defence in a new setting

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ARGUMENT

Neville Brown
Tam Dalyell
Raymond Fletcher
Andrew Wilson
Elizabeth Young
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1. the evolving strategic environment

Neville Brown

The time between the start of the development of a new weapons system and its final withdrawal from service may very often be about fifteen or twenty years; and this alone makes the likely world environment in, say, the 1980s something that the current revision of Britain's military role should take considerable account of. Still more important, however, is the probability that, in the course of the next few years, Britain will have to take decisions about her relations with, in particular, Europe and Afro-Asia so fundamental as to affect for many decades ahead the part she plays in the world.

It is difficult to be at all optimistic. Consider, for example, the negative and morbid attitude now being displayed towards the thermonuclear balance of terror by each of the two superpowers. Both now have in service well over 500 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the great majority of these in sites that are so well hardened by steel and concrete that an enemy would need to fire something of the order of 10 ICBMs at any one of them to stand a 90 per cent chance of destroying it. This means that their respective ICBM forces (to say nothing of their heavy bombers and ballistic missile submarines) confer on the superpowers the ability to retaliate overwhelmingly against any conceivable attack. Yet the two governments concerned have chosen to capitulate to military and industrial pressures and start to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs) designed to destroy ICBMs during the later stages of their flight.

Their decision to embark on what may well prove to be an endless quest for ballistic missile immunity may eventually be revoked or modified in response to both internal and external pressures. But unless and until this happens it will undermine seriously the moral right of the USA and the USSR to ask other nations to exercise nuclear restraint by such acts as signing a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is bound, moreover, to complicate greatly all the technological aspects of the strategic balance between the two of them and between them and other nuclear powers; and this will mean, among others things, that nuclear arms control and limitation agreements will be harder to arrive at and to implement. Furthermore, ABM deployment has many secondary implications that are alarming and not the least is the threat to the traditional freedom of the high seas in time of peace. For ABM defences will lose much of their effectiveness against surprise attack unless all objects that could conceivably be hostile missile firing submarines can always be kept hundreds of miles away from the coastal cities of any country maintaining such defences. What makes this prospect still more grave than it might otherwise be is the fact that already fishing disputes, ambitions to exploit commercially the seabed, and fears of military surveillance are leading to ever broader interpretations of national prerogatives in "home waters".

The USA and the USSR obviously share a certain confidence that ABM defence will discourage other nations from entering, or remaining in, the strategic weapons business. But China will almost certainly regard ABMs simply as an additional challenge requiring a still more vigorous technological response; and the leading Western European nations are also likely to seek to maintain an effective sovereignty in this field. It is true, of course, that ABM efficiency is improving, but it is most unlikely that it can ever approach perfection. For, apart from anything else, this is a form of warfare in which the element of surprise is of paramount importance, and surprise is predominantly the prerogative of the attacker. So it is quite conceivable that even a secondary nuclear power could develop a strategic deterrence sufficiently large and sophisticated to present any potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk of unacceptable damage under almost all circumstances.

The view has sometimes been expressed on the left, however, that the alternative prospect of a complete, or almost complete, Soviet American nuclear condominium should be tolerated or even welcomed. One argument that has been advanced in favour of such a pattern is
that major crises are less likely to occur, and could prove to be more manageable, if only two parties are ever directly involved; and to this proposition has been added the further one that the possession of nuclear weapons does not confer on a country as much general influence as one might expect, for example, the USA has not been able to curb North Vietnam. However, the Soviet American diplomatic dialogue that has been sustained, more or less, since "Cuba" has not yielded very encouraging results. On the contrary, it has intensified China’s sense of being isolated, made many Western Europeans nervous and resentful, and failed either to exercise adequate control over the Vietnam and Arab-Israel crises or to secure a stabilisation of the superpower strategic weapons balance. So there are few grounds for believing that if, as a result of their achieving a state of virtual nuclear duopoly the dialogue between the USA and the USSR became more extensive and exclusive, it would automatically produce a happier world. Indeed it might well eventually lead to acts of sinister collusion that would seriously jeopardise the dignity and freedom of the rest of mankind.

nuclear nations, in particular, should only forgo their strategic options within the context of a multinational arms control agreement involving extensive and inspected reductions in the nuclear inventories of each of the superpowers.

Connected with this problem is that of the risk of "nuclear proliferation", a phrase which is usually taken to mean the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states that do not currently possess them. Occasionally such proliferation could create regional balances of terror that would reduce the likelihood of local wars. It is probable, however, that its effects would more generally be adverse. For often the fear of a nuclear Pearl Harbor would enhance the risk of war occurring through accident, miscalculation, or irrationality; and, in other situations, the existence of a nuclear arms race would stimulate the nations concerned continually to seek the best means of defence and delivery available. There seems to be no technical reason, moreover, why the nuclear club should not contain as many as a dozen members by 1980 and twice that number by 1990; and a further possibility to reckon with is that certain nations that lack the skill or resources to build nuclear weapons will develop a crude but cheap and simple capacity for "bee sting" retaliation in the form of chemical or microbiological deterrents. Meanwhile, high rates of technical innovation, particularly in regard to guided missiles, will complicate the problem of remaining up to date in respect of delivery and defence.

Another hazard that may be more apparent by, say, 1980 than it is today is the tendency for military expenditure to be stimulated by a steady worsening of the world poverty situation. For by then acute and recurrent food supply crises are likely to plague India and certain other countries. Meanwhile, throughout the third world expectations will be rising still faster than now (thanks to such influence as the continued spread of the transistor, radio, television, and primary schooling; and to such conspicuous examples of exotic consumption as supersonic aircraft and space programmes)

collusion

People who find such collusion inconceivable because deep hostility is still at least latent between the two countries concerned, should bear in mind that in 1807 and then again in 1939 Russia found it all too easy to come to an understanding with her erstwhile major enemy, based upon the division of Eastern Europe into respective spheres of influence; and they might consider also whether the world as a whole is not now effectively smaller than Eastern Europe was in either of the years mentioned. Those who find collusion inconceivable because nuclear weapons seem not to be decisive instruments of international control should study, for example, the part that the USA’s invocation of the nuclear threat played in securing the Korean Armistice (see David Rees, Korea: the limited war, MacMillan, 1964). All this suggests that the Western European
whereas the rise in production per head will remain generally slow and uneven. So we must expect growing instability which will probably lead to increased emphasis on military activities in three ways. One will be a still more widespread tendency for armed forces to intervene in government; another a greater preoccupation with internal security operations; and a third a preparedness to export tension by stimulating adventurism abroad. All such trends may, of course, be retarded by the advanced nations diverting more of their own resources to economic aid. But it is most unlikely that they can thereby be averted. No such diversion is likely to be fast enough; and nor is it likely to be extensive enough. The World Bank, for example, has estimated that by 1975 the poor countries will be able to “put to constructive use” about three times as much aid as they receive today.

All these prospects are made worse by the apparent inability of the members of the UN to develop a very effective peacekeeping agency. The results of its efforts in the Congo, South Arabia, and around the borders of Israel have been far from encouraging. Action by the Security Council is now frequently circumscribed by two of its permanent members, France and Russia. France’s negativism on this score may diminish when de Gaulle leaves office, but Russia’s is likely (for reasons indicated below) to prove more durable; and the admission to the Council of Communist China, whilst obviously desirable in general terms, would be unlikely to result in the Council acquiring a more positive role. Another danger is that the proceedings of the General Assembly will come to reflect more and more a polarisation of the world between the “have-nots” and the “have-nots”.

the implications

Such a polarisation could have considerable implications in respect of Soviet geopolitics. For we cannot assume that Russia’s achievement of effective nuclear parity with the US will lead to her being permanently more relaxed. For one thing great powers tend not to react to situations as reasonably as that. For another, the USSR is likely to remain a society with a large measure of internal tension and the desire to export some of it. An indication of how great this tension is can be seen from the continuing denial of so many elementary freedoms after fifteen years of alleged “de-Stalinisation”. Among them are free elections, free expression, the right to strike, and the right to travel freely abroad; and, indeed, since the removal of Khruschev the repression has grown worse in several respects. So it is more than possible that the 1970s will see an internal convulsion in the USSR of a magnitude comparable to that of the USA in the 1960s. Therefore, the fact that the USSR need no longer resent and fear the nuclear might of the USA may lead to her external posture becoming not more relaxed but more belligerent; and this tendency may be much strengthened by an apprehension lest Eastern European pressures towards emancipation influence in particular, the Baltic States and the Ukraine.

