WORKERS' CONTROL?

by EIRENE WHITE, M.P.

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ONE SHILLING
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*Revised, Jan., 1951.*
I. INTRODUCTION

Every Worker a Manager?

The majority of industrial workers who helped to put Labour in power in 1945 voted for nationalisation for three reasons: because profits would no longer go to private shareholders; because nationalised basic industries were necessary steps towards securing full employment; and because in a nationalised industry the worker would cease to be the underdog and would come into his own at last.

With the first two reasons this pamphlet is not concerned. Our job is to discuss how far the workers’ hopes on the third count have been fulfilled or are likely to be in the industries which have come under public ownership to date.

Taking the short view, the subject is politically important because, whenever the general election is to be, the degree of enthusiasm among Labour supporters will depend partly on how far they consider nationalisation, for long a major plank in the party’s programme, has justified their belief in it as a means towards a more equitable society.

On a longer view, the confusion revealed by a study of recent thought in the Labour and trade union movement on the position which workers should hold in the nationalised industries is important as a symptom of a deeper confusion. Socialism by stages, in a democracy which would permit the enemies of socialism to be returned at the next or some subsequent election and in an economy in which the majority of industrial and commercial concerns still remain in private ownership, is confusing to anyone brought up on the simple slogans of the class war. The result is the present political and emotional uncertainty among workers who were taught to fight and who are now being asked to co-operate before the battle is fully won, an uncertainty which is, of course, readily exploited by Communists and fellow-travellers in the unions and local parties.

Coupled with these doubts as to the balance of power in the political sphere, is another uncertainty. So far, working class power has been built on political effort and on trade union organisation. It has not depended on control of the means of production, except in co-operative enterprise, relatively a very small part of British industry. Politically, control of the means of production is now being realised. Industrially, however, we have retained, with minor modifications, the status quo. There is very little more “workers’ control,” in the popularly accepted sense of the
term, in state-owned industry than in the more enlightened and
progressive private establishments. Among many workers there is
a feeling that this is not what they expected, but when they try to
reduce that feeling to practical proposals, these proposals are
usually vague or contradictory.

Into this confusion come the managers, the industrial con-
sultants, the productivity experts, the personnel officers and all
those concerned with day-to-day industrial organisation. The
T.U.C. must now be added to this list, with its rapidly growing
interest in the technical problems of management. It is on this
plane that the National Boards and the trade unions discuss
arrangements for each nationalised industry and that the Ministry
of Labour and the Board of Trade hold conferences and encourage
agreements between employers and unions in both the public and
the private sectors. Political differences are as far as possible
politely ignored and the aim, to borrow a phrase from Mr. George
Isaacs, Minister of Labour, is “to discover how all interested parties
can assist industry to increase productivity by developing
co-operation between management and workers.”

To the conclusion reached by these industrial leaders and
experts the worker in his turn applies his own criteria of satisfaction
and dissatisfaction.

A discussion on workers’ control, therefore, has to take into
account recent Labour Party and trade union controversy, some of
the political assumptions underlying it, the application of these
considerations to the practical problems of industrial organisation
in the nationalised industries and finally the reactions, actual and
probable, of the workers concerned.

The first step is to note the progress of nationalisation so far,
the criticisms already made and some of the answers to them.

II.

CONFLICTING OPINIONS

How It Looked in 1945

A list of industries to be nationalised was given in Let Us Face
The Future. How the workers’ own aspirations were to be realised
in practice had not, however, been thought out with any precision
by the ordinary collier, railwayman, bus-driver or gas-worker con-
cerned, and only in broad outline by the party and trade union
leaders, who concentrated mainly on the degree of participation
at the top and left all subsidiary relationships vague and undefined.
In the 1950 election programme, a further list included sugar, meat
wholesaling, cement, cold storage and water supplies as industries or services which were ripe for common ownership, with suggestions for publicly-owned units in industries which were not to be taken over completely. None of these fresh proposals altered the fundamental problems.

The basis for public ownership and administration had been settled by both the Labour Party and the T.U.C. in 1935, after five years of vigorous and occasionally acrimonious debate. The public corporation was to be the chosen instrument. It was finally agreed that the workers’ organisations should have a statutory right to representation on the governing body. This principle was conceded only after a running battle had been fought between Herbert Morrison on the one hand and some of the big unions, led first by Ernest Bevin and then, after Bevin had accepted a compromise, by the late Charlie Dukes, on the other.

The controversy arose during the 1929-31 Labour Government, when Herbert Morrison as Minister of Transport introduced the first Labour measure for public ownership, the London Passenger Transport Bill. Morrison had decided against direct workers’ representation. His Board was to be appointed by the Minister, from suitably qualified persons who should have no responsibility to any outside body, except, through the Minister, to Parliament.

Ernest Bevin at once took up the cudgels on behalf of the Transport and General Workers’ Union. The proposal was contrary to traditional union thought, which while stopping short of full syndicalism and admitting the need for State partnership with the workers, nevertheless demanded at least a measure of direct participation in management.

The T.U.C. were not united, and in 1932, after consultation with the Labour Party, issued a detailed report supporting Morrison’s view. But the General Workers were not satisfied and, although Morrison’s Bill, finally passed by the National Government, had gone through Parliament in the form he had chosen, after the conference debates, concluded in 1935, it looked as though in any future legislation some direct representation would have to be accepted.

The T.U.C., however, in its next public statement, the interim report of 1944 on post-war reconstruction, reverted to the policy of 1932. The boards were to include people who could be relied upon to see that the workers’ views would receive full consideration, but direct representation was abandoned, except on consultative bodies. With this view, the Labour Government in office has shown itself in full agreement.

It is worth recalling this controversy, especially to the generation unaware of pre-war history, because it shows that the British Labour and trade union movement has not stood fully united on
one side or the other. Even the individual unions have not been consistent. The National Union of Railwaymen, for instance, who were to the forefront in 1917 in demanding joint control in a nationalised industry, sided with Morrison over the London Transport Bill, only to take a lead at the present time in demanding "more railwaymen for the railways."

The Trade Unions Take Sides

The issue became alive again in 1948, with the first experience of nationalisation in practice and with discussion both at the Labour Party conference and at the T.U.C. At the former the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen, the Union of Post Office Workers and the N.U.R.\(^1\) supported, while the National Union of Mineworkers and T. & G.W.U. opposed a resolution asking for "workers' participation through their Trade Unions in the direction and management of nationalised industry at all levels." The resolution was withdrawn on an undertaking being given that the Labour Party executive and the T.U.C. General Council would have joint discussions on the matter.

