After the Cold War
Building on the alliances

Mike Gapes
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Introduction 1

1 A European Germany or a German Europe? 3

2 Superpower perspectives 7

3 Building on the alliances 11

4 NATO + WTO = ESO 18

5 Implications for Britain 23

Annex 26

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Introduction

The revolutionary political events of the last year have been so fast that specialists, pressure groups, political parties and governments have hardly been able to keep up, let alone provide coherent prescriptions for the future.

It is now becoming clear that as the stone of oppressive Leninist orthodoxy was lifted from the peoples of what we now call Eastern and Central Europe, not all that emerged was positive or pleasant. Indeed some very nasty historic animosities and feuds have now crawled out into the light of day.

Many people fear the consequences of the removal of the old bi-polar certainties as the problems caused by the systemic failure of the bureaucratic one party state are recognised. It is more and more apparent that the ending of the Cold War presents dangers as well as opportunities.

The division of Europe into two hostile military and economic camps which came about at the end of the Second World War served to ensure for a considerable period of time that there were no wars between the two military blocs. Pax America and Pax Sovietica ensured stability in Central Europe. Not all aspects of that stability were negative. Pluralism and freedom today are very welcome, but open ethnic conflict and religious fanaticism are not. There are potentially explosive situations in Romania, in Yugoslavia, and between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania. There are potential mass refugee movements of hundreds of thousands from East to West if there is complete economic collapse in Poland or the Soviet Union, and rising inter-ethnic conflicts in the USSR. These issues will affect the context in which the security and defence debate is conducted.

There is a danger that the Balkanisation of the former communist system will bring not western style pluralistic democracy but demagogic populism, racism and anti-semitism. It is already very difficult for any party of the left as we understand it in our part of Europe, or which espouses traditional social democratic values or collectivist
approaches, to get much of a hearing in Hungary. And in Poland Lech Walesa is using the term ‘socialist’ as a term of abuse against his internal opponents within the Solidarity movement.

How are Eastern and Central Europe to be prevented from reverting to what could be called old style balance of power rivalries? How are ethnic conflict and religious fanaticism to be contained? More specifically, in the sphere of defence and security policy, can the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) continue to exist in the ‘political’ role it gave itself at its most recent summit? Should NATO still have a military role, or any role whatsoever if there is no longer a militarily threatening WTO? How is the Soviet Union, with all its problems, to be reassured about German unity? How can the Europeans best influence the USA, which despite all the changes in Europe and its own economic difficulties, will remain the pre-eminent world power, militarily, politically and economically, for the foreseeable future? Should the European Community develop its own defence role?

There is much talk today of a ‘Common European Home’ — a phrase first used by Mikhail Gorbachev. It is an attractive notion. But what is the ‘architecture’ of our common home to be? Ours is a house of many different rooms with different colour wallpaper, and different furniture. We would like to live together but we want to keep separate rooms. We will need to develop new and better mechanisms for resolving internal disputes both within our families and with our neighbours living in the room next door.
A European Germany or a German Europe?

The division of Germany into two separate states was the key to the post war political system which lasted until the end of 1989.

Today Germany is already one country economically, with one currency. On October 3 it will become one country politically, and all German elections will be held on December 2. The pace of events since the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9 1989 has been much faster than most outside and many within Germany would have wanted. Instead of measured progress, there has been what at times has seemed like an economically driven gadarene rush to unity. This has been assiduously and ruthlessly exploited for his own domestic political reasons by the Christian Democrat Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl.

There was little anyone outside could do to stop this process as economic power and mass psychology (economic refugees voting with their feet) swept aside political concerns and existing European structures. Now we have to come to terms with this new reality and make a fundamental readjustment to it, something which members of the Nicholas Ridley school of political sophistication are clearly unable and unwilling to do.

The 'German question' is a matter of interest to many in Europe. For the past forty years there have been two Germanies, one in NATO and the other in the Warsaw Pact. A third German speaking state — Austria — is neutral by international agreement following the voluntary Soviet withdrawal from its territory in 1955. There is also a German speaking part of the Confederation that is Switzerland and there are large ethnic German minorities in Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Soviet Union. Many of them are now migrating 'home' to a country they have never seen and whose language they may not even speak. Juridically, the four victor powers Britain, France, the USA and the USSR, still jointly administer Berlin, and their troops will still be in the city after unification.
There is no reason to change the long term view that the German question cannot be solved except as part of a wider all European settlement taking account of the security interests of all the neighbouring states and of the members of the two military alliances — NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Ideally, no solution to the question ought to be have been reached without taking fully into account wider concerns and wider political realities. But the reality is that there will be a united Germany before such concerns have been fully resolved. Some issues such as the united Germany’s membership of the European Community and NATO will be settled this year. So should the question of permanency of the Western borders of Poland. But other issues, particularly relating to security and defence legacies of the Cold War, may take several years to conclude.

A neutral Germany?

No major political party in the Federal Republic of Germany is calling for a neutral Germany, not even the Greens. On the contrary all political parties want Germany tied into wider European security structures, although they do differ over the form and shape of those structures.

The German left does not want to reopen a nationalistic debate. Rather they agree with the Liberal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s call for ‘a European Germany rather than a German Europe’. They see the European Community and NATO as integrating a united Germany into a wider framework.

Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the East and France and the Benelux countries in the West also do not want a neutral Germany. They want Germany tied down, kept in, integrated. Only those far away from Germany’s direct borders or those who fail to understand European history seem to want to emphasise nationalism and neutralism.

