Has Israel really won?

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ARGUMENT

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Colin Jackson  introduction 1
E. F. Penrose  Arab politics 3
Dan Gillon  policies for Israel 7
H. G. Nicholas  the role of the UN 11
Neville Brown  strategic aspects 14
Frank Judd  integrating Israel 17
Elizabeth Collard  suggestions for peace 19

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1. Introduction

Colin Jackson

This Fabian pamphlet is an attempt to provide some thoughtful and constructive views on the Middle East crisis for average readers. No doubt those with extreme partisan views both on the Arab and on the Israeli side, will find the essays too lukewarm, but in fact, a little less fury in this part of the world won't do any harm. Unlike some other Fabian pamphlets, each chapter represents the views of the writer concerned and does not commit the other contributors. It is mainly concerned with looking forward because the Fabians are anxious for an answer and not just a debate.

Looking back for a moment though, one is struck by the appalling inevitability of the war of 1967. Any intelligent observer was bound to think that the conflict must come, but almost nobody did anything to prevent it. Extremist Arab views and a violence of language used by leaders of the Palestine Liberation Army went unchecked. So the Israelis were able to proclaim that the intention of the Arabs was the physical destruction of the people of Israel. Therefore if a tense situation arose a pre-emptive strike could be justified. It was only after the war that Mr Heikal, in Al Ahram, deplored the verbal excesses. Then the Israelis, after being condemned by the UN for aggression in 1956, showed little or no inclination to tackle the problem that has poisoned the atmosphere of the Middle East since the end of the British Mandate in Palestine; namely, the many thousands of refugees.

Also, a regular visitor to Israel could see that country becoming progressively more nationalist and forgetting the great international philosophy that inspired some of the founders like Nathan Goldman. The younger generations in the Arab states and in Israel between 1956 and 1967 were systematically taught to despise and fear each other.

If the Arabs and the Israelis are to blame for the 1967 war, with all its tragic aftermath, so are the Big Powers. Despite an attempt since 1964 by a Labour administration to come to terms with Arab aspirations, basically London has not been able to exercise a moderating influence because of its colonial image. The United States has continued to provide overwhelming financial support for Israel and, after a brief improvement in relations with the Arab world during the days of President Kennedy, Washington seems to have sunk back, in the months before June 1967, into a kind of negative apathy. Some observers have said that the US has been so busy in Vietnam that it has been inclined to leave the Middle East to the Russians. The Soviet Union, for its part, whilst partly trying to keep China out of the area, has in other aspects failed to restrain the extremist elements in the Arab world and supplied arms that lured Arab leaders into hopes of a military victory. The UN, perhaps, comes best out of this sad story with the devoted service of UN personnel both in the Gaza Strip and in the observer units.

But the UN leadership has been slow to point out in the loudest and clearest terms the inevitable consequences of the arms build up and the border raids.

Now what of the future? In any agreement that brings peace to the area, one of the major elements must be an acceptance by the Arab states of the Israeli people's right to exist free from harrassment. Israel, like other countries, should be able to sail for peaceful purposes along the maritime highways of the globe. It is possible in the future that Israel may enter into some political confederation embracing that part of the world from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arab Gulf. Certainly there's no future for Israel as a Western outpost in this part of the Afro-Asian world. Perhaps one of the most significant developments which could help in the future is the increase in Israel of people of Jewish faith drawn from the Arab world and a relative decrease of European and American Jews.

Israel should strive to present a friendly and a modest front to her Arab neighbours and stop the kind of arrogant posturing of General Dayan. Perhaps the Israelis might do worse than take as their motto for living relations with the Arab peoples that tune, "I've grown accustomed to your face". Of course, just as the Arabs must recognise the existence
of Israel so the Israeli armies must draw back from their recent conquests. There can be no peace in the Middle East if the Israeli leaders claim the right alone to possess Jerusalem. The West Bank, too, must go back to Jordan, otherwise the Israeli leaders will merely absorb the poison of an alien population.

The Arabs, in accepting Israel as a fact, would do well to concentrate on the more positive aspects of life in that part of the world. They should have more constructive reasons for unity than simple hostility to Israel. In fact the Arab nations could take a leaf out of the Commonwealth book and organise in more practical terms their co-operation in the fields of science and technology, medicine, communications and the press. An obsession with Israel has created a kind of pervasive inferiority complex amongst many of the Arab leaders. It is time that the Arab peoples once again gave a major positive contribution to world civilisation; through co-operation and unity the question of Israel would fall into perspective.

The Arabs and Israelis will not, however, agree to live together in peace of their own accord at this moment in time. One of the greatest dangers, in fact, in this immediate post-war period is the way in which extremist elements in both Israeli and Arab circles are now coming once more to the fore. When the General Assembly convenes this autumn, Russia and America, with the backing of influential nations such as Britain, Sweden, India and Canada, should promulgate their firm terms for a Middle East settlement which would basically involve the recognition of Israel in return for no territorial aggrandisement. Permanent UN officials of the highest level should press for permanent UN forces on both sides of the frontiers. The case could be argued for a permanent UN reserve and staging base being set up in one of Britain’s sovereign base areas in Cyprus, that could be leased to the UN. Similarly the General Assembly this autumn will need more than talk, it will need action for a refugee re-settlement plan on a much vaster scale than anything that has been seen before and Israel will have to be seen to be contributing. Finally, again on the basis of the Russian-American initiative, fresh and more urgent talks will be needed over the problem of arms control.

The cynics and the partisans will no doubt describe these proposals as impossible of achievement or unfair to their side. At the moment the odds seem against a peaceful settlement in the Middle East because the mood of drift at the highest level in world councils seems to be re-asserting itself. The chances must be, therefore, that a third round between the Arabs and the Jews will become inevitable. A third round with nuclear weapons could lead to a third war on a world scale. The international community has almost certainly less than a decade before violence overwhelms the region again. If the human race has any real collective intelligence it must get together to solve the Arab-Israeli problem, otherwise the outlook for the globe is grim.
2. Arab politics

E. F. Penrose

Ever since the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, those Middle East countries, a majority of whose populations are Arabs, have led a turbulent political life. Divided by geographical and historical circumstances, by varying local interests, and by the arbitrary actions of rival great powers, into a number of separate states of uneven size and development, they have achieved unified action only fitfully and incompletely, and mainly for the purpose of eliminating foreign domination and control. The common sentiment which they share and which is designated by the Arab words *gaumiyah* and *wataniya*, reflects a deep and important sense of kinship and special relationship which the outside world can only ignore at its peril, but which falls short of what Europeans understand by nationalism.