These had not reached a report stage when the T.U.C. met at Margate in September. Here the debate was primarily on the unsatisfactory composition of the Boards, with the N.U.R. again taking the lead.

At Bridlington in 1949 the T.U.C. General Council restated its attitude in the light of its initial experience of nationalised industries. Substantially this statement re-affirmed the 1944 position, giving pride of place to the public board, with full consultation, but leaving executive responsibility firmly in the hands of management. "Consultation does not imply diffusion of authority," said the Council, nor is direct workers' representation in management acceptable. On the contrary, the General Council underlined the need for a trade unionist taking a full-time appointment on a board to sever his formal connection with his union. Where part-time trade unionists serve, they must come from unions not directly connected with the industry:

Accompanying this affirmation of policy, the General Council published a summary of replies to a questionnaire, issued in March 1949, from unions connected with nationalised industries. These replies showed that it was too soon for most unions to reach positive conclusions. The significant point was that the N.U.R.

\(^{1}\)Names of trade unions are given in full at the first reference to them. Subsequently initials are used. For list of abbreviations see p. 31.
and the Post Office workers, both of whom have had experience over many years of consultation of a sort, maintained and still maintain that consultation is not enough.

In its demand for fifty per cent workers' participation in administration and management at all levels, the N.U.R. has most sharply expressed its disagreement with the official T.U.C. line. The Post Office workers have for some years past pressed for a joint administrative council to run the Post Office, staff and official side to be equal in number. The Electrical Trades Union also favours direct representation. Most other unions fear divided loyalties should they obtain direct representation and therefore support the official line.

Between conferences, Labour party and T.U.C. leaders have come together, but they have not proposed any major changes in policy. The only serious disagreement has been over the right of unions in nationalised industries to negotiate direct over workers' pensions, whether this was in line with government policy or not. The T.U.C. in this matter stood up for the unions' independence. Interest in the party and the T.U.C. has shifted to more general matters of administration under public ownership. But the issue of workers' representation is by no means dead.

Political Tests?

When the nationalisation Bills were going through Parliament there was little agitation among trade unionists. It was when appointments were first made to the Boards that serious concern became manifest.

To socialists in general there is something profoundly unsatisfactory in the thought that so large a proportion of the appointments to national Boards are of men who have shown no positive sympathy with the idea of nationalisation. A recent Labour Party publication has emphasised that only one in seven of those appointed to national Boards, Electricity Area Boards and Transport Executives is a known socialist. The Gas and Steel Board appointments have not increased the average.

This disposes of the myth of myriads of "jobs for the boys" but the suspicion of lukewarmness is serious, all the more so in that, as an enquiry among coalminers in all parts of the country has shown, hardly any of the officeholders are known even by name to the workers. The Public Relations staffs have not yet succeeded in making even paper "personalities."

To meet this criticism there could be either some form of political test for all members or a substantial increase in the proportion of known socialists and trade unionists to counter-balance the experts and former owners. Such a demand, made repeatedly at T.U.C. conferences, has been resisted by the platform.
To the political test there is one moral objection and two practical ones. The moral one is that nationalised industries belong to the community as a whole and not to one party. The first practical objection is that political barriers might keep out experts vital to efficiency and success. The other is that, in a Parliamentary democracy, political tests is a game at which two could play. If at some future date Labour is once more in opposition, what is to prevent a Tory Government from putting in its own political nominees?

The Communist Party draws a fat red herring across the trail at this point. Urging that the Boards need not be composed of so-called non-political experts, a recent pamphlet says: "No one suggests that the Chancellor of the Exchequer must be a stockbroker or the Minister of Defence a general, irrespective of their political opinions." The Board politically chosen should use the experts as a Minister uses civil servants.

This is an attractive argument but it is best suited to a one-party state. It does not take much imagination to see how unsatisfactory it would be to change the entire governing body of every basic industry whenever there was a change of majority at Westminster. Political appointments of this kind used to be the curse of the American civil service, where until recently even the village postmaster went out with the President.

If it were argued that such a wholesale change was not called for, but that as appointments fell vacant the party then in power should put in its own supporters, the result would be that Board meetings would become political dog-fights, and that administration would suffer accordingly.

Political direction of the nationalised industries is already provided for to the extent that each has a Minister in Parliament responsible for it, with certain powers of control. The fact that at present the Boards are being given a very free rein does not mean that they should be regarded in principle as policy-making bodies. They have to decide what steps are needed to secure certain desired results. These desired results are bound to have political significance and should be decided by the Minister answerable to Parliament. Just as a departmental estimate can be scrutinised in debate, so these industrial estimates, in terms of production targets, manpower and so forth, should be freely debatable.

More Workers At The Top?

Setting aside political appointments on principle as impracticable in a Parliamentary democracy, one may nevertheless record the comment that the present government has learnt over backwards in its determination not to appoint on political grounds.
Lord Citrine, as chairman of the British Electricity Authority, Mr. Hardie, as chairman of the Steel Board, with Lord Latham and Lord Inman at the head of two of the five Transport Executives, have been the only highest level appointments coming from anywhere even slightly to the left of centre.

Other things being equal, it appears to be a disability for the chairmanship of a national Board or Executive to have been connected with a trade union or the Labour movement and a positive disqualification to have been well to the left.

The same holds good at the Divisional level of the N.C.B. and the Area Board level of the B.E.A. Two out of nine of the original N.C.B. Divisional chairmen were former trade unionists, namely Sir Ben Smith of the T. & G.W.U., whom the Tories always remember—forgetting that Mr. Churchill thought well enough of him to send him on an important wartime mission to Washington—and Alderman Webb of T. & G.W.U. (In an endeavour to keep the peace, it was decided that N.C.B. Divisional chairmen should be independent, coming neither from the miners' union nor from the former employers' side, hence the appointment of two non-miners.)

To the rank and file, who had been expecting something in the nature of a crusade, with appropriate banner bearers, the lack of what they regard as at any rate symbolic recognition of the workers' importance in industry is puzzling.

Is it true their men are not good enough? If this is not the reason, is the Government playing into the capitalists' hands and what then will be the consequences should a Labour majority not be returned next time or the time after? With no government to champion them, the working people will be reduced to one or two representatives on each board, who stand more or less for their point of view, but who will always be in a hopeless minority.

It is from this frustrated feeling that the proposals have come for a larger number of workers on the Boards.

