The Russian Revolution and British Democracy.

By Julius West.

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The author, who is Russian by birth, and is a member of the Executive Committee of the Fabian Society, was sent by his colleagues to Petrograd in June, 1917, in response to a telegram from the Council of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Delegates, inviting the Society to send a delegate to discuss the then proposed International Socialist Congress at Stockholm.

The following paper was completed in August, 1917, before the author left for a second visit to Russia, and any later revision of it has not been possible.
THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION
AND BRITISH DEMOCRACY.

It is no easy task to estimate the value of the Russian Revolution for British democracy, but it is a very necessary task. There can be no doubt that when common sense and experience have blown away the froth which now covers the surface of events, and when time has allowed the sediment to sink to its proper place, we shall see a nation greatly different from the distressed Russia of 1917. The process of settling down may take some years to accomplish, but nobody with any knowledge of Russia can doubt that before long she will take her place as one of the undisputed leaders of the great democracies. And if democracy is to make for lasting peace and for the welfare of the world, it is clear that there must first be mutual understanding, as a preliminary to mutual trust. The purpose of this pamphlet is to explain, with this object in view, some of the features of the new Russia which seem to have a bearing on her future relations with Britain.

THE RUSSIAN WORKING MAN.

Industrially, Russia is one of the youngest countries in the world, although factories made their first appearance there as far back as here. (E.g., "Under Catherine II. [1762-96] the workers sent to the Imperial Court three delegates, instructed to implore the Imperial protection against the abuses of employers. These delegates received each one hundred blows with the knout, had their nostrils burnt with red-hot irons, and were deported for life to Siberia."—From Alexinsky's Modern Russia.) But, in spite of the fact that Russia was enviously looked upon as an employers' paradise by many of the capitalists of Western Europe, the factory system developed slowly. In 1913 the total number of factory employees in European Russia under Government inspection was only about two and a-quarter millions, out of a population of about one hundred and forty millions. Even if we allow for the large number of persons employed in the factories which have been springing up at convenient points away from towns, especially over
the south and south-west of Russia, the total industrial population in all that vast area will be very far short of that of England and Wales.

The factory workers, relatively few though they be, are in most cases of peasant origin; that is to say, that they have been born in the villages. They had been coming to the towns before the traditions of serfdom had been fully extinguished. In consequence they have put up with abominably bad treatment from employers and foremen, with insanitary and insufficient housing accommodation, and with ridiculously low wages, which made existence possible only on a diet of weak tea and black bread. From 1870 to 1905, in spite of brutal repression, serious strikes were taking place in all the towns. And, be it remembered, the Russian working man was generally illiterate, and had no means of improving his own condition. The Government came down heavily on all forms of self-organisation, thus making trade-unionism, co-operation or political action practically impossible. There was no Duma and no labour representation anywhere.

In the circumstances it is not surprising that the political theories which the Russian working man evolved for himself were generally based on the necessity for a violent revolution. In 1905 a great effort was made to produce it—very nearly with success. But the difficulties of existence prevented the general acceptance of any definite and detailed political and industrial programme. The task of carrying the revolution through was gigantic enough to absorb all the energies of the working man; he could not see beyond it. And, it is important to note, this faith in a revolution was not confined to a section of the working class. It was the creed of the whole working class. The separate representation of working men was provided for in the Electoral Law under which the members of the Duma were chosen. The experience of four general elections led Prof. Milynkov to say that "every representative of the working men is invariably a Socialist in Russia. Thus it is quite impossible for the capitalists to elect a non-Socialist member. Russia is the only place in the world, I suppose, where the 'bourgeois' and the 'junkers' are obliged to elect Socialist members" (in "Russian Realities and Problems," 1917).

The fact that the political creed of the working class, insufficient though it was, was so generally accepted created a feeling of class solidarity incomparably stronger than any counterpart which may be found in Great Britain. This class solidarity, in combination with the faith in revolution, led to the ready acceptance of the Marxist doctrine of the class war. In Russia the line between one class and the next was very distinctly drawn in the days before the Revolution. A Russian had to belong to one of five legally defined classes, which was named in his passport. The "bourgeois," or middle-class man, although scarcer in Russia than in Western Europe, was, in accordance with the theory of Marx, looked upon as the natural enemy of the working man,
or, at the outside, tolerated as a temporarily necessary but ultimately superfluous institution.

THE COUNCIL OF WORKERS' AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES.

This explanation may clear up the attitude of the Russian revolutionist towards the world, after his success in March, 1917, when the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates became, for all practical purposes, the Russian Parliament. Here it may be as well to describe the origin and growth of this generally misunderstood assembly.

The revolutionary movement of 1905 came to a head with a general strike, about the middle of October. The strike was a political one. It began on the railways, and by the 14th of the month it had spread over the whole of Russia, the Caucasus and the greater part of the Siberian and Asiatic railways. The factories immediately followed, and fights took place between strikers and soldiers in many parts of Russia. The telegraph ceased to work; the Government was paralysed. On October 12 it was decided, at a meeting in Petrograd, to form a Council of Working Men's Deputies. Within four days it had branches in all the great cities, and a Press of its own. Within a week this body became the real Government—the only organisation with any power behind it. On October 17 the Emperor ostensibly capitulated and signed a manifesto granting Russia a Constitution. On the 20th the general strike was discontinued by order of the Council. This was its high-water mark. We need not concern ourselves here with the subsequent unsuccessful general strikes, the risings, military and civil, of 1905 and 1906, and the gradual suppression of the revolutionary movement by the army and the police. The leading members of the Petrograd Council were arrested at the end of November and the beginning of December, when the centre of the revolution shifted to Moscow, where the local Council of Workers' Deputies, with a revolutionary Council of Soldiers' Deputies, kept up a fierce struggle for a month or so before they were overpowered.

