had not been presented. He was answered immediately by a minister in the Smith regime, who said: "If the Conservative Party think that this concept can be revived and the government of this country can again be persuaded to drift along on a middle course until they, in their turn, are executed in the same manner as was the Federal Government, then all I can say is 'Think again, Mr Heath, think again.'"

The most dangerous aspect of limiting action to economic sanctions is that the prolonged delay may cause Britain to give up. There is a temptation, which will grow greater as the months go by, to think that we have done our best and that we cannot be blamed if the activities of South Africa and Portugal render our measures ineffective. It can be said that we should hand the matter over to the United Nations. Even only a few weeks after UDI the Daily Mirror, with a sure instinct for the preoccupations of the British public, said exactly that. If in a few months' time Britain were to be faced with a choice between sending troops or calling off the boycott, the long delay since UDI would operate against the political practicality of sending troops. No sane person would want to use force if it is not necessary, but prolonged delay will lose us the option to use force even if it is necessary.

Yet, as the months go by, the case for using troops grows stronger. It has been officially stated that troops should be used only if required to maintain law and order. We have recently seen a clamp-down on those university lecturers and students who have chosen to remain loyal to the law; further expulsions can be expected and when these articulate critics have been sil-
enced a new campaign of repression can more safely be conducted against others. The law broke down in Rhodesia last November; what order exists is a lawless one. Nothing that has happened since UDI was unpredictable, or unpredictable; but the actual realisation of our worst fears creates a justification for intervention which did not present itself in such inescapable form last year. In the new circumstances the case must be examined afresh.

the United Nations
But why should the matter not rather be handed over to the UN? The first answer is that Rhodesia is a British colony and Britain is responsible for its good government. The case is not to be compared with South Africa. We do not approve of South Africa’s policies and some action may be called for to put pressure on its government. Our duty there is of the same order as our duty in respect of oppression in Russia or any other country. But our responsibility towards Rhodesia is of a totally different character, for Rhodesia is legally our problem and its difficulties were created by our action or inaction.

As important as the legalistic argument is the practical one. If it were merely a matter of coordinating economic sanctions, the job could be done as well by the UN as by Britain. But we shall only be tempted to hand the problem over to the UN if economic sanctions have failed. If military action should be called for, there is no doubt that the UN is less able than Britain to carry it out effectively. The UN has not overcome the problem of who pays for its peacekeeping activities. Moreover a mixed UN force is notoriously inefficient. Only in the Congo has such a force been called on to do serious fighting, and the precedent is not encourag-
ing. It also suffers from a more creditable disability. Stuck deep in the cement of moral principle and bound by its own resolutions, the UN finds compromise difficult. Committed to the idea of one man-one vote now, the UN would not be able to effect the gradual transition of power which is absolutely vital if standards of administration and prosperity are to be maintained. Only a sin-tainted old colonial power like Britain can deal out virtue in small doses. Legally it’s our job and in practice only we can do it effectively.

first principles
When a country holds sovereignty over territory it must be prepared to exercise that sovereignty by the use of such minimum force as is required to apply the law. There is nothing outrageous about this: it is the very basis of political organisation. When Britain decides whether to recognise a new government in some other country, the test applied is whether the government in question is in effective control of the country. In this sense Britain today is not in effective control in Rhodesia. All the mechanics of government and administration are in operation in clear defiance of the law as laid down by Britain. Whatever verbal assertions Parliament in London may make about its continuing legal rights, there must come a time when international lawyers will have to conclude that Britain’s rights have lapsed because they have not been exercised, but only asserted. This argument has already been advanced in a Rhodesian court and the judge who was faced with it commented, “If we are to remain the judicial branch of the state, isn’t it inevitable that we must recognise de facto the people who constitute the executive... Mr Bottomley is not here to carry out his functions.”
Nearly all the sanctions so far imposed are actions which it is legitimate for one sovereign state to take against another. The one action which Britain has not so far taken—the despatch of troops—is the one action which characterises the rights of a sovereign state in its own territory.

David and Goliath

In the last three years relations between Britain and Rhodesia have been distorted by the implied exclusion of the possibility of sending troops. Because of this exclusion the British government had no effective counteraction with which to nullify Rhodesia's threat to declare independence, and Rhodesia's bargaining power became inflated. This is why Rhodesia was able to resist British pressure to liberalise the constitution. Britain, by refusing to use the only ace in the pack, placed little Rhodesia in a position of equality with herself, the fifth most powerful nation in the world.

The Rhodesian equation will never add up unless the factor of military force is reintroduced. Military force is the raw material of power. The factor does not always have to result in fighting. Deployment without fighting can often be enough; and a threat which is meant and seen to be meant can make even deployment unnecessary. But, at bottom, power is based on bayonets and bombs.