Neutrality or non-alignment is not necessarily synonymous with disarmament or pacifist intentions. The experience of France in the 1960’s should be a salutary warning to all those who now advocate neutralism or dis-integration in European defence and security policies. French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1967 did not assist the process of nuclear or conventional disarmament. Instead NATO headquarters were relocated to Belgium and weapons systems were redeployed to Britain and Germany, whilst in France itself nationalist ‘nuclearphilia’ — love of nuclear weapons — became the dominant factor in defence and foreign policy debates.
and eventually led a decade later to movement by both the socialist and communist parties into the pro-nuclear national consensus. The fact that France did not have a mass peace movement in the 1980s was largely due to its unique position in NATO and the European defence debate.

**Polish views**

Poland sees itself as the meat in a sandwich, potentially squeezed by two powerful neighbours, Germany and the Soviet Union. The current communist President, General Jaruzelski, told a visiting Socialist International delegation in November 1989, four days after the opening of the Berlin Wall: 'winds blow from the east and winds blow from the west and Poland suffers'.

From 1795 to 1918 Poland ceased to exist as an independent country following its partition between Austria, Prussia and Russia. Its regained independence was crushed by Stalin and Hitler in 1939 and only restored on more westerly borders in 1945 after the four powers gave up territory to the USSR in the East (including Vilnius, the current capital of Lithuania) and took territory including Gdansk (Danzig) and parts of Prussia from the former Third Reich in the west.

The Polish government is strongly against a neutral Germany because it could lead to uncertainty about the policies of the unified Germany in the future. This view is shared by Poles of all political backgrounds. To give one example, a leader in the Solidarity daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* on 17 February 1990 said: ‘We don’t want a neutral Germany because a great power in the middle of Europe cannot possibly behave indifferently’. Three days earlier, the same newspaper had argued for the retention of Soviet troops in Poland and East Germany because as long as they remain Europe will have an interest in setting up a new system of European security.

**Germany in NATO**

The agreement reached in Stavropol on July 16 1990 by Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev accepted that a united Germany could be politically a member of NATO, but stipulated that the armed forces of the new state would be limited to 370,000 (less than current FRG force levels alone) and that no NATO forces or nuclear weapons would be deployed on GDR territory.

This agreement was remarkable in two respects. In the first place because Gorbachev moved so far from his previous positions, and
secondly because Kohl decided to do this on a bilateral basis without any pretence of previous agreement by the allies in NATO or the ‘2 plus 4’ group of the two German states and the wartime victors. The USA, France and Britain were therefore faced with a fait accompli. This strengthens the argument for the need to get a united Germany integrated fully into European institutions, and indicates the diametric opposite of the Nicholas Ridley thesis: the EC could be a useful ‘conspiracy’ to stop German economic and political power being used unilaterally against the interests of Britain and other West European countries.

But there is no need to fear a united Germany. The Germany of today is a pluralistic, democratic society with many features to be admired in its political and social life. Indeed Britain could benefit greatly if the decentralised regional and local government system and industrial relations model introduced by Britain and the other allies after the Second World War were to be applied here. Moreover it has been a long standing aspiration of the British Labour movement to secure a united Germany. To give but one important example: the 1958 Annual Conference adopted the ‘Declaration on Disengagement in Europe’ which called for ‘German re-unification within a framework to be agreed and guaranteed by the four powers (Britain, France, USA and USSR), including free elections, leaving the ways and means to be settled by the Germans themselves.’
Superpower perspectives

Both the Soviet Union and the United States will retain a military presence in Europe, to meet not only their own security concerns but also those of (other) European countries.

The internal economic and political situation in the Soviet Union is now extremely serious. The countries of Western Europe and the new pluralistic governments and emerging democracies of Eastern and Central Europe have a common interest in the survival of Gorbachev and the success of perestroika.

Nothing should be done in the defence and security fields to undermine his already precarious position. President Gorbachev has argued that ‘the world has become an integral whole in a setting of diversity and contradictions’. Gorbachev clearly hopes that ‘perestroika with all its international effects is eliminating fear of a Soviet threat, with militarism losing its political vindication’.

His various disarmament proposals of the last five years and the asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces in Europe which are currently being implemented or negotiated show the seriousness of the Soviet intention to halt the arms race. Cutting their massive military budget is seen as essential to freeing resources for domestic reconstruction.

Democratic changes within Eastern and Central Europe and the Soviet Union are largely domestically driven. However, the West can and must help. The best assistance the West could give would be increased economic and political co-operation from the European Community, the individual countries of Western Europe, and the industrialised nations as a whole, to assist the processes of economic reform and the development of a pluralistic market-based economy. A major programme of economic assistance, on the scale of the 1945 Marshall Aid Plan from the USA to Western Europe, is clearly needed but with special emphasis on technical, educational, marketing, distribution and other forms of trading advice, which can help minimise the dangers of economic collapse and political instability.
The reunification of Germany was initially ruled out by the Soviet Union and then accepted in the face of inevitable processes after the GDR elections gave victory to Chancellor Kohl’s Christian Democratic allies. Gorbachev was originally adamant in support of longstanding Soviet policy that ‘there can be no ambiguity about the inviolability of frontiers in Europe’. But later, despite considerable reservations in Soviet society and especially in the Soviet military, the USSR has come to accept the inevitability of fast German unification. It has also had to accept that the Germans will decide by self determination to unite politically in NATO. Anyone who saw the mass ranks of the stony-faced military sitting at the Congress of the Russian Communist party in June must recognise how difficult this process is for Gorbachev. Some in the Soviet military are saying privately and a few even publicly ‘Stalin beat the Germans and divided them and gave us security, but Gorbachev is giving it away’.