From the end of 1905 to March, 1917, the Petrograd Council of Workers' Deputies lived underground. On March 12, 1917, the Duma was apparently at last in control of the situation. On the morning of that day it had decided to ignore the Tsar's ukase proroguing the Duma. The Petrograd garrison had united with the working men in armed resistance to the police. The Chairman of the Council, a Georgian member of the Duma named Cheidze, decided that the time had come. A meeting of the Council was hastily summoned at the Taurida Palace, the building occupied by the Duma, and on the same day a proclamation was published inviting the workmen and soldiers of Petrograd to elect representatives to a Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates. This Council came into existence three days before the Provisional Government, and one of the strongest men in Russia, Kerensky,
was a vice-chairman. The C.W.S.D. was strong enough to exert an influence on the composition of the first Provisional Government. When it (the C.W.S.D.) was only a week or two old it had already grown to such dimensions that it could crowd the Duma out of its own home and take possession of the Taurida Palace, where it remains.

Within a few days of the revolution local C.W.S.D.'s had sprung into existence over all Russia and Siberia, followed a little later by Peasants' Councils. The members of the C.W.S.D.'s are naturally all Socialists, but of a good many different shades. In July, 1917, the writer heard a man holding forth in a Petrograd street to this effect: "The mother of seventeen young children lies dangerously ill. Her brood is misbehaving, making a terrible racket in the house, quarrelling amongst themselves, and fighting. If the noise continues, the mother will die, and the children will starve. Is it not right, therefore, that the children should compose their differences for a while, forgetting that their names are Esserr, Bolshevik, Menshevik, Internationalist, Anarchist, Cadet, and so on, until the old lady has recovered. For if the Motherland dies, what will become of the Revolution?"

The man was speaking extremely good sense. There are too many parties, and the nearer they are, curiously enough, the greater the distance between them. The insuperable goes arm-in-arm with the inseparable. A and B, two Socialists, in agreement on everything that matters, will find some point of detail on which to differ, and will form separate parties. Then C, a kindly theorist, will say: "Why this disunion? Let us unite." And a few of the followers of A and B will leave them and come under C's banner, thus making a new party. Half the parties in Russia are the result of somebody's efforts to unite the other parties. The people who try to compose sectional differences succeed only in decomposing the existing organisations.

THE SOCIALIST PARTIES.

To see how the Socialist movement in Russia has been affected by this tendency to split up in the name of unity, let us glance over the party make-up of the great All-Russian Conference of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates of June, 1917—about as representative a body as one could hope to find. There were in all 1,090 delegates:

- 285 Social Revolutionists.
- 248 Mensheviks.
- 105 Bolsheviks.
- 32 Internationalists.
- 73 Non-Party Socialists.
- 10 United Social-Democrats (Bolshevik and Menshevik).
- 10 Bundists (Jewish S.D. Party).
- 3 The "Edinstvo" (Unity) Group.
- 5 Labour Group.
- 1 Anarchist Communist.
The total falls a good deal short of 1,090 because the list does not include various representatives of provincial organisations, the army, the navy, and the peasantry, who were not selected on a party platform.

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It may be gathered, therefore, that the people who really matter are the Social-Revolutionists, the Mensheviks, and the Bolsheviks. All three groups are Marxian, especially the Bolsheviks. The other two recognise the, at any rate, temporary justification of the existence of the middle-class, or bourgeoisie (a member of which rejoices in the name of "boorjooy"). The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, want to get rid of the boorjoys out of hand. The Social-Revolutionists (or Esserists) base their views on the theory that you must begin on the bottom floor, which means the mouyik. In their economic doctrine, as in Tolstoy's, one begins with the peasant and the land, the first holding the second in communal ownership. The Mensheviks and Bolsheviks are not quite so keen on the land. They claim that the revolution must be the work of the victims of capitalism, who are not the peasantry, but the working classes.

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About 1898 there was formed a party known as the Social Democratic Labour Party. In 1903 it split into two, called the Bolsheviks (or Majorityites or Maximalistes) and Mensheviks (or Minorityites or Minimalistes). The first party were the followers of Lenin. As the foregoing table shows, the Bolsheviks are now the minority, and vice versa. But both parties stick to their old names. No Menshevik wants to be called a Bolshevik, accuracy notwithstanding; to him the word has become a term of abuse more than a party description. The Mensheviks have provided the Socialist members of the Cabinet, and their party, working amicably with the Social-Revolutionaries, has been able to ensure a dependable majority in favour of the continuation of the war, and a sane policy generally. They meet, none the less they do not mingle. Plekhanov tried to get them to merge, and the result was the "Edinstvo" Group, the size of which is indicated by its three representatives at the All-Russia Conference. The Bolsheviks harmonise, so far as this is possible, with the Internationalists, who want to see the whole world follow the example of Russia.

The Peasant Councils are ostensibly non-party; they nevertheless practically accept the Social-Revolutionary programme. The vote of peasant soldiers was large enough to elect a Social-Revolutionary majority in the municipal elections held in Moscow in June, 1917.

LENIN.

The difference between the outlook of the British and Russian working man cannot be illustrated better than by reference to a well-known and generally misrepresented extreme case. Lenin
was an active member of the Social-Democratic Labour Party from the start, in Russia and in exile. Some people say that he is a German agent, but it is more likely that he is one of those curious products of the Russian revolutionary movement who have ceased to live on the moral planes of the rest of the world. So many revolutionists have turned out to be police agents, who in their own heart of hearts did not know which of their employers held the first claim on their allegiance. Azev, and Father Gapon, and the detective who shot the Premier, Stolypin, are all examples of the type. Messrs. Joseph Conrad and Maurice Baring have dealt with it. Lenin is probably under the same shadow. To him the future of humanity, and its realisation by his methods, are everything—matters infinitely more important than the sources of the subscription to his funds, or the character of his allies.

