CREATING THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

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TWO SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE
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1. Planning Peace

In all discussions of international affairs there are two important pre-requisites. The first is to look at the map and to study its strategic implications. Such a study often shows the objective limitations to what can be done. The other is to consider past policy, whether it be that of a nation or of a political movement; and to reflect upon how the principles guiding or determining past policy can be adapted to the actual situation one confronts, and to people’s aspirations for the future.

Looking back to the period in Britain between the wars, one observes what may seem at first glance a paradox. On the one hand there was an international approach, a marked confidence in such world-wide agencies as the League of Nations, especially in the Labour and Liberal parties; and on the other side, there was a diffidence and, indeed, distrust, not unwarranted by the historical events of the Thirties, of “the Continent”. But these two elements are not necessarily contradictory. There is a certain British optimism that any sound international structure must, to be stable, rest in the last resort upon those same principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law and of the maintenance of human rights, which are also specially recognised and historically exemplified in the British political system. They have been among the major British contributions to Western civilisation, of which the British have been justifiably proud, and which many other countries have made their own.

Many politically minded people, again particularly Labour and Liberal supporters, have transferred their resolute support for the League of Nations to the United Nations. It is, however, quite proper to ask whether the United Nations can, at the present time, realistically be relied upon to maintain and “enforce” peace or, to use the words of the Preamble to the U.N. Charter, “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”? More, can it assure the conditions of personal security and freedom? The logical consequence of these aspirations may be the establishment of some kind of World Government or world security authority, to maintain the international rule of law. Such a development would involve an improved peace-keeping machinery, and effective force to operate it.

The United Nations Charter

At the present time, not only is the United Nations Charter in grave need of revision, owing to the disparity between voting power and executive power, but the Organisation itself faces a serious risk of bankruptcy owing to the failure to pay agreed contributions, or to support U.N. emergency action, for example, in the Congo, on the part of some members, among them the USSR and France. Encouragement in principle of the admirable Secretary-General and his staff is one thing; any development that might enable them to intervene to settle, other than by agreed
arbitration, any dispute between the major Powers, or even their close allies, is quite another. Even the Geneva Protocol’s principle of agreed compulsory arbitration, for which Arthur Henderson fought between the wars, is not yet generally accepted. Although it is in process of erosion, the principle of equal national sovereignty among equal states obtains, at least in theory, in the United Nations. The Afro-Asian bloc, for instance, while willing to discuss in Addis Ababa combined intervention in South Africa, and even African continental union, continues to support national sovereignty in New York and Geneva.

We can debate whether an organisation for effectively upholding international law can best spring from a revision of the present United Nations Charter, or whether the present United Nations can no more turn into a world government than a horse and cart can naturally evolve into a diesel engine. The pace may be different, but the intended function of the UN and of any form of World Authority is the same. The necessarily slow evolution of the UN does not stop other Governments, as well as the United States, from co-operating to form an international Peace Corps of volunteers, nor does it preclude the first stage in establishing the international armed police force contemplated in the United Nations Charter, but never implemented. One such stage has been suggested by Lord Attlee: a Commonwealth armed police force, composed of seconded units or of volunteers. This could be the model for a wider scheme.

Although the UN is probably capable of evolving into a World Authority, and deserves sincere support, it cannot, in its present condition and on its own, maintain a stable peace in the world in a way consistent with personal freedom.

A World Authority and its Control

The real obstacle to world government projects emerges with firm opposition to anything like the troika proposals to divide the UN Secretariat into three. Any kind of international police force has to be used to execute certain decisions and would have to be controlled by some kind of authority. Decisions have to be made and control exercised. Hugh Gaitskell believed that this could be done by setting up a World Authority, which might perhaps gather under its aegis a number of functional international organisations, economic, military, legal and political. There would yet have to be a locus of final sovereignty to decide, or to act as an arbiter.

The United Nations is still “a free assembly of sovereign nations”. Perhaps the formula to be realised is “a sovereign assembly of free nations”. It is not a final objection that this is a remote ideal which has little bearing on the politics of the contemporary world. A ship’s captain would be a poor seaman if, while rightly taking the advice of his navigation officer and his chief engineer while at sea, he had no notion of the port he proposed to reach. Men are “choosing animals”. It is part of their intelligence to know where they are trying to go, and what ideals may be realised.

The obstacle lies not in the remoteness of the world government ideal,
but in the profound conflict about the goal to be reached. This was the reality behind the troika conflict. This is not to say that the Russians and Chinese disapprove in principle of world government. The question is: who exercises decisive control? The West may fear, under any system of democratic world representation, the millions of China. The Communist bloc keeps its eyes fixed on the Afro-Asian bloc as well as on Latin America; and upon the chances of being outvoted in any world assembly that is no longer checked by the veto. The world victory of Marxist-Leninist Communism, it seems to them—or its world defeat—could turn on this issue. Here the Peking Government, in some ways so Stalinist at home, becomes Trotskyite in its international approach. The realistic advocates of world government have to advance with this difficulty in mind.

Despite the difficulties in the short run, a world government is the logical guarantee of peace and will inevitably come. The so-called “absolute sovereign state” was shaped in the Seventeenth Century and is today as out of date for maintaining peace as most other pieces of machinery from that date for their particular functions; its place is in the museum of history. Used under conditions of twentieth century technical knowledge and pressure, the sovereign state will explode. The national states, of course, remain sovereign for specific functions; but the keeping of international peace is not one of these functions. The problem of practical politics is to find a really effective instrument for keeping the peace permanently. Such an instrument cannot be developed in one stage.

The Sharing of Power

Clearly the development of any world structure to enforce peace, and even of an effective United Nations, depends upon an extensive measure of accord and agreement on policy among the Great Powers, or upon the hegemony of one Power or group, a hegemony beyond the prospect of effective challenge. An instance of the former was the extraordinarily optimistic expectation of harmony among the Great Powers who had emerged as victors from the Second World War, an expectation that was the basis of the veto-armed Security Council. An instance of the latter is the situation envisaged by Communists when they speak of the eventual world dominance of their ideology—even although Russian and Eastern European Communists may hold that the route to this dominance lies in organising the support of a majority among the masses of the peoples of the world, so that its achievement beyond possibility of overthrow could come about peaceably and even democratically. Hence there can be “peaceful co-existence” provisionally—and even peaceful competition leading to increased prosperity for all.