**Soviet forces in Eastern Europe**

The Warsaw Treaty Organisation now has a majority of non-communist, or more accurately, anti-communist, member governments. It has in practice ceased to exist as a credible military organisation. But it is not dead yet. Its new so-called ‘political/military’ role is being continued. It is argued that this is little more than fig leaf — a face saving device for the Soviet Union as it withdraws militarily and politically from Eastern Europe. Although this may be true, the WTO could continue to exist in that role for many years.

Although large reductions in Soviet forces are occurring there is no imminent prospect of complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. The US and Soviet preliminary agreement in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations will permit an overall ceiling of 195,000 Soviet forces to remain in Eastern Europe. In practice, with the planned complete withdrawal from Czechoslovakia and Hungary in the next year, and other reductions, this permitted figure is soon likely to be higher than the reality on the ground. A follow-on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE2) negotiation is likely to codify even larger cuts in both US and Soviet force presence than those currently envisaged.

The current 380,000 Soviet troops in the GDR will be drastically reduced and withdrawn over the next few years. But there will be Soviet troops on the former GDR territory within a united Germany for three or four years. And remarkably, the Solidarity led government in Poland has said it is quite happy for Soviet troops to remain there.
during this process of transition. It has not called for their withdrawal. In fact it is in Poland that there are probably the greatest concerns about the unification of Germany, as the furore early this year over Chancellor Kohl’s original failure to give unequivocal guarantees of the German-Polish border indicated.

Soviet troops will therefore remain in Germany and Poland for several years, to meet not merely Soviet concerns, but also those of Germany’s neighbours.

Europe and the USA

The United States is the only global economic, military and political superpower. It has economic, military and political interests throughout the world.

The economic power of the US is declining in relative terms but despite the dangers of what Paul Kennedy calls ‘imperial over-reach’ (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 1988), the USA will remain for many years the pre-eminent military power. Indeed the new American military strategy appears to envisage a policy of ‘global reach — global power’ and an ability to hit, hard and quickly anywhere on the planet.

The most important US commitments today are in Europe, although the new ‘National Security Strategy of the United States,’ published in March 1990, envisages a growing importance for the Pacific and the Gulf. Despite the Gulf crisis, NATO remains the most important military alliance in the world. The Bush administration has said that it wishes to be involved for the foreseeable future in a continuing alliance with the countries of Western Europe, and for NATO to continue to exist.

In the past Western Europeans wanted a US presence on the European mainland to offset the perceived overwhelming Soviet superiority. In future this may be less important but the Soviet Union will remain by far the largest military power on the European land mass. So for a number of years US forces will, in smaller numbers, remain on German territory and British and French forces will also retain a small presence there.

As former US disarmament negotiator Jonathan Dean has written: ‘Without membership of a united Germany in NATO and some deployment of American forces on German territory, it is doubtful that the United States could maintain a militarily significant troop presence in Europe or that NATO itself could be a militarily significant factor to counterbalance Soviet military power. (Components of a Post-Cold War Security System for Europe’ 1990)
Trade disputes between the European Community and the USA could get far worse after 1992 and economic pressures from US steel producers and agricultural interests could combine with resentment in the US at ‘wealthy’ Europeans allegedly not pulling their weight on defence burden sharing. This would fuel existing pressures from Republican right wingers and left wing Democrats in Congress for unilateral US troop withdrawals from Europe or a treaty to limit the size of the US military presence in Europe. Nevertheless even if Senator Nunn’s more radical proposals are agreed, there will still be some 70,000-100,000 US forces on the European continent.

For Western European governments of all political hues, US forces in Western Europe will be needed as a source of stability and reassurance for as long as the Soviet Union keeps its forces in the countries of Eastern Europe. Given the size of the Soviet Union and its position as both a European and an Asian power, some would probably want at least a small US presence as a political symbol even if the Soviet Army withdrew to behind its own frontiers.

Similarly in Eastern and Central Europe there are few voices calling for immediate US withdrawal from Europe. As the Polish Foreign Minister Krystof Skubiszewski argues: ‘The Polish approach to politics is that of change-in stability...The United States’ involvement has proved to be of a stabilising nature, and that role may increase with the unification of Germany... We should all make an effort to turn the presence of the two superpowers in Europe into a factor that supports and reinforces European security.’

It is not in the interests of Europe — East or West — to develop either a populist, nationalist anti-Americanism or anti-Sovietism. We have a wider responsibility to work for world nuclear disarmament, common security between East and West and a stronger role for the United Nations. There is nothing disreputable about asserting the internationalist case for left-wing Euro-Atlanticism as a means to achieve these ends.
Building on the alliances

For many years the Labour party and many other people in Britain and elsewhere, socialists and non-socialists alike, have called for the creation of new forms of international organisations and a new internationalist politics.

The Labour Party called in 1984 for 'the establishment of a new security system in Europe and the mutual and concurrent phasing out of NATO and the Warsaw Pact' (Defence and Security for Britain, National Executive Committee Statement to Annual Conference, The Labour Party 1984.)

But until the mutual dissolution of both blocs, Labour has always been firmly committed to NATO. As the Party stated explicitly in the Manifesto for the 1987 General Election: 'Labour's defence policy is based squarely and firmly on Britain's membership of NATO. We are determined to make the most useful possible contribution to the alliance.' (Britain Will Win, The Labour Party Election Manifesto 1987.)

The reasons for Labour's firm commitment to continuing membership of NATO were threefold. First because of historical experience. As the 1987 Manifesto pointed out, it was a Labour Government which helped to establish the North Atlantic Alliance. No Labour Party Conference, even in the most strongly anti-nuclear years of the 1960's or the 1980's, ever voted for Labour to adopt a policy of British withdrawal from NATO.