At the Labour Party conference in 1948, Mr. R. Openshaw, speaking for the A.E.U., said: "We have always argued in the Socialist Party that brains are not a monopoly of any particular class. I certainly believe and am convinced that there is sufficient brains within the Trade Union and Socialist movement to warrant a greater proportion of seats on the governing bodies of nationalised industries."

At the T.U.C., in the same year, Mr. J. B. Figgins, general secretary of the N.U.R., put the same point more specifically by showing that the Minister of Transport had powers to appoint up to eight members of the Transport Commission and up to eight on the Railway Executive. The places had not all been filled and the vacant ones, he argued, might be given to workers in the industry.
Mr. Figgins was at pains to make it clear that the extra members need not be drawn from among paid officers of the unions, but might well come from members of outstanding worth in the rank and file. Much the same arguments were put forward at Brighton T.U.C. Conference in 1950 by Mr. J. H. Williams, speaking for the Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives and Technicians.

This demand makes it appear as if a few more ministerial nominations of the “right people” to the Boards would satisfy, the main doubts of trade union leaders and of the rank and file. In fact, it is problematical how far, after the first few moments of gratified surprise, such a change would influence the ordinary worker. He would have no direct link with the new nominees, any more than he has with the present ones. On appointment they would withdraw, as the others have done, from direct contact with their union. If they were party to decisions contrary to union views, the workers in the industry would have no means of bringing them to book.

For these reasons, the more thorough going revisionists are pressing the demand for direct workers’ representation. The selections would be made, not by the Minister, after informal consultation with the unions, as is the present practice, but either by nomination by the union executives or by ballot of the union membership.

The demand for direct representation is put most emphatically by Harry Pollitt in a recent pamphlet on the miners. “The N.U.M. should be directly represented on all National, Regional and Area Boards by men who keep their connection with the union and its members, instead of being artificially cut off from democratic discussion and decision inside the union as soon as they take on the new responsibilities. These members should be subject to recall by the union if their work is not satisfactory, thus ensuring that they do not become mere place-holders, out of touch with the men on the job. They themselves should have the right to return to the union without loss of status if policy or general conditions make it impossible for them to work effectively on the Board.”

The contrary view has been expressed by Will Lawther, president of the N.U.M., saying: “We as a miners’ organisation do not want to have people in the ridiculous position we see on the continent, where the president or secretary of a miners’ organisation is also on the Coal Board running the industry, so that he has on occasion to pass a resolution to ask himself to give himself something. The position of the trade union is to remain independent of the Coal Board or whatever Boards or Executives may be set up.”

At a later stage we shall have to deal with a fundamental matter which arises out of these two statements, namely the question of
trade union independence in a planned economy, with some reference to experience in the U.S.S.R. and in Fascist countries.

Meanwhile, examining Harry Pollitt's proposal from the point of view of the composition of the national and regional boards, it is clear that representatives appointed on these terms would, or should, have divided loyalties.

**Conflict of Interests**

The workers' representatives would serve two masters, their union and the public as a whole. Even on class-war principles, they would have to consider their own union and the interests of other workers in the community. The union for its part would wish to support its representatives yet would have to oppose Board decisions which it felt were contrary to its members' interests. Simply to withdraw its representatives, as the C.P. suggests, would lead to a breakdown. Alternatively, the Board would work under the possible threat that withdrawal might be enforced, with full union authority behind it. This might be exploited to the extent of industrial blackmail.

It would be very difficult for the Board to work smoothly as a team, so long as certain members owed no allegiance to anyone except the community, as represented by the Minister in Parliament, whereas others were under a constant obligation to report back, and might be formally mandated on all major issues.

For the union members, the decisive discussion would not be at the Board meeting, but at the union executive or delegate conference. Important decisions might have to be delayed to allow the union representatives to consult their executives, which in turn would reach decisions without having heard all the relevant arguments.

There might also be questions of confidence. Where should the representatives draw the line in reporting back? Divided loyalties would once more arise.

The mere fact that there were two kinds of member on the Board, one set obliged to refer back and the other not, would tend to make self-conscious groups, more liable to oppose one another and less able to treat each matter on its merits, as members of one team.

To this must be added a further practical objection, which has tended to be overlooked, because coal-mining is apt to be taken as the prototype of nationalised industries. The N.U.M. is an almost complete "industrial union," covering all types of worker in the industry, including some clerical grades. Other nationalised industries are served by a variety of unions. Complete representation would radically change the character of the small, intimate,
high-powered team which is what a Board is intended to be, particularly if representatives were included, as in equity they should be, of the administrative, scientific and technical staffs. Representation of this kind is suitable for a National Joint Council, to which we shall come later, but not for the general staff conducting operations.

These difficulties lead one school of thought to the conclusion that the principles of democratic representation suitable for political bodies in national or local government are not applicable to the executive body in charge of an industry. The function of a National Board is not to reflect opinion or to balance interests, but to get on with the job. The Board should be functional and not quasi-political.

This conception is most adequately expressed by some of our leading industrial sociologists. But before examining their ideas, we must go a little further with the opposing school of thought, which still looks on industry as part of the battlefield on which the class-war must be waged. Few who hold this opinion would now call themselves syndicalists or Guild Socialists, but they inherit emotions and a point of view from both doctrines. So it is worth taking a quick look at this inheritance.

III.

POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS

Syndicalism, a form of Marxism which flourished in France in the twenty years preceding the first world war, is the doctrine of direct action by class-conscious trade unionists. The word itself means simply "trade unionism," but the connotation is always revolutionary.

In the class war, which for the syndicalist is the central political reality, parliamentary action is futile, leading as it must to compromise and to the moral enslavement of the class-conscious worker by the bourgeois with whom, in the process of compromise, he associates. Anything is dangerous to the worker which makes him less conscious of class, including membership of a political party based on common ideas but drawn from different classes. The trade unions, which by definition consist solely of workers, are the only safe instruments of working-class progress, based as they are not on common ideology but on the sounder foundation of identity of economic interest.
According to the syndicalist plan, the trade unions were to acquire power at first by taking over as many functions as possible from the state or local authorities. The rest was to be accomplished by a general strike which would paralyse the state, bring power to the workers and make way for the genuine proletarian organisation of society. The state, in the form previously known, was to disappear and everything was to be run by the unions and trades councils.

The belief in this country in the efficacy of the general strike was extinguished in 1926. From that time trade union leaders in general have renounced “direct action” in industry as a means to political power in favour of achieving a workers’ government by means of the ballot-box. This has involved the practical consequence noted by the syndicalists, of fraternisation with the middle-classes and to some extent assimilation. Traces of what may be called syndicalist psychology not unnaturally remain as a powerful influence, although, as high incomes are cut by taxation and in so far as new opportunities for education and advancement for the workers are realised, class jealousy ought to have less political importance.