His career during his abode in Russia, between his return from exile in April and his escape in August, is only explicable on this theory of his character. He arrives in Russia from Switzerland, the country of his exile, via Germany, in a special train lent him by the Kaiser's Government. He arrives in Russia, and explains that it is his mission to fight Russian Imperialism as much as the German brand of the same article. He needs a headquarters in Petrograd; so an armed body of his followers descend upon the house of a well-known ballet-dancer, Mme. Kshephinskaya, turn her out, and make themselves at home, remaining to this day in an admirably chosen strategic position. He needs a Press, so his armed followers come down on the editorial department of the Ministry of Agriculture. This used to publish a bulletin for distribution in vast numbers among Russian agriculturalists, as well as pamphlets and leaflets galore. Lenin and Co. therefore come into possession of a ready-made newspaper office, with a huge stock of paper in hand and machinery of just the right kind. He starts a daily paper, and immediately attacks the Provisional Government. The latter remonstrates feebly, but Lenin does not budge. The Pravda (Truth) comes out, with a swarm of local editions, a special edition for soldiers, and another for propaganda purposes at the front. The last, however, was soon suppressed.

Pravda remained until August, and was on sale everywhere. Its four pages contained, day by day, the essence of the pro-German and anti-Allies campaign. No lie was too blatant for Pravda, no argument too thin. Alone of the Petrograd Press it did not even mention the successful offensive of July 1—though its twin-brother, the Soldiers' Pravda, made the comment that the advance was a stab in the back of the German democracy! The word Allies was always printed in quotation marks in Pravda. Statements were made in every number with the purpose of discrediting the Allies. France, it was alleged, shoots Russian soldiers for faterming with the enemy, and England looks on Russia as a sort of India or China, to be exploited hereafter. All
English Socialists are false to Socialism; even MacDonald, because he has never fought the capitalistic imperialism of British "boorjoos." When there were joyful demonstrations, Pravda used to get up counter-demonstrations of dilapidated soldiers carrying banners: "We want to go home." "If we do not bring in the harvest the war is lost." The whole thing was an imposture, of course. The soldiers were already deserters to a man, and the principal reason why they could not go home is that their own people refused to have them there.

THE OUTBREAK OF FREE SPEECH.

The prevalence of such extremists, and of their opinions, is very largely to be attributed to the political conditions of the Old Russia. Before March, 1917, you could not for all practical purposes make a speech in Russia. It was fairly difficult even to find a speech to listen to unless it took the form of a lecture on some subject not too closely connected with politics. They do not preach much in the Russian Church, and the chances of achieving pulpit fame as a disenter were, and still are, very limited. The Revolution removed the gag. Everybody began to talk at once, and is still at it. The importance of it all lies in the fact that the task of governing Russia has got mixed up with the very natural desire to address the meeting. Russia has contracted the habit of holding Conferences, several at once, and all the time. They last sometimes from 9 a.m. to 5 a.m., and then they start again. They go on for weeks and weeks. There have been Labour Conferences, Socialist Conferences, Professional Conferences, and the usual Party Conferences. Thousands of them. They have not all been on the beaten track. In May, 1917, there was a Conference of the Criminal Classes held in Odessa, and more recently a sort of rash broke out over the map of Russia of Children's Conferences. The latter seem to have been a source of deep annoyance to the older generation. The infants of several towns demanded the return of the Romanovs, and in one or two places they discussed the Future of the Family.

The writer was present at some of the meetings of the All-Russian Conference of the C.W.S.D.'s, reference to which has already been made.

One evening he heard an American Socialist, Charles Russell, of New York, welcome the Russian Revolution. He described the way in which the most peacefully disposed among modern democracies had been compelled to take up the sword, and he assured his audience that they, too, would find sooner or later that there could be no real peace while Germany was undefeated. The crowd cheered ecstatically. Then an officer read out an immense resolution, all about this being an imperialist, bourgeois, capitalist war, about Russia's desire for peace, and her disinclination to conclude a separate peace in case one side or other came out of the war stronger than she would otherwise do—a resolution which took
at least ten minutes to read, bristling with self-contradictions, a resolution which might have been composed by everybody in a crowded room saying what they thought about the war to a reporter who reported everything and forgot to work out an average. And the crowd cheered ecstatically. They admire speech as an art in itself. Their discussions are got up for the sake of the speeches, not the division on them. Most of the resolutions before the Conference in point seemed to be of academic interest. In the meantime the Executive Committee did all the work, settling strikes, negotiating with the Provisional Government, and so on.

An interesting sidelight on the fact that in Russia free speech is still in the nature of an imported luxury is thrown by a widely distributed pamphlet, calling itself "The Revolutionist's Pocket Dictionary," which explains about a hundred terms at present in vogue. About six of them are Russian, the others come from Western Europe. Words such as "annexations," "contributions," "internationalism," "lock-out," "boycott," "trade union," and, in fact, all the vocabulary of industrial warfare, and of Socialism, are borrowed from the countries where first these things were practical politics.

ARTELS AND TRADE UNIONS.

The aspects of Russian Democracy described above are the more obvious ones, the thing which strikes the eye of the casual traveller, rather than those gradually evolved institutions which matter more, while they show up less.

At the bottom of Russian industrial and co-operative organisation is the artel, which has been described as follows by Dr. Harold Williams, in his Russia of the Russians (undoubtedly the best book published in recent years on the country). "An artel is a kind of mutual liability association. Workmen frequently form artels as a guarantee against loss. The porters on railway stations are organised in artels, so are the floor-polishers, so are the messengers and red caps who stand at the street corners in the cities, so are the messengers in banks and business houses. The artel is liable for all its members, so that if one of them steals or injures property the artel has to make the loss good. The members of the artel pool their money and share gains as well as losses. Peasants from a village community often form themselves into an artel when they go to work at a distance, and local patriotism seems to form the basis of membership in the big artels in the cities, the men of Yaroslav forming one artel, the men of Kostroma another, and so forth. The name artel is now used in the co-operative movement, and in this way a link of continuity is maintained with traditional Russian forms of association."