Arab nationalism, however, is strong enough to create an ambiguity of allegiance in the Arab states. The Charter of the Arab League affirms—and Egypt was foremost in demanding that it should affirm—the principle of independence and non-intervention of each Arab state in its relations with the others. But two political parties or movements were founded on the opposite political principle, the Ba'ath Party and the Arab Nationalist Movement, the headquarters of the first being usually in Syria and of the second in Beirut. Emphasising that there is only one Arab nation, their activities have spread into several Arab states and they have sometimes aimed at the downfall of governments and individual ministers in more than one country on the ground that they were untrue to Arab nationalism. The two movements have often been in conflict with one another, especially when the Ba’ath clashed with President Nasser. As to their relations with the latter, both of them were ready to recognise him as “leader of the Arab world”, but in any form of union both of them expected him to share power, at least local power, with them. This he was never willing to do. Without aiming at the annexation of other Arab countries, he aspired to be undisputed “leader of the Arab world”, an aspiration difficult to harmonise with non-intervention in the affairs of other Arab states.

These political stirrings have occurred in times when, apart from the special case of Israel, the whole Middle East has been struggling to bring itself fully into the modern world, leaving behind the remnants of mediaevalism which survive in rural areas, in the small towns and villages, and on the outskirts of the larger cities. Important advances have already been made, but they fall short of what is desired, and the impatience of younger Arab nationalists has drawn them in some countries into co-operation with ambitious army officers who, having seized power, initially with popular approval, have entrenched themselves as authoritarian rulers no more, and usually even less, subject to representative control than their traditional predecessors had been.

“Arab socialism” was added to Arab nationalism as part of the drive for modernisation. Michel ‘Aflaq, the Ba’thist philosopher, had propounded it from the beginning, but in general terms only. After the Egyptian revolution in 1952 and the Iraq Revolution in 1958, the landowning and richer merchant classes which had been sources of capital investment, fell into political disfavour and when, in the late fifties and early sixties, economic plans to hasten modernisation were adopted, the *avant garde* of the younger planners began to favour increased state enterprise as a means of controlling investment. Other special circumstances also contributed to the sweeping nationalisation measures in Egypt in 1962 and similar measures in Iraq and Syria later, extending to financial and many distributive as well as to productive activities. But these measures did not find favour everywhere, nor is it clear that in themselves they hastened development.

However, their effect was to place the more traditional Arab states on the defensive and to divide the forces of Arab nationalism. Conflicts of regional interests within the Middle East were aggravated by doctrinal wrangles and by aspirations for leadership. The Egyptian occupation of the chief centres of population in the Yemen was a means of
asserting Egypt’s influence and that of the modernising forces against the traditional. But in practice the sense of kinship between Egyptians and Yemenis proved to be slight, and the majority even of the would-be modernisers among the Yemenis came to look on Egyptians as foreigners. The war soon showed striking analogies on a smaller scale with the United States war against Vietnam. It provoked Saudi Arabia, which had quickly taken on new importance and strength following the displacement of King Ibn Saud by the Emir Feisal, into giving aid to the Yemeni resistance.

Syria’s influence
The cold war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia broken, until the Khartoum agreement, only by a short lived truce after the Jeddah agreement and the Harad conference, gained only a few cutright adherents on each side. Several countries, like Iraq, which has recognised the Yemeni republic, attempted to maintain friendly relations with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Moderating tendencies were showing themselves in a number of the Arab countries before the Israeli-Arab war, but Syria was a notable exception, after the seizure of power in Damascus in February 1966 by army officers of the Alawiya sect of the Shi’a. In disfavour with the Sunni majority of the country, they resorted to demagogic appeals to the radical left in the Arab world, accentuating divisions, further weakening the ability of the Arab countries to face outside dangers, and tending to push President Nasser into a more venturesome external policy than he had been prepared to follow earlier with respect to Israel. In 1967, Jordan, itself the victim of an Israeli military assault in November 1966, replied to Cairo propaganda by taunting President Nasser with seeking shelter behind a United Nations screen. It is not clear how far the “pinprick” raids into the fringes of Israel were organised by ad hoc autonomous groups among discontented refugees and how far by groups under direct control of the Syrian government, since the latter in any case wished to claim credit for them. The violent Israeli riposte against Jordan last November was the worst possible way of dealing with them.

In discussing Arab policy towards Israel a wide misconception in the English speaking world must first be considered. It has sometimes been suggested that Arab opposition to Israel is the work of extremist groups mainly in Egypt and Syria, and that a number of other countries would come to terms with Israel. To those who have lived in different parts of the Arab world, this is a dangerous misconception. The “conservative” countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, and Morocco have again and again made their attitude known in no uncertain terms. The interposition of Israel into the Middle East was certainly not less offensive to the conservative Islamic states than to the progressive states. Actually, President Nasser has been a moderating force on this question for most of the period since 1952. In particular, by calling a “summit” meeting in 1964, he was able to check the rash tendencies then appearing in some of the other Arab states.

The fundamental grounds of Arab hostility towards the state of Israel are independent of the divisions among the Arab states, such as those between “right” and “left” or republican and monarchist. To Arabs, regardless of shades of political opinion, Israel is a foreign intrusion into their midst, established at a time when decolonisation had appeared to be practically complete in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. The modern Zionist movement was founded and sustained by European and North American Jews to carve out for their members an enclave of Asian territory inhabited by a majority of Arabs over many centuries. If one of its main objects was to settle permanently an unlimited number of Jewish people, some of whom had been subjected to persecution or discrimination or both, in Europe and North America, then, in Arab eyes, it was an attempt to redress wrongs perpetrated by Europeans and their overseas descendents, at the expense of Asian peoples, who had played no part in com-
mitting them. It was not surprising, therefore, that the partition of Palestine in the face of Arab opposition should have been regarded as a return of occidental imperialism, creating a state directed by leaders of European and North American origin, and sustained by occidental immigration to which no limit was set, and by large imports of capital, mainly from the United States.