The Chinese Communist Government, on the contrary, asserts that such a peaceful development would be challenged militarily by reactionary forces; and, therefore, one cannot dismiss the probability that military domination will also have to be established. However, short of a nuclear or conventional weapons breakthrough of a kind that one cannot predict (least of all of China), the balance of terror makes such military domina-
tion unlikely. The nuclear monopoly which the Americans temporarily held lies in the past.

The realistic alternative to the hegemony of one nation or one group is not a perfect harmony between the Great Powers which is hardly likely to be attained, but the full development of the concept of "peaceful co-existence". Peaceful co-existence—which does not mean the end of ideological warfare but only of military conflict—can be practicable between very diverse social systems. This indeed has happened often enough in the past. It has happened between Christendom and Islam—although only, be it added, after bitter battles such as Lepanto—and between Catholics and Protestants. In the present case, can we reach the compromise without a direct military confrontation?

There have indeed even been military alliances between conflicting social systems, such as the Triple Entente of 1914, which included Republican France and Tsarist Russia. This was a closely organised alliance of power, however much some of the states within it hoped that a liberal parliamentary ideology would prevail, and however much Tsarist Russia hoped for the contrary. Parenthetically it may be pointed out that, nearly a century before, the historian Alexis de Tocqueville prophetically declared that the United States and Russia would be the two super-Powers of the future; but it was yet of a Tsarist Russia that he wrote.

"The Prevention of War"

The major theme of John Strachey's book, The Prevention of War, is that the stable peace of the world, at least for this century, is likely to depend upon a condominium of the two super-Powers, the USA and the USSR. Since the days of the San Francisco Conference of 1945 and earlier, the Soviet Union has tended to conduct her international relations in Great Power terms. Major negotiations or agreements have been reached between the Soviet Union and countries she regards as on a level, militarily and politically, with herself. At San Francisco Molotov held that only the decisions of the Great Powers on the Security Council, holding a veto, demanded serious attention. Indeed these Powers were in his view at most three, the United States, the USSR and Great Britain. China was given a veto as a gesture to Asia's future, and France as a courtesy to the European past.

The same prepossession explained Mr. Khrushchov's periodic anxiety to negotiate directly, at the summit, with the US President, and the difficulties recent British Prime Ministers have sometimes in the past encountered in trying to get themselves accepted as serious negotiators. That nuclear power should be held only by two Powers was re-emphasised by Mr. Khrushchov in his talks in 1963 with Mr. Harold Wilson in Moscow. The same policy explains the chilly reception of the tentative diplomatic flirtations and hints about a Europe extending from the Atlantic to the Urals which were put forward by General de Gaulle.

President Roosevelt, thinking in condominium terms, contemplated a direct deal with Stalin, about whom he had optimistic views, even at the
cost of unshipping the pilot in the shape of the “imperialist” Churchill. The view that the USA and the Soviet Union (who have, as was proclaimed in 1941, “never yet fought a war”) cannot get together, does not square with the historical facts, whatever may be the prepossessions of ideological doctrinaires. Now that the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and that country’s broadcasting system can openly mourn the death of an American President, all things are possible.

The Observer (30th December, 1962) had an editorial on Strachey’s idea of basing world government on a duopoly of nuclear arms under the effective control of the USA and USSR alone, acting through the United Nations.

“Critics have answered that such a system could not be imposed on a recalcitrant France, let alone on a determined China. This may prove to be so; but in that case, no system of world government with less powerful backing would have a hope of obliging such recalcitrants to comply: and a government that cannot enforce its edicts is no government at all . . . so far our own Government has scarcely given a lead.”

A main and urgent object of policy must be to prevent a wider distribution of thermo-nuclear weapons. The logic of national sovereign independence, prestige and glory is opposed to such a policy. The interest of humanity is in its favour. By the time Albania has the Bomb, then, by accident, irresponsibility or escalation from a conventional war, nuclear destruction will not be possible but probable. The “Unthinkable” will have happened. This downward slide must be stopped, if necessary by force majeure: above all, existing nuclear Powers should neither sell nuclear arms nor assist in their manufacture by third countries.

The obvious reply to Strachey would be that the smaller countries of the world would never tolerate his proposal. Their leaders and electorates would never stand for it. The response here is: does it matter, in power terms, what they think, or what they would tolerate? If necessary, they will have to be told. They will have to be embargoed. This is a harsh and undiplomatic way of putting the matter. But it closely connects with the great nuclear conundrum: how many fingers finally on the trigger?

What, nevertheless, is true, and what diplomatic statesmanship must reckon on, is that the legitimate political and military claims of those countries which are not Super-Powers must also be taken into account, through recognised and organised consultation. An international dictatorship, even a diarchy, is not a happy solution. This point we shall have to discuss further, as well as whether the Europe of the Six is not itself a Super-Power.

The central question is whether there is any serious prospect, in view of their ideological differences, of Washington and the Kremlin coming to such a dual arrangement. As mentioned above there are historical precedents, some of them in very recent history, for believing that this might be possible. Turning to the current ideological differences, we must rid our minds of cant: a century hence, many of our so-called ideological differences will be looked at with wondering incomprehension. To the pure
Communism of, say, the Israeli Kibbutzim, few people entertain any objection, although they may doubt its general practicability in the industrialised modern world. There is much to be said in favour of the idea. As to “materialism”, there are in the West fully as many “materialists”, governed by the profit motive and corrupting our culture, as there are in the Soviet Union. The same applies to “atheists”, whether inside or outside the religion of Marxism. It is not only in the Soviet Union, after all, that the Lord’s Prayer may not be recited in the State schools: it happens in the United States.