Secondly, the arguments the party put for changes in defence policy did not imply a sanguine view of Soviet policy. A 1986 NEC statement to Conference was quite specific. It argued that:

'Central to the choices made by a Labour government on its armed forces will be an appraisal of the potential military threats facing Britain and its NATO allies. The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies may have no intention of attacking Western Europe or NATO; nevertheless...we recognise that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have a large military capability that could pose a potential military threat to Western Europe. Accordingly, it is only prudent that
Britain and its Western European allies should maintain adequate non-nuclear defence forces capable of resisting and deterring such a potential military threat. (Defence Conversion and Costs National Executive Committee Statement to Annual Conference, The Labour Party 1986.)

Thirdly, Labour recognised that Britain could have far more potential influence by using its position within NATO than it could conceivably have in the unlikely eventuality of the British people ever voting into office a government committed to leaving the Western Alliance and attempting to work from the outside.

But in the past no one thought that we would see the Warsaw Treaty Organisation virtually collapse as a military organisation. Instead a process in which the two alliances would transform themselves together into a new security structure simultaneously was envisaged.

A future for NATO

Is this still the right approach in the new circumstances of today, when rather than seeing simultaneous dissolution we see the virtual collapse of one alliance? Should we now simply say, as do some in the peace movement: 'because the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has collapsed we don't need NATO'? Or should we rethink and take the advice of those in Germany and elsewhere who argue that NATO can remain but must change its policies, strategy and structure?

We do not start with a blank piece of paper. The Europe we live in today is not the Europe of 1945 when Nazism was defeated and Germany was divided. It is not 1949 when NATO was established, or 1955 when the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was formally set up. We cannot ignore European history.

Things are changing rapidly in the East and both East and West require mutual stability during this period of transition. Such stability is provided by the continued existence of the two alliances especially as they become more co-operative and more political and less military in character. There are still strong and valid arguments for keeping NATO today until such a time as we are able to create a new all European security structure to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, defined the purpose of NATO as 'to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down'. That was certainly one of its functions in the early Cold War period, when Western Europe faced an overwhelming Soviet military superiority.
Today the circumstances are different but NATO still has a role — to keep the Americans in, the Germans in, and nationalism down. It also has a role in working with the Soviet Union to build new co-operative security structures.

NATO should continue to exist for the foreseeable future, but giving less emphasis to the military and more emphasis to the political aspects of security. A united Germany should (and will) become a full political member of NATO but with clear restrictions and safeguards designed to reassure the Soviet Union.

The London declaration of NATO in July 1990, which formalised the end of the Cold War, invited the Warsaw Pact countries to sign a ‘joint declaration in which we state that we are no longer adversaries’. It also invited them to appoint diplomatic representatives to NATO. Several have already responded positively.

The London Declaration also said ‘As Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defence’. It called inter alia for negotiated ‘elimination of all nuclear artillery shells in Europe’, ‘fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range’, and for ‘a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort’.

This is not yet a policy of ‘No First Use’ but it is in effect ‘no early first use’. For too long NATO has relied on an outdated and incredible strategy of ‘flexible response’ and threatened first use of nuclear weapons against a conventional attack. Far reaching changes within NATO policy and strategy are now both necessary and inevitable.

The European pillar

For many years pressure has grown both from the USA for the Europeans to take on more of the burden of military spending, and from Western Europeans themselves to have a stronger voice within the NATO decision making process.

There are some in the Western Europe on both left and right who are very keen on building a West European military organisation to the detriment or exclusion of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Some see the Western European Union (WEU) as fulfilling this role. The WEU is a relic of the early Cold War years which has, to paraphrase Pirandello, been ‘an organisation in search of a function’.

The WEU recently expanded from its original seven (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) to nine members with the admission of Spain and Portugal. The WEU is the only European defence organi-
sation with a Parliamentary Assembly. It also has a permanent secretariat in Paris and London. All its members are in the European Community. But it does not include Denmark, Greece or Ireland. Norway, Iceland and Turkey are non-EC European NATO countries outside WEU.

Some NATO governments have seen WEU as a way to bring France closer to the European members of NATO’s military structure. It also allows nine EC countries to discuss defence issues without causing problems for the Irish Republic, the only neutral country currently in the EC.

The WEU provided the means by which some European countries were able to send naval forces to the Gulf in 1987, including the Royal Navy’s Armilla Patrol. It has also co-ordinated West European responses to the current Gulf crisis following the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. The WEU is being used as a way to get round the impediment of Article 6 of the NATO treaty which confines NATO to the North Atlantic region north of the Tropic of Cancer. The WEU treaty contains no such geographical limitation.

There was some enthusiasm in parts of the European left when French President Mitterrand and German Foreign Minister Genscher launched an attempt to revitalise WEU in 1984. Some saw WEU as important because it provided a Parliamentary Forum for Europeans to debate defence and disarmament issues without the presence of the USA. It was also seen as a way to develop a stronger European voice or ‘pillar’ within NATO without causing difficulties within the European Community.

However, the adoption of the emphatically pro-nuclear Platform on European Security Interests in 1986 indicated a desire to make membership unacceptable to ‘nuclear sceptics’ such as Greece, Norway and Denmark.