The development of the artel into the trade union was complicated by political conditions. The men who were responsible for the formation of the unions, in the seventies and again in 1905, wished to make them political rather than economic organisations. In order to counteract a tendency which might
work out to the danger of the existing order, the Government, from 1901 to 1906, actually encouraged the formation of trade unions of an economic type. The Chief of the Political Department of the Moscow police, named Zubatov, had the ingenious idea of nursing workmen's societies, in order that anti-Government feeling might be worked off on employers, and, incidentally, to give the police a chance of levying blackmail upon the factory-owners, who either had to pay up or see their workers come out on strike. This fake trade unionism was worked up all over Russia, and for a time it undoubtedly did a great deal towards choking a genuine movement. In the long run, however, it failed utterly, for Zubatov, having brought working men's societies into existence, necessarily taught their members how to organise themselves, and so paved the way towards the real thing. Zubatov's activities frightened the Government, and he was dismissed and banished to the Province of Arkangel. But he had set the ball rolling—and not at all in the desired direction. In 1907 there were said to be a quarter of a million organised trade unionists. Their numbers were subsequently reduced by repression; funds were confiscated, and when unions were allowed to exist, they were forbidden to federate. The Revolution has, of course, led to the formation of many great new unions. It is at present impossible to give any figures, as the unions are growing very quickly, and the process of amalgamation and co-ordination have not yet been clearly defined. The metal-workers' unions are attracting members by the hundred thousand, but as the number of workers at their trade has been artificially and perhaps temporarily inflated by the wholesale establishment of munition factories, it is at present impossible to trace the lines on which their organisations will develop. This much only is certain—the trade union will be a big thing in the new Russia.

A definition of the artel has already been given. It should be borne in mind, however, that there are several types of artels, which correspond to the various British forms of working-class economic organisation.

A. The most primitive kind of artel. The members supply only their labour; raw material and capital are not required—e.g., a body of men form an artel for the purpose of hauling barges up a great river. The artel is paid in a lump sum, and divides it among its members in proportion to the amount of work done.

B. This type of artel requires capital, which is either found by its members or borrowed. It corresponds to the unsuccessful self-governing workshops which were set up by the Christian Socialists in England, and to a certain extent to the existing Productive Co-operative Societies where these are run by the workers themselves. Such artels do not require very considerable capital. The "Russian Peasant Industries" productions, which are now so popular in England, are
generally manufactured in this way. Toy-making, for example, requiring no elaborate machinery, is largely conducted by this class of artel. Occasionally we find highly skilled work being turned out by artels. "The Co-operative Movement in Russia," by J. V. Bubnov, describes artels at some length, and mentions what is supposed to be the biggest one in Russia. This is at Pavlovo, in the Province of Nizhni-Novgorod, and employs about 300 men, of whom 125 are members; it is normally engaged in the manufacture of cutlery, but since the outbreak of war it has been making surgical instruments. Artels generally have a very much smaller number of members, and are naturally suffering from factory competition. In their present state they are doomed to extinction, but there are signs of their transformation into two new types. The first of these is:

C. During the last three years a great many artels, engaged on war-work, have been capitalised by the Zemstvos, and have, in fact, developed into State workshops, run by the local rural and urban authorities. Some idea of the work of these will be obtained from the section on the Union of the Zemstvos.

D. Is another newish type. The artel here loses its original character and turns into a trade union, which consists of all the employees at a single factory. Such artels (the name is adhered to) are, of course, made possible by the incomplete capitalist organisation of Russian industry, and by the existence of isolated factories near villages, where the employees all know one another and are not easily displaced.

E. Finally, there is, practically, the joint-stock company, or the co-operative factory. The artel finds the capital, and takes on its employees in the usual way. The co-operators are the employers, not the employed.

CO-OPERATION.

This classification of the artel system will show that co-operative consumption and production are connected naturally with the previously existing types of organisation. There was no question of the acceptance of a new theory. Both the theory and the practice were already present; they merely needed a few business-like individuals to hitch them together. Some fifteen years ago the impulse came, and since then the growth of various forms of co-operation has been stupendous. The war has merely stimulated what was already a prodigious growth. The progress of the co-operative movement since the Revolution (no figures are available) has been unchecked; indeed, it is possible that the predominant type of Russian production will be co-operative, just as the British type is joint-stock. Let us begin with consumers' societies—the Russian equivalent of the "co-op." stores. It is impossible to give any
up-to-date figure of their number and membership. According to
Mr. Bubnov, there were on January 1, 1914, 10,080 consumers'
societies, and three years later there were about 20,000. During
the period of the war they have been forming at the rate of about
ten a day. The total membership on January 1, 1914, was
1,450,000, and it must have more than doubled by this time. The
"Co-operation" Society in Moscow had in June, 1917, 65,000
members. The provinces of Kiev, Podolia and Poltava are the
principal centres of this form of co-operation. Here, again, there
was already in existence an organisation of a lower type to simplify
the evolution of the higher. A few years ago Russian factories fre-
quently had an ostensibly co-operative store attached to them, run
jointly by the management and workers. This system is now
almost extinct; it seems to have had a good many of the disadvan-
tages of the "truck" shop of the early part of last century, with
some of the benefits of the co-operative store.