In the political sphere, most people in the West prefer the multi-party system. But it is not sacred, and whereas some peoples accept it, others have freely voted for its rejection. Many countries who are allied to the United States or Britain have a one-party or non-party system, or even a “benevolent dictatorship”. Among the allies of the Soviet Union, restrictions on political life and intellectual life have been considerably relaxed: in Poland, Hungary and Russia itself, there is greater freedom of speech, if not yet of the Press or of political organisation, than at any time since the last war. In economics, both the Soviet bloc and the West are increasingly coming to accept the principle of social planning, made dynamic by competition. The Soviet Union confronts the problem of meeting consumer choice, and thus the beginnings of a free market, at a time when the Western nations recognise that profits and wages cannot be decided entirely by the movements of the market, but must be guided by the national interest. Of course, in some doctrinaire quarters on both sides, there is a fanatical desire to impose one social and doctrinal blueprint upon the world by force, and this must be resisted. The real issue is one of power and dominance: and issues of power have always been matters for possible accommodation.

On all questions of accommodation, optimism must be tempered by prudence. However, if effective power passed to the Soviet Army, it might be easier to deal with than any political party of ill-defined but fanatical inspiration. This is indeed thought probable in the Pentagon. Alternatively, the Soviet people may politically “normalise”, becoming primarily concerned with their standard of living at home, and with the relaxation of restrictions, and less with the forwarding of any revolutionary doctrine.

In short, far from a Washington-Kremlin agreement being impossible, it is frequently argued that, in practice if not in principle, American policy today is concerned to reach some wide-ranging agreement on policy with the Soviet Union, the partial test-ban being one example. The effort to take the tension out of the relationship between the two countries has again been demonstrated by their independent decisions to reduce the size of their military budgets. All this, however, is quite different from the argument, sometimes coupled with it, that Washington, in pursuit of this policy, has lost interest in Europe, NATO and the Atlantic Union. This is false, nor it is to be supposed that the US will go behind the backs of its allies in reaching or seeking agreement. Indeed there is probably too much timidity in the US State Department about such a suspicion being awakened.
On the contrary, French policy has recently been assuming the stance that all discussions of policy with Washington by “United Europe” must go diplomatically through Paris.

The Pacifists

It may be argued that the theme that accommodations of power are the best guarantee of peace is misguided; that it is not true to allegation that all politics is power politics, whether operating through co-operation or domination. The right route, it may be said, is very simple. If everybody gave up war, there would be no wars. Fighting—even including violence on the part of civil authorities, like the police—is morally wrong.

This is not just impractical nonsense. That an entire nation, led by a disciplined corps, might sit down and fold its arms, is an aspect of the tactic of civil non-co-operation. It appeared in Socialist circles once, in the form of the argument, by Jaurès and others, for a General Strike. Similar tactics, for example, as used by Norwegians in the period of Nazi occupation, can be of considerable embarrassment to the conquering power. However, a demand for lasting and total non-co-operation directed against a conqueror government is in effect an appeal for permanent anarchy among the conquered. It is a difficult policy to sustain, likely, as against the Vichy Government of France, to turn to other forms of resistance.

The doctrine of Gandhi is often given as an instance of successful non-co-operation. But that doctrine is now being busily reinterpreted in India as one limited to civil disobedience and not designed to cope with international conflicts. This almost certainly does the Mahatma an injustice; but his spiritual successor, Vinoba Bhave, does not go beyond saying that, if rifles have to be used, they will be fired with “reluctance and regret”. In effect the Indian attitude favours an appeal to public opinion and to the world’s conscience, and its diplomacy is conducted with great self-control; but it is not a full-blown acceptance of the pacifist position.

There is, however, a permanent value in pacifist opinion. It lies in preserving a balance of public attitudes. So long as there are many “unreconstructed” people in the world who think that political problems can best be solved in primitive traditional terms by “sword and shield”, and who make no radical attempt to change political patterns and agencies now utterly archaic, there is a case for the presence of those holding an entirely opposed view, who would rather die, protesting, under the rule of a tyrant, than take to war. A sane public opinion can emerge from this clash of views.

Further, a public opinion shaped in part by obstinate peace-mindedness can compel statesmen to bestir themselves to vision and moral courage, instead of being tempted to behave traditionally, quieting their consciences by saying that they have done all that can be expected of them, while “backing their machines over the precipice”. Such stubborn supporters of peace put a brake upon appeals to irrational national passion and jingoism. It also encourages a willingness to take some risks for the sake of peace on earth, and for the slow growth of mutual trust between peoples.
An international police force, like a domestic police force, can only be successful in maintaining peace if a world public is educated in, and accepts, the habit of peace-mindedness, and if, moreover, there is an habitual and general confidence in such an institution.

The Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons

The demand for the total renunciation of nuclear weapons for national ends, whether general or unilaterally by Britain, raises issues which cannot be adequately discussed here. There is a solid argument for the renunciation of a type of weapon which is crushingly expensive (especially if a second strike force is taken into account), where, within an alliance, this armament can be functionally better maintained by others. It might, of course, be necessary to have a counter-balancing expansion of conventional arms, pending agreed measures of disarmament. But beyond the technical argument, there is of course a crucial political one. It is difficult, to say the least, to campaign against the indiscriminate spread of nuclear weapons, so likely to end in "accidental" war, if one insists on a privileged position for oneself, which other countries of similar standing may well want to imitate. It is not by any means certain that a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons by Britain would be an example that would be followed elsewhere, e.g. by France. But it is likely that such a proclaimed readiness to make a future renunciation would make it far easier to draw the line at the present position, and to prevent any further nuclear dispersion. It is deplorable that disarmament, defence and foreign affairs are so often treated as segregated subjects. While Geneva labours on disarmament, NATO has not even a subsection working on such problems.

What must be realised, however, is that there is no simple solution to international tensions. Even those who are prepared to put up no resistance of any kind to an attack or bid for domination will not find the solution lies there. The slogan "Better Red than dead", for all its sickeness, avoids the technical probability that, in any area of nuclear war, even those willing to become opportunistically "Red" will find themselves dead also. If such a war took place in Europe, no European country could hope to escape completely. Indeed a neutralist policy, which would upset the present balance, might encourage a gamble and thereby increase the chances of war.