This impression was strengthened by the uncompromising attitude of Mr Ben Gurion's government on the question of the refugees created by the war and by the policy of stimulating as much occidental immigration as possible, regardless of population pressure which, in an area lying within the arid belt that encircles the globe, might lead to demands for expansion at the expense of neighbours. The Anglo-French-Israeli aggression of 1956 seemed fully to confirm the Arab view that Israel was an occidental inspired creation to serve as a bridgehead for imperialist aims. The British Government's role in this discreditable affair has been justly condemned by the British people, but it should not be overlooked that Israel was responsible for similar deception and lawlessness.

The war of June 1967 also appears to Arabs to fit into the same picture. Here, it must be agreed, President Nasser's political judgment was seriously at fault, when he allowed pressure from Syria and Jordan to draw him into measures for which the military forces of the Arab countries were ill prepared. The "cold war" which had divided the Arab countries, the frequent political purges of army officers, the disastrous war in the Yemen, and the war in northern Iraq, had destroyed all chances of a cohesive Arab army able to face Israel on equal terms. But the actual course of events seemed fully to support the standard Arab views on the nature and role of Israel. On the eve of the war Britain at once took sides against the Arab countries by seizing on the question of the Gulf of Aqaba, in isolation from the other and even more deep seated issues, notably the refugee question, on which Israel had shown little respect for the United Nations. When Mr Wilson hastened to Washington amidst reports that he wished to confer on forceful measures to keep the Gulf open, the damage to British interests was already done.

But the final confirmation in Arab eyes of "Anglo-Saxon" collusion with Israel came in the circumstances of the eve of the Israeli attack, when U Thant, President Johnson and the Soviet Premier all asked President Nasser not to open hostilities, and he accepted the request and acted accordingly. When Israel ignored requests and unleashed full scale warfare on June 5, the "Anglo Saxons" refused to join in any condemnation of the act and the Arabs found that by keeping their word they had gained nothing and lost the advantage of the first "strike" (General Dayan was kind enough to point this out to them. See Le Monde, 21 July 1967, p4). We may ask, would the act of starting the war have been condemned by the English speaking countries if Egypt had struck first? The Egyptian Vice-President, known for his moderation, was about to leave for Washington to discuss the issues and a compromise might well have been worked out if the broader issues of the refugees had been taken up in addition to the question of the Gulf. Israel's attack was a disaster for the world that has gone unreproved.

actions of the US

Much remains to be uncovered regarding the precise role of the United States in the critical hours on the eve of and during the outbreak of the war. How seriously did they attempt to restrain Israel from starting the war? What were the attitudes of the White House advisors and the US State Department respectively? What was the mission of the USS Liberty in the area? While we can reconstruct diplomatic events in Cairo in considerable detail we know very little or nothing of exchanges between Washington and Tel-Aviv, orally and on paper.

It follows that Arab peoples see the war and the post war discussions in the
United Nations as confirmation of their conviction that Israel is an outpost of occidental and especially United States imperialism. Their case has often been spoiled through exaggeration, but in its essentials it remains strong. Feeling as they do, it is chimerical to suppose that any Arab statesman, even if (which is unlikely) he wished to do so, could enter into bilateral negotiations with Israel. The differences among the Arab states in respect to Israel are differences only in tactics, arising out of differences in the interests of the different Arab countries. No tentative or even provisional settlement is possible without total withdrawal of Israeli troops. On the other hand, there may be an opportunity to modify the Arab attitude towards non-recognition of Israel if the refugee question is tackled comprehensively. The best line of approach here is to keep on emphasising that the “eastern” as well as the “western” countries and most of the Third World, disagree with the Arabs on non-recognition and the latter will weaken their general case if they persist in it. The best statement yet was that made on 5 July 1967 on behalf of the Foreign Minister of Tanzania, who said that his country had, by recognising Israel, implicitly condoned the act of aggression in establishing it, but this was solely because the world recognised an exceptional, unique case here, arising out of the inhuman treatment received by the Jews from Europeans. But, he added, no further aggressions, like those in 1956 and 1967, could be condoned. This attitude might form the basis for attempting to obtain recognition from one side, and comprehensive measures for dealing with refugees by return of a certain number and adequate compensation for the rest, from the other.

In the long run, however, the only hope for the acceptance of Israel in the Middle East lies in what the French call “désionisation”, including the abandonment of unlimited immigration of European and North American Jews. This aim would be assisted by an actual decline in immigration from overseas and an increase in that of Asian Jews with higher birth rates. Gradually Israel might find accept-
3. Policies for Israel

Dan Gillon

In the immediate aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war the chances for peace seemed brighter than at any time in the past twenty years. Yet in the period that has elapsed since the ceasefire there has been a hardening in the public positions adopted by the two sides. In this situation of apparent deadlock the Israeli government will have to prepare itself for a number of alternative possibilities:

1. An Arab readiness to forego belligerence and sit down at the negotiating table.

2. The possibility of bi-lateral negotiations with any one of her Arab neighbours.

3. A de facto peace settlement, but one which did not include formal Arab recognition of Israel's existence.

4. A refusal on the part of the Arabs to enter into any substantive negotiations.

The chances of a negotiated settlement are obviously slender. There was a time when Israel would have been prepared to do almost anything to bring about peace. Continued Arab intransigence, however, particularly in the face of Israel's latest victory, has resulted in an almost equally tough approach on the part of Israel.

Although it is clear that divisions within the Israeli Cabinet do exist, three irreducible conditions for a final peace settlement have now emerged: recognition of Israel's right to exist, freedom of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal, and a united Jerusalem, although not necessarily under total Israeli control. From the Arab point of view the ruthlessness with which their armies were defeated this time has added considerably to the humiliation they already feel as a result of their defeats in 1948 and 1956. This may increase Arab determination to gain revenge on the battlefield. Pride cannot be restored through negotiations, even if refugees and lands can be. Moreover, the "Palestine problem" has become such a major factor in the drive for Arab unity that its resolution at this stage would mean the removal of the one cause for which the Arabs are prepared to come together. For Nasser and President Al-Atassi of Syria peace with Israel is to be avoided, if their dream of a united Arab nation from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf is to be fulfilled. A final contributing factor to the difficulty of achieving a negotiated settlement has been the almost total inability of the major powers to reach agreement on any of the issues. In their disunity and their continued willingness to supply arms, they have failed to weaken the resolve of either side not to abandon their adopted positions.