**Fortress Western Europe**

The Western European Union is not the appropriate body on which to base the future of European security because of its narrow membership. Expanding its role and giving it greater importance today would send exactly the wrong signals to other European countries particularly the newly emerging pluralistic democracies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Another possible basis for Western European security arrangements is the European Community itself. Voices as influential as former British Foreign Secretary and NATO Secretary-General, Lord
Carrington, European Commission Vice-President, Sir Leon Brittan and the French Socialist Commission President, Jacques Delors, have called for the EC to take on an explicit defence role. The European Parliament has also passed resolutions supporting such a role. The implicit threat is that those who object will be left behind in a ‘two-speed’ Community.

This is linked to the debate about enlargement and the ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ of the European Community. The current focus of the debate is the attitude to be taken to Austria’s application made in July 1990 for membership of the Community. The admission of neutral countries such as Austria would make it far more difficult to have a Community defence policy. The debate tends to be polarised on national rather than ideological lines, with the majority of EC governments (led by the Germans and Italians) in favour of the Austrian application, and the French and Dutch being implacably opposed.

**Euro-Gaullism**

There is a fundamental choice between two alternative approaches for the future of the European Community. Should it be a wide Community? Or should it be a tight and narrow Community based upon common political, economic and military institutions? These choices could be described as ‘Wider Europe’ or ‘Fortress West Europe’. In military and security terms the debate could be characterised as ‘All-European Security Organisation’ or ‘Euro-Gaullist bloc’.

The Labour Party favours the former. It argues: ‘We want a majority of European countries to belong to the Community, so that it can be a truly European Community’. Labour is therefore opposed to any military role for the European Community. The present British government has, largely because of the peculiarities of its own internal divisions, so far failed to influence this key debate. There is a danger that the growing differences between Western Europe and the USA and exaggerated fears amongst European conservatives of total US withdrawal from Europe could lead to the development of an anti-American (and anti-Soviet) ‘Euro-Gaullism’. This would seriously complicate international relations and make disarmament and arms control negotiations even more difficult. It would also entrench a new bloc division in Europe between the EC on one side, the EFTA and ex-communist states in between, and a beleaguered and resentful Soviet Union on the other side in the East.

The left should rethink and learn from history. We should not encourage either a Europe of competing nationalisms or shifting allian-
ces, with German or British or French or Russian or even American neutrality. Nor should we favour a powerful West European bloc facing an economically weak but still militarily powerful Soviet Union. We need instead a pan-European Security organisation involving all European states and both the USA and the USSR.

CSCE

Ultimately the Helsinki CSCE process may provide the best framework for such a security organisation. Although the development of CSCE in the last fifteen years has been patchy, there have been important substantive achievements, particularly since the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev and 'new political thinking' in the Soviet Union. After the unproductive 14 year long negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the two alliances agreed to hold the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations in Vienna within the framework of CSCE, thereby allowing the group of 12 neutral and non-aligned countries to participate. This followed a watershed agreement on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, signed in 1986 in Stockholm after 33 months of hard negotiations. The agreement brought in a comprehensive system of verification methods, notification of troop movements, and short-notice observation and paved the way to success in the subsequent bilateral nuclear weapons negotiations between the two superpowers.

But today CSCE is not strong enough to replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. CSCE currently has no permanent secretariat or address. It has no staff, no facilities, not even a telephone number. CSCE has to work by total agreement of thirty five states. Every state, including those as small as the Holy See and Liechtenstein, has a veto. So its proceedings have been often cumbersome and difficult.

In 1980, for example, Malta delayed agreement at the Madrid second review conference because it wanted greater emphasis on its view of Mediterranean issues. In 1985 Romania blocked agreement on Cultural Co-operation because of a dispute with Hungary, and last year one of the final acts of the Ceausescu dictatorship was to block a CSCE report on the environment. More generally the meetings were often used in the past for an exchange of Cold War polemics between the USA and USSR.

A large number of proposals have been made to remedy the weakness of CSCE. For example, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Dienstbier, has called for the CSCE to establish a Commission on
Security in Europe as the executive organ of an all-European treaty on collective security.

The 'London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance', adopted by NATO Heads of Government on 6 July 1990, called for CSCE to become 'more prominent in Europe's future' and 'institutionalised' with a small secretariat, a mechanism to monitor elections, a Centre for the Prevention of Conflict, including exchange of military information and conciliation of disputes, and establishment of a parliamentary body, The Assembly of Europe.

It is obviously necessary for the November 1990 CSCE Conference in Paris to take urgent action on all these questions, but such things will take time to set up and institutionalise. Moreover, the NATO proposal does not amount to an all-European Security system. For these reasons and because of the need to secure total unanimity, immediate steps based solely on the Helsinki CSCE framework are likely to be inadequate. It will take several years to implement fully the provisions of any new CSCE treaty. We should not throw away those European Security institutions which we do have until something better can be put in their place.
Until there is an all-European structure, it would be preferable to retain NATO and the Warsaw Pact in their new roles instead of continuing to argue for their mutual dissolution.

Co-operation between the more political NATO and the new political/military remnants of the Warsaw Pact should be developed as the basis for a European Security Organisation (ESO). It could develop, in time, into the European Regional Security body of the United Nations which many envisaged when the UN organisation was established in San Francisco in 1945.

The ESO could ensure that the new politics of Eastern and Central Europe do not revert to old style balance of power rivalries. It could reassure the Soviet Union and the neighbours of Germany that the process of German unity in self determination would not be destabilising or threatening.

The ESO would allow the European Community to concentrate on building economic and political relationships with the neutral, non-aligned and Warsaw Treaty countries of Europe without facing the internal difficulties which would be created by trying also to address the defence issue. At the same time both the new ESO and the expanding EC could be linked to the wider and on-going Helsinki CSCE process.