The conclusion is obvious. Nuclear war has finally to be excluded, as an instrument of policy, by effective power. This must mean the development of mutual confidence in an agency, first a regional one within the United Nations, then taking in a majority of states, and finally global in its scope. The escalation to nuclear war from some conflict of "vital interests", for instance oil in the Middle East, must be checked at its beginning. It is entirely premature, and indeed mistaken, to try abruptly to bring the Soviet Union into the Western camp, or even to presume that, in a crisis, Russia and China would not act together. Indeed, such strategic and economic influence as the Soviet Union may have in Peking is of immense importance; for it will enable China to be gradually brought
within any world settlement. But, in the first place, the need is to work out a modus vivendi, or some measure of habitual co-operation and confidence, between the USA and the Soviet Union, who hold the actual requisite power between them.

The task of statesmen is to treat the establishment of a stable peace as their prime object in politics, while obtaining, for those of their countrymen and their allies who share similar values, the best deal compatible with that object. In a negotiation between the giant Powers, the sincerity of purpose which generates confidence must be displayed. It is crucial to avoid such deplorable and gauche mis-timings as the U-2 incident, and to resist pressure from selfish combinations of industrial and military power. It is also necessary that the negotiator should have the power that the other side respects. A major cause of war is the temptation to take an irresponsible gamble.
2. Regional Arrangements

An examination of the documents shows that the honeymoon of the West and the Soviet Union, between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the "Cold War", lasted only a few weeks. It was soon eclipsed by the vexed issue of free elections in Poland. The excessively optimistic supposition of unity among the veto-holding Powers in the Security Council evaporated. Increasing disillusionment about what the United Nations, no longer "a club of the like-minded" but "a town-hall of the world", could do in executive terms to enforce peace, led many of its members to seek security in another quarter. These were Regional Arrangements, authorised under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter itself. It was hoped that a firm mutual confidence might be developed within these arrangements.

NATO and OEEC

Ernest Bevin, in the Brussels Treaty of 1948, made an unprecedented commitment on Britain's part to guarantee the security of continental Western Europe, though West Germany was still at this time excluded. However, with the formation of the Western European Union in 1954, the German Federal Republic was brought within the ambit of the organisation. The Brussels Treaty was a stage in the organisation of an effective alliance for Western defence, which culminated in the establishment of NATO. But the development of regional organisation was not exclusively military. The Hague Conference, sponsored by six voluntary organisations, met in May, 1948, to consider the political implications. Issuing from this, the Statute of the Council of Europe was signed in London in May, 1949, and the Council first met in Strasbourg three months later. George Marshall's famous speech at Harvard in 1947 was seized upon by Ernest Bevin, and from that grew OEEC and a parallel regional development on the economic side.

ECSC and EEC

The European Coal and Steel Community, which came into existence in 1951, was the outcome of a different kind of approach to regional arrangements. The High Authority of this community was from the beginning supranational; and its status was recognised by the accreditation of permanent Government representatives to it, and later to the European Economic Community—in effect, ambassadors. Robert Schuman, briefly Premier and for long Minister of Foreign Affairs for France, was largely responsible for the creation of ECSC, together with that able civil servant, Jean Monnet. Schuman never concealed his belief that the issues of sovereignty and political organisation could not be avoided, and that functional agencies could not operate for long, efficiently, without some control of
their political direction. The British Government persistently expressed a preference for a more modest approach, not going beyond close intergovernmental co-operation, until the decision, a decade later, to apply for membership of the EEC.

The first major reverse for this new and hopeful policy, supported by Alcide de Gasperi of Italy and Conrad Adenauer of West Germany as well as by Schuman, came with the defeat in 1954 of the proposals for a European Defence Community (EDC), which has aroused bitter controversy in the Fourth Republic. M. Pierre Mendès-France felt that less ambitious proposals were more likely to meet with British co-operation; and the scheme was shelved. It was due to disappointment over this failure that the late John Foster Dulles spoke of a possible “agonising re-appraisal” of US policy towards Europe. In retrospect, it seems possible that a great blunder was made, despite Lord Avon’s arguments to the contrary. But the proposals for a European Economic Community went forward. The Messina Conference, in which the British Government did not choose to take official part, took place in June, 1955, and the consequent Treaty of Rome was signed in March, 1957, coming into force in the following year. As a counterbalance, the British Government set out to organise the seven EFTA countries into a free trade area, but without any central authority possessing supranational powers. In the view of some authorities, Britain had made the wrong choice in staying out of the EEC. Mr. Dean Acheson, sometime US Secretary of State, and a good friend of Britain’s, declared that she had lost, through too much scepticism and too little vision, a sense of the historical role that she had to play.

**British entry into EEC**

The more recent developments in the Common Market controversy will be fresh in most people’s minds and do not need to be recited here. Mr. Macmillan swung so far towards the view that entry into the EEC was vital, that the Sunday Times was able to write editorially, “there is no political alternative, for the Conservative Party, for whom Europe is now the central strand of policy”. What one is entitled to say is that, if Britain had been a party in the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Rome, the leadership of the emerging Community would almost certainly have been hers. As it was, the organisation of the Common Market increasingly became an arrangement, for their mutual benefit, between French farmers and German industrialists. In Mr. Walter Lippmann’s words, the EEC tended to become “a closed community under French control with German assistance”. This development culminated in the, in many ways, admirable Franco-German Treaty of 1962; thereafter British entry on tolerable terms became increasingly difficult in itself, as well as more clearly involving breaches of EFTA and Commonwealth pledges already given.

**French Policy**

French policy affirms that a European bloc would be economically strong enough to become a Third World Power and to afford its own nuclear
weapons. Its exponents persistently suspect that the US Congress cannot be guaranteed to be permanently committed to such a Europe. Since the present NATO Treaty permits secessions in five years' time, they really visualise a new kind of NATO—their own. And they hold that the Soviet Union can be safely defied, on the hypothesis that it will not in fact go to war, because the Americans, here useful, will have no option but to check this, should it happen. In brief, they assume an "Anglo-Saxon" shield of protection, while feeling free to cock a Gallic snook at the US and the UK. It could become a policy of calculated contempt.