Russian aid

What military form might such belligerency take? For some time past it has consisted merely of the giving of arms and military advice to friendly states and insurgency movements. Such a form obviously suits the USSR admirably because of her own revolutionary tradition and because of the limitations that her geographical constrictions and her lack of historical experience place on more direct military intervention. So what Western cold warriors call “aggression by proxy” can be expected to remain the predominant kind of Soviet expansion. It may be backed up, however, by more extensive deployment of Soviet naval power. Her new and expanding fleet of nuclear propelled submarines, for example, provides Russia with an extremely powerful means of overcoming what has for so long been one of her greatest strategic weaknesses, namely the difficulty with which she deploys her strength beyond her own borders.
A pattern that may therefore strengthen is that of the USSR as well as China lending support to the radical nationalist forces of Afro-Asia and Latin America in order to bring about the eradication of direct Western influence and control from all parts of the third world; and the prime targets of such a movement are likely to be certain territories that lie on the periphery of the Afro-Asian world and which, in the eyes of most of its radical nationalists, are closely identified with the West, Israel, Libya and the sheikdoms of the Arabian peninsula, the Portuguese and Spanish colonies, and Rhodesia are the obvious choices at the moment. Later on the emphasis may shift to South Africa, Australia and New Guinea. The trouble is that all such measures are likely to produce in the West a powerful backlash of hostility towards, and contempt for, everything Afro-Asian. Perhaps the biggest task that the social democratic movements of the West face in the course of the next two decades is ensuring that all meaningful contacts are not broken between their nations and the third world.

**future trends**

Within this general evolution there are likely to be several specific trends. Among them are the emergence of Japan as a nation seeking an important political role, the rise of China as an increasingly self-sufficient power in both economic and military terms, a mounting Indian political crisis, an increasing tendency in the Arab world to look for radical solutions to the problems of internal development and the containment of Israel, the continuing decline of the Commonwealth, and (perhaps most important of all) a sharp increase in instability in Latin America with resultant violence between its member states as well within them. Another important change may be a sharp rise in the incidence of urban insurgency (see “Vietnam: towards a wider conflict?” *World today*, May 1968).

So we may be moving into an era in which we shall look back on the late 1950s and early 1960s as a halcyon period of comparative peace and harmony. And it is in the context of this grim prognosis that the case for building up a viable political and military community in Western Europe becomes, in my view, almost self-evident. Western Europe is unlikely to adopt positive and constructive policies towards the third world in respect of, for example, military and economic aid unless it has the motivation that will come from having some sense of collective strength and influence. Yet without the European nations playing their due part it is hard to see how the West as a whole can maintain a satisfactory relationship with the third world. In the euphoria of the post-Keynes era of relatively steady growth and high employment levels there has been a tendency to forget how much the USA remains out of touch ideologically with the rest of mankind. Her economic and political philosophies are still largely based on eighteenth and early nineteenth century premises that mean very little to peoples less well endowed with material resources; and their problems often mean very little to her. The relative prestige of the term “socialist planning” in Western Europe and the USA ought to be a sufficient indication that the former is more in tune with the general problem of development.

**the evolving strategy**

But it is no use talking of collective strength and influence unless this involves a fair measure of strategic independence. Western Europe’s ability to withstand any Soviet nuclear or non-nuclear military threats must not continue to depend so heavily upon the protective presence of the USA that by differing from the latter it puts its own security at risk. The area must have an indigenous military capacity sufficiently large, versatile and well organised to ensure that it regularly makes a major contribution to its own defence and retains the capacity to “go it alone” at quite short notice.

Pessimistic inferences about the near future do not preclude attempts to arrive
at international arms control and limitation agreements. What they do suggest is that the time honoured quest for utopian prescriptions within this field, such as blueprints for general and complete disarmament within several years, should be abandoned in favour of an application of the classic Fabian strategy of evolutionary progress. But this is a shift that should be encouraged for other reasons also. For it would seem that a major part of the explanation for the paucity of practical results from most of the arms limitation debates that have taken place this century lies in the turgid, tedious and unrealistic character of almost all the intellectual contributions; and most have been of this quality, because they have started from utopian premises.
2. the future roles of NATO and WEU

Raymond Fletcher

Alliances are not what they used to be. States once signed treaties with one another, sent representatives to have a look at one another's manoeuvres, exchanged monarchs on ceremonial visits and left it at that. Militarily, of course, it was a more stable world. Technology did not blow up calculations and contingency plans by quinquennial revolutions in weaponry. And though political patterns changed they did so very slowly.

Practically everything has changed in Europe since NATO was created. Stalin, its true begetter, has gone and his system is now joining him. Western Germany, then little more than a no man's land, has arrived as a state. France, then the sick man of Europe, in international affairs, now strides where she used to stumble. Britain, a potential leader of Europe in 1949, cannot even get into the continent by the tradesman's entrance less than two decades later. Western Europe itself, moreover, though still a target, is no longer a temptation. If there are Soviet leaders who think they could take over the West as easily as home grown communists take over a trade union branch their peculiar notions are not even hinted at in public.

NATO has tried hard to adapt itself to the changes which its own existence helped to bring about. It has created a supranational superstructure above its military base and had it been able to develop logically this superstructure would have acquired a powerful life of its own. Politics, unfortunately, is not about logic. It is about interests, about taxes, about cushioning electors against change and about moods rather than thought. The NATO superstructure, therefore, never really got off the drawing board. It has added debating facilities to shape and that is about all.

Yet ideally Britain's major contribution to NATO in the 1970s should be to its political machinery, shadowy though it is at the moment. "We arm to parley," said Churchill of the alliance soon after it was created, and we happen to be rather good at parleying. We can also afford to be realistic about Europe. Nobody in Britain gives a damn about either the Oder-Neisse line or the re-unification of Germany.

Soviet thinking

But before we discuss what the alliance needs and how much of it we ought to contribute, we must take a look at the other side of the hill. It is difficult, of course, for the communist leaders are still trying to make up their minds how much of their own propaganda they should believe. The one clearly defined strand in their thinking, however, is their fear of Germany. It is doubtful whether even the most obscure party official in Omsk really thinks that Western Germany is about to pass into the hands of the neo-Nazi National Democrats and then drag the whole of NATO behind her in a repeat performance of 1941. But the Soviet leaders do fear German influence, no matter how much, in their private deliberations. They discount German power. Even the decay of the Hallstein doctrine and the subsequent approaches to East European countries have reinforced suspicions instead of dissolving them. It may be an irrational fear, but all fears are facts in politics.

The second strand in Soviet thinking, less apparent than the first, is its essential conservatism. Radical thought in the West is busily demolishing such concepts as national sovereignty and the sacredness of boundaries. Not so in the Soviet Union. Pare away the Marxist jargon from any public utterance by a Soviet public figure and you are left with sentiments that Metternich would have applauded and Palmerston would have recognised. The Soviet Union's intentions, as distinct from its capability, are to preserve the status quo as established by their military victories of 1945. This does not mean they will not cause trouble. Palmerston himself was a great artist in stirring things up abroad. Recent moves by the Soviet Union in the Middle East show that they are adept Palmerstonians. Nor does it mean that a future Soviet government, abandoning the cold caution of Kosygin, would resist temptation if...
say, a social collapse somewhere in West Europe offered it.

But whatever permutations of Soviet power we may see in the crystal ball there are two propositions which, though not fashioned out of granite, are sufficiently hard to build on. The first is that if there is no social collapse anywhere in the West there will be no temptation to Moscow. The second is that even if the more deluded Soviet theorists equate, say, student riots with such a collapse there will be no move by Soviet forces over Western frontiers so long as they are manned and, in the military sense, mechanized. How many men and what kind of machines are required to fulfill this requirement has been discussed in NATO for years and is being discussed now. The current discussion, we may be sure, will be inconclusive. NATO Ministers decide what they will collectively provide. Back home in their own parliaments, however, they vote for what their individual countries can afford. It is always less, usually considerably less, than the figure they first thought of in the NATO Council.

As with force levels, so with strategy. It is all very well for NATO ministers to accept, as they did in December 1967, the doctrine of flexible response. It makes sense to be able to fight for a while at any level from skirmishes to set piece battles, holding thermonuclear weapons back as the last shots in the locker. But it does not make sense to individual countries to be nominated by a committee as major conventional battlefields. It makes even less sense to pay out more cash and provide more men in the nineteenth year of the alliance. For, make no mistake about it, if "flexible response" is the thing, then Enoch Powell's ideas as to the strength we need to contribute to Europe are right; and they are very costly ideas indeed. To accept the thesis that no conventional clash will be large scale and no nuclear one prolonged, makes more economic as well as more political sense.

So there is no need to enter into the kind of abstruse calculations that keep Rand Corporation theorists happy and waste millions of man hours at shape. The robust realism of Montgomery is a better guide for Fabians than the virtually incomprehensible equations of the computer strategists. "Rhine army," he said in the House of Lords on 13 March 1968, "can be reduced to a small token force. Personally I should withdraw it altogether. But clearly, for political reasons, we must have something there, though not more, I should hope, than one division. What is essential in Western Europe, it seems to me, is friendship and solidarity between France and Germany. But its aim must not be towards a united Germany, because in that policy lies great trouble."