Membership of the ESO would initially include the current members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, it would also be open to any other CSCE member state which wished to join. In time it is to be hoped that all CSCE states including the strong neutrals such as Sweden, Finland, and even Switzerland would join.

The Soviet Union is partly a European power and its involvement is essential for that reason. But why should the USA and Canada be involved in these European Security arrangements? The USA and Canada are involved very much in Europe today. They are both members of NATO, and key players in the Helsinki CSCE process. Their presence is wanted by all the other participants including the USSR.
Moreover as General Sir Hugh Beach has argued: ‘The reason for pressing on with a pan-European security system which includes the North Americans and the Soviet Union is plain...It is only if all these powers get their act together that we stand any chance of confronting the real issues of the 1990's: drugs, terrorism, disease, a decaying environment, protectionism.’ (The Guardian 23 August 1990).

**Alternative boundaries**

ESO could be the security arm of the ‘Common European Home’. However there are two alternative boundaries for the ESO. Its area of competence could be restricted solely to the European continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the surrounding waters. Alternatively it could include the whole territory of the USSR and the USA and Canada, and therefore be the basis of a wide northern hemisphere security zone extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

By definition the latter is much more than simply a European Security Organisation. But for purposes of verification and confidence building it would be preferable to have this wider scope. It would certainly be easier if the ESO area of competence was contiguous with that of the whole territory of its member states. The ESO might then have a provision similar to Article 5 of the NATO treaty under which ‘the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all’. This would of course have to be extended to cover the whole of Soviet territory.

In either case, in order to reassure neighbouring countries such as China, Japan, and countries in North Africa and the Middle East, the ESO could have a provision similar to NATO’s Article 6 which confines its activities to ‘the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer’. This would provide reassurance that ESO did not aim to be the military arm of the ‘North’ against the ‘South’ or ‘East’. However this would not preclude discussion and consultation within ESO, or co-ordination and concerted action by individual member countries outside Europe.

The ESO could also, like NATO’s Article 7, stipulate that member countries rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations are unaffected by their membership of the ESO. They would therefore be able to contribute individually to UN peace-keeping forces. Members of the ESO would be able to act to deal with ‘out of area’ threats at the request of and under the auspices of the UN and its Security Council. Since four of the five permanent members of the
Security Council would belong to ESO this would undoubtedly facilitate their co-operation on global security issues.

There would be no restriction on individual states choosing to join other regional alliances or organisations. This would allow the Soviet Union to come to some security arrangements with its Asian neighbours, such as China and Japan, and the United States and Canada to continue to be involved in the Organisation of American States. It would permit the continued work of the European Community on economic and other non-military aspects of security. It would allow the new five nation grouping between Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Hungary and Yugoslavia to develop co-operation.

**ESO structure**

How would this ESO work in practice? The initial aim would be to bring the existing military structures and personnel of the two alliances together in an evolutionary co-operation. There would initially be regular exchanges of civilian and military personnel, joint exercises, establishment of a joint verification agency, and shared use of military and observation satellites. In time a joint military structure and a Chief of Staff, equivalent to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) could be established. It would be preferable if both the General Secretary of an ESO Secretariat and the military Chief of Staff were from 'European' countries (ie not American, Canadian or Soviet citizens).

An interim step towards this new structure might be the establishment of joint peace keeping forces which could operate within Europe at the request of national governments, for example if ethnic and nationalist conflicts in Yugoslavia deteriorated even further, or if ethnic tensions between Hungarians and Romanians, or Muslim-Christian conflicts involving Bulgaria and Turkey led to border disputes.

United Nations experience since 1945 shows that the organisation has had only a limited success in 'peace-making' as opposed to 'peace-keeping' activities. It works best when the superpowers act in unison and when the Security Council is able to provide united leadership.

Clearly a regional organisation like ESO could face similar difficulties. However the end of the Cold War means that conflicts in the Balkans or elsewhere are far less likely to be destabilising to relations between the USA and the USSR. Co-operation between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to defuse tensions, provide channels for dialogue, restrict access to armaments and encourage peaceful, demo-
cratic resolution of disputes will be essential components of the new Europe.

Joint multi-national brigades might also be developed, for example between Poles and Germans or Italians and Hungarians, as has been done in recent years between the French and West Germans. It would also encourage co-operation if troops of one country were to be based for a period on the territory of another. This could build on current NATO practices such as British and American exercises in Norway. It would in this way be possible for Soviet troops to serve tours of duty in Western Europe and British and American forces to be stationed in Eastern and Central Europe.

Arms transfer and proliferation

The ESO could become an effective means to co-ordinate and control arms transfers, including sale and transfer of missile components to third world countries. Ending the East-West military confrontation will not secure peace unless the transfer of redundant military equipment to other regions of the world is prevented. US-Soviet agreements, and action by the WEU and EC countries, are useful, but a wider all-European body like ESO would be more effective.

A related issue here is the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation. There are today 50,000 nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the superpowers, with a destructive power of more than a million Hiroshimas, enough to destroy the entire planet many times over. Britain, France and China also each possess several hundred nuclear warheads. South Africa, India, Pakistan and Israel are all thought to have the knowledge and capability to make nuclear devices. There is a growing danger of proliferation to other countries, as the Iraqi super-gun affair demonstrated. We have a long way to go to secure a nuclear weapon free world. No single country is able by its own actions to rid the world of all nuclear weapons. Neither the United Nations or any regional or international agency is today strong enough to achieve the goal of a secure and lasting peace.