A type of co-operation which is doing very well in Russia to-
day is represented by the sixteen or seventeen thousand Credit
Associations, with their membership of over ten million house-
holders. There are various types of these; their common object is
to help the peasant smallholder (he must be an owner) to borrow
money in order to purchase livestock, agricultural machinery, etc.,
on the security of his land and crops.

Lastly, there are the co-operative productive societies. These,
again, vary greatly. The most characteristically Russian is the
mass of associations of various types which come into the Union of
Siberia Creamery Associations, formed in 1908. This has grown
directly out of innumerable butter artels, and is now apparently in
a fair way to gain a monopoly of the whole dairy business of
Siberia. There are also productive bodies built up on a model
similar to that of the English and Scottish Co-operative Wholesale
Societies. The Moscow Union of Consumer Societies is the prin-
cipal such body. During the last few years it has opened a great
many factories all over Russia, and its activities have been stimu-
lated rather than checked by the war. Then there are a large
number of auxiliary bodies connected with the co-operative move-
ment. The Moscow Narodov (People's) Bank is the principal finan-
cial organ of the movement, which also has an educational side.
At the moment of writing Russian co-operation, although in a
thoroughly healthy state, is too shapeless to be described in detail.
While certain sections of the movement were regarded with sus-
picion by the pre-revolutionary governments, others (e.g., the
Credit Associations) used to receive intelligent encouragement.
Now that all unnatural restrictions upon their growth have been
removed, the co-operative organisations are developing in unex-
pected directions. The high prices of food, the scarcity for which
the late Government was largely responsible, and the consequent
profiteering and uneven distribution, have largely discredited the
private trader and given a great impetus to the co-operation.
THE LAND.

The movements which have been described in the course of this paper have been urban with the exception of the co-operative impulse, which has made itself felt in village and town alike. On June 7, 1917, the All-Russian Council of Peasant Deputies issued a statement on the land question, in the course of which the leading ideas which have been in vogue among the peasants since the abolition of servitude are briefly expressed. Although the policy which this statement recommends has not been completely accepted by the Provisional Government, and will have to be decided in the long run by the Constituent Assembly, there is no doubt that its ideas are already being acted upon very largely both by Government Departments and by the peasants themselves. All lands, whether belonging to the State, the Church, or private persons, are to be handed over to the people, with no compensation to their present owners. The land administration is to be handed over to local agricultural committees, which are to be responsible for the cultivation. These committees are to have the power of requisitioning agricultural machinery where its present owners are not already using it to the national advantage. The committees are to gather in the harvest, regulate river fisheries, and control the output of timber. They are, further, to fix rents, prices, and wages in connection with these activities. The statement from which these points are taken concludes with the expression of the conviction that only under these conditions will it be possible to create a new social organisation worthy of Free Russia, an organisation which "will unite in one family of brethren, under the protection of one Government all the toilers on the land, without distinction of nationality, religion, and social standing—the great Russian and the Ukrainian, the Christian and the Mussulman, the peasant and the Cossack, the Russian and the stranger within his gates, the villager and the courtier." This may read like the wildest Utopianism, but Russia happens to be the one country on earth where Utopian schemes are practical politics. The peasants' programme, as we shall see a little later, has already led to certain disorders. But it is also leading to a more intelligent peasantry, with a greater sense of responsibility for Russia. It is as well to be reminded that the peasants' programme will affect the destinies of about a hundred million persons.

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The last of great Russian democratic organisations is

THE UNION OF THE ZEMSTVOS.

There used to be a legend—it is not dead yet—to the effect that Russian people were used to being autocratically governed. The people who held this view maintained that if the Russians were allowed to mind their own business instead of letting it be conducted for them by German officials and half-German Courts, there would be confusion, if nothing worse. This quaint theory
is, of course, entirely baseless. Democracy as a living force has nowhere shown itself more wonderfully since the outbreak of the war than in Russia.

When war began it immediately became apparent that the Russian War Office was going to have its hands very full indeed. It also became pretty clear that the Russian Red Cross Society, admirable body though it is, was not strong enough to do the work laid down for it. A new organisation was needed to rectify the shortcomings which were immediately apparent, and a new organisation came into existence, without the help of the Government—actually for a time in opposition to the Government or to one member of it. Russia is divided for purposes of local government into what are known as Zemstvos, to which our county councils may be taken as equivalent. Many years ago, during the war with Japan, a Union of Zemstvos had been formed to supplement the very inadequate Red Cross Organisation. Almost immediately after Germany made war in 1914 the Russian Union of Zemstvos was revived, and was soon followed by a similar body on a smaller scale, the Russian Union of Towns, consisting of a federation of town councils. Early in August, 1914, the new organisation sprang into existence. The movement began in Moscow, and the rest of Russia quickly followed. The Cossacks of the Don contributed no less than £50,000 to the Union. Before the war was a month old the organisation was under way.

The Union of Zemstvos was supposed to play a subordinate part in the work of the sanitary organisation of the Ministry of War and of the Red Cross Society, and consequently the War Office, as well as the Red Cross, would not allow the Union to work independently for the evacuation of the wounded and to extend its activity to the battle line. The work was to be divided so that the Red Cross should be at the front, whilst the Union was supposed to relieve the wounded in the interior of Russia. According to these plans and in consideration of the very limited funds of the Union, provision was made for about 25,000 to 30,000 beds and for a few hospital trains which were to run in the interior of the Empire. But from the very beginning the circumstances necessitated not only the widening of the sphere of work as formerly planned, not only the extension of the Union's activity to the fighting line, but also to give over to the Union some functions that were purely Governmental, and were formerly undertaken by the Government alone.