This suggests we need "something there" more to preserve a balance of power within NATO rather than one within the continent as a whole. The prime reason is, in other words, political; and it is one that remains valid. The military reasons, put quite bluntly, are to ensure that even if one West European state disintegrates socially the rest can still put a military barrier between it and any Soviet leader who wants to take an ideological plunge into Trotskyism and a military plunge into North West Europe. So long as the "something there", taken as a whole, is strong enough to provide a barrier against temptation and flexible enough to carry out internal security tasks it is all that is needed.

The big problem is that generated by the nuclears. It is unlikely to be solved either in the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee or the smaller, and younger, Nuclear Planning Group. In the first place war is still the realm of the intangible and unexpected. "The enemy," said Von Moltke once, "always has three courses of action open to him—the two we have provided for and the one he actually takes." Officers can learn how to rise to command from textbooks and the close study of guidelines: actual command is an art that cannot be codified no matter how high the level at which it is exercised. It is theoretically possible, for instance, that a single tactical nuclear shot could win a battle and end a war. The
precise circumstances in which such a shot would have such an effect could not be worked out in advance nor, in the event, could a quick decision (and tactical decisions have to be quick) be made by a committee. Secondly, since tactical nuclearars are likely to be mere triggers for the strategic nuclearars if any battle goes nuclear, the command and control problem ultimately remains a superpower one. The many attempts to solve it at a lower level, including the sunk nuclear multilateral force and the forgotten Atlantic nuclear force, have enlivened the literature but left the problem where it was.

Command cannot be shared. When the Americans faced the Russians across Cuba they engaged in a deadly game that only two could play. To have had Kennedy’s will weakened by lengthy consultations with America’s allies would have been to concede the game before it had started. The nuclear strategy at that time boiled down to one man’s determination to put his own cities at risk to force his opponent to back down. The single will was the credibility and hence the strategy.

Control is a different matter. To change the terminology, it is crisis management. It is the art of handling things so that, without surrender, you avoid being backed or blackmailed into the corner where the nuclearars are stockpiled. It is the business of convincing the antagonist that he risks a great deal because you intend to risk even more. It is, in a European context, deciding how much of a continent should be destroyed in order to preserve the rest. It is the skilful non-use of nuclearars to back up diplomacy. It can and must be a shared activity. But where is the machinery for the control by Europeans of those nuclearars under the command of Europeans? More specifically, since the British and French deterrents exist, and confer extra bargaining power by existing, through what organisation can this power be distributed to benefit Europe as a whole? It cannot be NATO. It could be Western European Union (WEU), the Six plus Britain.

WEU has waxed and waned over the years according to the uses made of it by its members. It is frequently a talking shop, sometimes a kind of countervailing power to NATO itself, frequently the voice of Western Europe and always, and this is potentially important, an arms control organisation. (The term “control” alters its meaning in this context, but it is not necessary to inject an essay in semantics at this stage of the argument.) It is through WEU that Germany is proscribed from manufacturing nuclear warheads on her own soil. It has experience, limited but valuable, in the techniques of inspection. If arms control becomes, as it must, a major practical aim of the Western alliance then WEU will be propelled to the forefront of European affairs. To add to its functions, moreover, is to signal to the Soviets that a joint control of European commanded nuclearars reduces the danger of miscalculations. For, in Soviet eyes WEU can be seen, though it is not yet seen, as a cage for Germany rather than a launching pad for what they call revanchism.

the third world

There is no need to go into detail about how WEU could work as a custodian of European nuclearars, a vastly different proposition, incidentally, from acting as a midwife for an independent European Nuclear Force. Going too much into detail too far in advance is a vice from which the Labour Party must liberate itself. Fabians should not encourage it. Signposting a path is enough. But the potentialities of WEU are not exhausted if it becomes what the arguments above suggest it could and should become. Stabilising Europe is an end that is also a means. It is outside Europe, in the third world, that real conflict is taking place. The third world in 1968 is like the Balkans in 1914. It is where the powder kegs are stacked and the fuses ready for the matches. Defusing is the first task. It requires economic and political action. A secure Europe is a secure base for combined political, economic and military action outside itself. A strengthened and expanded WEU is the appropriate instrument for such action, in so far as it
has to be concerted action, for it could control and concentrate what is strongest in Europe, politically, economically and militarily.

There is no reason why its membership should stay as it is. As a peace keeping instrument outside Europe, as a channel for combined aid to the third world, as an arms control organisation and a nuclear controlling organisation it should both attract and accept into membership Norway and Denmark and develop a fruitful association with Sweden. These new recruits would not only strengthen it: their membership would be a visible guarantee of the potential importance of its non-military functions.

No military alliance can be permanent. NATO’s greatest achievement, in a sense, will come when it can dissolve itself along with the Warsaw Pact, into an all European security organisation. The time for that is not yet. At this time it is better for the alliance, as such, to keep its collective nose out of individual gropings for agreement between East and West. The alliance’s task is to prepare itself for adaptation to the changed political map of Europe that might be produced by such agreements.

Part of the process of adaptation must be to farm out some of its functions to WEU, which can do the job that Montgomery stated had to be done—to firm up the European pillar of NATO, and at the same time to refashion itself so that it can make a contribution to security outside Europe.
3. arms control and the security of Europe

Elizabeth Young

The arms control context of British defence policy is likely to become more important to us as our strictly military capabilities are reduced. At the same time as the relation between military power and political effectiveness has been growing more and more incausal, the cost of military hardware has been increasing and so has the time it takes to produce it. Military success in the Middle East and military failure in South East Asia in the last year have derived equally little from the quality and number of weapons employed, and equally much from success and failure of intelligence, morale and above all political insight. In time it is to be hoped that the sheer inconvenience and inefficiency of current large scale arms procurements will give way to an international system in better keeping with the world’s requirements than the present one of the alternate stockpile and bloody liquidation of weapons.

In Europe (in Germany and France perhaps rather better than in Britain), the lesson has at last been learnt that the two massive and mutually deterrent military systems, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, cannot themselves solve the problems of Europe’s division. The security both of Western Europe and of Eastern Europe has been successfully maintained under the respective aegis of the two alliances: what there has not been until very recently (and still not at all in the military fields) is any sign of movement such as could get us from here to there: from a static military balance to a more dynamic security process.

Eventually there had to be a European security system, and internally to Europe it must be an arms control system. Externally it will have to provide such security forces as our small but vulnerable continent requires, and what these are will depend on the world situation.

It is worth remembering that the division of Europe, the line down the centre of our continent, has several characters: it divides a people, which will not indefinitely put up with division; it divides a country whose neighbours are highly apprehensive of its re-unification; it is a frontier between the American and Russian spheres of interest established in 1945 and the only land interface of their military systems today; it is the site of a vast agglomeration of military hardware and personnel; at it, and particularly in West Berlin, the Soviet Union is able to apply pressure on the USA and might do so, to relieve American pressure in Vietnam or elsewhere another time. It is in relation to this frontier that West Europeans desire a forward strategy and more or less instant deterrence, and despite that the USA would prefer a defence in depth and a flexible response. To the superpowers it is a frontier of some convenience; to Europe it is a wound kept open by its own military function. Because of this, the multiple character of Europe’s division, all possibility of arms control within Europe depends very largely, and quite directly, on the progress of international agreement on arms control outside Europe, particularly as between the superpowers.

At the moment, the prospects for arms control and disarmament agreements are not particularly good. Neither superpower shows any willingness to submit itself to the constraints each of them wishes to see imposed on others; their own arms race is proliferating in terms of quantity, quality and variety.

obstacles

Clearly the Vietnam war itself has gone a long way to preventing the USA and the Soviet Union from reaching any bilateral agreement on limitation and control, and this impediment is strongly reinforced by their shared but unco-ordinated animosity towards China. The Chinese, however, already accuses the Russians of “allowing” American troops to be transferred from Europe to Vietnam, and of engaging in a “military alliance” and “nuclear monopoly” with the USA; these being deduced from the non-proliferation treaty negotiations, the recently proposed guarantees against nuclear blackmail, and the two countries’ ARM programmes.
There seemed a year ago to be a chance that the USA and the Soviet Union might be prepared to discuss a possible limitation of missile strengths, both offensive and defensive, but the proposal never got off the ground. China’s nuclear programme makes each of them apprehensive, but until American withdrawal from continental Asia, it is difficult to see the Chinese programme being modified. Until the Chinese programme is modified it is difficult to see Indian or Japanese or Australian apprehensions disappear. Equally, until the Soviet Union shows willing to reduce the number of medium range missiles trained on Western Europe it is difficult to envisage anything in the way of a nuclear free zone in Europe or much in the way of nuclear arms control or disarmament.