We do not inhabit a peaceful planet. Western Europeans are living in an unprecedented time of peace. But today in Africa, Asia, Central America and the Middle East power often comes out of the barrel of a gun rather than from the freely expressed will of the people.

Whilst the United Nations international disarmament processes and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime are extremely important, the ESO could also help the process of negotiated nuclear disarmament both globally and on a regional basis. It would contain
within it four nuclear weapon states, the USA, the USSR, Britain and France. They could work co-operatively to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and transfer of nuclear technologies. The ESO could also assist the continuation of effective international verified nuclear disarmament at the strategic level after START 1 and further removal of remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in Europe after INF and CFE 1.

**Defensive defence**

It has been an enduring central theme of Labour’s policy to ensure the greatest possible de-militarisation in Central and Eastern Europe combined with creation of a wider European security framework including both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The ESO could make a major contribution to ensuring that the next few years sees negotiated removal of all tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, full implementation of defensive military postures and doctrines, associated withdrawal of offensive military capabilities such as tanks and armoured vehicles from particular zones and corridors, and deep cuts in both conventional and nuclear weaponry under effective international verification.

The ESO could build on the ideas first put forward in the Plan of the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in the 1950’s, the more recent efforts by the governments of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark to establish a Nordic nuclear weapon free zone, and the Palme Commission which proposed the establishment of a 150 kilometre wide nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe.
Implications for Britain

As one of only three nuclear weapon states in Europe, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a member of the EC, NATO, the WEU and the Commonwealth, Britain has a special role in international politics.

Unfortunately, the present British government is not fulfilling our potential in any of these areas. It is overly cautious in regard to the future of European security and the potential for negotiated and verified conventional arms reductions. On the contrary, it is actively working against further nuclear arms reductions in Europe. It is unilaterally escalating the size and capabilities of its ‘independent’ nuclear arsenal — by purchasing four Trident submarines and by planning a new nuclear armed cruise missile for the Tornado aircraft. It has also, despite the new political situation and the end of the Cold War, pressed NATO to modernise short range and battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe and introduce the Tactical Air to Surface Missile to compensate for the nuclear weapons being withdrawn under the INF Treaty.

NATO is not a fixed entity. Politics in Europe are not frozen. By intelligently using its position in NATO, and potential role in ESDP, Britain could have considerable influence on the debate in the US Administration and Congress. Outside NATO, Britain would have little impact on either the United States or European opinion: there would be no compensatory gain in terms of increased stability and security.

Disarmament

Britain and its allies should of course maintain adequate defence forces capable of resisting and deterring the much reduced potential military threat. But there is now a real opportunity to move towards non-provocative, non-offensive defence policies on both sides of the former Iron Curtain.
President Gorbachev's disarmament proposals of January 1986 called for abolition of all nuclear weapons in the world in a three stage process to be completed by 2000. This is admittedly a very ambitious timetable. However even if only the second stage were to be fulfilled and the nuclear weapon states moved towards postures of 'minimum nuclear deterrence' it would require all nuclear weapon states to begin to participate in the process following on from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 1) expected to be reached by the USA and USSR later this year. It will require a halt to all nuclear tests and speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. It will require Britain and France to participate in the negotiations aimed at reducing and ultimately getting rid of their nuclear weapons in concert with the superpowers. Britain should join the international nuclear disarmament process.

Leading Soviet strategic specialists have argued that, for both political and military reasons, reductions beyond 75% in US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces 'would be impossible if the other nuclear powers had not by that time participated in the process of nuclear disarmament. Calculations show that in order to maintain a stable strategic balance it is necessary for the other nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear forces approximately proportionately to the reductions of those of the United States and the Soviet Union.' (Andrei Kokoshin, Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1988).

The massive political changes in Eastern and Central Europe open up the real prospect of successful international negotiations which could lead to major reductions in UK military spending. The government should ensure that resources made available by such reductions are used for restructuring our manufacturing base and that the process of defence industry diversification happens as smoothly and beneficially as possible.

**Conclusion**

Despite the current Gulf crisis a fundamental review of defence and security policy is still required. Clearly events in the Gulf need to be taken into account, but it is important to prevent those who are developing 'rent a threat' policies, in the defence industries, the armed forces or on the Tory backbenches from using current events to weaken government resolve and cause an inadequate, overcautious response to the enormous changes in Europe. The end of the Cold War presents great opportunities to rebuild and strengthen Britain's civil manufac-
turing base. It can also, over future years, help finance the vital health and social services and assist the fight against poverty in Britain and the world.

The continuation of the disarmament process in Europe will provide a unique opportunity to rid our continent of the tension which has been present for the whole Cold War period. Those of us born since 1945 have known nothing else. This tension affected every aspect of political and day-to-day life. Its legacy still affects normal diplomatic relations, trade, culture, travel, academic life — even the unity of families — indeed almost the whole range of activities by governments and citizens alike. We now need urgently need to establish a new system of collective security in which all of us, East and West, can live in peace and justice. This means working to consolidate and expand the recent achievements and to strengthen the Helsinki process in all its aspects. It is vital that we create a new security system which will make Europe a continent of lasting peace.
Annex

Existing European Institutions

CSCE

There are 34 countries in Europe, including the Eurasian giant the Soviet Union. 33 of them, along with the United States and Canada, are signatories of the 1975 Helsinki accords of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Albania refused to have anything to do with CSCE, but sent an observer to a meeting in 1990 for the first time.

The CSCE 'Helsinki Process' is organised in three areas or 'baskets': security, economics, (including science and technology and the environment) and human rights. Each basket is addressed in regular meetings. Full Review Conferences are held roughly every five years.