The reintroduction of the mere possibility of using force would transform the Rhodesian problem: you can lead a man by the arm if he knows you mean to frog-march him if you have to. Ever since the first sanctions were imposed on the day of UDI our greatest weakness has been the absence of the long-stop, ultimate deterrent to lend persuasion to lesser measures. Indeed the missing factor can be traced farther back. On 27 October 1964 the British government issued a public statement of the severe consequences that would follow from an act of rebellion. But it can be argued that such an act was even encouraged by what might be called the invisible last sentence of the statement. At the end of the catalogue of consequences, the absence of any reference to military action was taken as an indication that none would take place.

A declaration that force would be used if other means fail, would make South Africa think even more carefully about the undercover support she now gives Rhodesia. Doubters in Rhodesia would be enormously encouraged. Judges would not have to face the impossible dilemma of choosing between an illegal government in full control and a legal government in London showing no conclusive evidence of really meaning to get control. Immediately after UDI, Rhodesian citizens were advised and even instructed not to lend assistance to the rebel regime. But is it reasonable or fair for us to expect loyal Rhodesians to risk their freedom and even their lives upholding the law, if we, the sovereign power, offer them no credible assurance that we shall re-establish legality in the end? Even if finally we do bring the Smith regime down it cannot be questioned that there has been utter scepticism about our determination to do so.

Although total commitment to restore legality and use whatever means are necessary to that end would paradoxically make peaceful sanctions more likely to succeed, there can be no bluff. A mere threat to use force stood perhaps a 90 per cent chance of being effective before UDI—now less so. If we threaten we must be prepared to carry out the threat.
It has sometimes been argued that, on logistic grounds, Britain simply cannot get the better of Rhodesia militarily. Rhodesia certainly enjoys certain military advantages. Zambia, the best base for British operations, normally obtains its main supplies through Rhodesia and is finding it difficult enough to switch her lines of supply for normal goods; to take in supplies for a military operation would be no easy matter. An airlift would be needed to supplement the capacity of the bad roads from Dar-es-Salaam to Lusaka. The Zambesi constitutes good natural protection along Rhodesia’s northern border. Rhodesia’s forces would be operating on their own ground while we were operating far from our bases. South Africa would no doubt facilitate the flow of volunteers from the Republic.

The military situation should however be assessed from first principles. Britain is a country of 50 million people; Rhodesia has 4 million and only about 200,000 who could be counted on actively to support the regime. Britain has almost as many men in her army, leaving aside the Air Force and the Navy, as the number of Europeans in Rhodesia, men, women and children. Rhodesia’s regular forces number about 4,500 and the reserve forces up to 10,000. They are well trained; but if the reserves were away from their jobs for more than a few weeks the Rhodesian economy would collapse. Rhodesia’s annual military budget is about 8 million pounds; Britain’s is over 2,300 million pounds.

One might say that if it were impossible for Britain to conduct such an operation, every battle in the last war was impossible and our final victory a miracle. The point can best be expressed thus; if we approach the business in the same robust spirit in which the rebels have approached it, the difficulties will fade; if the rebels had approached it in the way some people in Britain do, they would have frightened themselves to death long ago and never have dared to defy British authority. When one country is much stronger than another, diplomacy, backed if necessary by military deployment, should be able to secure the objective without recourse to fighting. A clearly demonstrated determination to use force if necessary, minimises the amount of force that has to be used. The first step in Rhodesia is to accept that in principle force may be right and necessary; timing and method can then be worked out.

Objections

The most compelling consideration against force is the possibility that it would cause a run on sterling to a degree that would wreck our sensitive financial position and make us unable to complete the operation. There is no doubt that to launch a policy of military intervention would have drastic and probably unbearable consequences on sterling unless the ground were well prepared in advance—not because the operation would be beyond our means but because holders of sterling would know too little about it to be confident where such an operation might end.

The key to this problem is the United States. The United States has even more reason than Britain not to want Rhodesia to go the way of South Africa, a development which could only strengthen communism and would probably end African neutrality in the world power confrontation. The Americans know that they cannot push an unwilling Britain into effective intervention but if Britain herself were clear in her will to perform the task she
could convince the Americans of its necessity and practicality and so gain American support. American support would in turn assure the success of the operation if it took the form of monetary and psychological help in the financial world. In this matter the way in which American help is sought is all-important. The Americans need first to be convinced of our determination to succeed; a half-hearted approach will not get the right response.