It soon became evident that many needs, and some of them not directly connected with the relief of the wounded, had not been foreseen in peace time, and that neither the Sanitary Department of the War Office nor the Red Cross Society could supply those needs, especially when, owing to certain events developing unexpectedly, both these institutions had to devote all their energy for the medical work at the front. This created the necessity of erecting numerous hospitals, of collecting and distributing centres for the sick and wounded coming from the front. At those centres an adequate medical staff had to be appointed; all the equipment,
as well as trains for the transport of the wounded, had to be provided. All that could be effected, and all these pressing needs could be met only by a close alliance between the Government and the public corporations, of which the Union of Zemstvos, possessing the confidence of all classes, and having at its disposal a well-trained staff, took the lead.

The Government was bound to accept its aid, and the General Committee was ready at once to assist the army with all its strength and with all its available means.

After organising hospitals, hospital trains and food providing units, the Union of Zemstvos extended its activity to the front; its first attempt proved a success, and the High Command laid on the Union the most varied tasks. New enterprises followed one after the other, more primitive ones were extended, and new duties were added. The units at the front increased in number, stores of various kinds, with their bases in the rear, accumulated at the front, and, in conjunction with the War Office, stations, medical organisations supplemented by canteens, bath houses and laundries, were established by the Union. The victualling of a host of over 300,000 men, engaged in war constructions in the immediate rear of the army, fell to the care of the Union. The medical sanitary work with numerous units for dealing with infectious diseases, units for vaccination, disinfecting units, bacteriological laboratories, medicinal stores at front and base, movable bath houses, developed rapidly. The Union of Zemstvos was required likewise to relieve the refugees, and responded by organising a net of canteens, medical institutions, registration and labour offices, refuges for children, workshops, etc.

Nor was this all. Little by little the Union of Zemstvos, always helped by the Union of Towns, found itself taking over the whole work of looking after the sick and wounded. At the beginning of 1916 it ran fifty hospitals. But it was not only Russia's sick and wounded who needed help. The War Office organisation was quite incapable of undertaking a campaign so enormous as that in which Russia found herself engaged. All sorts of essential articles were lacking. The Union began to provide clothes for the army, organising for that purpose the co-operation of the local authorities in every part of Russia. Funds were raised for the purchase of necessary articles abroad, especially in England and the United States. In February, 1915, the only tannery in Russia was requisitioned by the War Office and handed over to the Union. A little later, when the Union had succeeded in getting supplies of tanning extracts, a special leather factory was opened. Contributions for the great work came in readily. The local authorities found the greater part of the necessary funds. Private subscriptions were also forthcoming, and even the War Office came down with handsome contributions. When the great retreat of 1915 took place, it was the Union which had the task of dealing with the refugees, of whom there were no fewer than four millions on the south-western front alone.
A number of guides were appointed to help the refugees on their way. These took upon themselves the care of refugees traveling by railway. The necessity of rescuing the children brought into existence a great number of crèches and nurseries, to which more than 58,000 children were admitted on the south-western front alone. Apart from that, there were established, for the benefit of the refugees, labour exchanges, inquiry and registration offices, and many investigations were made with regard to the position of the refugees in different districts.

The extent of the Union’s operations may be gauged from the fact that it had at the beginning of 1916 no less than 124 establishments in the Caucasus alone. So far the work which we have been describing has been of a character subsidiary to the War Office. But the Union did not stop at this.

In the spring of 1915, when the Russian army had suffered severely from a deficiency of shells and ammunition, a general movement to give assistance to the army swept through the whole of Russian Society. At this very moment the Russian Union of Zemstvos took an active part in the work of providing the army with all the necessary materials. After the failures in Galicia in 1915 it became evident that there was a colossal inequality between the equipment of Russian troops and that of the Austro-Germans. The Government itself could see the necessity of calling upon all social forces for the sake of reinforcing the fighting power of the army. The Russian Zemstvos, of course, could not remain indifferent with regard to this work.

The meeting of the representatives of the Government Zemstvos, which took place in Moscow on June 5, 1915, decided to commit the charge of this enormous task of providing the active army with all necessaries, not to isolated Zemstvos, but to the Union of Zemstvos. In all the Zemstvos, government and district committees were formed, and these approached this work very earnestly. The first and most important task was the unification of small industries, the work of the peasants in their homes, and also the uniting of the isolated technical ability of the country.

In July, 1915, the Union of Zemstvos took orders from the military authorities for different articles of ammunition and army equipment, which amounted to many millions of roubles. Among these were not only articles of commissary-supplies (vehicles, harness, kitchens, wheels, horseshoes, tarpaulins, knapsacks, saddles, etc.), but articles for artillery and military equipment, such as shells, hand-grenades, entrenching tools, telephones. All these orders were immediately distributed among the local organisations of the Union of Zemstvos.

Simultaneously with the distribution of these orders among local committees, the General Committee set about the organisation of enterprises of its own: munition works for providing 3-inch and 6-inch shells, the erection of factories for making sulphuric acid, telephones, tarpaulin, and much besides.
With regard to supplying the army, the Union of Zemstvos co-operated from August, 1915, with the Russian Union of Towns. Both these Unions are working together, having formed a Special Committee for army supply.

All this marvellous organisation, it must be repeated and emphasised, has grown up independently of the Government departments. The Russian people alone, through their elected local authorities, have done the work. Can it be said any longer that they are incapable of self-government, fit only to be the subjects of an autocracy? *

**ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES.**

For the present, however, the situation is ominous. English opinion is too much inclined to attribute the disorders on the other side to political causes. The British public is apparently under the impression that the trouble is mainly due to party disputes, with a certain amount of German propaganda thrown in. There is no doubt that these are very important factors in the situation, but by themselves they can hardly be held accountable for the increasing disorganisation of affairs in general. The root of Russia's present difficulties is economic and financial, and not political. So far as there is a political difficulty—and I do not for a moment deny that it exists and is serious—it is to a very large extent merely the reaction of the prevalent economic conditions.