Again, the possibility of the withdrawal from Europe of American forces, and with them of the American tactical nuclear weapons that form the essential middle rungs of the deterrent ladder in Europe, is something never far from the minds of European defence ministers. This year only some 35,000 American troops are to be withdrawn, but with them apparently are going some 280,000 dependents (including dependents of some troops who will remain) and as far as guaranteeing the American guarantee goes, these dependents are as important as the soldiers. Despite the recent Russian American British proposal for guaranteeing non-nuclear powers against nuclear attack or blackmail, it is clear that “guarantees” are becoming less and less convincing. They are being questioned in Western Europe, just as they have been in Eastern Europe, just as the Americans did under McNamara, could allow “the outer country of the [Warsaw] Treaty [to] become a theatre of war, without sufficient guarantees of nuclear defence... The member states of the Warsaw Treaty may ask questions similar to those which some time ago led de Gaulle to quit NATO” (Prague Home Service, 6 March, 1968). This apprehension is itself a motive for détente; but not necessarily, as we have already seen in Western Europe for de-nuclearisation. We do pay our military for their pessimism and until they can be persuaded that nuclear weapons are not, and can successfully be prevented from ever becoming, relevant to national security (which to a European power means European security) we shall not succeed very far with disarmament, nuclear free zones, or even arms control. The speed, scope and scale of the present United States/Soviet Union arms race demonstrates only too clearly how tortuous and slow a process it is likely to be.

The arms race is a Hydra, and we are, I believe, deluding ourselves if we hope to destroy it one head at a time. Only a package assault makes sense, as the group of non-aligned powers at the Geneva negotiations have pointed out for years.

A list of contents for a plausible first step package has grown up and is now familiar. Its purpose is purely preliminary; to curb further proliferation of nuclear weapons, proliferation being held to include the further vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons in the hands of the present nuclear weapons powers as well as the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands of currently non-nuclear weapons powers. The preliminary package has usually included the following measures:

1. An undertaking by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to others.

2. An undertaking by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against countries which do not possess them.

3. An undertaking to safeguard the security of countries which may be threatened by powers having a nuclear weapons capability or embarking on a nuclear weapons capability.

4. Tangible progress towards disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, a freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, as well as a substantial reduction in the existing stocks of fissile material.
5. An undertaking by non-nuclear powers not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons.

This is a substantial political and military programme and we are still a long way from it in the present non-proliferation negotiations. Indeed an examination of the arms control measures already achieved is dispiriting, their contribution to the real requirements seems so exiguous.

test ban

Thought about arms control as an international security system suddenly accelerated, both in quantity and quality, at the beginning of this decade, and in the time just before the drafting and signature of the Partial Test Ban, it looked as if a step might in fact be taken in that direction. The Partial Test Ban, itself not an arms control measure, might have been such a step if the declarations of intent in its preamble had in fact been followed up. In retrospect it has to be seen, on the one hand as an anti-pollution measure, and on the other as an element in the superpowers' jointly pursued "non-proliferation" policy. This, in effect, has amounted to a desire to prevent horizontal proliferation, while avoiding any restriction on their own vertical proliferation. The Partial Test Ban scarcely impeded the prosecution of the major technological arms race, between the USA and the Soviet Union, because it permitted nuclear testing underground to continue; indeed a promise of such testing was extracted from the Kennedy administration by the Senate as a condition of its acceptance of the Treaty in spite of the undertakings in the preamble to complete the test ban as soon as possible. The Partial Test Ban was not able to attract the signatures of the then nth powers, France and China, whose requirements for nuclear weapons derived from Russian and American possession of nuclear weapons, which, of course, was not affected by the treaty. In the next year or two, as the American ABM programme progresses, there may develop pressure from the American military to abrogate the Partial Test Ban; there is a belief that the Russians in their 1961 series of tests examined the effects of radiation at high altitudes, and thus stole a march on the Americans. It will only be when this pressure commences that the Partial Test Ban will be seen actually to bite on a superpower.

Outer space

The value of the outer space treaty is still obscure, partly because "outer space" is nowhere defined in it, and partly because it is so worded that neither the recently announced Soviet orbital bombing, system nor the American military space bus are held incompatible with it. Insofar as there is no provision made for international inspection, it is unsatisfactory. Whether its language will turn out to be exact enough to prevent national appropriation of the moon's surface remains to be seen.

non-proliferation treaty

The current negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty show a higher degree of sophistication, and co-operation, among most of the nth powers than in the days of the Partial Test Ban. The superpowers' privately negotiated gift horse has been closely examined in the month and found somewhat wanting, including our EFTA colleague Sweden, our EEC friends, Germany and Italy, and India, Rumania, and many others. It is also widely noticed that while the Russian and American joint chairman of the eighteen nation disarmament conference at Geneva were sponsoring identical drafts for a non-proliferation treaty, their governments embarked on ballistic missile defences and on various other new and destabilising forms of nuclear weaponry. At the time of writing the governments of India and of South Africa, both could be proliferators, have announced they will not sign the draft non-proliferation treaty now under discussion at the United Nations. The chief value to the world of the non-proliferation treaty will lie in the pressure it will enable the non-
nuclear weapons powers to exert on the superpowers to bring their own arms race under control, which they now undertake in the text of the treaty to do.

guarantees

Recently there has been a rather conditional Soviet American British offer of “nuclear guarantees” to non-nuclear signatories of the proposed non-proliferation treaty, which in fact scarcely goes beyond what is already in the charter of the UN. The offer has not been greeted as particularly impressive in India, the prime target of the offer. It may not have been observed that all proliferation so far has taken place within alliances where far stronger and more plausible guarantees obtained than are now being proposed. Indeed for India to accept specific guarantees from the United States and the Soviet Union might well turn her into something of a pawn in Sino-Soviet or Sino-American disputes: embattled powers are not well placed to offer protection to others. Nor, of course, are outgoing American administrations, whose undertakings, unless in the form of treaties ratified by the Senate, do not bind their successors.

Apart from this general implausibility (and conceivable danger) there is the possibility that the superpowers might be tempted to claim exemption from arms control and disarmament measures on the grounds that their nuclear weapons were necessary to protect the world from Chinese threats. It would probably be inadvisable in any way to legitimate United States or Soviet Union animosity towards China.

underground test ban

It is possible that in the next few months the question of the underground test ban will become active again. The Soviet Union mentioned it recently as an example of what could follow the signature of the present non-proliferation treaty draft. (Why it should not accompany the non-proliferation treaty was not made clear). The present United States administration is unlikely to welcome this: the Atomic Energy Commission has recently announced a much enlarged underground test programme, presumably in connection with the ABRM system.

Certain aspects of article V of the current non-proliferation treaty draft, which deals with the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, might conflict with an internationally controlled underground test ban. The non-proliferation treaty has not been designed to plug straight into a complete test ban.

no first use declaration

Of the five nuclear powers, only China has so far made a declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons or no use against non-nuclear weapon powers.

curb on strategic missiles

The US has recently again referred favourably to the possibility of Russian American talks about a curb on the numbers of strategic missiles, both offensive and defensive. The astonishingly swift doubling of Russian numbers in the last year or so, and recent slowing down of activity on the ABRM defence sites around Moscow could perhaps be seen as making such a curb more likely. Mr. Clark Clifford’s testimony that he favours American missile superiority may have been no more than a courteous gesture towards the Senate’s hawks.

additional measures

Now for some measures which, because of their urgency, should be added to the preliminary package.

Non-militarisation of the sea bed. One such measure is the non-militarisation of the sea bed. The fact that both the Soviet Union and the US consider Mr. Pardo’s (of Malta) proposal in the General Assembly for non-militarisation and internationalisation “premature” is not in
itself enough to arouse suspicion; however, both are carrying on massive oceanographic research, and it is clear that the militarisation of the deep sea is only a matter of time. The law of the sea bed is at present a mess, and it would be as well to have a UN resolution and declaration on, particularly, non-militarisation, to tide us over until an acceptable code can be devised and enforced. There can probably be prevention: cure might be impossible.

Control of the international arms trade (both in first and second-hand weapons). This is at present a growth industry of noticeable vigour, and American balance of payments problems may further reduce the State Department’s control over the Pentagon’s zeal in selling arms. Among other prospects the State Department has forecast the arrival out of NATO on to the second hand market of some 7,000 only rather obsolescent tanks within the next three years: enough to furnish several Sinai campaigns.

Biological and chemical weapons. Here are two areas of weaponry, in each of which there have been recent technical advances, and which are at present controlled only by the 1925 Geneva convention (not ratified by the USA) and by our instinctive distaste and horror. This latter instinct has combined with official secrecy and the sheer danger to keep these forms of warfare out of sight, out of mind, and out of informed discussion. General Lord Monkton, recently Chief of Staff, Rhine Army, has said that there are in Europe large quantities of equipment for biological and chemical warfare, on both sides, and that we should be even more concerned about this than about nuclear weapons. The international scientific community which has discussed and ventilated the problems and dangers of nuclear warfare has only recently begun to discuss biological and chemical warfare. Up till now the dangers and problems have been evaluated almost exclusively by those who see no harm in working secretly on these matters. But this situation is now changing. A government whose policies on disarmament and Vietnam have remained relatively unscathed even by well informed criticism, would do well to preempt agitation in this field by developing policies which will both seem just to those likely to agitate, and in fact be so.