The most commonly quoted reason against the use of force is that the British people would not stand for it. No government can, or should, drag its people into a policy completely against their wishes. If, however, it is found that the people are against what is considered to be the right course, it is the duty of us all to try to change their opinion. If we fail to convince them we must abide by the general will; that is democracy. What is not democracy is to make no effort to place the facts before the public but merely to accept the limitation of their uninformed inclinations. There has been remarkably little publicity given to the appalling conditions in Rhodesia today and to the weight of Britain's responsibility; and there is consequently widespread reluctance to take strong action. It is hoped that this pamphlet will do something to help correct the situation. If the case is widely known there may well be a recognition, no doubt reluctant, that it may be Britain's duty in the end to use force to preserve law and justice in Rhodesia.

It is said that British troops cannot be sent to make war against our own kith and kin who fought at our side in the war. Rhodesia had a fine war record and the European population provided a high proportion of its numbers for active service. But war service was not limited to Europeans; there were 15,000 Africans in Rhodesia's forces against 9,000 Europeans, and this despite the fact that Africans were not conscripted as Europeans were. Although most Africans were kept at home, Rhodesia's roll of war dead contains about 125 non-European names—they are separately listed—out of 1,000. If war decorations are important, which do we favour with our support—a Smith minister with his DFC, or Hardwick Holderness, a strong opponent of Smith's racial policies, with his DFC and DSO? If all this has to be invoked, let's remember that service and bravery were not limited to Europeans, or, amongst Europeans, to supporters of Smith.

But, in any case, British troops would not be sent to make war on anyone, but to protect those in Rhodesia who care to abide by the law. It is to be hoped that white Rhodesians would not open fire on their own kith and kin carrying out their duty according to law. Fighting could only take place if it was started by the rebel regime. It is objected that military action would lead to a bloody revolt by the African population and that the whole of Central Africa might blow up in a spasm of violence. There is no better way of getting violence in Central Africa than by allowing the Smith regime to entrench itself. In the end, 200,000 whites cannot stay on top of 4 million blacks. If they are allowed to sit tight there will be an explosion; it may take a year or two but it will come and when it comes it will be bloody. A white government will be replaced suddenly by a revolutionary black government with all the fury that characterised the sudden transition in the Congo. In other British territories, where power has been transferred gradually, such a bloodbath has been avoided. To oblige Rhodesians to adopt the method of gradual transition is not to force a
Congo upon them but to save them from it.

The objections to the use of force may seem imposing when presented in a confused mass; but a hundred weak arguments do not make a strong argument. When the objections are examined separately the case is not convincing.

the larger context

The Rhodesian question must also be seen against its larger background. South Africa has now entrenched herself by means of ruthless police methods and by making her economy as self-sufficient as possible. She is reluctant to prejudice her success by linking up with Rhodesia, Angola and Moçambique, regarding them as buffer states which may have to fall to African nationalism. But if Smith is allowed to gain untrammelled independence for Rhodesia, a link-up will become more attractive. A Greater South Africa will have been created against which the world could batter its head in vain for generations. The Bantustans within the Republic and the independent states of Swaziland and Basutoland would be held up as evidence of South Africa’s tolerance of African government prepared to co-operate with her. The vision of such a Greater South Africa inspires the leaders of the Rhodesian Front. It is not Britain’s sanctions that are driving Rhodesia into South Africa’s arms but the fact that the two regimes share a determination to maintain white rule.

have we got what it takes?

Our duty is clear and the only question is whether we have got what it takes to allow it to be done. We, in this case, means the British public. Our govern-

ment has already done more than most people wanted it to do.

If we allow white supremacy to be established in Rhodesia, our whole colonial record will be in ruins. In the archives there are rooms full of speeches, statements, books, by leaders of all parties about our worthy discharge of colonial responsibilities. It will all have been lies if we allow Rhodesia to go the way of South Africa. We are fond of thinking of ourselves as a world power. The rest of the world is amused by our delusions; they only want us to keep our own house in order—and Rhodesia is our own house. We like to think of ourselves as the extinguisher of brush fires, a country that can do the little peace-keeping jobs that the United States and Russia cannot do; in Rhodesia we have a brush fire in our back garden.

The country is faced with a test of character. It is hard on us. We thought we had seen the last of colonial problems and here we have the toughest of them all, distracting us from domestic matters intrinsically more important to us. It would be nice if it would go away. It would be nice if we were not directly responsible. But we are. If we look in the opposite direction, if we do a little but not enough, we shall condemn ourselves as a small nation unfit to have colonies in our control. There is no honourable discharge until the job is done.
The Fabian Society exists to further socialist education and research. It is affiliated to the Labour Party, both nationally and locally, and embraces all shades of Socialist opinion within its ranks—left, right and centre.

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Enquiries about membership should be sent to the General Secretary, Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, SW1; telephone Whitehall 3077.

George Cunningham was on the staff of the Commonwealth Relations Office at home and abroad for six years. He became Commonwealth Officer at the Labour Party's headquarters in 1963, and visited Rhodesia in 1965. He was Labour candidate for Henley in the 1966 general election.
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