However, it is a very dubious assumption that Dr. Erhard or Willi Brandt will play this game. Both of them have reiterated time and time again, their loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, and their support for the idea of a partnership, a union of the two great clubs. Certainly, as Lippmann has said, "the partnership which we have assumed to be existing has in fact been struck a shattering blow"—his comment on the final breakdown of the negotiations for British entry in 1963. But, as has been happily said, no one yet knows for certain whether President de Gaulle himself is "an unconditional Gaullist".

Breaking up NATO

One challenging view of the present European situation has been put forward by Dr. George Lichtheim in *Europe and America: The Future of the Atlantic Community*. The author believes that the future of the Atlantic Community is nil. What Britain should still do is to join the Common Market, if possible, on the probable French terms. The Commonwealth is not a unit, although it could be "a trading partner". "We are not here concerned," says the author, "with the prospects of these countries". As for the British, who lag economically behind their Continental neighbours, they "must get over their lingering attachment to the myth of Anglo-American partnership". Culturally, this particular partnership, or supposed partnership, is viewed by the continental Europeans with hostility. What is proposed is a third Gaullist force, a new "little giant", brandishing independent sovereignty between the two other giants, which "little giant" is here called "Europe", though it is, of course, no more than North-western Europe plus a dubious Italy.

In brief, the book advances a plan for breaking up NATO, the assumption being that the West in two parts—two mutually suspicious parts—can balance the Soviet Union and keep the peace. In the words of M. Guy Mollet, "this presupposes the end of an integrated NATO". It is also deeply hostile to a USA-USSR rapprochement. What we have instead is a profoundly reactionary attempt to replace either One World or a Commonwealth of Free Nations by a revived absolute sovereignty, regional and exclusive, clad in the imperial cloak of Charlemagne.

The right kind of Regional Organisation

The customary argument against all regional arrangements, especially of a closed or "community" nature, is that they only conduce bigger and
better wars. This argument is unsound because, as with the EEC, they can eliminate the very real risk of war between old enemies which are brought together *within* the regional arrangements; and because Russian policy, for a generation or more, has been indisposed to serious negotiation except with Great Powers. It is quite true that the Soviet Union, while maintaining the Warsaw Pact, has denounced NATO as "aggressive", an allegation not borne out by the actual military dispositions of NATO. But the probable condition of Western Europe today if, in the later days of Stalin, the NATO alliance had not been established, it not pleasant to consider. It is also unsound because regional arrangements are the only present practical steps, concurrently with U.N. development, towards a wider or even worldwide organisation in which sovereignties will be "pooled".

The discussions about NATO, EFTA, and the Common Market in the last few years have revolved around the central question of the kind of regional organisation we want.

One fundamental observation can be made at the outset. A regional organisation is only desirable in so far as, in policy and structure, it is "open-ended" and can be expected to evolve in the general direction of a world system, which, as we have said, is alone able to be finally responsible for the maintenance of peace. It must have a definite urge towards economic understandings, trade links and even administrative co-operation with other areas; and it must not be restrictive and autarchic beyond the actual requirements of its own growth. All this is precisely what the Common Market of the Six, anyway (under its present dominating influences) mainly French, unfortunately is not.

The European Economic Community

To agree with what is said above is not to condemn the European Economic Community as such. It is rather to say that the policy of the Community as at present shaped by Paris, despite the vigorous protests of many Frenchmen, has taken an unfortunate new direction. The objection to the European Community is not one of principle, but is a repudiation of its rejection of a broader membership and an objection to its political framework. What, then, is to be done? Or, more exactly, what should Britain do?

It may well be said that Britain should wait for a more favourable moment to join the Common Market, pending some change (which it is optimistically assumed will be for the better) in the political condition of France, such as the final entry of General de Gaulle into Olympus. Dr. Erhard is very ready to consider a wider community. He has used his influence to work for wider Community advances in connection with the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations, though it is still difficult to predict what will come out of these negotiations. But, despite Dr. Erhard's efforts, the prospects for British membership of OEEC on any agreed terms, let alone on terms other than the straightforward acceptance of the formulae of the Treaty of Rome, are far from bright.
A Wider Framework

The crux of the matter is, of course, the conditions of entry. And of these conditions, those that affect British relations with the Commonwealth are the most difficult of all to agree upon. The wider framework of the Atlantic Community or even the Commonwealth of the Free World, a framework for the present and specifically including the whole Commonwealth, North America and Western Europe, can overcome this difficulty in a fashion satisfactory for Britain and the Commonwealth. Merger in an exclusive and autarchic North-west European bloc, after the British people have (in General de Gaulle's words) "detached themselves from everything that holds them outside our community", would be a submergence lethal for the Commonwealth and contemptible for Britain.

It has often been claimed by responsible people that both the EEC and the Atlantic Community are desirable goals; but that, instead of the diplomatic building of the structure moving simultaneously and pragmatically, the Common Market of the Six must be firmly established first. Events have falsified this policy, whatever its abstract desirability or otherwise. For the Common Market, on this argument, was itself seen as capable of extension to take in other members, in particular Britain. The breakdown of the 1962-63 negotiations showed that this could not be taken for granted. Secondly, the political content of the Community was such that close political ties with other international groupings, like Britain's with the Commonwealth and the United States, were not easy to reconcile. Those who believed that only an economic negotiation was involved should have learned better from Dr. Hallstein's blunt statement: "We are not in business; we are in politics", It is easy enough to say that the Commonwealth and the Common Market are not incompatible, and what is wanted for Britain is to be in both; but how?