EC

The 1957 Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community deliberately excluded competence for defence or military questions. However, the 1980's saw an increasing concern about 'security' issues within the European Community. Since the adoption of the Single European Act in 1985 the Community countries 'are ready to co-ordinate more closely on the political and economic aspects of security' (Article 30(6a)). Some in the Commission and European Parliament want to go much further and develop an explicit defence role for the Community. This is particularly difficult for Ireland, currently the only neutral country belonging to the European Community.

Separate from, but linked to, this is the question of a common EC Foreign Policy. The European Political Co-operation (EPC) procedure established in 1970 has worked well, giving the Community countries a stronger and more coherent voice in the world on issues such as the Middle East, Central America and Southern Africa. Current discussions about 'Political Union' and the planned Intergovernmental conference at the end of this year are intended to consolidate this process.
EFTA

The six remaining members of the European Free Trade Association: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland are currently engaged in difficult negotiations to create what the EC calls a ‘European Economic Space’ (EES) of 18 countries (EC plus EFTA).

Many states outside the EC are hoping, in time, to get into the inner circle. Apart from Austria’s decision to break ranks with its EFTA partners and apply for full membership of the EC, there is growing support in Norway for another application some twenty years after the last one was accepted by the EC but rejected by the Norwegian population in a referendum. In Sweden the right is moving in favour but the governing Social Democrats are currently opposed, largely because of their strong commitment to Sweden’s 150 year old neutrality policy. They also fear that the EC will drive a particularly hard bargain in the negotiations with EFTA in order to force individual countries to apply for full membership rather than benefitting from the club whilst remaining outside. If Sweden applies Finland could follow. Isolationism is also losing its appeal in neutral Switzerland.

In addition to Austria, three other countries, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta have so far lodged formal applications to join the EC. None are likely to be considered before 1993. The Commission has already said that the Turkish application, made in 1987, was premature, and expressed doubts about the maturity of its economy and the strength of its democracy.

Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have also expressed interest in close association and possible full membership of the EC in the long term. The first two are probably in a better economic position, but neither is likely to be considered until the question of Austrian membership has been resolved.

NATO

Fourteen European countries, plus the USA and Canada, belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation which was established in 1949. West Germany joined in 1955. France left the integrated military command in 1967 but remains a political member of the Alliance. Iceland has no armed forces; it is a member of NATO because of the US military base on its territory. Spain became a member in 1982, but is not fully integrated into NATO’s military structure, in accordance with the conditions set out in the 1986 referendum which confirmed its membership but rejected nuclear weapons on its soil.
Within NATO, an informal ‘Eurogroup’ was established in 1968 by British Defence Secretary Denis Healey, ‘to ensure that the European contribution to the common defence is as strong, cohesive and effective as possible.’ At the Eurogroup, European NATO Defence Ministers exchange views on a ‘flexible and pragmatic’ basis. Meetings are attended by twelve countries (not Iceland or France). They are prepared by an ad hoc committee of NATO Ambassadors in Brussels and the secretariat is provided by one part time member of the British delegation. An Independent European Programme Group also exists, through which the European members of NATO (including France but excluding Iceland) seek greater co-operation in arms procurement and production.

**WEU**

The Western European Union was formed in 1954 on the basis of revision of the old Brussels Treaty Organisation established in 1948 by Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom. The BTO was, in Ernest Bevin’s words, the ‘sprat to catch the mackerel’, since its establishment signalled to the United States Congress a desire by the European allies to create a post-war security structure in Europe which included the USA. NATO was established the following year.

**WTO**

Seven countries, including the USSR, (which is both a European and an Asian power) belong to the Warsaw Pact. The others are Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the soon to disappear German Democratic Republic. Albania left the Warsaw Pact in 1968 after its break with Moscow. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation was formally established in 1955 following West German accession to NATO. However, the Soviet Union had already imposed strict military co-operation agreements, on a bilateral basis, with each of the countries in its ‘sphere of influence’. The WTO was the military instrument of the policies of the Soviet Communist Party — the economic instrument was the wider Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). This has become irrelevant with the rapid moves to integrate Eastern European economies into the world economic system, and the Soviet decision to charge world market prices for its oil and raw materials.
After the Cold War: building on the alliances

The end of the Cold War has brought a welcome increase in pluralism and democracy, but also the return of long suppressed nationalist and ethnic tension. How can a return to conflict and old-style balance of power rivalries be avoided? What should be the architecture of the Common European Home?

Mike Gapes, Senior International Officer at the Labour Party (writing in a personal capacity) argues that:

- Security arrangements which concentrated exclusively on Western Europe would lead to a resentful and potentially hostile Soviet Union in the East

- A defence role for the European Community, as advocated by Commission President Jacques Delors, would complicate the task of political and economic integration, and block the expansion of the Community

- Continuing US involvement is necessary to re-assure governments in west, central and east Europe

- Co-operation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be built up into a European Security Organisation (ESO). This could co-ordinate regular exchanges of military and civilian personnel, and run a joint verification agency

- The ESO could act as the Regional Security body of the UN, providing peace keeping forces where necessary, and controlling arms transfers

He argues that, in the long run, the CSCE may develop into a pan-European security structure, but that in the interim the best way to maintain peace and stability is to build on the old alliances.

The Fabian Society brings together those who wish to relate democratic socialism to practical plans for building a better society in a changing world. It is affiliated to the Labour Party, and anyone who is eligible for membership of the Labour Party can join; others may become associate members. For details of Fabian membership, publications and activities, write to: Simon Crine, General Secretary, Fabian Society, 11 Dartmouth St, London SW1H 9BN.