International inspection

The question of international openness is of the very greatest importance to the whole concept and possibility of arms control and disarmament. One of the faults of the current non-proliferation treaty draft is that the nuclear powers are exempted from all inspection; equally there is no inspection required by the space treaty. Perhaps even more alarming is the suggestion made by Mr. Paul Warnke, a senior official at the American Department of Defence, that should Russian-American talks on missile strengths start, “we hope to avoid bogging down in the perennially difficult issue of international inspection”. International inspection is certainly difficult, but no system of arms control or disarmament will command, or deserve, the confidence of governments unless inspection is evidently effective and internationally monitored. For the superpowers to hope otherwise is naive; the purpose of any arms control and disarmament system is to provide security, and governments will be as responsible to their peoples for the effectiveness of these security measures as they are today for the effectiveness of the country’s military forces. It would not be acceptable to the world community merely to take the word of the superpowers that they had reduced the number of their ICBM’s or ABM’s. This will necessarily be true in all fields of arms control and disarmament.

I have not discussed the unilateral renunciation by this country of nuclear weapons, although there are sometimes still calls for this, particularly in the context of the non-proliferation treaty. They come from parties as diverse as Mr. George Ball (a possible Secretary of State to a possible President Humphrey), Sir Anthony Buzzard, and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Denis Healey has pointed out that “None of our European
friends would wish there to be no European power, or for France to be the only one, which has nuclear weapons”. He has also pointed out that none of the could be proliferators “is concerned with whether we have nuclear weapons or not; some are concerned with whether the Russians or Chinese have them, some may be concerned with whether the Americans have them”. In short our renunciation of nuclear weapons today would not assist non-proliferation. Nor have I discussed the recently rather fashionable topic of “crisis management”, partly because it is part of the everyday business of government and not logically separable from it, but also because of a suspicion that by the time a crisis has declared itself to be such, it is often too late to “manage” it. “Crisis identification” and “crisis avoidance” are enormously much more important.

It is certainly our business to promote any real process of disarmament. It is not our business to study the convenience of the technological arms race by attempting to push through the international community a non-proliferation treaty that it does not find satisfactory, or, if one is passed, by failing to put what pressure we can on the superpowers to put a curb on their arms race. It would be against both our own local interest and against that of the Europe we have always belonged to and are now committed to, to do anything to perpetuate or exacerbate the division of Europe and the technological arms race does perpetuate and exacerbate that division. It seems reasonable to suggest that if the non-proliferation treaty is signed, its ratification should be made contingent on an underground test ban being also agreed and signed; and that its continuance in force should be directly and explicitly geared to further progress in disarmament. After all there is more immediate danger to us all from the nuclear weapons already in existence than from those that the Swedes, the Germans, and the Indians have said they do not wish to acquire.

It may seem perverse to recommend progress yet more deliberate in this area of already extreme sloth. The issue, however is that halting the arms race and agreeing not to proliferate are two sides of one coin and we shall be ill advised to try to split it down the middle.

a European security system

The complexity of a world wide arms control system coupled with the unlikelihood of such a system being negotiated in the near future, suggests that we shall have to combine several approaches to the business of substituting a European security system for the present arrangement of opposed military alliances. There is wide official support in all parts of Europe for eventually convening a “European security conference”, but it is clear that Europe’s new security garment can only be made up when the various pieces of the pattern are ready to be put together. The security conference cannot start from scratch; its purpose will be to declare and confirm that the new system is viable, and that the previous one can safely be dismantled or put in mothballs.

A number of questions pose themselves, to which there can be no absolute answers. Who should the participants in a European security system be? What role, other than that of victors of 1945 making a peace treaty with Germany, should the superpowers play? What about the Soviet Union, only some of whose constituent republics are European? How should the security system relate to other relationships, institutional and informal, political and economic, in Europe? What about the two military alliances, and national military forces, including British and French nuclear weapons? For this country, the question also arises, how does our EEC application relate to the construction of this wider European system?

Each of the superpowers has at various times tried to marshal its alliance into a coherent negotiating position about all this. The European allies on each side (except for East Germany and Bulgaria) have displayed a surely sound instinct in preferring to discuss these matters tête-à-tête.
tête, to construct the pieces of the eventual European ensemble bilaterally or in small groups, rather than in the presence of the extra European superpowers. The purpose of these discussions after all is to discover, and positively to accentuate, what we, as Europeans, have in common, not what, as members of opposed alliances, we have against each other.

Only a few years ago, there seemed to be a real choice for the nations of Western Europe between becoming a sort of supra-national state within what Chancellor Kiesinger has called a “North Atlantic imperium”; and keeping open and nourishing the possibility of some wider and eventually more independent arrangement which could include the perfectly European nations beyond the iron curtain.

For a variety of reasons we have effectively chosen, and are now embarked on, the second course. But we do not have till the end of time to complete this desirable evolution: the problem posed by the division of the German nation may well become acute within the next five or ten years, when power will increasingly be falling to a generation in no way responsible for Hitler or Nazism. How, at one and the same time, to permit the reunification of the German people while anchoring their institutions to the satisfaction of their neighbours, is the key to Europe’s future. The Soviet Union’s granite like refusal to recognise this could in time result in a drastic reduction in Russian influence in central Europe: better relations with Western Germany has so far been a first step in a new foreign policy for Moscow’s growingly independent allies. Unless controlled and mitigated, Soviet intransigence and neo-Nazi intransigence will reinforce each other, and the Eastern Europeans should now begin to put pressure on their large ally to avoid this.

The Russian government will be tempted to drag its own feet, as well as those of its more obedient allies, over the institutional arrangements, particularly the defence arrangements, of the eventual European system, largely out of apprehension over the attraction it will exert on its own non-Russian European republics. The current triumph of Slovak national feeling must be at least as alarming to the Russian leaders as the Czechoslovak triumph of free speech and historical accuracy.

For the time being there is almost unlimited scope for increase and expansion in economic, political, financial and cultural exchange among the nations and the existing groupings of Europe, and it is in this way that the European fabric will be made. But as long as the Soviet-American arms race continues, and as long probably as China too is in pursuit of nuclear superpower, there will not be much opportunity for military change as such in Europe. Alliances and national military forces, more or less co-ordinated, are likely to remain. It must be our joint concern, both East and West, to ensure that Europe, although presenting a thoroughly unattractive target to possible aggressors, should do so as unprovocatively as Sweden or Switzerland. We must ensure this within our own alliances for the time being and also we must ensure that our major allies are never tempted to pursue their private rivalry at Europe’s expense. Eventually, as they realise that their military presence inside our continent is unimportant, they will withdraw it. To hasten this day, when a European security conference can announce Europe’s military neutrality except in the service of the United Nations, we should never forget how closely connected are European integration and the cessation of the technological arms race.
4. new tasks for the forces

Tam Dalyell

For the pacifist the world is fairly simple. He can advocate the run down of armed forces without regard to awkward problems such as morale, recruitment and minimum effective size, below which a force ceases to be a force at all.

However, if one believes in the requirement for some credible defence of the homeland, and in European security, a practical policy is far from simple. Unless we start from a position of being pacifists, having no truck with armed forces of any kind, those of us who have been advocating withdrawal from East of Suez and the Middle East are under a pressing obligation to make clear just how we do propose to face up to the consequences to the forces that flow from these decisions.

If a government wishes to maintain a viable army, navy and air force in an "end of empire" situation, urgent consideration must be given to the structure and exact nature of the forces and to the interests of the serviceman. For example, is it realistic any longer to go on thinking about a service career in terms of the major part of a life-time in the forces? Perhaps it would be better if a man assumed as a matter of course that his service career would come to an end by his early thirties, and that it was part of an integrated pattern, in which he would be trained for appropriate posts in civilian life.

A trend along these lines would involve a constructive attitude towards the reserves. Here there is a need to dispel the prevailing myth that every soldier must have a far more thorough tactical and technical training than ever before. In fact, because of technical advance, and a bias towards replacement rather than repair of weapons and parts of weapons, the degree of expertise and practice required may often be less than it used to be. Hence, it is more realistic to put reliance on a concept of reserve forces.

For it is very doubtful whether, given the requirement in the latest Defence Review, the state will be able to offer men an attractive future, based on the characteristic lengths of service that obtain today.

the past

For, mistaken though the fundamental political objectives may often have been, the fact remains that ever since 1945 British forces have had some kind of job to do, be it in Malaya, Cyprus, Guyana, Aden, Borneo, or some other trouble spot. These episodes have provided opportunities for training and for doing one's professional job in earnest. They have also provided a raison d'être for being a soldier.