The Guild Socialists gave to the British Labour movement a modified version of syndicalism. They were at their zenith during the first world war with Professor G. D. H. Cole as the leading exponent. They too were concerned with the class war and regarded possible political action as inadequate. For them, too, the trade union was to be the main instrument of progress, though unlike the syndicalists they did not exclude all other associations. The state, representing citizens primarily as consumers, was to continue in partnership with an Industrial Guilds Congress, which within the industrial sphere was to be self-governing. It was to legislate for itself, not admitting any superiority in the political partner.

Guild Socialists believed in thorough-going industrial democracy, beginning in the workshop with election of overseers and foremen and continuing throughout the industry in a National Guild. A pre-requisite, of course, was the organisation of all workers in one industry in the one guild or “industrial union.” Guild Socialists stressed the need for including technical and administrative staff.

Nationalisation, narrowly confined to the transference of shares and assets to a public corporation or Government Department, which was advocated by Sidney Webb and his Fabian colleagues and is essentially what we have today, they regarded with suspicion and distaste. They pointed out that state capitalism is not necessarily more democratic, as far as the worker in the industry is concerned, than private capitalism, though it may have advantages
in other directions. Economic servitude, the "wage-slavery," would remain. In fact, the chains might be riveted a little more securely.

For it is the main tenet of Guild Socialism that democracy is not completed by the political ballot-box, but only by the right of the worker to have his say in the running of his industry. The trade union, on this view, would cease to be a bargaining force disputing with the employer and would become a controlling force, an industrial republic. "Out of the bargaining Trade Union must grow the producing Guild" (Cole, *Self Government in Industry*, 1928, p. 42). It was recognised by most Guild Socialists that wages could not be determined independently of the community as a whole. The share of the national income accruing to each Guild would have to be collectively determined on behalf of the whole society but each Guild would have freedom in the distribution of its share among its members.

It was unfortunate that the Guild Socialists, who touched on many of our present problems in the nationalised industries, for various reasons failed to make their message generally accepted. They were thinking mainly in terms of a rapid and quasi-revolutionary change from capitalism to socialism, which occurred in Russia and started in Germany and Hungary, but in Britain never took place. On this account a number of their concrete proposals proved unpractical. This led to the rejection of, or only half-hearted agreement with their principles, which were consequently never fully worked out. Professor Cole has himself recently set aside the Guild Socialist formula in present circumstances and regards it as an aspiration for some undefined future.

Saying that Guild Socialism is the best solution in the long run but not now, he explains: "The Guild method implies the existence among all those who work in industry, from administrators and managers to unskilled workers, or at any rate among those of them who have most influence with their fellows, of an attitude of responsible acceptance of the obligation to put the public interest in the first place. Such an attitude can be expected in any high degree only in a society permeated through all its parts by the spirit of justice and equality, set free from the class conflict, and conscious that rights and duties go together and that the obligation of service is the correlative of freedom. Moreover, such an attitude cannot in the nature of things come into existence suddenly. Men are creatures of habit; and neither among managers nor among workers can the habits of mind established under capitalism be suddenly transcended as soon as an industry passes from private to public ownership."

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IV.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Supervisory Control

Having thus deferred full Guild Socialism to the millenium, Professor Cole in his study of the National Coal Board offers a compromise for immediate adoption. He proposes to retain an element of quasi-political control, but instead of centring it on the National Board, to embody it in a Supervisory Council for each nationalised industry. It is important to examine the proposal because it is a compromise between the two opposing schools of thought noted on page 12.

This ingenious suggestion was first put forward in principle by the late William Mellor, Professor Cole and a group of leading trade unionists in 1933.

The proposal is for a Supervisory Council for each nationalised industry to consist of the members of the Board plus representative members chosen by the trade unions and professional bodies connected with the industry, with representatives of consumers, and of closely related industries. The chairman would be appointed by the Minister, though it is suggested that whenever appropriate the Minister himself should preside.

The Council would have the right to all information, it would report and make suggestions on matters of policy direct to the Minister and it would be consulted on filling vacancies on the Board.

Council members would be paid expenses only, not salaries, and would retain their position with their own organisations. This is particularly important for trade unionists, who seem to their comrades to move into another world if they are paid £3,000 or £5,000 a year. The Council would be watch-dogs for the interests of their own organisations, and while they would not give orders to the Board, they could give the Minister information on which he could do so.

As Professor Cole gives this scheme in outline only, he does not specifically justify his proposal that members of the Board should also be members of the Supervisory Council. It would seem better to keep the two separate, although one would assume that there would be joint meetings on occasions, for example, when the Minister wished to discuss with both bodies some major criticism or a development in policy.

The advantage of the Council would be that it would not only give the Minister more vigorous and perhaps better-informed advice
than he would be likely to receive from his Civil Servants, on whom at present he largely depends, but it would give the unions the status which they now lack, to entitle them to call the Board to account. They would be under-dogs no longer. This would go a long way towards countering the psychological frustration which most workers have felt on discovering that nationalisation in practice still leaves them "workers" as before, with all too often the same persons as their immediate boss. Through their men on the Council, they could at last be the bosses' boss—a gratifying feeling.

They would also have the safeguard that through their representatives on such a council they could strengthen the hands of a Minister carrying out policy approved by the union and put some check on a Minister pursuing a contrary policy.

It would save the time of the Board and its staff and probably a good deal of paper work if this Supervisory Council could in some way be co-ordinated with whatever machinery was set up for the supervision of nationalised industries by Parliament. It is not likely that M.P.s will remain for long satisfied with their present limited right of questioning the Minister. Already suggestions are being aired for a special committee on the lines of the wartime committee on National Expenditure. Parliamentary privilege being what it is, a combined body is probably out of the question. But as the Supervisory Council would be in intimate relationship with the Minister, there would be no impropriety in a full exchange of information and some consultation between it and whatever Parliamentary instrument is ultimately chosen. There would be no point in harassing the Board by making it explain the same acts and circumstances to two bodies of questioners working independently.

To this idea of Professor Cole's, which is worth close attention and discussion, one can object that it is adding yet another body to the hierarchy dealing with the industry. At each level the industry is grappling with problems in a new form and by means of a new machinery.