Commonwealth Interests

Commonwealth opinion about British entry into the Common Market ranged from the dubious to the openly hostile. Mr. Lester Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, has consistently favoured, on a liberal economic basis, the policy of the Atlantic Community and the Kennedy Round of tariff liberalisation; and he has restored closer relations with the United States. Mr. John Diefenbaker led the opposition to British entry into the EEC, emphasising that "the Commonwealth is the only proven pattern of mutual tolerance, understanding and co-operation". In Melbourne, Sir Robert Menzies, talking in terms not of political emotion (which may yet help to win wars) but of statistics, said "there are people in Britain—some of them very highly placed—who have yet to learn of the massive extent of the trade between this country and Britain..."

The distinctive political strength of Britain, manifested in many a moment of crisis, has lain precisely in her Commonwealth ties. If it can be said that "the British Isles are geographically part of Europe", like Spain or Sweden, equally Europe itself is just a peninsula of Eurasia—
and the Soviet Union, in both Europe and Asia, underlines this fact. In language, culture and stock, Britain has other connections.

A dynamic Britain has to consider her own economic development. Likewise each of the other Commonwealth countries has to watch what may be for the benefit of its own economic future. Sometimes this has meant the imposition of tariffs on British goods in order to protect infant industries, and industrialists at home have not been voiceless in making their protest. The fact remains that Britain exports more to the Commonwealth and dependencies than to all the European Six, although recently Britain has increased both her Commonwealth and also her European exports.

If Britain is going to be the seventh member of the Community, with all that this implies, the Commonwealth countries will take a new look at their own interests, one consequence of which may be closer ties with the United States. Canada is already closely linked to US capital, as a condition of her own development; Australia and New Zealand are indubitably strategically dependent. If there is a tendency towards Britain becoming merely European, it could spell the break-up of an historic association. The members of the Commonwealth will become “foreign”.

These two divergent interests can only be reconciled if a completely new framework of discussion is involved. That framework will have to include Western Europe, minus the Iberian peninsula, and the Commonwealth. The late Lord Beaverbrook’s long and hard-fought campaign for a Commonwealth Free Trade Area alone is not practicable, since, to take but one example, his own native country of Canada will not play. But Mr. Harold Wilson’s outward-looking, free-trade and monetary proposals, first made in Washington in April, 1963, are practicable. Within this wider regional framework specific British problems and specific Commonwealth problems can be solved, especially if a substantial part of the Kennedy Round’s proposals are adopted. Nor would it be wise to postpone consideration of an Atlantic initiative until the EEC’s differences have been ironed out. It is doubtful whether the EEC, as at present constructed, could ever expand by natural evolution from this nucleus into an Atlantic Community, as distinct from a military alliance. It has to be reshaped; and an Atlantic initiative should be an element in its reshaping.

It may be thought unsatisfactory that acceptance of any common ideology, such as lies behind the Warsaw Pact, should be required for a community of free nations. At least this is arguable. Nevertheless, if such a community is to be developed, there is a strong case for its having a democratic basis. The Treaty of Rome makes no such requirement, and the recent history of Germany, Italy and even France, offers no such guarantee.

Finally, as regards the Commonwealth itself, much could be done that is not being done. Not only is a Commonwealth-wide Development Commission required in general but, in specific terms, Commonwealth trade should be deliberately encouraged as a matter of policy. For this purpose an established Trade Commission, holding regular meetings, appears to be
needed. Some of the Commonwealth countries are at a stage when they require products which we are ceasing to require here. For the products of our locomotive works, railway machine shops, and some kinds of engineering works, there is a vast potential demand. As Harold Wilson suggested at Seaham in May, 1963: "We should agree to expand those sections of our industrial system where existing capacity is inadequate to meet Commonwealth needs . . . we should agree to work jointly for world-wide commodity agreements to stabilise primary prices . . . and expand the volume of world liquidity for financing world trade". Above all, we should co-operate to the full in the aid which nations who boast that they are prosperous can give to those which can make no such claim. We must seek to offer our aid in such forms as grants, no-interest or very low-interest loans, which do not add to their ever-increasing debt.
AS the limitations of what the United Nations could achieve in the enforcement of peace were recognised, NATO was developed on the military side and European Union on the economic and cultural side. However, for some decades there had been an alternative line of thought.

The “Special Relationship”

As long ago as 1909, A. J. Balfour put on paper, for Theodore Roosevelt’s eye, a memorandum entitled The Possibility of an Anglo-Saxon Confederation. It contemplated a joint Foreign Office and Admiralty, and stated: “If England and America do not federate, the history of the world will continue to be one of warfare”. Had, indeed, some action been taken on the document, the history of 1914–1918 might have been different. However, federal or even confederate union was far too strong meat at that time for the public and the politicians, while objection to anything that might appear like a cultural bloc was rightly strong for free traders. The union itself was disliked by imperialists, who felt that they could very well “go it alone”.

The proposal was still to be too much to take, when advocated in broad Western terms by Clarence Streit in Union Now, in 1939, and later, again by him, for a more limited area. The blunt truth about wider schemes at this juncture was that Germany and Italy were enemy countries along with Japan; that Russia had negotiated the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact; and that France was soon to be under the Vichy Government. Proposals had, therefore, to be made in terms of that part of the free world that was actually allied against the Axis and fighting against it or was soon to do so. This part was in fact almost exclusively English-speaking, apart from the Soviet Union.

Historically the Republican Party of the United States has always hitherto favoured the “special relationship” between Britain and the United States, since the days when the Party was influenced by that eminent strategist, Admiral Mahan. Over half the white population of the USA claims descent from Britain or from Ireland. Apart from population descent, the special relationship is a matter of language, law and history. As M. Georges Pompidou, the French Prime Minister, significantly said in Paris: “The Anglo-American link is not a European link”.

The Democratic Party in the United States has a traditionally different view, which the British Labour Party should be peculiarly able to appreciate. Here, indeed, the two Parties tend to think and feel together. Opposed to regionalism save under stress (although later a vigorous supporter of NATO), the Democratic Party since Woodrow Wilson has affirmed, as Party policy, its strong support for international organisations, first the League of Nations and then the United Nations, and for a global approach, only modified by the necessary distinctions based on ease of collaboration.
On the British side, dislike of the "special relationship" has been envenomed by a vocal anti-Americanism, less in evidence in Britain than in certain Continental countries, but evident enough, especially on the extreme Right and the extreme Left, and on analysis largely inspired by self-righteousness, jealousy and envy. This chauvinist jealousy does not contribute to, but rather weakens, that chance of reaching a satisfactory accommodation between Washington and Moscow on which the peace of the world actually depends.