Yet, at this juncture, Israel's prime objective must remain the achievement of a negotiated settlement. Arab numerical superiority combined with Russian or Chinese military, economic and technical assistance, may well mean a fourth or fifth round with disastrous consequences for Israel. Israel cannot count on always being able to achieve the sort of sweeping military success she has had in the past. Arabs may draw from their mistakes the lesson that they must reach a higher standard of training and preparedness, rather than the more obvious lesson that they are likely always to be defeated by Israel. If a negotiated settlement is to be reached now it would be in Israel's long term interests to adopt a more compromising attitude than that held at present by the powerful "hawks" in the Israeli Cabinet.

An obvious stumbling block in this connection is the question of Jerusalem. Israel's real need in the case of Jerusalem is freedom of access. If Jordan continues to insist that a state of war exists, access can be secured only by Israel's retaining possession of the whole city, including the holy places. In the event of a negotiated settlement it would be unwise to rely on Jordanian promises. Even under British mandatory rule, predominantly Arab control of the Old City made it more often than not a dangerous place for Jews to be in. The restoration of peace would, however, open the door to the establishment of international con-
control or, alternatively, to a joint Jordanian Israeli rule over the holy places.

In a negotiated settlement, Israel must strive to eliminate Arab fears of her ambition to acquire more territory by a willingness to withdraw from all lands occupied since June 5 (with the exception of the Jerusalem area). As it is, the 1948 war added some 23 per cent of the land area allotted to the Jewish state by the UN partition resolution of 1947. Arab acceptance of the 1949 armistice lines must be accompanied by Israeli readiness to forego any further enlargement of her territory. As a condition for her withdrawal, Israel would be bound to insist on firm international guarantees of her right of innocent passage through the Suez Canal and Straights of Tiran. In addition withdrawal would have to be conditioned by the demilitarisation of the Gaza Strip, an area of the west bank of the Jordan and the Syrian Heights—important not only because it has been used to shell Israeli settlements, but also because it controls one of the sources of the River Jordan. An Israeli withdrawal would not exclude the possibility of border rectification for security reasons. It would, however, mean that such rectifications would be based, not on the fact of Israeli occupation, but on a mutually negotiated settlement in which the need to effect viable borders was agreed to by both sides. Of course, Israel should be prepared for the possibility that frontier adjustments might in some cases be made at her expense.

Such a withdrawal by Israel would leave a number of issues in need of clarification. In the first place there is the question of the refugees. A solution to this problem will require enormous capital expenditure, way beyond the means of any single state and certainly beyond that of Israel. The refugee problem will require assistance from all interested parties; the major powers, the United Nations and other international agencies. However, in negotiating the return of the west bank of Jordan, for example, Israel should be prepared to offer to assist generously in financing the economic resettlement of the refugees.

Closely allied to this is the problem of the Gaza Strip. Before 1948 this strip was an integral part of Palestine. The UN partition proposals envisaged Gaza as forming part of the Arab state which was to be created as the result of partition. Returning this region to Egyptian control makes little sense, since it is a poor, densely populated and under-developed territory two hundred miles from the centres of Egyptian population. Nevertheless, it would be in Israel’s interest to allow Gaza to be incorporated into Egypt as part of a negotiated settlement. If Egypt will not negotiate, or if the Egyptians should regard Gaza as a liability they would rather do without, then Israel, with assistance from other governments and international agencies, may be forced to accept the burden of developing the area herself.

second best

Second best for Israel would be a settlement involving only Jordan and possible at a later stage the Lebanon. Such a solution would leave unresolved the questions of Suez, Tiran, the Syrian Heights and possibly Gaza. In addition the durability of such a settlement must be in doubt since the dangers to Hussein’s position of “going it alone”, particularly if Israel were to remain in occupation of Syrian and Egyptian territory, are enormous. Yet the possibility of such a settlement is worth considering from an Israeli point of view. In return for Jordanian recognition and a non-belligerence pact, Israel might be prepared to return the west bank to Jordanian control, given, of course, suitable arrangements for the demilitarisation of this region. Furthermore, although the problem of the refugees tends to be viewed by the Arabs as an “Arab problem” it is in the final analysis an Israeli-Jordanian one. So far as Gaza is concerned, it is tempting to suggest that in the absence of Egyptian co-operation, the strip should be ceded to Jordan, since this would offer two advantages to Israel. Jordanian acceptance of the offer would further weaken Arab solidarity by driving a wedge between Jordan and Egypt.
Secondly Jordan would then have a powerful motive for maintaining friendly relations with Israel since communications between the two parts of the country would be through Israeli territory. The appeal to Hussein of such a scheme is less apparent. Yet it is conceivable that the idea of Jordan becoming the successor state to "Arab Palestine", coupled with Israeli and increased UN assistance in solving the refugee problem, would have its attractions. Finally Jordanian control of Gaza may also give the Israelis and the Jordanians a vested interest in the utilisation of the Jordan river waters.

While the future of Jerusalem would be no more negotiable in the event of a bilateral settlement than it would have been in a global agreement, Israel in order to bolster Hussein's position would have to offer among other things Jordanian access to a Mediterranean port, a joint development plan, a mutual defence pact and possibly the integration of the communication systems of the two countries, all of which would greatly benefit Jordan and her economy.

A solution which is apparently favoured by a number of leading Egyptians, including Nasser, involves the arrangement of a de facto peace settlement without the accompanying Arab recognition or non-belligerence pacts. Israel's unhappy experience with the settlement reached at the end of the 1956 war has made it unlikely that she would be prepared to budge an inch without rigid guarantees of her future security and rights of innocent passage through Tiran and Suez. Yet it is feasible that in return for a series of demilitarised zones in Syria, Jordan and Gaza plus firm international guarantees for the rights of passage, Israel might be induced to withdraw her troops from occupied Arab territory with the exception of areas she considers essential to her future security in the absence of a final settlement. It is clear that this is considered by the Israeli government as a last resort and would probably only come about either as a result of strong international pressure being brought to bear on Israel or because of the extreme economic strain of keeping an army of occupation in all the conquered territories.

If the major powers were, on the other hand, to agree to an embargo on arms shipments to the area, or at least limit such deliveries, the Israelis might be more inclined to accept such a position.