To superimpose the proposed council is to put a heavy strain on the senior officers of the unions concerned, who would have a triple relationship with the industry (a) as members of the Supervisory Council; (b) as members of the National Consultative Council; (c) as ordinary trade union negotiators on wages and conditions. There is no need for the same men to do all the three jobs, but in practice they almost certainly would. They would also have to be able to explain to the rank and file in which capacity they were acting at any particular time.

To provide through the Supervisory Council an outlet for external criticism, while it would gratify the self-esteem of the workers, would tend to divert attention from the need to co-operate
with management at the highest level on the existing National Consultative Council of the N.C.B., the National Joint Council of the British Electricity Authority and the similar bodies for the other industries.

Each nationalisation Act specifies the duty of establishing consultative machinery. The N.C.B., for instance, has to consult "with organisations appearing to represent a substantial proportion of the persons in the employment of the Board or of any class of such persons" on:

1. "safety, health and welfare";
2. "the organisation and conduct of the operations in which such persons are employed and other matters of mutual interest arising out of the exercise by the Board of their functions."

The B.E.A. is enjoined to consult with "any organisation appearing to them to be appropriate" on "matters of mutual interest, including efficiency in the operation of the services of the Boards." The Gas Act, Civil Aviation Act and the rest, excepting the Act to nationalise the Bank of England, have similar clauses.

These terms of reference are comprehensive. So, generally speaking, is membership of the national consultative bodies, though this varies from one industry to another. In mining, for example, there are nine representatives of the National Association of Colliery Managers, three of the Colliery Overmen and Deputies Association and nine of the N.U.M. sitting with members of the Board, but the scientific and administrative staff are not included.

The National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport, covering all three airways, provides for representation by trade or grade and also by place of work (see diagram1). It also combines functions (b) and (c) by dealing with wages and conditions as well as with efficiency.

Workers' representatives on these bodies have industrial responsibilities far wider in scope than anything hitherto enjoyed, except perhaps in the Post Office and in a handful of private firms.

1 The diagram opposite is reproduced by kind permission of the Bureau of Current Affairs (117 Piccadilly, W.I) from a pamphlet: "The Problems of Nationalisation" by Ian Mikardo, M.P. (price 9d.). The pattern of joint consultation in the industry is shown graphically and it can best be followed by taking the case given by Mr. Mikardo. If a problem concerns "fitters at London Airport it will be dealt with by the local maintenance and repair engineering panel on the Airport (see diagram); if it concerns fitters over the whole industry it will go from that local panel to the maintenance and repair engineering national sectional panel. If the problem concerns not merely fitters but also other classes of workers, but only at London Airport, it will be dealt with by the Base Committee at the Airport; but if it concerns workers in other bases as well it will go from the Base Committee to the National Joint Council itself. Thus, there are two avenues of contact between the worker and the National Joint Council—the departmental one, which operates as between one workplace and another, and the functional one, which operates as between one class of workers and another." (Page 15).
JOINT CONSULTATION IN CIVIL AIR TRANSPORT

London Airport

Each of Six Other Airports

LONDON AND LOCAL SECTIONAL PANELS

LONDON AIRPORT PILOT OFFICERS' PANEL
LONDON AIRPORT RADIO PANEL
LONDON A.P. MAINTENANCE & REPAIR ENGINEERING PANEL
SIX OTHER LONDON AIRPORT SECTIONAL PANELS
'X' AIRPORT PILOT OFFICERS' PANEL
'X' AIRPORT RADIO PANEL
'X' A.P. MAINTENANCE & REPAIR ENGINEERING PANEL
SIX OTHER 'X' AIRPORT PANELS

NATIONAL SECTIONAL PANELS

PILOT OFFICERS' PANEL
RADIO PANEL
MAINTENANCE & REPAIR ENGINEERING PANEL
SIX OTHER NATIONAL SECTIONAL PANELS

AIRPORT COMMITTEES

LONDON AIRPORT BASE COMMITTEE
ALL OTHER BASE COMMITTEES

NATIONAL JOINT COUNCIL
For the first time they have achieved the right to give their views on what have hitherto been regarded as managerial functions. There have been no easy stepping stones to this position. The responsibility has had to be accepted at a time when the industries are being reorganised and when management too is feeling its way.

The proposed Supervisory Council would not displace the consultative body. It would be in addition to it. Those who are concerned with the difficult job of making a success of this new internal industrial partnership are inclined to look askance at what they consider to be a doctrinaire proposal that yet another body should be brought to life.

To this argument Professor Cole replies that it is useless to wait until industry has had time to sort out its present relationships, because these relationships as they stand are fundamentally unsatisfactory. They are not satisfactory because "something more than consultation is needed." This is, of course, the crucial issue. Is "workers' participation" through consultative machinery ever going to be enough? Will consultation always be considered second best, with consequent dissatisfaction and striving after something different? Or, if it is properly carried out, which in practice it hardly ever is, can consultation fulfill all reasonable aspiration within industry, leaving other issues to be settled outside?

To reach a fair answer to these questions we must turn back to the sociologists mentioned on page 12.

Control and Consultation

The more advanced exponents of modern business management accept a line of thought most fully and clearly expressed in the papers of the American sociologist, Mary Parker Follett. The aim of scientific management is not to impose arbitrary authority on inferiors of any grade, but by careful study of the circumstances to try to discover "the law of the situation". Having discovered it, it is just as much binding on the manager as on the men. Both accept "the situation" which demands such and such action. The giving of "orders", on this view, should not be regarded as imposing one person's will on another. Orders should be "depersonalised". Each worker, according to his place and function, should be given and should accept his own responsibility for helping to find the "law of the situation" relevant to his own job.

Consultation is therefore a true partnership in the search for scientific, impersonal truth. The more any problem is broken down into measurable facts, so that the argument is concentrated on

1 See in particular Dynamic Administration, 1941.
specific data and not on issues of status or opinion, the more satisfactory consultation will be. The task at the highest level is to bring out all the facts, so that the decision, as it were, makes itself.

If this view is accepted, consultation is not merely the giving of advice which may be taken or rejected. It is taking part in the process of sifting the facts which finally “explode” into a decision. Such a process can work only if all accept the basic principle that to run the undertaking in the most efficient way is in fact in the best interest of all concerned. In a private firm, the existence of profit is a barrier to the acceptance of this principle, but in national industries this difficulty does not arise.

This view also involves a change in the attitude towards power. If each person or group is aiming at obtaining or retaining power over another person or group, conflict is inevitable and the battle for power becomes more important than the good of the whole. Power must be thought of as the ability to guide aright, not the power to control other people’s actions. It is co-active, not coercive, to use Miss Follett’s phrase.