The enemies or rivals of Britain, from Bismarck to Hitler, have recognised, as basic, her "special relationship" with the USA and also with Canada and Australasia. The USA has a dominant economic relationship with Canada, and a dominant strategic one with Australia and New Zealand. The "special relationship" is, as a matter of fact, an association which has saved democracy on more occasions than one. Traditional dislike of les pouvoirs anglosaxons has been seldom absent from the mind of General de Gaulle. But such exclusiveness is deplorable. A sound world policy must be at a minimum an Atlantic policy, which includes Europe with others. It is not an Anglo-Saxon or a North-west European policy. It is an Atlantic policy or one that might more happily be called a policy of the Free World Commonwealth, essentially including India and the new Commonwealth countries and the other developing countries, as stages to a wider integration on the international plane. Here is to be found that wider framework or "tripod" arrangement which has been mentioned above.

The Atlantic Community

The Atlantic Community, strictly construed, is not perhaps a fortunate title. At a minimum the concept is thought of as including Australia and New Zealand, which are in the Pacific. If it is to be "open-ended", then all appearance of a racial bloc or a club of rich nations must be avoided. The inclusion of such Commonwealth countries as those of the Indian sub-continent is, therefore, important. It is essential that co-ordinated assistance shall be given by the wealthy nations, acting jointly, to the developing countries of the world, in such a fashion that the risk of building an exclusive bloc of the "have" nations shall not only be avoided, but be seen to be avoided.

We must not, however, be too literal-minded. NATO includes Greece and Turkey, which are not on the North Atlantic, both of which are developing countries. The phrase "the Atlantic Community" will serve for the present, although the phrase "the Commonwealth of the Free World" is, in certain contexts, preferable. The periphery must be as wide as possible. The effective nucleus, in terms of resources and power, is likely to be an Atlantic one for the foreseeable future. If the relationship between Britain and Western Continental Europe is to become closer, not least if Britain should again contemplate membership of the EEC, this can only be done within a framework, or an "organic union" including not only EFTA, the Six and the Commonwealth, but North America too. This is obvious on strategic and financial grounds alone, leaving out cultural bonds.
To omit the United States would be like leaving her out of NATO and expecting what was left to be effective.

To get one important power to adjust its interests to those of another has been, through the whole history of politics, notoriously difficult. Perhaps a major cause of the contemporary malaise in France and in Britain, which can easily be stimulated into a popular neurosis, is the emotional crisis of adjustment to other nations following from diminished military power and injured national pride. But at present we in Britain have reason to be satisfied with the pace and nature of our adjustment, since there is the prospect of an evolution towards a greater future joint influence. Within such a joint arrangement, the "subordination" of British to American views should not be necessary.

Building the Partnership

It is frequently alleged, not without justification, that Washington tried for several years to push Britain into the EEC in the belief that, once there, she would assume the leadership in policy and could be relied upon to mitigate any anti-American tendencies. This was to count on too much. Any such attempt to seize the leadership by a late arrival suspect of being an Anglo-American "Trojan Horse", was doomed by French resistance.

It is much more to the point that Britain should early, not late, throw herself wholeheartedly into building an Atlantic partnership; should not repeat her earlier error of hesitant delay; and should assert her leadership by pressing for this partnership to be a genuine one, in which Congress must listen to its European partners, instead of assuming an isolated self-sufficiency or a policy of "go-it-alone".

One first consequence of an Atlantic partnership or community, or an "organic union", is that Britain, Canada and other members should not only be habitually consulted on high policy by Washington, but that their views should, as a routine and accepted matter, be allowed proportionate weight in shaping the policy of the Community on matters that affect the well-being of all the members. The traffic of partnership must be a two-way traffic. The USA must be prepared to consult and co-ordinate as a firm practice, no less than her allies, who enjoy an equal sovereign dignity.

At the present time, according to a recent poll, 70 per cent of the people of Britain do not feel that the Americans, in any significant sense, treat them an equal partners. The electors or Senators from Nebraska must not be under the archaic illusion that they, any more than the electors or M.P.s of Britain or France, are sovereign in deciding the policy of the whole free world. There must be habitual and routine consultation.

An "organic union", would involve a steady interchange of personnel at all administrative levels; the development (as obtained during the last war) of the appropriate organs of co-operation; the erosion of legal obstacles to all this, based upon too rigid juristic concepts; and a mutual influence on policy. There seems to be a case for eliminating duplication by bringing NATO and OECD, despite some differences in membership, into closer administrative conjunction; and perhaps for developing and giving official status to a joint Parliamentary Assembly. There are some
grounds for believing that existing Congressional rules might so far be changed as to permit the U.S. Congress to be adequately represented. Such representation could not only encourage personal understanding, but have a two-way effect upon policy. Certainly there is a strong feeling that, if there is going to be a community or partnership, Congress must make changes and acknowledge the new situation. The decisive Congressional support for President Kennedy’s Trade Expansion Act indicated “a wind of change”.

The Defence of Europe

Although the strategic details of the partnership cannot be discussed here, clearly every Government must be assured of the reliability of its allies before yielding control of its own weapons. The French Government is alleged to feel that the US cannot be guaranteed to provide for the nuclear defence of Europe. It also feels, by something of a lapse in logic, that France can be guaranteed to provide this defence for a non-nuclear Germany. But mutual confidence is the basis of NATO, as of every military alliance. The indivisibility of the defence and the vital strategic importance of Western Europe lies in the centre of the American scheme. This, however, means that the President, and even more Congress, must recognise more explicitly that the USA also is not fully independent of her allies. This last point, rightly seen by the French to be crucial, does not preclude each country retaining forces adequate to protect local interests, though the day for Suez adventures lies in the past. Of course, the political adjustment that is needed in the United States towards NATO is paralleled within Europe. The military commitment by France and Britain to the Alliance (not only NATO) has tended to be the first commitment that is pared down, in the belief that the USA will take up the slack. A higher political priority for the Atlantic Community in American terms must be matched by a high military priority in British and French terms. However, this priority of commitment will, in the contemporary situation, affect crucial areas beyond the North Atlantic area as well as within it.