**annexation**

At the time of writing no Arab country has indicated a willingness to enter into direct negotiation and it may be that this position will be maintained for some time to come. In these circumstances there would be many Israelis including a number of cabinet ministers who would strongly advocate the annexation of all conquered territory with the possible exception of Sinai, the latter remaining under Israeli military occupation until such time as the Canal becomes open to Israeli ships. A slightly less drastic view taken by some is that Israel should annex those areas which are of vital strategic importance. This would mean the incorporation into Israel of the Syrian Heights, a section of the West Bank so as to widen the narrow Israeli "neck" north of Tel Aviv, and the Gaza Strip. For neither group would the future status of Jerusalem be in any sense open for negotiation. So far as Sharm el Sheikh is concerned, those who favour total annexation would clearly not favour an Israeli withdrawal from this position either, while the second group would require extremely firm guarantees of Israeli rights of passage before such a withdrawal could be considered.

**refugee problem**

There is, however, an alternative which gives Israel the added security she would derive from either of the above solutions, while at the same time keeping the door open to an eventual settlement. Under this proposal Israel would remain in military occupation of all the territories she currently holds; it being clearly understood that the future status and ar-
rangements for all these areas would remain open to negotiation if and when the Arabs decided that the time had come to negotiate. Meanwhile Israel would set about dealing with the problem of the refugees. This would necessitate a massive scheme of economic development to be carried out by Israel (with outside assistance) on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The successful rehabilitation of the Arab refugees by Israel would surely go a long way towards removing what has become over the last twenty years the most severe source of friction between Israel and her neighbours.

A lengthy Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank would undoubtedly create many problems of its own. As it is, the lot of the refugees under Jordanian and Egyptian rule has not been a happy one. A negotiated settlement in, say, ten years' time, with a whole new generation of politically conscious Palestinian Arabs, would surely have to take account of their wishes as to their future status. While at the moment it may be assumed that given the straight choice between living under Israeli or Jordanian rule, they would choose the latter, their decision at some indefinite point in the future is not so predictable. The example of the 300,000 Arabs already living under Israeli rule is a case in point. To overcome this difficulty it may be necessary to conduct a plebiscite amongst Palestinian Arabs in which they would be asked to choose between (1) a return to Jordanian rule, (2) an Israeli-Jordanian condominium, (3) an autonomous state in treaty relations with both Israel and Jordan, which would guarantee both its future security and economic viability.
4. the role of the UN

H. G. Nicholas

The role of the UN in the settlement of the present Middle East conflict must be marginal, but may be crucial. When I say that it must be marginal I mean that at the present stage of its development the organisation has only a limited capacity for modifying the aims and the relative power balance of its members. The UN in essence is an instrument which nation states try to use for the advancement of national interests. That they use such an instrument at all implies a recognition that national interests must be more widely conceived than within the previous state system.

The fact nevertheless remains that the UN's capacity to transcend national interests is limited; it depends at any given moment upon three variables: the sense of shock and crisis, the existence or otherwise of a voting consensus, and the capacity of the Secretary-General and his staff to take action on behalf of the international community. No one of these factors alone is sufficient; shock and crisis did not energise the Security Council in the hectic days of Israel's blitzkrieg, though coupled with the emergence of at least a "negative consensus" in the General Assembly, it has produced a willingness to let the Secretary-General go ahead with the establishment of an observer corps along the Suez Canal.

To estimate how much farther the UN can go one must know how far the negative consensus can be positively developed, bearing in mind that the present Secretary-General, as his action over the withdrawal of UNRIP revealed, is not likely to take a creative or adventurous view of his powers or responsibilities.

Yet, given these limitations, the UN's role may yet be crucial. Short of a fresh flare up, involving great power intervention and the wiping out of Israel (and no doubt many other things besides), there is only possible solutions to the present problems of the Middle East require action from outside the area itself, action of the kind which only the UN is equipped to supply.

However determined either side may be, they are quite incapable by themselves of coping with the refugee problem, of bringing some kind of economic development to the area, of solving the problems of access to fresh water resources and salt water outlets, of establishing an administration of shrines deemed holy by faiths represented all over the world, or, above all, of creating and maintaining any reasonably peaceable and stable national frontiers. Moreover, with the emergence of the USSR as a super power with a Middle East presence, the day has gone by when the Western powers singly or together could do these tasks for the Middle East by a kind benevolent paternalism at extra—even if Arab nationalism would let them.

One starts then with the two assumptions, that there is an indispensable role for the UN to play and that the obstacles in the way of it discharging it, are enormous. How enormous can be simply appreciated by reading any day's Security Council or General Assembly debates and seeing the range of intransigent animosities therein expressed. No idealistic "ground design" is going to survive the barrage of suspicion, resentment, mortified pride and religious fanaticism which will be fired at it, by veto in the Security Council or by the hamstrunging of resolutions in the General Assembly. In face of such sentiments, effort expended on thinking up ingenious, quasi-governmental UN roles is effort wasted. The problem is to get the UN re-admitted at all into an area where one side sees it as a dangerous sham, a sort of dove in hawk's clothing, while the other views it as the reverse, an agency of neo-colonialism.

In such a dilemma the only way forward is to build on what exists, ruinous though its condition may be. The two UN presences still operative in the Middle East, however shakily, are the refugee organisation, UNRWA, and the observation corps, UNTSO. Harrassed and molested though both have been, neither of the two sets of combatants has demanded their withdrawal—a remarkable tribute to their continuing indispensability. The competence of each is limited, but war
has, of course, intensified the need for their ministrations.

The scale of the refugee problem is immense and any solution will necessarily arouse the most violent passion and obstruction. Yet it is now surely clear that no piecemeal solution can possibly be effected. Israeli action has destroyed the old basis for what might be called "permanent refugeeism" at Gaza, or elsewhere. The way is therefore clear for a sweeping scheme of refugee re-settlement which, even if it involves additional transfers of population, cannot but be more humane than any perpetuation of the slum camps of Gaza and the latest Jordanian diaspora. Re-settlement on such a scale, however, is going to be costly. It will require imagination, drive, patience, diplomacy and money. It cannot be done from below as it were, by the efforts of UNRWA administrators, however devoted. It will require the initiative, political leverage and economic resources of a great power, though no single power, even the United States, should be expected to carry the burden alone. Once launched, it would need an administrator of the energy and enterprise of a Paul Hoffman.