The decisions of January 1968 have altered all this. For it now looks as if a Labour government will never again embark on this kind of unilateral post colonial exercise, however justified it may look at first. For example, should trouble break out in Fiji it would be doubtful whether a British military force would be sent. Two years ago, or even a year ago, had such a situation occurred, the hypothesis would have been that a task force would have been despatched.

What is more, as some discerning senior officers have now become aware, such a different attitude is not confined to the actions and thinking of the Labour Party. The truth is dawning that, whatever noises some of the Tory Party in Parliament might make, and whatever the tone of speeches at the Monday Club, another Tory government would probably be no less reluctant to become involved in a unilateral adventure. A situation is thus created whereby we need forces, who none the less are increasingly unlikely to see active service, except as members of a UN contingent.

It can be legitimately argued that the concept of "availability for UN tasks" can mean anything or nothing according to the basic attitudes of the user of the phrase. In this context it is salutary for "cheap armed forces—pass the buck to the UN" school of thought to be reminded that the biggest campaign since 1945 has been the operation in Korea. All
sorts of debating points can be made for or against the likelihood of a requirement for a substantial British UN force. It is sufficient in this context to observe that hopefully never again will a British government wish to participate in an overwhelmingly Anglo-American UN force—if there is to be British participation let it merely be in proportion to our wealth and position as a member of the UN and of its Security Council. Given such a limited horizon, who is going to devote even half a lifetime to service in such circumstances?

**morale and recruitment**

If all that one can offer is “action in the event of circumstances as yet unforeseen and ill defined”, it really is doubtful whether a country could maintain service morale, let alone attract sufficient recruits. Indeed, by the summer of 1968 the recruiting figures are little short of alarming. A situation could indeed develop where in order to maintain much of a force at all one would be obliged to introduce selective recruitment on a conscript basis. The political palatability of such measures can be left to the imagination.

Concern about the number of potential recruits leads to a question that is more real than a debating point or riddle. When is a force not a force? At what minimum point do services cease to have any credibility at all? Being dewy eyed or super optimistic on these matters is counter productive. It is better to try to come to terms with the new situation that exists.

It is against this background that certain questions must be discussed. Can we gear our services to a dual civilian and military existence? Is it realistic to talk in terms of the services performing tasks at home, which have hitherto been alien to their nature and function? No claim is made for originality as the 1967 Defence white paper included a paragraph along these lines, and senior officers, such as General Sir Derek Lang, present GOC Scottish Command, have been active advocate of such thoughts inside the Ministry of Defence.

**a role for the army**

The first difficulty is that men do not join the army to build roads or help with the hay in the Scottish Highlands. However, there are many situations where a positive response is required, and there is no feeling, “They’re making work to keep us occupied”. The contrast should not be between soldiering in Aden or Borneo and doing a civil task in Britain, but between doing a constructive civil task in Britain or abroad and living a not obviously purposeful existence at Aldershot or Catterick. Given the choice between a campaign abroad and training at home, most professional soldiers would normally choose to go abroad. This is not the choice that faces us. The real choice is between constructive tasks and doing not very much in particular, perhaps for long periods at home.

Little reluctance if any shows itself where troops are asked to counter a self-evident emergency such as oil from the Torrey Canyon on the Cornish beaches, or hurricane damage in central Scotland. The fact is that in the early stages of the clean up in the aftermath of the hurricane, the army provided a service to the community that could not have been provided from other sources. Difficulty might arise when the need is for the performance of less dramatic tasks. Perhaps one criterion should be whether there is a training element in the task to be undertaken. Any notion of simply using troops to do civilian jobs because it was cheaper would rightly be resented by the trade unions. The reaction of the trade unions to these concepts is, in fact, not nearly as hostile as might be supposed. Most trade union officials are appalled at the size of the defence bill, yet regard forces as necessary, and concede that per man the services are dramatically more costly than they were even a few years ago.

In these circumstances, and in the absence of direct job fluxes, in areas of
underemployment, they tend to be acquiescent.

If it is necessary for the army to practice bridge building, surely it is better to leave some permanent structure of use to the community rather than spend time on Salisbury Plain digging holes and filling them again. Indeed, a little ingenuity should make it possible to introduce a training element into most tasks, even cleaning out fifty years of dirt and grime in cow sheds in the aftermath of the foot and mouth epidemic. This exercise provided an opportunity for testing field equipment and mobile laundries, and most people are agreed that the servicemen set about this disagreeable task with remarkable cheerfulness. For example, what one can't do is ask the servicemen to help farmers as a matter of routine. There are comparatively few novel tasks that cannot be tackled by a disciplined force, subject to the oversight of a comparatively few skilled personnel.

The enormous resources of the forces to back up any operation can be overlooked. Is it generally realized, for example, that the army possesses easily the most efficient system of containerised transport facilities in the North of England and Scotland? The forces really do have the potential flexibility required for most tasks. Such facilities should be made available on a commercial basis.

Retraining is part of the life of the modern officer and the modern NCO. Already the modern officer must spend an average of 7½ years out of his working life on a retraining course of some kind; he is in effect retrained three times during his working life. As any Member of Parliament who is available to his constituents in a development area knows, the question "retraining for what?" has got to be answered. It is counter productive and an injury to the morale of individuals if a man who has undergone a course in retraining then fails to achieve a post appropriate to his effort.

Therefore, there would have to be coherent plans involving the creation — there is already a nucleus — of an even more highly educated officer class liaising closely with the various parallel professions and trades in civilian life. Specifically, the Ministry of Technology should make haste with its thinking on the subject of how the forces could be used to train and improve the social status of engineers. This could evolve into an "anti brain drain" measure. To those who doubt the practicability of such a proposition, it might be pointed out that part of the reason why France alone among the nations of the West has something approaching a sufficiency of engineers arises from precisely such a synchronisation of engineering training between military and civil life.

the training of young people

Mr. Alex Dickson, founder of Voluntary Service Overseas, is keen that the army should also be responsible for tasks which would involve large numbers of young people, in relation to the numbers of soldiers required to provide leadership. "Better," he says. "that a task be done less than efficiently by 100 soldiers and 400 young people, than more tidily by 200 soldiers." This is a refinement of the general argument that is worthy of serious consideration. If properly managed, such schemes could be a sound educational proposition; though how keen young people might be in cleaning Britain's inland waterways under military supervision might be open to speculation. The leadership would have to be first rate. Initial experimentation could be based on the foundation of experience gained by those schools which have cadet forces.

At this point in the argument two reservations should be laid bare First, the number of schemes that can be usefully undertaken by the services in Britain is not wide. Suggestions should be seen in the light of useful work, rather than as a panacea to all problems. For example, educational and youth service schemes involving the forces are at the acorn stage, and it will be a long time before we can hope to see an oak tree. Secondly, desirable as the "peaceful" employment
of the army may be in the coming years, officers and men, in view of the great reduction that should take place in their numbers, will have to maintain a very high standard of military training. So, in its military role as well as in its civilian role, the army should welcome the trend of Denis Healey's thinking about its role overseas.

use of the army overseas

There is, in fact, little doubt that the prospect of overseas travel has been a major element in recruiting young men into the forces; and the Defence Secretary has clearly taken account of this by preparing elaborate plans for overseas training periods in the future, during and after withdrawals from the Far or Middle East. The overseas training programme will serve in part as a compensatory factor for withdrawal of permanent garrisons.

In these circumstances it would seem sensible and realistic to consider whether units with particular skills or aptitudes could not take part in the development programmes of certain developing countries. It might be easiest in countries where the army is already partly responsible for such development as is taking place. This line of thought would have to be pursued with some care, as there are many areas of the world in which the presence of white troops would outweigh the economic advantages to a developing economy. For example, in some areas of the world, it would be fruitful and perhaps necessary for men to dress other than in standard military uniform.

An issue that flows from this line of thought is whether the present battalion regimental system of forces organisation can be adapted to new circumstances.

On balance, there does seem to be a certain virtue in retaining names such as the Lancashire Fusiliers, Greenjackets or Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders which evoke emotional loyalties. There is no self-evident reason why tasks well performed in helping the economy of developing countries should not be regarded as successful regimental tours of duty, if not as battle honours.

It is not stretching the imagination to the point of inviting ribaldry to suggest that the young recruit, officer or other rank to the services would view a development task well performed, as interesting and a boost to self-esteem. In fact, such a prospectus of civil and purposeful exercises abroad might well do something to mitigate the need for high material inducements, which would inevitably be the only alternative method of attracting recruitments to the service of a necessarily higher calibre than hitherto.