The power which the workers will have, in this sense, will depend on their own capacity. To the extent that they have the capacity they will in fact “run the show” and have genuine “control”. To grant formal control to those who do not have the ability to exercise it would be an empty gesture. They would become dependent on others who had the necessary knowledge and who in turn would be the real controllers, whatever nominal authority was vested in the workers.

On this analysis, the alternative is arbitrary authority, not itself based on capacity to contribute and preventing the full contribution of others. This situation is frequently found in business today, but it would be no more desirable if those put in authority were workers instead of owners.

The idea put in philosophic language by the Follett school of sociologists is becoming a guiding principle in the most progressive businesses and in much recent government action. Comparable with “the law of the situation” is the budgetary control now used in large undertakings to the impersonal demands of which departmental heads like everybody else must conform and to the drawing up of which they have contributed. Similarly, under national planning, the various target figures are impersonal “orders” demanded by the national economic situation. The Working Parties and Development Councils are ways of eliciting the contribution of all, without any question of who is the top-dog or under-dog.

Everyone helps to “control” or guide everyone else and all are subject to the “laws of the situation”. It is an idea which was implicit in most of Sir Stafford Cripps’s speeches, with the emphasis on common effort rather than on mutual antagonism.
The Socialist corollary is that injustice between classes in society can be remedied outside industry, by redistribution of incomes and other political means. The community has its own political weapons against those who will not play their part in industry. Within industry, the common aim should be the highest production at the lowest cost in effort and materials, giving everyone at all levels the opportunity of making the best contribution in skill and ideas of which he is capable.

To carry out the principles of dynamic consultation, personal qualities are needed of a high order on both sides. Even if one sets a somewhat lower standard than Professor Cole demands for Guild Socialism, a radical change of outlook is required from the majority of managers and from most workers. A greater responsibility is placed on management, because it is expected that the initiative will come from them. This is not an essential condition and as some American and Scandinavian trade unions have shown, it can come from the workers.

Once the barrier of private ownership is removed, dynamic consultation, in which workers of all grades play a fully active rôle, can bring a real sense of fulfilment. The difficulty is to establish the new kind of relationship in an industry already set in its ways. It is acutely difficult in an industry such as coal mining, where the tradition of management has been peculiarly autocratic. It is easier in a newer and more compact industry like civil aviation, in which the National Joint Council for Civil Air Transport¹ not only has a voice in matters of high policy but also influences senior appointments.

The fact that so few workers have had any first-hand experience of dynamic consultation at its best, or indeed at all, makes it hard to find acceptance for the idea. Those who want something more forget that in complex modern industries workers' control in the popular sense would not do away with managers, any more than they have been done away with in co-operative enterprises. They would still be there, though differently appointed. There would still be problems of the relationship between managerial staff and the rank and file and consultation would still be required.

¹ There is nothing derogatory in consultation with somebody but because the word has acquired the sense of consultation of somebody by someone else, who can pay attention or not as he pleases, the word "consultative" has been left out of the title of this national council. Until consultation has been developed on completely level terms, it would be better for it to be omitted from the other titles too. There is no doubt that the word conveys an idea of "second best". There is no convenient adjective from the verb to participate and in any case there is nothing wrong with "National Joint Council", which conveys the full meaning without reservation.
It is important to emphasise this for another reason. There is talk in some quarters as if there were a left-wing solution which would cause all such troubles to melt away. To judge whether this is likely one can look at the U.S.S.R.

**Is there a Left-Wing Solution?**

In the U.S.S.R. the political class war has been decisively won. But industrial fulfilment has by no means automatically followed. It is clear from Stalin’s speeches and from such reports as one can find that there is no short cut to industrial salvation, even in the workers’ state. Most of the problems of industrial organisation with which we are familiar are to be found in the Soviet Union including absenteeism, labour turnover, need to man basic industries, fixing of incentive wage rates and so on.

The relationship between workers and managers and the functions of trade unions in a planned economy are of particular interest. The relative positions in industry of the director or manager of an enterprise, the trade union organisation and the Party cell were defined in 1929 by a decree of the central committee of the Communist Party (Quoted by Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System*, 1946, p. 171.) Full responsibility for management is laid on the director. His orders are unconditionally binding on all workers, whatever their standing in the Party. He appoints all managerial and technical staff, the trade union and party having the right to state their views and if they disapprove to appeal to higher authority. In the meantime the director’s decision is binding. Foremen are chosen by the workshop committee.

The trade unions are to defend the claims of the workers but must at the same time energetically foster their interest in production and their initiative. The unions must study production methods and the production-finance plan for the factory and industry, but must not intervene directly in management. On the contrary, they should in every way contribute to enforcing unity of control.

The Party is to keep everyone up to the mark, but again without direct interference with management.

With variations, this pattern has continued in Russian industry, the tendency being to lay more, not less, stress on the independent responsibility of management, subject to the supervisory planning authority. So far indeed had the principle been applied that in 1939 the Party Congress reacted against it and once more asserted the right of “primary Communist Party organisations” to supervise the managers of State undertakings. By this time, however, there was a new class of managers to deal with. The workers’ own
"industrial and technical intelligentsia", for which Stalin had called in his famous speech of 1931, had come forward. They had sufficient influence in party councils, no doubt with the help of the war threat in the background, to secure the withdrawal in 1940 of the resolution passed the previous year. Managerial authority was re-established

Meanwhile, 1929 marked the beginning of a change in the functions of the trade unions. With the removal of Tomsky from the post of chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the unions became more and more closely bound up with production problems and were less concerned with protecting the workers' interests. So zealous did some become that Stalin had to remind them of their obligations towards their own members.

This tendency, too, seems to have continued. In conditions of full employment labour discipline has had to be tightened. The setting up of "comradely-production tribunals" in 1931, chosen by the workers, with power to inflict fines and to recommend dismissals, was followed in 1932 by drastic penalties for absenteeism, including the loss of one's house. Penalties had to be entered in the worker's labour book. The tribunals and other disciplinary bodies were not organs of the trade unions, but they could and did call on the unions to reinforce penalties by depriving the culprit of the benefits of union membership for a stated period.

On the positive side, penalties for bad work or slackness have, of course, been matched by rewards, social and material, for exemplary performance and throughout the emphasis has been on the social value of the work done and on the good effect of "socialist emulation". But in general the industrial workers' organisations have had no rights not attainable under a full development of our own proposed system of workers' participation.