The outward and visible sign of the troublesomeness of the situation is paper. Metal currency has ceased to exist. If you ask people where it has got to they shrug their shoulders and talk about hoarding. Illiterate peasants, it appears, dislike paper money, and have collected all the coin in circulation. During the last three years the Romanov Governments attempted to get out of their financial difficulties by printing vast quantities of paper money. This had the result of driving coins out of circulation and depreciating the rouble. In a country with an advanced banking system the effects would not have been so serious, but in Russia, where banks are mistrusted, the unrestricted issue of paper money provided an exceptionally easy descent towards national bankruptcy.

With a banking system such as exists in Russia there is no limit to the quantity of paper money which the country can absorb, and consequently to the liabilities which the Government can incur in issuing it. The smaller coins—30, 20, 15 and 10 copecks, and down to one copeck—have been replaced by a special issue of postage stamps, printed on specially thick paper. The one copeck note (now worth about the tenth of a penny) may be regarded as a pathetic symbol of Russia's difficulties.

This, however, is only one side of the difficulty. There is also the wages problem to be considered. The Russian town workman

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*This account of the work of the Union of the Zemstvos is based upon the Report, published by Messrs. P. S. King and Son. 1s. net.
was until quite recently in receipt of extraordinarily low wages, and accustomed to a terribly low standard of life. His wages, in English terms, often came to no more than a pound or two a month. He and his family lived on black bread and weak tea, and shared a room or a cellar with perhaps several other families. In the circumstances it is not surprising that he was seldom a particularly efficient workman. He was slow, and his employer generally called him lazy. Wages had been rising gradually since 1905, the year of big strikes, and they had been increasing fairly rapidly between the outbreak of war and the Revolution. But even so they were appallingly insufficient, especially in view of the extraordinary rise of prices during the latter period.

Consequently, when the Revolution came, the workmen felt they were justified in asking for an increase of wages, which sometimes came to as much as 300 or 400 per cent. And yet, in the circumstances of the case, the Minister of Labour, M. Skobelev, assured me that such demands could not always be regarded as unjustifiable. Immediately after the Revolution these demands for higher wages took place at virtually every factory. But it was found impossible to settle matters immediately on a satisfactory basis, as prices, after a temporary decline, started once more on the upward path. So that a succession of demands for higher wages took place, and in a good many cases the workmen felt that the food speculators were getting the best of them and that the only way of meeting them was to insist on the demands of wages out of all proportion to those which they had been receiving. Cases have been heard of when the workmen demanded as much as 800 per cent. over pre-Revolution rates.

This demand for higher wages naturally has not been accompanied by smoothness throughout. There have been innumerable strikes, although they have seldom lasted more than a few days. The dangerous element in the new movement has been the tendency towards syndicalism. Workmen have attempted to take control of factories and to dispense entirely with the so-called “bourgeois” management. In certain cases the workmen have very soon discovered that they could not carry on without their technical staff, which found itself reinstalled after a very few days.

The net result of this agitation has been an enormous decrease of production. It must be remembered that not only have the workmen been insisting on higher wages, but they have also been demanding (and they have obtained) a greatly reduced working day. Moreover, employees of a great many large factories have refused to go on working unless the management complied with certain almost penal conditions. For instance, men elected by their fellow-employees to serve on local councils of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates must continue to receive their wages, and time lost through disputes has also to be paid for.

In the circumstances it is not surprising to find innumerable undertakings shut down altogether. Factories engaged in the pro-
duction of munitions have in most cases been able to secure help from the Government, but those not directly engaged on war work have been having a very bad time.

There are, of course, no reliable statistics available as to the extent of the fall in production. A few fortunate factories in Petrograd and Moscow have been able to report that they have not suffered to the extent of more than 20 per cent., but the majority, perhaps, place the figure at something like 50, and one hears occasionally of places where only 20 per cent. of the pre-Revolution output is maintained. I have heard of one unfortunate establishment engaged on Government work, employing many thousands of men and women, which turned out during the three months following the Revolution only 7½ per cent. of its output for the previous six months.

Add to these facts the very important consideration that transport is becoming more and more difficult, that the number of locomotives needing repair is something in five figures, while the number of locomotives actually undergoing repair is comparatively microscopical, and it must be realised that the economic situation is perhaps even more menacing than the military. A great many things which we had been in the habit of regarding as necessaries of life have virtually gone out of manufacture. In Petrograd and Moscow boots, shoes, and clothing cannot be obtained except at fantastic prices.

The refusal, for that is what it practically comes to, of the workmen to work, except on economically impossible conditions, finds its parallel not only in the behaviour of the Armies, but also in the attitude which is being taken up by the peasant in a great many parts of Russia. It is impossible to sum up the agrarian situation in a few words, and I shall not attempt to do so. But this much is certain: a great many peasants, with all the produce of particularly lucrative harvests turned under their cottage floors, have not recognised the necessity of seeing that this year’s harvest should be a normal one. Production in this direction has also enormously dropped off, and sooner or later the pinch will be felt in consequence. Moreover, conditions of instability have asserted themselves in “expropriation,” and in the large towns one meets a good many men and women who were wealthy landowners until the other day when their peasants reduced them to bankruptcy at a single blow. Here, as in the case of the town workmen, retributive justice has been at work no less than human folly. The employer who did his best for his men, and the landowner who always kept before him the interests of his peasants, have distinctly received preferential treatment. It is gratifying to know that among the former there are a number of British enterprises. In the long run, however, one is brought up against the fact that democracy is based upon discipline, and that in any state citizens which try to do without discipline simply cannot exist. But discipline in Russia is peculiarly scarce at the moment. Let me give one or two illustrations.
THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINE.