The Government's present plans for overseas training visits to countries such as Ghana, Canada, and Australia, seem worthy of applause. The land shortage situation in the United Kingdom makes it more and more difficult to provide adequate space. Besides, in view of even a potentially limited United Nations commitment, troops must have experience of extremes of temperature. Facilities in the Canadian cold and the sweltering heat of Northern Australia would appear to be especially valuable. This is not to suggest that one should necessarily endorse the idea of a permanent Australian training base.

In some ways the problems facing the navy and the air force are not so very different from those confronting the army. The integration of career structure with civilian opportunity is parallel. The requirement for purposeful training is the same. The problems posed by the need for a higher degree of professional training are as acute in relation to the reduced manpower of each service.

the role of the navy

While at first glance it may appear that the potential role of the navy in civil work is more limited than that of land forces, this may not in fact be the case.

The beginning of development of the marine environment will be one of the
major events of the 1970s, certainly as far as the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned. In the USA in June, 1967, I had a half hour interview with Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, solely related to the American marine science programme. The fact that the Vice-President sees fit to be personally active and informed as Chairman of his country's Marine Sciences Council is in itself something of an indication of the importance attached by Americans to the development of the resources of the ocean. While it is true that private firms such as General Electric, Westinghouse, General Dynamics, Lockheed, and North American Aviation have each sunk over 100 million dollars worth of their own money into marine research, the real boost to progress comes from the Federal Government who, in successive years, have put 330 million dollars, 390 million dollars, and 470 million dollars into the marine science programme.

Any significant British project or contribution to an international project on the basis of the Maltese proposal at the UN would, necessarily, depend on government resources. In these circumstances, it would seem sensible to expand in those activities where the navy already has a scientific interest, for example, in hydrography or in meteorology. Naval weather ships have a high reputation for giving sound facts to the Meteorological Office. With the coming of computers, much more detailed weather forecasting is made possible, and a greater volume of fact can be digested. One current need is for tighter coverage of the area west of Ireland from which area most of our British weather comes.

To what extent the navy should become involved on the fringes of production of mineral extraction is debatable. But basic research for this could well be a navy task.

Deperately urgent is the whole bleak prospect facing the fishing industry. A survey of figures over the last five years shows not only a dramatic reduction in the catch obtained in near fishing grounds, but the results of overfishing in the traditional rich areas off Newfoundland, Bear Island and Iceland. It is not too wild to suggest that the navy has a role not only in an expanded fishery protection and regulation service, but in the development of fish farming too.

A quick and valid answer to the cynics is that, unless such action is undertaken by somebody, the world's fishing areas will become more depleted at the very time when the human population is increasing.

Here again, the Government deserve credit. In March 1968 the Minister of Defence (equipment) opened a seminar on deep diving technology at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, attended by representatives of the services, naval and scientific, the academic world, and industry. This conference could be the beginning of a new line of development for the navy in time of peace.

One not unimportant by product of the naval participation in a British Marine Science programme is the potential liaison between naval personnel and industrial firms, which could better fit them for technical posts after leaving their service career (see Hansard, 11 December 1967).

the role of the RAF

Much of what has been said in relation to the desirability of army and naval personnel becoming integrated during their service careers with civilian industry applies with equal or even more force to the RAF. In an air force, however small, in which the job is increasingly to be able to manipulate complex systems rather than simply to fly aircraft, the scope for transfer of skills is huge. Already a small number of serving officers are attached to the Ministry of Technology defence contract project teams at working level. There is a great deal to be said for serving RAF officers and NCOs (who are of higher technical calibre than ever before) spending a lot of time working in industry.

The House of Commons Select Commit-
tee on Science and Technology are currently looking at the problem of qualified scientists and engineers in defence research establishments. What has become only too obvious is that the technology of systems in a military sense is closely associated with (and crucial to the innovation rate of) the rest of advanced civil technology. When weapons were simple, there was not much research and development fall out. Now that weapons and their production have become complex operations, it really is quite sensible to propose that a significant proportion of a smaller but technically qualified RAF should spend, as a matter of course, up to one third of their service career actually working on the development and production side of industry.

This select committee investigation is of crucial importance to the future of British industry. Equally, the RAF should continue to train pilots, navigators and other flying personnel and rather specifically and consciously organise itself in relation to the needs of the airlines. An integrated service between RAF and BEA/BOMC involving for example a coherent pension and insurance scheme might do something towards staunching the flow of British pilots draining away towards the United States airlines.

Royal Defence College

Although plans for the Royal Defence College have been postponed, a visit to Shrivenham reveals what potential exists for expanding the excellent facilities and the skill of the staff who work there. So does a visit to the Royal Naval College at Greenwich.

It would be no giant stride to create two military, technical, industrial post graduate universities of a novel kind. At Greenwich and at Shrivenham, academic, military institutions could emerge where joint civil and military training in advanced technology could be developed. The increasing number of civilian students constitutes a good start by showing a path in which civilians are being trained in what is essentially a military environment.

Conclusion

Some of these ideas will be alien and unwelcome to a great many serving officers and men. Equally a great many servicemen may not be averse to a radical change in the forces as they have known them. The choice, however, is not between the traditional service life and the kind of argument deployed here. It is between accepting this train of thought and on the other hand having forces that few men of calibre would wish to join, unless compelled to do so. At the same time, such an approach points the way to harnessing the military, industrial complex for civil and development ends, while retaining the defence capability required by people who are in general agreement with the assumptions posited by the authors of this Fabian tract.
5. Britain’s task in peace-keeping

Andrew Wilson

Peace keeping is an imprecise and overworked word in the military vocabulary. It can become totally discredited if used to describe operations intended simply to protect national interests overseas from the effects of political change. More genuinely peace keeping means first the encouragement of peaceful adjustment to political realities, and only secondly the use of force to contain or prevent armed conflict that could lead to general war. Britain shares with other countries an interest in, and obligation for, this kind of peace keeping, wherever it may be possible.

In the past Britain has ostensibly contributed to a form of peace keeping by a system of wide ranging commitments intended to promote “stability”. In general, operations in support of these commitments have been conducted with skill and restraint. (The Borneo operations were an outstanding example). But to the extent that “stability” was identified with the status quo, the commitments themselves too often merely hindered the process of political adjustment and, notably in South Arabia, caused more unrest and bloodshed than would otherwise have been the case.

A majority of these unilateral commitments are now being terminated or redefined for financial and economic reasons. But this still leaves Britain with formal extra European commitments to SEATO and CENTO, as well as obligations to Commonwealth members, including, under modified arrangements, Malaysia and Singapore. It is doubtful whether SEATO and CENTO have ever served more than a symbolic military purpose; and Britain might now acquire greater influence as a peace maker by leaving them than by continuing an ambiguous commitment for which, at least in the case of SEATO, she lacks the will, and will soon lack the resources to fulfil.

Some of our peace keeping obligations in respect of Commonwealth countries cannot be so lightly dismissed. (An example is the obligation to support Zambia against military threats from Rhodesia.) But it could be argued that we owe these obligations as much in our capacity as members of the community of nations as in that of our membership of an increasingly divided Commonwealth.

It is, in fact, from membership of the international community that all our obligations stem; and the decision to withdraw militarily into Europe (correct as it is from a strategic and economic point of view) would be a short sighted abdication if it led to the disregard of our wider responsibilities.

The framework

What the withdrawal from East of Suez obliges us for the first time to do is to ask what capability we should retain for overseas peace keeping, and the ways in which this capability can properly be exercised. The chief framework within which we may be called upon to undertake international peace keeping operations is that of the UN. Our withdrawal from both colonial and post colonial entanglements should in time make us welcome participants in various types of UN operations from which we have hitherto been excluded. (Our participation in the Cyprus operation is a hopeful sign.) The British armed forces have experience and technical skills which the UN badly needs. But it would be unrealistic, in view of the difficulties raised by many UN members towards peace keeping operations in the past, to suppose that such operations will be undertaken regularly or as often as circumstances require. We may therefore receive calls to participate in other kinds of collective peace keeping operations outside the UN. It is, of course, impossible to pre-judge the nature of such calls. But they will need to be rigorously examined if we are to avoid involvement in the suspect and self defeating kind of “peace keeping” operation undertaken by the USA and its allies in Vietnam.

The resources which Britain can offer in peace keeping are already considerable, without the need to set up specialised units. The chief demand in any UN opera-
tion is liable to be for logistic and technical assistance. In this respect RAF Transport Command is well placed to help with its new fleet of medium, long range C-130s. The Royal Navy can offer sea lift. The army can offer signals and engineer units either from home based forces or from BAOR. (NATO has never raised difficulties about the detachment of units for peace keeping operations, for example, to Cyprus.)

The use of combat forces, particularly infantry units, in peace keeping operations, requires a special kind of disciplined restraint for which the British army has earned a high reputation. Training for international “police” operations must continue to have an important place in the Army's training programme. To maintain an effective peace keeping capability, it will also be necessary to conduct active training overseas. In this connection every opportunity should be taken to extend present arrangements for overseas training visits, particularly to Commonwealth countries with old ties of friendship and a wide variety of climate and terrain. Such visits whether at company, battalion or brigade level, will serve better than anything else to demonstrate our military flexibility without binding us, as formerly, to commitments beyond our resources.