Almost certainly any such refugee programme would require as a corollary the development of the national resources of the area. Having regard to what these are, this is going to involve the costly schemes of de-salination and/or development of the Jordan Valley, which have already been defined in their technological and administrative implications by many experts, from David Lilienthal to Edmund de Rothschild. It is true to say indeed that any proper solution of the refugee problem would involve a far-ranging transformation of the whole environment, political as well as economic, of the area. For this reason alone it will have to run the gauntlet of great and many sided political criticisms. But then so will any plan which attempts to defuse the Middle East, while at least an approach such as this allows a possibility of subordinating the impossibly intractable political issues to economic considerations which, however contro-

versial, are at least susceptible of discussion in the rational terms of more or less rather than the absolutes of yes or no. It is also true, of course, that if the UN puts its hand to any such programme of refugee settlement and regional development it will have to find the money to foot a substantial bill. In fact, however, it does already pay out substantial sums every year to UNRWA simply to keep refugees alive, with no constructive design for ending the dole. Though a comprehensive programme would cost more at first, it would give clear promise of becoming self-liquidating within a measurable period. And if it succeeded there should properly be credited against its costs the economy of not having a major war in the Middle East every decade, with a closed canal, blocked pipe lines, suspended oil production and the like.

But this, it will be objected, ignores the political problems and the need for territorial settlements and the like. Not at all. It is not difficult to draw up a catalogue of the desiderata—a clear and policed set of frontiers for the State of Israel, a Jerusalem under international protectors and supervision, a guarantee of free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. Nor is it difficult to think of UN instrumentalities for securing them—a UNEF stationed on both sides of the frontiers it supervises, a trusteeship administration for at least the Old City of Jerusalem, a UN naval police unit in the Gulf of Aqaba, a revised treaty to secure valid users’ rights in the Suez Canal. The problem is to secure acceptance by adequate UN majorities of the aims which seem so self evidently desirable and to persuade those majorities to equip the UN with the powers necessary to secure them. For this there is no easy solution; there are only the old techniques of diplomacy, of persuasion, of pressure, of bargaining.

But however successful these techniques may be—and no one, I imagine, will rate them very high—they cannot hope for success by making a frontal attack on the political issues. Their only hope lies in linking the political objectives to the economic and social possibilities. It
is only by marrying the politically dis-
tasteful to the economically imperative
that any progress can be made. There
must be a package deal, devised with
skill and with complete indifference to
short term European and American in-
terests. This is asking a lot. But does
anyone think, after 1956 and 1967, that
peace in the Middle East can be had
for less?

Finally, a footnote. The Middle East
war, though short, was brutal. Some of
the brutality was inescapable, some was
not. The practice of roasting men alive
is no more admirable in Jordan for hav-
ing become routine in Vietnam. The
use of napalm ought to be brought with-
in the ban of the Geneva Convention.
Any such ban may, of course, be flouted.
As Egypt has flouted the ban on poison
gas in the Yemen. This is no reason for
any civilised country condoning it after
we have seen what results it produced
in the streets of Jerusalem and in the
jungles of Vietnam.
5. Strategic Aspects

Neville Brown

Reaching a permanent solution to the Arab-Israeli problem is going to be a long and difficult process. Instant blueprints for lasting peace are unlikely to make an impact on an Arab leadership that is still wallowing in the aftermath of one of the most cataclysmic military defeats in history. And to involve the United Nations in too elaborate a system of safeguards too soon may be to jeopardise both the safeguards and the UN. Besides, since the Arab armed forces are now too weak to consider challenging the Israelis to any full scale conflict for several years at least, a permanent settlement is not an immediate prerequisite of stability. So perhaps it is best to eschew too strong a sense of urgency in the search for a lasting peace and concentrate for the moment on a further examination of some of the factors that must ultimately be taken into account.

What must surely be obvious is that Israel dare not risk an eventual reversion to a situation like that which obtained on the eve of her June offensive. For she was then virtually hemmed in by an Arab military alliance with a combined strength well in excess of hers. Egypt had available (i.e. exclusive of the 50,000 men in the Yemen) some 150,000 soldiers, 1,100 tanks, and 500 warplanes. Iraq, Jordan, and Syria had mustered 150,000 soldiers, 700 tanks, and 200 warplanes. Israel had 200,000 soldiers mobilised, 800 tanks, and 350 combat aircraft. So even a modest build up of Arab field units in West Bank Jordan would have made it hazardous for Israel to retain in the Negev sufficient strength to offset the Egyptians in the Sinai. Furthermore, Israel's air force, being concentrated on only four bases, would have been so exposed to possible "Pearl Harbor" strikes from several directions as to have made it hazardous for her to have attempted localised retaliation by air and land against an Arab guerrilla campaign that seemed bound to intensify.

A classic air and land blitzkrieg has eliminated the threat for the moment, but a repeat performance if there was a confrontation along the 1967 borders in, say, 1977, cannot be taken for granted.

For Egypt's decision to mass in the Sinai was a sudden one, made (perhaps in case Israel moved against Syria) despite her general feeling that, in view of other internal and external commitments, war against Israel would be inadvisable for several years. Next time Egypt may precipitate a crisis when the situation seems to her more ripe for one. Next time also her officers and NCOs may be better both at administration and at operational leadership. So may those of her allies. The Israeli soldier is, of course, likely to remain more highly skilled and motivated than his Arab counterpart for decades to come. It is also likely, however, that the gap will gradually narrow, as indeed it appears to have done during the last twenty years.

The Israeli air force played a key part in the recent campaign, swiftly knocking its Egyptian counterpart out on the ground and then exploiting its command of the skies to the full. A massive Egyptian neglect of the rules for the dispersal and protection of aircraft parked on the ground does much to account for this. So does the unsuitability of the present generation of Soviet ground to air missiles for use against low altitude attack. Both these weaknesses are remediable and so, in any future conflict, Israel may find air superiority harder to achieve and to exploit. Her own inherent vulnerability to low level intrusion could then become a cause for extreme concern.

Among the more dramatic military breakthroughs since 1945 has been the advent of guided missiles light enough to be carried by men or small vehicles and powerful enough to cripple battle tanks at ranges of perhaps a mile or so. France has led the world in the development of such weapons and has exported many to Israel; the USSR has lagged behind badly (apparently because of the blimishness of its armoured corps) and so therefore have Egypt and the other recipients of Soviet arms. Herein probably lies an important clue to the Israeli success in the big tank battle that took place around Gaza during the first night of the war. But the Red Army is now bringing anti-tank guided missiles into
service and Egypt, in particular, is likely soon to follow suit. This, coupled with a greater immunity to Israeli air power, could enable her to slow down the tempo of an Israeli onslaught in the event of another war; and one corollary of the fact that Israel maintains an order of battle that is remarkably large in proportion to her national resources is that she would find any full scale conflict lasting more than a week a considerable strain on her arrangements for battlefield supply and maintenance.