Allowing for our late start, which with our more advanced organisation is not such a great handicap, there is nothing for which a worker in a nationalised industry need envy the Soviet worker—at any rate if he is a man!

On the other hand, an interesting experiment in workers' control has recently been reported from Yugoslavia.

In June, 1950, the Yugoslav Parliament passed a law whose preamble states that its aim is the gradual realisation of management of state enterprises by the producers themselves. The law provides for the election by secret ballot in each enterprise of Workers' Councils through which the workers are to participate in management.

The Councils consist of from 15 to 140 members according to the size of the enterprise. They, in turn, elect by secret ballot the Management Board of each enterprise.
The Boards contain from 3 to 11 members, of whom three-quarters must be employees directly engaged in production. They are responsible to the Workers’ Councils and to the higher state organs. Members are subject to recall by decision of the Workers’ Council.

Until the law decrees otherwise managers of enterprise are to be appointed by higher state organs. Each manager is, ex-officio, a member of the Management Board of his enterprise and he is responsible to it and to the higher state organs. He can refer to the higher authority decisions made by the board of management and can defer their execution for ten days but not longer. If there is disagreement the higher state authority must resolve it without delay.

It is too early yet to judge how this bold experiment in workers’ control is working out but it will be watched with interest by British trade unionists, bearing in mind that up to now productivity in Yugoslav industry has not been high.

The New Managers

Having shown that managers are likely to be always with us, our job is to indicate the changes required of them. Briefly, as indicated in the section on consultation, they have to learn the meaning of democratic instead of autocratic authority. At present, many are bemused because they find themselves caught between the new bureaucrats and the workers to whom they are now obliged to listen. In their frustration they are tempted to play off one against the other. Some will never be reconciled. The only remedy for them is to replace them. But many of the younger ones are co-operative, if assured a fair deal, which there is no reason why they should not have.

The main work here is education, which must not be skimmed because of the apparently more urgent claims of production. Recently a group of mine managers was brought for a weekend to discuss managerial problems with their counterparts in one of the most progressive private firms in the country. The mine managers were a generation behind in their ideas on human relations, although technically highly qualified. Many more such interchanges are needed to help the transition.

Management will set the tone in consultation. By far the most important requirements are that the manager should believe in consultation, that he should rid himself of the urge for personal power—which does not mean abandoning responsibility—and that he should regard consultation as being worth much time, effort and patience. Belief in consultation means genuinely taking decisions
with the staff and workers and not presenting them with decisions for acceptance. It means bringing out ideas which the workers themselves may find difficult to express.

The basic lesson for managers is that there is nothing undignified in being accountable for their actions to the workers in their industry, in just the same way as Ministers, the highest servants of the State, are accountable to Parliament and to the electorate.

The Trade Unions

Experience in totalitarian countries, both left and right, emphasises the importance of preserving trade union independence. It has proved a grave disservice to freedom to allow the workers’ organisation to become so closely identified on the one hand with the industry and on the other with the State economic machine that it has no separate vitality of its own.

The dilemma for British trade unions is how to preserve this independence and at the same time to become merged in the new industrial partnership.

Trade unions have grown up as bargaining, and when necessary fighting bodies. The more widely-based the membership the stronger, within reason, the union is likely to be. The workers’ new rôle, that of partners in production, does not require mass force. It calls for intimate and specialised knowledge of each local unit of production.

Branch organisation, with members working in different places, is unsuitable for industrial consultation, while the kind of man who is a good fighter and wage negotiator is not necessarily interested in production. For these and other reasons it is suggested that two industrial hierarchies are needed. The trade unions should keep their traditional rôle and not allow themselves to be submerged by becoming, as it were, too co-operative. They should put the workers’ claims on wages and conditions and be independent channels for expression of grievances, which will be needed. There are times in all large organisations when the normal channels become clogged. If this is accepted, then there is much more point in establishing the Supervisory Council proposed by Professor Cole. It would not then be duplicating the National Joint Councils in function or personnel.

Within each industry, consultative machinery should be set up at all levels by election by the workers actually engaged in the industry concerned. At present, this is the practice at the lower levels only except in coal-mining, where the N.U.M. decided to nominate at pit level too. At Regional and National levels, the workers’ representatives are not directly elected but are nominated by the unions, generally from full-time officers or executive members.
These elected representatives, who should be members of their appropriate trade union, would be concerned with the efficient running of the industry. They would put the workers' point of view on methods of production but they would not be co-operating one minute and bargaining the next. This is important because the rank and file is apt to lose confidence in leaders who seem to be playing two parts.

Whether this is the final solution can be discovered only by trial. It satisfies the full demand neither of workers' control nor of fully integrated consultation. But for the foreseeable future, it holds out the best promise.

Links with the unions, for mutual information, would of course have to be preserved. And the fullest service would be needed from the unions and the T.U.C. in education and discussions of general policy.

This division of function should be seriously discussed, although it is only right to point out that the present trend of trade union opinion is against it. As the N.U.M. decision to nominate to all consultative bodies shows, some trade unionists dislike an organisation which is not tidily within the trade union framework. Trade union officers are reluctant to see others directly elected to positions as rivals to themselves, or in which they may prove troublesome to a union which has no direct control over them.

These are real difficulties, but some apparent sacrifice of trade union prestige may be the best way to safeguard ultimate independence.

Workers' Opinion

Most of our discussion has been about the high level direction of the nationalised industries. It is easier at that level to keep principles in view, because at the lower levels there are so many differences in detailed organisation in the various industries that general discussion becomes unhelpful.

But everyone who has looked at the problem agrees that what matters most for the spirit and success of the social experiment of nationalisation is what goes on in the individual pit, workshop, goods depot, generating station, bus garage and so on. That is where industrial democracy will succeed or fail. It is on the local issues that argument is fiercest and feelings run high and if there is to be trouble, it is more often caused by a local grievance than a national one. Lack of understanding at this level is exacerbated by emotional reaction against the high salaries paid to members and officers of the National Boards, which have shocked many workers, and against the number of new white collar appointments, especially in and about the mines, which have not been adequately explained.
Some of this admired feeling is justified, but much of it, as Arthur Horner has pointed out, is irrational. It would be neutralised if the workers were satisfied that there was a genuine change in the attitude of the management at the level at which they meet it and if they recognised in themselves a power which they did not have before.

The constructive way to acquire this power, as we have indicated, is to acquire knowledge so as to use the opportunities now open. Methods of organisation are of secondary importance and cannot of themselves give satisfaction. Principles generally applicable are that the electorate for consultative bodies at the lowest level must be small enough to allow adequate reporting back and that a line of appeal to the next highest body should be clear. There is nothing more frustrating than being unable to take a step further some suggestion or grievance.