At home a bold initiative could meanwhile be taken in the organisation of peace keeping staff courses, open to military officers of other UN member countries. Such courses, which might one day form the basis of a UN staff college, could standardise staff procedures for national forces liable to be thrown together suddenly in ad hoc peace keeping contingents. It must be stressed, however, that the opportunities for military peace keeping are inevitably limited, and that the logical extension of the argument for localising armed conflict is that it is better if possible to forestall its outbreak.

It requires no special insight to see the formidable threats to peace likely to arise in the near future from a variety of socio-economic conditions. Among these are world hunger, the growing gap in wealth between rich nations and poor, and the dependence of primary producing countries on a precariously fluctuating commodity market. In particular, approaching famine in many parts of the world might be seen as an even graver threat to peace than the accumulation of nuclear armaments. These are areas in which effort could be devoted to peace keeping of the most practical kind. For the threats are in most cases measurable, and the remedies necessary to counter them are clear. Such effort can be justified by self interested considerations of long term security, quite apart from the obvious moral considerations.

As a start, Britain should set an intelligent example by applying means now devoted to the analysis of military problems to the analysis of problems presented by broader threats to peace. (The resources of the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment at Byfleet might well be enlisted for this purpose.) Using case studies, field research, political military games and other operational research techniques, analysis should be made of the nature, dimensions, and immediacy of such threats; of the feasibility and cost of programmes to reduce them; and, as far as may be possible, of the comparative effectiveness of political economic, as opposed to precautionary military measures, to alleviate them.

In particular, analysis should be made of the opportunities for using military resources, including manpower, for civic action overseas, which apart from its practical purposes could serve to identify the armed forces with the population they serve both at home and abroad. Such action could include engineering work (for which the recent road building project of the Royal Engineers in Thailand sets a precedent), instructional assistance in health and educational programmes (in which the French army, for example, has done pioneer work), and the generous offer of forces, including RAF and naval units, for relief work in natural calamities.

The crux of the problem, however, is to
achieve a balance between military and overseas development spending, currently in a ratio of ten to one. For this it is essential to establish a closer relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Overseas Development, and to end the competition for funds between the two which, if the broader threats to peace are acknowledged, is as anachronistic as that formerly existing between the three armed services. Indeed, there are strong arguments for establishing a common budget for the two departments and making them the responsibility of a single minister—perhaps the only way of dramatising the immediacy of threats to peace other than those conventionally considered.

Here the psychological causes of conflict enter into question, together with the social, political and economic factors already mentioned. Case studies could be made of conflicts such as the Indonesian confrontation and the Cyprus dispute with which we ourselves have been deeply involved. Simulation exercises could be conducted of both real and hypothetical conflict situations, and analysed from all relevant angles. Use could be made (and practical support given) to other conflict research studies already being undertaken in a number of British universities. While such studies must for some time to come appear largely theoretical, they may, in some cases, provide insights of immediate and practical value in planning for future contingencies.

Such a broadening of the concept of peace keeping would not only accord with the realities of the world situation and Britain’s ability to contribute to its amelioration), but could also prove indispensable if the defence programme is to command popular support in the years ahead.
A paradox that has to be reckoned with is that the abandonment of the "independent world role" has certain implications that are especially disconcerting for the Labour Party. For the Labour Party has always felt strongly that peace is indivisible and been anxious that Britain exercise a positive influence wherever it is threatened. The left is also likely to find especially painful the compromises and adjustments that may be required of an industrial trading nation that finds itself in greater need than it once was of alliances that may help to maintain its influence and guarantee its security. In practice, moreover, the Labour Party has often reflected that curious blend of insularity and internationalism that has formed the basis of Britain's traditional attitude towards the rest of mankind. It will not find it easy to adjust itself to the prospect of "European Britain".

So what this pamphlet has sought to do is to reconsider Britain's contribution towards her own security and that of others in the light of her climacteric decision to withdraw her military presence East of Suez. Its authors have worked from the conviction that the presentation of a spectrum of Fabian opinion would be more healthy and more instructive than an attempt to organise some kind of consensus. Perhaps this makes it especially significant that, whenever the various sections impinge on each other, they display a large measure of accord.

Recent developments in the United States and Europe have underlined the fact that the international system has become more fluid and complex than ever before. An awareness that this is so has affected all the contributors to this pamphlet and led them to eschew the simple dichotomies that dominated discussion of security questions for far too long. So unilateral nuclear disarmament is not seen as the sole alternative to independent nuclear deterrence. General and complete disarmament has not been treated as the only means of escape from the crude and fragile system of deterrence and containment. Involvement in Europe is not assumed to depend upon full and unconditional acceptance of the Treaty of Rome. Nor is it thought automatically to imply an abnegation of all responsibility for the security of more distant regions.

Above all, however, emphasis is laid on the growing interpenetration of civil and military affairs. Both economic aid and a capacity for military intervention are regarded as essential to the promotion of peace and security throughout the world at large. The political prevention of crises is accorded the same priority as their military resolution. Another need that seems to us important, now that our troops are marching home, is an appraisal of the structure and motivation now appropriate for the British armed services and of their relations with the civil population.

Neville Brown introduces the discussion with a sombre prognosis for a world, the peace and freedom of which he sees as endangered as never before by the formidable and interrelated threats of widespread economic stagnation and military technological advance. His contention that the influence of Western Europe within this environment will depend upon its achieving some measure of collective and exclusive solidarity is endorsed by Raymond Fletcher who goes on to show how valuable the existing machinery might be in this connection. Mr Fletcher's essay also demonstrates the growing irrelevancy of neat tactical and strategic doctrines to a European balance of power that is becoming ever more unstable and multilateral.

Elizabeth Young has shown how interdependent arms control measures are, not only with each other, but also with the political and economic integration of Europe, both East and West. Most of the arms control theories still prevailing were formed in the days of the cold war and the two great alliances, and so are dangerously anachronistic. Work on the non-proliferation treaty should be followed by measures which will contain and reverse the technological arms race between the superpowers: an arms race which threatens the future of mankind in
general and, in particular, stultifies the
hopes of Europe.

Ian Dalyell and Andrew Wilson concern
themselves predominantly with the
role of Britain’s armed forces in the new
national context. Mr Wilson considers
how much, and how little, there is in the
concept of international peace keeping
and explores its several aspects. His call
for a synoptic view of the whole ques-
tion will be welcomed by all those who
have felt uneasy about the way in which
has tended to be parcelled between
various government departments and dif-
ferent academic specialisms. Mr Dalyell
seals with the services’ own adjustment to
the end of empire, a problem that has so
far received quite inadequate public at-
tention. His topic will not be to the taste
of those for whom the army is an “un-
touching” that must never be discussed until
some dreaded enemy has reached the
channel ports. But such appraisals are
necessary if we are ever to obtain value
for money in defence and if, indeed, the
military are to be treated with the kind
of consideration that other sections of
the economy have come to expect during
times of contraction and change.

Here are, we feel, some good reasons
for being sanguine about the new situ-
ation in which Britain finds herself. For
the past twenty years, in particular, the
presses and strains of imperial decline
have been continuous and severe. So on
the left, as elsewhere, political discussion
has almost always been dominated by
some urgent dilemma in the field of de-
fence or overseas policy. The result has
usually been the worst of both worlds.
Domestic affairs have been neglected
while attitudes towards external ones
come to be examined all too hastily. Now
we are approaching a time in which we
can both spare more attention for the
er more complex economic, social and
political problems that beset us at
home, and evolve a more measured and
long term approach towards our responsi-
bilities towards our neighbours and the
world at large. This is a prospect that
theians should welcome.
a Fabian defence review
The Fabian Society exists to further socialist education and research. It is affiliated to the Labour Party, both nationally and locally, and embraces all shades of Socialist opinion within its ranks—left, right and centre.

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Inquiries about membership should be sent to the General Secretary, Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth Street, London, W1; telephone 01-930 3077.

Neville Brown is a lecturer in International Politics at the University of Birmingham, and defence correspondent of the New Statesman and the New Scientist. He wrote Britain and world security (Fabian research series 258) and Britain in NATO (Fabian tract 357).

Tam Dalyell is MP for West Lothian and a member of the Select Committee on Science and Technology. He is a former secretary of the Edinburgh Fabian Society.

Raymond Fletcher is MP for Ilkeston, Derbyshire.

Andrew Wilson is defence and aviation correspondent of The Observer.

Elizabeth Young is a writer and broadcaster and author of Nations and nuclear weapons (Fabian tract 347) and jointly with Wayland Young of The socialist imagination (Fabian tract 326) and Disarmament: Finnegans choice (Fabian tract 333).

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