Whether the desire of many nations, possibly including the Germans, to have a share in the control of nuclear armaments is best met by an “in-mixing”, a multinational nuclear force, such as the proposed MLF or ANF, is controversial. It should be said that it is an honest attempt to meet a political and diplomatic difficulty which, in the long run, should give the maximum guarantees and minimum offence to the Russians. A multinational force as such (perhaps non-nuclear) is certainly not, to use Lord Montgomery’s words “utter and complete poppycock”. The crux lies in the restriction to the practicable minimum of persons (which logically means the US President) who can authorise its use.

For the moment only the Americans and British, and more questionably the French, have their fingers on the trigger; but this situation can scarcely persist. Some kind of multilateral Presidential council or controlling board, linked with NATO and responsible for the Strategic Air Command, seems to be called for. This constitutional consultation would not conflict with Mr. Wilson’s position that “only the United States should have (the
final custody of the West’s nuclear deterrent”. The Conservative policy of an independent British deterrent deliberately pointed at great centres of urban and industrial population, as distinct from conventional arms or a second-strike force, is not an agreeable one.

Creating the Community

All this does not necessarily mean setting up some kind of common Foreign Office. There are many matters in which one of the Allies has prime interests and the others are little concerned. But it would mean that meetings of heads of Government became routine, as proposed at the meeting of the US President and the Canadian Premier. Also, in economic terms, it could mean the negotiation of international commodity agreements within the scope of the President's general tariff policy. It could, as suggested by Mr. Alastair Buchan, spell a reshaping of NATO, probably in closer conjunction with a non-military OECD, and an enlargement of its civilian staff. Clause 2, the economic and cultural clause of the NATO Charter, also requires far fuller implementation than it has hitherto received.

Writing in Foreign Affairs (January, 1963), Mr. Christian Herter, the US Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, argued that, within the NATO structure, the NATO Parliamentarians “should be given additional functions” (perhaps enlarged to include OECD); that there should be a NATO Court of Justice; and a “permanent High Council at the highest political level, to concert and plan, and in agreed cases to decide policy on matters of concern to the community as a whole”. Some of these far-reaching proposals may run a little ahead of the pragmatic scheme of the present game. More recently he has claimed that the creation of a true Atlantic Community within this next decade is a realistic and attainable goal. Both the proposal for routine Summit meetings, mentioned by Mr. Harold Wilson on his visit to Moscow, and the suggestion that major issues of strategy, where all the members of the Alliance are involved, should be settled on a basis of unanimity by a multinational council of three or four, are compatible with this.

Mr. Herter's immediate recommendation was that “the governments of the NATO nations be asked to appoint at the earliest practical moment a special governmental commission charged with the responsibility of drawing up plans for the creation of a true Atlantic Community”. The problems of associate membership of such a community are difficult ones because certain proud and influential countries would not want to be left completely outside (Japan, a member of OECD, is an example), yet associate membership might seem to relegate them to the second rank. In a Commonwealth of the Free World it is certainly to be hoped that India would be included. These issues cannot be settled prematurely; but what does matter is to end the weakening dissensions within the alliance. As Churchill said, it is “the gradual assumption by all the nations concerned of that larger sovereignty, which can alone protect those diverse and distinctive customs and characteristics and their national traditions”. International interdependence becomes the condition and context of national independence.
4. Conclusion

At his Press Conference on November 30th, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson said: “The ultimate essentials of the defence of the Atlantic Community are the firmness and the mutual trust of the United States and Europe. The United States position I should make abundantly clear. The safety of the United States depends upon the freedom of Europe, and the freedom of Europe depends upon the strength and will of the United States. That strength and will have never been clearer, have never been more necessary than today. The United States is committed to the increasing strength and the co-operation of the Atlantic Community in every field of action—economic, commercial and monetary. There are no problems which we cannot solve together, and there are very few which any can solve for himself. The United States sees no safe fortune for ourselves and none for any other Atlantic nation in a policy of narrow national self-interest. One of the great aspirations within the Atlantic Community is the aspiration towards growing unity among the free peoples of Europe. No nation on either side of the Atlantic has done more to support this purpose than the United States. This support will continue.”

Great statesmanship consists in vision of the future, judgement, and insight into the nature and past history of a people. That policy best fits a country which is consonant with its national tradition, in the case of Britain a liberal tradition. Support of international organisations should lead logically on to support for some kind of World Authority. If and when some effective basis of co-operation can be reached with the Soviet Union, this will become practical politics, and we must not be diverted from this as our ultimate intention.

One of the greatest features of British statesmanship has been the ability to enlarge a particular national policy into one with a wider scope and a more international appeal. Thus the Empire concept turned into the Commonwealth idea. Thus, too, Britain has adjusted herself to the rise to major world power of the greatest of her ex-colonies, the United States, an adjustment which goes back to the days when the Monroe Doctrine was made effective by the strength of the Royal Navy. This Anglo-American co-operation has had striking results, not least since the war, in the establishment of NATO, in some considerable measure on British initiative, and in the co-operation between Marshall and Bevin, which led to OEEC and the recovery of Western Europe.

The line of evolution is clear. It must be integral partnership and organic union. For Britain, constructive statesmanship lies in full co-operation in building up an Atlantic Community as a prototype of a new Commonwealth of the Free World, to guarantee world peace, by common negotiation with the Soviet Union, within and through the United Nations,
“making the world safe for diversity”, as President Kennedy put it. This is a policy of such magnitude as to provide us with a sense of purpose and is well worthy of the challenge of our day. In the words of Emerson, we must be found “with strength still equal to the time”.

4. Conclusion

A press conference on November 29th, 1902, President Lincoln...
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