Israel's present dominance renders her able to embark upon a military nuclear programme, should she so wish, without being liable to trigger off an Arab preventive war; and a fear of future conventional inferiority could make such a course of action appear attractive. Her experimental 24-megawatt civil nuclear reactor at Dimona (which the French provided) is thought to produce enough plutonium each year to make two fission bombs. But plutonium has to be very pure to yield an explosive reaction and a special chemical separation plant is needed to achieve this purity. Israel has not yet begun to construct such a plant, but she has made extensive studies of the technical problems involved. It would seem, therefore, that Israel could become a military nuclear power within a few years of taking a firm decision to do so.

The multinational control of arms exports to both Arabs and Israelis is not the panacea it is often seen as. For one thing it may be politically impracticable. For another it could have certain adverse results. Surely the contrast between the 1914-18 campaigns in France and those in World War Two is sufficient to demonstrate that open mobile warfare (i.e. the type involving many tanks and aircraft) is often less hideous than its more static counterparts. Besides, a restriction in the supply of heavy offensive weapons (i.e. aircraft and armoured fighting vehicles) could be much to Israel's disadvantage, because the technical proficiency with which she offsets the Arabs' numerical superiority is particularly associated with the use of such equipment.

Another possibility being discussed is that Israel will eventually be persuaded to forego both her recent territorial gains and her military nuclear option by the positioning of United Nations combat units around all her borders. But such a UN presence might simply leave the Arab states effectively free to sponsor guerilla infiltration whilst depriving Israel of her ability to retaliate by means of local sorties by land or air. So the deployment of a UN field force is more likely to be suitable as a means of consolidating a political settlement than as a means of achieving it.

**Western support**

How appropriate might be cast iron guarantees to Israel from Britain and the United States of decisive air and naval support in case of need? That such guarantees could pitch the balance of power permanently in Israel's favour is beyond reasonable doubt. The snag is that under certain circumstances such a line up could, as has been suggested above, seriously damage the standing of all three countries in Afro-Asia as a whole. Just before the recent war Archbishop Makarios declared his utter opposition to Britain's sovereign base areas in Cyprus ever being used against the Arabs; and this admonition must be taken seriously,
not because the Cypriots could ever make it impossible for the RAF to operate from the Akrotiri SBA, but because it shows how, in general, the tradition of Afro-Asian solidarity operates against the Israelis. For all those Afro-Asian regimes (e.g. Damascus and Peking) that behave as if they long for a showdown between the underdeveloped world and the West willingly depict Israel as being essentially an outpost of the latter; and so, indeed, do all those people (e.g. in Pretoria and Salisbury) who favour the maintenance of some kind of “white supremacy”. The rest of us should, therefore, try to prevent this view from gaining universal acceptance.

It is in this context that an evaluation of Soviet strategy becomes crucial. Perhaps the most dangerous of all the fallacies about the current balance of power is the one that the Cuban crisis of 1962 “proved” that the Soviet Union will always back down quickly when presented with the threat of general war. In 1962 the USSR was at a decisive disadvantage *via a vis* the USA in respect of intercontinental rocket strength and so was vulnerable to American threats of nuclear action. But this is no longer the case. One handicap she does still labour under, however, is that her direct military access to various parts of the world (e.g. Borneo, the Caribbean, the Congo, the Mediterranean, and Vietnam) is much more restricted by geography and by historical precedent than is that of the United States and Britain; and she naturally feels tempted to offset this weakness by stimulating (e.g. by diplomacy, economic aid and arms exports) conflicts embarrassing to the West in such areas as the Arab-Israel border zone and South Arabia. For a year or so past Soviet policy towards Egypt and her ambitions has had just the tentative quality you would expect it to have if the Russian leaders were intent on keeping open the option of stepping the Middle Eastern confrontations up in the event of an American escalation of the war in Vietnam. And so the Arab-Israel border problem is one that is not likely to be resolved until the USSR has decided that she can safely forego her ability to ex-
6. Integrating Israel

Frank Judd

With considerable foresight and characteristic courage U Thant had warned the UN in autumn 1966 that peacekeeping operations amounted to an expensive and cumulative process which of itself did nothing to reconcile the potential parties to a conflict. UNEF was not established by the Security Council, but on the recommendation of the General Assembly, and therefore as Dag Hammarskjold had said on 6 November 1956, "It could not request the force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the government of that country". Israel steadfastly refused to permit the presence of the force on her territory and U Thant has emphasised that she was perfectly entitled to do so. However, against this background, when Egypt requested the withdrawal of the force the Secretary General had no alternative but to comply immediately. Whatever the private mem- oranda, the political reality of the Middle East situation, taken together with the fundamental debate on the UN's role in peacekeeping which had nearly wrecked the organisation in recent years, meant that had he delayed by even a day, his position as an acceptable international civil servant would have been jeopardised; he would have been dismissed by almost half the world as a tool of Western imperialism. For Labour leaders to deny this is misguided. For Conservative spokesmen to do so is indefensible, because it was the Anglo-French veto in 1956 which had prevented any effective action by the Security Council; a force created as part of such action could have stayed in the Middle East without the permission of the local powers.

U Thant did consult the special Committee of nations participating in UNEF and there are grounds for believing that he hoped to reactivate the mixed armistice commission which would have brought the Arabs and Israelis into a more direct responsibility for the preservation of peace.

One tragic aspect of the crisis is that fully nine months before the major conflict began, the Security Council was discussing the grave incidents on the Syrian Israeli border as a threat to peace. Informed opinion at the UN believed then that the worst of the crisis was still to come. Because the great powers still regard the UN as peripheral to the main stream of their foreign policies—although some statesmen like George Brown are sincerely convinced in theory of its vital significance—the international community became preoccupied with other issues and the outbreak of war in spring 1967 came almost as a surprise.