The main need is for widespread, imaginative and sympathetic training, in which political and human questions would not be barred, but would be discussed and analysed by people really interested in finding the answers. Training on a technical level only, including "personnel management", for which much has been done by the Ministry of Labour and other agencies, is not enough.

During the war, time and money could be found for army education, A.B.C.A., British Way and Purpose, Forces Educational Broadcasts and the rest on a scale never attempted in peacetime. Officers and N.C.O.'s were spared to train for the job. Two full-time residential establishments, one in England and one in Wales, were used for nothing but the training of officers to lead discussion groups. The fact that we were fighting for our lives was not accepted as an excuse for keeping them with their units. Much of what was done no doubt had no direct effect on the mass of servicemen. But the keen ones were interested and that interest filtered down, as we saw in 1945.

Our peacetime industrial development is equally necessary for survival. We shall not succeed with nationalisation until every worker who wants to be interested feels the mental and moral stimulus of being able to understand a new and better system.

V.

CONCLUSION

In summing up the discussion, it is clear that nationalisation does not bring a simple solution to the problem of the place of the worker in industry. It removes the very great disincentive to cooperation, the existence of private profit. It also removes the
sanction of ownership, direct or indirect, by which management in the past has justified autocratic rule. Now, the workers as citizens, have together a greater share in ownership than the managers, and everyone in the industry is a servant of the public.

These changes make possible, in a way which is hardly ever possible in private industry, “dynamic consultation” and a genuine partnership. This change in outlook and method cannot come overnight. It needs conscious effort and imaginative training for both workers and managers.

Although in practice the change is most important at the workshop level, the inspiration at this stage must come largely from the top. Education must not be skimped because of pressure for production.

Having said this, two main problems remain. One is the internal problem of authority within the industry. The other is the relation of the industry and those employed in it to the rest of the community.

The demand for “workers’ control” is a demand that authority in industry should reside with the workers. Consultation is said to be not enough because one side—the management—keeps the right to issue orders, and the other side—the workers—has at best a right to make a protest, which may or may not be accepted.

Complete workers’ control would mean that there would be no managerial powers in industry at all, but that everything would be settled by show of hands. This is the real opposite to the contrary principle, best shown in the armed forces, of a chain of unquestioned command coming down from the top. In practice, no one suggests that either extreme could work.

We have tried to indicate instead that industry is partly an organisation like the army, for moving men and materials, and partly a society of individuals. Anyone who has worked in a large organisation knows that orders are needed, that someone has to take responsibility, and that at the time orders are given they must be obeyed. Otherwise, efficient production is impossible.

But because workers are individuals, they have the right to prior consultation whenever possible, and managers must be prepared to account fully for their actions.

“Dynamic consultation” is the term used by certain sociologists to indicate that managerial orders need not be autocratic but should arise out of joint study with the workers concerned of “the law of the situation”. Each then accepts the order as inevitable in the particular circumstances. Objections to this solution are traced to desire for personal power on the one hand and resentment of it on the other.
There should be no "sides" in industry, no "superiors" and "inferiors" but only differences of function based on knowledge and ability.

If human nature were perfect, this would be the final answer.

As it is not, we suggest that everything possible should be done within industry to bring about this kind of consultation and to eliminate conflict. But to safeguard the workers' interests and to provide a channel for views which have not been met through the consultative machinery, the trade unions should preserve their independence and not become too completely identified with the industry concerned.

This involves organising workers in two ways: one according to their positions in the industry and the other through their union.

It is suggested that instead of pressing for direct representation on the Board in charge of the industry, to which there are a number of objections, further consideration should be given to the proposal for a Supervisory Council with direct representation and with direct access to the Minister. The Minister should take policy decisions, with the advice of the Council, and the Board should be executive only.

The foregoing conclusions are based on the assumption that, within a nationalised industry, conflict based on a "class war" concept has no place. In so far as this battle has still to be fought, it should be carried on by political means.

But, as Russian experience shows and as the Guild Socialists foresaw, there still remains the problem of deciding what claim on national resources each industry should have. We are becoming used to sharing out raw materials. Labour targets are set, though not always reached. Wages and conditions are still subject to bargaining, as they were in capitalist industry, but with the scales now weighed more heavily in favour of the workers.

On these subjects, the workers in a nationalised industry cannot be the sole judges. The decisions are political as well as industrial. The workers have the right to press their case and to have full knowledge of the relevant facts. The Boards are equally not in a position to take these decisions. It should not be their business to decide to what share of national resources the industry is entitled. Major price changes are and should be subject to ministerial approval. By this means the government can influence the allocation of resources between one industry and another.

These considerations do not affect arguments for and against workers' control in the domestic affairs of each industry. But the problems arising from centralised economic planning, in which the nationalised industries play an important part, are relevant to any discussion on the workers' new position.
They also serve to emphasise, in conclusion, that miners, railwaymen, transport workers and the rest not only have to accept much more exacting individual responsibility than in the past. Keen political study and activity is as much needed after nationalisation as before, if the change to socialised industry is to be successfully accomplished with the least possible friction and the greatest satisfaction to all concerned.

READING LIST

Democracy in Industry: J. Price
(Workers' Educational Association).

The Union and Workers' Control: Post Office Workers' Union.


Management by Consent: Fabian-Asset Group (Fabian Society). 1/-

Miners and the Board: M. I. Cole (Fabian Society). 1/-

What is a Socialised Industry?: Michael Young
(Fabian Society). 6d.

National Coal Board: G. D. H. Cole (Fabian Society). 2/-

Labour in Nationalised Industry: Fabian Research Group. 2/-

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(Fabian Society). 2/-

Joint Consultation and Responsibility: J. Roper (W.E.A.). 2/-

Works Councils and Committees: Industrial Welfare Society. 2/-

Joint Consultation: Industrial Welfare Society. 5/-

Nationalisation of the Chemical Industry: R. Edwards
(Chemical Workers' Union).
ABBREVIATIONS

A.E.U.       ... Amalgamated Engineering Union
B.E.A.       ... British Electricity Authority
N.C.B.       ... National Coal Board
N.U.M.       ... National Union of Mineworkers
N.U.R.       ... National Union of Railwaymen
T. & G.W.U.  ... Transport and General Workers' Union
U.P.W.       ... Union of Post Office Workers
U.S.D.A.W.   ... Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers
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