The Nevsky Prospect, the main thoroughfare of Petrograd, is the nightly scene of innumerable little meetings. You can hear workmen arguing their right to the whole produce of labour; you can hear impassioned ladies beseeching deserters to return to the front and to defend Russian "cultura," and you can hear innumerable unenlightened discussions on an extraordinary number of purely theoretical matters. The most interesting feature about these discussions, however, is the attitude of the deserters. Sometimes they repeat what is evidently a set speech as they heard it delivered by a Leninite. They assure their hearers that it is all one to them whether they are ruled by German capitalism, or, as at present the case, Anglo-French capitalism. When they are asked where is the latter they generally, I notice, begin again from the beginning. One hears officers beseeching deserters to return to the front, and one also hears deserters explaining to officers why the latter should follow their own example.

Take another example, also from the Army. General Brusilov, the Commander-in-Chief, orders a general offensive. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' delegates of the town occupied by General Headquarters sends a bitter protest to Petrograd and the Government against the General's refusal to discuss the conditions of the offensive with them beforehand, and this protest is widely circulated all over Russia, conveying the impression that the General was not entitled to order an offensive.

They are repeating a story in Petrograd a good deal just now. It may not be absolutely true, but it seems to sum up the situation in a perfectly admirable manner. As English readers will be already aware, the lines of the opposing armies on the Russian fronts have seldom been as close to one another as in Flanders; at some points, in fact, the lines have been several miles apart. When the hot weather came on an officer in command of a unit at the front decided that the present position of his men, which was in a swamp, was not healthy, and likely to become worse. In front of them was a hill, behind them was another. The officer ordered an advance. The hill in front could probably be taken without any loss of men, and an advance was ordered accordingly. The men thereupon held a meeting, and decided that they would not advance as they were not fighting a war of aggression. The officer thereupon suggested a move to the rear, any hill being healthier than the swamp. The men again met to consider the matter, and decided that as this was an offensive war they would not yield any ground. One almost feels justified in using the words: "and so they all perished miserably."

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE.

Now what effect is all this slackness going to have on the future? The immediate prospect for Russia is distinctly uncomfor-
able. In the first place, the number of desertions is likely to grow rather than diminish when the cold weather sets in. Moreover, the increased difficulties of picking up a living will probably lead to various forms of brigandage which at present fortunately are rare. The problem is more than a purely military one. We must consider the effect which a demoralised Russia will have upon the state of feeling in Germany and the rest of Europe. Undoubtedly the effect will be to encourage the supporters of absolutism in all its forms throughout the world. If the Russian democracy cannot pull itself together it will make itself for many generations to come “the horrible example” to be quoted as an argument against any further democratisation.

And yet the Russian people themselves are hardly to be held to blame for the catastrophe in which they are unwittingly taking part. The most enormous, and at the same time the most ignorant of the European nations has suddenly found itself able to shape her own destinies. Up to the day of its liberation the Russian democracy had never been allowed to consider what it would wish its destiny to be. If Russia has fallen into the hands of theorists and extremists, it is because the practical, experienced administrator of Liberal principles had not been previously allowed to exist. The present débâcle is the legacy of the Romanovs, their last but deadliest insult to the intelligence of Europe.

Such is the situation in Russia to-day. The success of the Revolution is not yet assured. The new Russia has a magnificent foundation in its democratic institutions and in its genuinely democratic sentiment. The danger comes not only from indiscipline and treachery, but also from the apparently too materialistic outlook of many of the present leaders. The greatly talked-of “moral personality” of the Revolution is too often allowed to supersede the personal morality of the revolutionist. But no genuine democrat need despair; if democracy is indeed the spirit which makes a nation great, then Russia is safe.

What can the British Labour movement do to help Russia? Mutual knowledge is the first essential. The Russian co-operative movement has been making advances to the British movement, and it is clear that the two great people’s organs are bound to become more closely associated in the future, possibly, as some Russian co-operators believe, to the point of interdependence. British co-operatively manufactured goods will certainly be exchanged against Russian agricultural produce through the media of the co-operative organisations.

Relations between British and Russian trade unions must depend upon the extent to which Russia avails herself of the help proffered by this country. In this case, at any rate, the youngest democracy has much to learn from the oldest.

The Labour and Socialist movements must keep in close touch. A useful start has already been made in this direction by the exchange of delegations. It is to be regretted that the oppor-
tunity of the Stockholm Conference was not whole-heartedly accepted, as the British Labour point of view on the war is generally misunderstood and often willfully misinterpreted.

The British Labour movement can itself do much to bring about a better understanding with the foreign democracies by insisting on the appointment of Labour Attachés at British embassies and legations. (The idea, I believe, is Mr. Arthur Henderson's.) The selection of youngish men from the ranks of trade-union officials for such posts would have these desirable effects. First, the better mutual knowledge of the working classes of the civilised nations. Second, the education of the future trade-union leaders and Labour M.P.'s. Third, the breaking down of the social exclusiveness which tends to prevail at British embassies and legations. A Labour Attaché to the Embassy in Petrograd might be of the greatest service to both Britain and Russia.

The time is clearly coming when the Labour movements in all countries will have to appoint their own ambassadors. The representatives and plenipotentiaries of Labour will concern themselves with economic rather than with political questions; they will watch over international Labour legislation and make it effective; they will prevent the manipulation of tariffs in the interests of any particular body of manufacturers, and they will see that one country does not undercut another's industry by allowing sweated labour to continue. For the first time in European history Labour controls the government of a great nation. Whatever the blunders of the Russian Revolution, it has already demonstrated the possibilities for good latent in democracy.

The future peace of the world will depend very largely upon the relations of the great democracies to one another when the common cause of war has ceased to hold them together. Britain is united with the U.S.A. by ties of blood, and with France by a common tradition and a great memory. If these three nations conclude a people’s pact with the Russia which will assuredly arise from the present disorders, the world will be able to afford to laugh at the lessening menace of the few remaining autocracies.
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