More recently, not for the first time, the indispensability of the organisation has become obvious. General Odd Bull and his UN Truce Supervisory Organisation pushed so unceremoniously aside during the fighting, have been essential to securing and supervising a cease fire. The one place where throughout the crisis the Arabs, the Israelis, the Russians, the Americans, the French and the British have been in constant contact, is the UN. An extension of the conflict was avoided by great power agreement formalised in the Security Council. The only way of persuading the Arabs to participate in serious negotiations is likely to be in a fairly wide international context provided by the UN; in any case whether Dayan and others like it or not, the great powers will have to take part because they are already very much involved in the area. The ultimate peace settlement will almost certainly have to be guaranteed by the UN and interim arrangements beyond the immediate cease fire may well necessitate a UN presence.

As the Secretary General frequently reminds us the UN cannot be more effective than its members want it to be and for it to succeed in this area there will have to be a positive attitude on the part of both the Arabs and Israelis. Nuclear potential alone necessitates a final and durable peace settlement. There is no room for fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability of renewed conflict within the next decade.

To achieve such a settlement there can be no question of unilaterally imposed solutions. George Brown was absolutely
right to underline at the UN that to uphold Israel's right to survival in no way implies support for unilateral annexation of territory by her. However moving the case for her retaining control of Jerusalem, in the light of long term and more recent Jewish history, it must be forcefully argued that such retention may bar the way to a lasting settlement and that without a lasting settlement there can be no effective guarantee of permanent access to the holy places. She must also be told quite categorically that the precedent of international endorsement for unilateral action by her would deal a devastating blow to the principles of the Charter and to international order. Israel’s leaders must appreciate that many of those who argue this case do so because they care desperately for her future.

Negotiations will have to deal with the short term priorities of strengthening UNTSO and establishing a Security Council presence on both sides of the frontier. As a first step in the aftermath of such large scale hostilities new armistice agreements will be essential. Re-settlement and compensation for both old and new refugees is also urgent. The Arab states will have to come to terms with the existence of Israel; she cannot be expected to live with exactly the same frontiers she has been compelled to endure for almost 20 years; free movement of her shipping through Aqaba and Suez must be ensured.

Before the recent crisis there were hopeful indications of a possible reconciliation. The moderation of Bourguiba in Tunisia had almost certainly found an echo in Arab minds nearer to the heart of the problem. Lebanon had shown signs of wanting to come to terms with Israel. Hussein had won considerable respect amongst the Israelis. It remains to be seen whether such trends can survive the extent of the Israeli victory and the post war militant pronouncements of at least some of her leaders.

When in Israel during the fighting I heard the story of a Jordanian soldier blinded by his wounds being carried in-
7. suggestions for peace

Elizabeth Collard

Provided that the Arabs get justice and repatriation and the UN resolutions on refugees and Jerusalem are carried out, there is no reason why a permanent settlement should not be worked out during the coming weeks. Meanwhile, it is worth looking at what the United Nations and the great and smaller powers have been suggesting as the basis for negotiations since the end of the fighting.

Apart from the unanimous cease fire resolutions of the Security Council, weeks of talk at the General Assembly resulted in two resolutions. By 99 votes to none, with 20 abstentions, the General Assembly considers the measures taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem as invalid and calls on Israel to rescind all such measures already taken and to take no further actions which would alter the status of the city. Although the United States abstained in this vote, President Johnson made a White House statement that Israel should not take any unilateral action on the status of Jerusalem, and not a single state or world statesman has approved Israel's action on the unification of Jerusalem.

The second General Assembly resolution still relevant calls on Israel to “facilitate the return of those inhabitants who had fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities”. The gesture was made by Israel, but only a fraction of those who had fled from the West Bank have in fact been able to return, the stream to the East Bank continues, and includes refugees from the Gaza Strip who have been encouraged to go and “find their relatives”. The net result is an even more acute refugee problem than before 5 June. Whatever happens, international aid on a vast scale will be needed to help the refugees and the money being poured in from the oil states cannot compensate for the lack of experienced people to plan and carry out the vast programme that is needed, wherever the refugees are re-settled. As the Arabs see it, there is still room for those refugees that wish to do so, to return to their homeland in Israel, for so long as Israel continues a policy of ingathering, of calling for Jews all over the world to come and live in Israel, then there is, prima facie, space for the refugees to return. In fact, the majority would probably prefer to settle in Arab lands, and there must be not only repatriation for their lost homes and property, but some measure of recompense for the sufferings of the past 20 years. If Israel would accept the responsibility and organise reparations on the scale needed—and there have already been enough offers of aid on the scale needed—it would be to her benefit as well as to the unhappy, displaced people.

The United States view of a permanent settlement includes the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territory, an end to the state of belligerency, acceptance of Israel’s right to exist, renunciation of the use of force, free maritime passage for all through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, regional economic development, a limitation on the arms race, the resettlement of refugees, and an effective UN presence until treaties are agreed and an international mediation procedure.

The Soviet Union has made it clear that it supports an immediate withdrawal of all Israeli troops from Arab territories as a prerequisite for further negotiations and has also condemned the Israeli annexation of the Arab part of the city of Jerusalem.

For the British Government, George Brown’s statement to the United Nations General Assembly remains official policy. He referred to Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and stated categorically that “war should not lead to territorial aggrandisement” and also called on Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem that would conflict with this principle. He called also for a great international effort to alleviate the refugee problem. He has suggested the appointment of a mediator between the Arabs and Israel in the settlement negotiations, and insisted that “any settlement must recognise the right of all states in the area to exist, in true dignity and real freedom, and that must include the ability to earn their living in assured peace”. To the House of
Commons on 7 July, George Brown added that the way to open the Suez Canal was by political rather than by legal action.

There have been conflicting reports both of the results of the famous Johnson-Kosygin talks at Glassboro meeting of 23 June and of the content of President Tito's mediation efforts, which have now been extended to include General de Gaulle. Enough has come out of all these talks, however, to predict the first steps of a way forward for a settlement, especially if the Arab States remain united enough collectively to accept some parts of such a settlement which might have been unacceptable in the past.

That there must be a withdrawal of Israeli troops to their pre-5 June positions is an essential step which could be accompanied simultaneously by an ending of the state of belligerency between the Arab states and Israel. Everything else can follow naturally. There may be some form of Big Four guarantees of the frontiers of the Israel and the Arab States, to give both the security they need, and this will require a UN presence on both sides of the borders.

There is an important proviso: no such agreement as outlined in the previous paragraph will be acceptable to the Arab States unless it is contingent on a just settlement for the Palestinian refugees. Then and then only can there be permanent peace in the area and all other questions resolved.
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